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A   REVIEW   OF   THE   HISTORY 
OF  INFANTRY 


A  REVIEW  OF 

THE  HISTORY  OF 
INFANTRY 


E.  M.  LLOYD, 


COLONEL,  LATE  ROYAL  ENGINEERS, 

AUTHOR    OK 
kAUBAN,   MONTALEMBERT,   CARNOT :    ENGINEER  STUDIES." 


LONGMANS,    GREEN,    AND    CO. 

39    PATERNOSTER    ROW,    LONDON 

NEW  YORK,  BOMBAY,  AND  CALCUTTA 

1908 

All  rights  reserved 


PREFACE 


In  a  boat-race  each  man  of  a  crew  must  do  his  best  and 
all  must  pull  together.  So  in  war:  individual  efficiency 
nmst  go  along  with  united  action.  Lord  Wolseley  has 
said  in  praise  of  drill  that  "it  not  only  trains  the  body, 
but  it  disciplines  the  nund  at  the  same  time.  It  teaches 
men  the  first  rudiments  of  obedience  ;  and  if  I  were  asked 
what  is  the  greatest  of  all  military  virtues,  a  virtue  even 
higher  than  courage,  I  should  reply  it  was  absolute  un- 
questioning obedience."  ^  On  the  other  hand,  Lord  Roberts 
has  pointed  out  that  "the  backbone  of  a  thorough 
military  training  is  the  careful  and  gradual  instruction 
of  the  individual,  officer  or  soldier,  in  every  duty  he  may 
be  called  on  to  fulfil,  and  the  development  to  the  utmost 
of  his  mental  and  physical  powers.  But  such  develop- 
ment is  impossible  unless  free  play  is  given  to  individual 
intelligence  and  initiative."  ^ 

These  doctrines  are  not  contrary  to  one  another,  but 
supplementary;  they  are  the  two  halves  of  the  truth. 
Sometimes  the  one  needs  emphasising,  sometimes  the 
other.  As  Dragomirov  says :  "  In  order  to  carry  out 
military  duties  we  require  punctuality  and  promptitude 
in  the  execution  of  orders,  based  upon  a  boundless 
devotion,  and   sustained   by   the   active  working   of  the 

1  R.U.fi.F.  Journal,  189.5,  p.  .50. 

»  Preface  to  Infantry  Training  (1902). 


2H>^:\'yo 


vi  PREFACE 

intelligence."  i  It  is  one  object  of  drill  to  make  certain 
motions  become  second  nature  to  the  soldier,  so  that 
he  will  execute  them  instinctively  in  the  excitement  of 
action.  But,  in  these  days  especially,  he  must  be  some- 
thing more  than  a  machine.  He  must  learn  to  combine 
reason  with  instinct,  self-reliance  with  self-surrender. 

In  Herbert  Spencer's  Sociology  the  militant  type  is 
treated  as  the  forerunner  of  the  industrial  type,  not  as  its 
companion  and  counterpoise.  It  is  admitted  to  have 
played  a  useful  part  in  the  evolution  of  society,  by 
welding  tribes  into  nations,  and  training  men  for  voluntary 
co-operation ;  but  its  work  is  done  and  it  is  doomed  to 
disappear.  If  so,  the  more  progressive  peoples,  being 
the  first  to  lose  their  militant  characteristics,  are  bound 
to  fall  a  prey  to  the  less  progressive.  But  history 
shows  that  success  in  war  has  been  due  quite  as  much 
to  industrial  traits — individual  energy  and  enterprise,  as 
to  militaiit  traits — subordination  and  cohesion.  Indus- 
triahsm  not  only  supplies  the  sinews  of  war,  improved 
weapons,  and  accessories  of  all  kinds;  it  demands  and 
develops  characteristics  which  are  indispensable  to  the 
soldier.  Nation  after  nation  has  gained  predominance 
by  one  kind  of  excellence,  and  lost  it  by  want  of  the 
other  kind.  For  continuous  success  the  two  must  go 
hand  in  hand.  In  short,  for  war  as  for  peace,  in- 
dividualism and  collectivism  must  be  harmonised. 

A  distinguished  officer  has  declared  his  conviction 
"that  up-to-date  civilisation  is  becoming  less  and  less 
capable  of  conforming  to  the  antique  standards  of 
military  virtue,  and  that  the  hour  is  at  hand  when  the 
modern  world  must  begin  to  modify  its  ideals,  or  prepare 
to  go  down  before  some  more  natural,  less  complex,  and 
less   nervous   type.    .    .    .    City-bred    dollar-hunters   are 

•  R.U.S.I.  Journal,  1887,  p.  973. 


PREFACE  vii 

becoming  less  and  less  capable  of  coping  with  such 
adversaries  as  Deerslayor  and  his  clan."  •  True  enough : 
but  after  all  Deerslayer  was  a  product  of  civilisation, 
and  was  on  the  whole  a  better  Kghthig  man  than 
Chingachgook. 

'  A  Staff-Officer's  Scrap-book,  vol.  i.  p.  5. 


't 


"Ne  lisez  pas  I'histoire  pour  apprendre 
I'histoire,  mats  pour  apprendre  la  guerre,  la 
morale  et  la  politique" — Belleisle. 


CONTENTS 


I.   THE   GREEKS 

PASS 

Persians  and  Greeks— The  Spartan  hoplite — The  Athenians  :  Mara- 
thon and  Plataea— The  Peloponnesian  war — Professional  soldiers : 
Xenophon  and  Iphicrates  —  The  Thebans:  Epamlnondas  — 
Philip  of  Macedon — Alexander  in  Asia :  combined  tactics— The 
successors  of  Alexander 1 


II.   THE   ROMANS 

Latin  characteristics :  the  legion—  Manipular  tactics  :  sword  and 
pilum — Romans  and  Greeks  :  Pyrrhus — Romans  and  Cartha- 
ginians :  Hannibal  —  The  conquest  of  Greece :  legion  and 
phalanx— Professional  soldiers:  Marius— The  legionary  under 
Caesar — The  reforms  of  Augustus- The  later  empire :  frontier 
defence  


III.   THE   MIDDLE   AGES 

The  Franks  :  beginnings  of  feudalism — Charlemagne  and  his  succes- 
sors—Mercenaries :  the  Crusades— Burgher  militia — Feudalism 
in  England — The  armies  of  Edward  III. — The  archer  and  the 
dismounted  man-at-arms — Crccy  and  Poitiers — Agincourt  :  de- 
fensive tactics — The  free  companies,  and  the  beginning  of 
standing  armies:  Charles  VII.— The  Swiss — The  downfall  of 
Charles  the  Rash 


IV.   THE   SIXTEENTH    CENTURY 

Growth  of  standing  armies — Swiss  and  German  mercenaries — 
French,  Italian,  and  Spanish  foot — "  The  great  captain  "  in 
Italy— Influence  of  artillery  and  small  arms — Harquebus  'and 
musket — The  Spanish  discipline — The  failure  of  Spain — Organ- 
isation and  tactics  of  infantry — The  Dutch  order :   Nieuport — 

English  infantry :  disuse  of  the  bow 

ix  J 


CONTENTS 
V    THE   SEVENTEENTH   CENTURY 

Gustavus  Adolphus-The  fewe  „a,_Fvench  infantry  under 

r ;J "irrJu/ois-Defensive  -Ji--— Monte-     ^^^ 
cucooli-The  Turks-Luxemburg  and  Catinat     . 

VI.  THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY  :   1. 

supersession  of  t.e  nratcMock  >^^  ^^^^^^tgtln  r^tt T-M^. 
%iUebytUebayonet-Conseque  ^^^^^^^^^  ^^^^  ^^  ^^,„  , 

S^lS^a^Eoy^^Higbia^-- 

deductions  from  them  .         •        ■         • 

VII.  THE   EIGHTEENTH   CENTURY:   II. 

The  seven  Years'  ^^-^-T^^J^  ^'i:ZC^ 
The  British  at  ^^"^ff^-f^'^J^S  tactics-French  advocates 
rtrcrriSeCarcrrricanlnaependence-Thetwo-    ^^^ 

deep  line         - 

VIII.  THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION  (1792-1815) 

„  ;„   i7Q2_The  volunteers:   Valmy— Du- 

State  of  the  French  f™?  \°  ^!^;^,l_The  campaign  of  1793-The 

n^ourie.  invades  the  ^^t^^f  "^^J.^.e,  „£  the  failure  of  the 

amalgamation:  campaign  °"';*      .    tio^_Bonaparte  in  Italy 

,Uies-Bepublican  tactics  and     g^^^^^^^^ 

-Changes  made  ^^J  ^^'"^  •/"'^' f ''   .,h  columns-French  and 
and  Auerstedt-lncreased  --  "J  *  ^^^^^J  sab-gal-British  light 
English  in  the  ?— IV^sX  and  the  Ir  of  liberation- 
infantry— The  invasion  of  Russia  ana  .         .     18 
Ligny  and  Waterloo       .••■•■ 

IX.  THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY:   I.  (1816-1866) 

Xnfantry  formations  after  ^-^^^^ -l7^-"rbe::tS::-The 
fm-cinirarTrwa?^-:  the  breechloader      .         •     . 


CONTENTS 


X.   THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY  :    II.  (1867-1900) 

PAG 

The  Franco-German  war— The  Russo-Turkish  war— Tactical  deduc- 
tions and  discussions— Magazine  rifles  and  quick-firing  guns— 
The  war  in  South  Africa — The  Russo-Japanese  war     .  .     2£ 


TiTLKS  OF  Works  referked  to  in  the  Footnotes             .    291 
INDEX 297 


A  REVIEW  OF  THE  HISTORY 
OF   INFANTRY 


THE   GREEKS 

Herodotus  tells  us  that  when  Greek  met  Persian  at 
Platsea,  "in  courage  and  in  strength  the  Persians  were 
not  inferior,  but  they  were  without  armour,  and  moreover 
they  were  unversed  in  war  and  unequal  to  their  opponents 
in  skill."  1  It  seems  strange  that  this  should  be  said  of 
the  picked  troops  of  a  wealthy  empire  which  had  con- 
quered all  its  neighbours,  and  was  now  dealing  with  the 
burghers  of  some  small  city-states.  But  it  is  explained 
by  the  history  of  the  two  races  and  the  character  of 
their  respective  countries. 

Medes  and  Persians  were  highlanders,  bred  in  the 
mountain  ranges  which  run  south  from  Ararat.  The 
bow  was  their  native  weapon.  As  children  they  were 
taught  to  ride,  to  shoot,  and  to  speak  the  truth.  Horses 
were  at  one  time  rare  among  them,  but  (if  we  may  believe 
Xenophon  -)  Cyrus  taught  his  mountaineers  to  look  upon 
it  as  discreditable  for  any  man  who  had  a  horse  to  go  on 
foot.  In  the  open  plains  of  Mesopotamia  he  had  found 
that  he  must  have  cavalry  to  reap  the  fruits  of  victory ; 
but  infantry  never  reaches  a  high  standard  where  foot 
service  is  despised. 

'  Herodotus,  ix.  62.  "  Cyropmkia,  iv.  8. 


^■■■•..•■■■;;  -THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

Horse  and  foot  alike  relied  chiefly  on  missiles.  The 
frieze  of  Darius'  palace  at  Susa  shows  us  the  men  of 
his  footguards,  armed  with  a  seven-foot  spear  and  a  bow 
of  half  that  length,  with  felt  caps  or  turbans,  and  long 
tunics  with  loose-hanging  sleeves.  Large  quivers  are  on 
their  backs.  Herodotus  says  that  they  had  a  sort  of 
scale  armour  and  shields  of  wicker-work,  and  a  dagger 
hung  from  the  girdle  on  the  right.i 

Such  men  were  ill-fitted  for  hand-to-hand  encounter 
with  the  Greek  hoplites.  In  Greece,  and  especially  in 
Peloponnesus,  the  conditions  were  singularly  favourable 
for  the  production  of  good  infantry,  well  trained  and 
well  equipped.  It  was  "a  land  of  hills  in  the  midst  of 
the  sea."  Its  mountains  cut  it  up  into  cantons,  and 
hindered  the  growth  of  any  widespread  despotism.  Its 
valleys  were  too  narrow  to  give  much  scope  for  cavalry. 
Its  soil  demanded  labour,  but  not  incessant  labour;  and 
its  bracing  yet  genial  climate  encouraged  an  active  out- 
door life.  The  people  had  the  hardiness  and  indepen- 
dence of  mountaineers,  while  the  neighbourhood  of  the 
sea  saved  them  from  the  rudeness  and  poverty  of 
mountaineers.  They  borrowed  their  weapons  and  armour 
and  learnt  skill  in  metal-work  from  trading  peoples, 
Carians  and  Phcenicians.  Their  warlike  aptitude  was 
developed  by  an  incessant  struggle  for  existence. 

This  was  especially  the  case  with  the  Spartans.  "Few 
against  many,"  they  had  conquered  the  valley  of  the 
Eurotas,  and  to  maintain  themselves  against  their  subject 
races  they  needed  every  man  they  could  muster,  and  the 
best  organisation  and  training.  The  features  of  the 
military  spirit — fortitude,  obedience,  conservatism,  super- 
stition, imperiousness  and  contempt  for  the  weak- 
characterised  the  Dorian  race  as  a  whole,  and  were  most 

'  Herodotus,  vii.  CI, 


THE   GREEKS  3 

fully  developed  in  Laced;emon.  Sparta  was  a  camp  rather 
than  a  city,  and  every  man  of  military  age  was  said  to  be 
on  guard.  Not  blending  with  the  former  inhabitants,  the 
Spartans  drew  their  fixed  share  of  the  produce  of  the 
land  as  a  tribute  from  the  Helots,  and  devoted  them- 
selves to  military  training  as  a  soldier  caste.  From  the 
age  of  seven  the  young  Spartan  was  practised  in  athletic 
exercises.  At  eighteen  he  received  his  arms,  and  was 
instructed  in  the  use  of  them.  At  twenty  he  took  his 
place  in  the  ranks,  and  not  till  ten  years  later  was  he 
reckoned  a  fully  trained  soldier,  and  allowed  to  marry. 

The  whole  strength  of  a  Spartan  army  lay  in  its  heavy- 
armed  infantry  (hoplites).  It  was  left  to  Helots  to  serve 
as  light  infantry,  throwing  darts  and  stones ;  and  though 
the  richer  citizens  had  to  provide  some  cavalry,  it  was 
held  in  so  little  esteem  that  they  did  not  serve  in  it 
themselves.  Even  the  band  of  300  picked  youths  who 
formed  the  king's  bodyguard,  and  bore  the  name  of 
"  Horsemen,"  fought  on  foot.  The  equipment  of  the 
hoplite — brazen  helmet,  breastplate  and  greaves,  oval 
shield,  sword  and  spear — is  reckoned  to  have  weighed 
about  three-quarters  of  a  cwt./  but  a  slave  helped  to  carry 
it  on  the  march,  and  a  Spartan  force  could  cover  100 
miles  in  three  days  on  occasion.-  The  spear  was  not 
more  than  9  feet  long;  it  was  wielded  with  one  hand, 
and  was  levelled  at  the  height  of  the  hip  for  a  charge. 

The  Spartan  system  of  command  seemed  to  Thucydides 
worthy  of  particular  mention :  "  [the  king]  gives  general 
orders  to  the  polemarchs,  which  they  convey  to  the 
commanders  of  lochi ;  these  again  to  the  commanders 
of  pentecosties,  the  commanders  of  pentecosties  to  the 
commanders  of  enomoties,  and  these  to  the  enomoty."  * 

'  Riistow  and  Kochly,  p.  44.  -  Herodotus,  vi.  120. 

'  Thucydides,  v.  66. 


4  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

This  marks  out  the  enomoty,  or  band  of  sworn  comrades, 
as  the  tactical  unit.  At  Mantinea  (b.c.  418)  its  strength 
■was  about  thirty  men ;  it  formed  four  files  with  an  average 
depth  of  eight  men.^  Xenophon,  a  Httle  later,  speaks  of  it 
as  forming  sometimes  three,  sometimes  six  files,  according 
(we  may  suppose)  as  it  was  eight  deep  or  four  deep.  As 
to  the  larger  units,  Thucydides  reckons  four  enomoties  to 
the  pentecosty,  and  four  pentecosties  to  the  lochos,  but 
Xenophon  halves  these  numbers.  The  point  is  not  of 
much  importance,  as  the  units  were  drawn  up  side  by  side 
in  phalanx,  with  no  second  line  or  reserve.  They  were 
local  not  numerical  units,  and  their  strength  would  vary 
with  the  population  of  the  ward  from  which  they  came 
and  the  number  of  classes  called  out.  All  Spartans  were 
liable  to  military  service  from  twenty  to  sixty  years  of 
age,  but  the  youngest  and  oldest  classes  were  seldom  sent 
into  the  field. 

Originally  the  other  Laconians  (Periceci)  formed  separate 
lochi,  but  this  was  altered  in  the  course  of  the  fifth  century 
B.C.  During  the  Peloponnesian  war  the  decline  in  the 
number  of  Spartans  made  it  necessary  to  use  even  Helots 
as  hopUtes  in  distant  expeditions.^ 

As  the  best  men  were  placed  in  the  front  ranks,  it  was 
important  that  those  ranks  should  always  be  presented 
to  the  enemy  from  whatever  quarter  he  might  attack. 
The  men  were  therefore  taught  to  countermarch,  and  to 
move  in  column  of  sections,  from  which  they  could  either 
wheel  into  line  to  a  flank,  or  prolong  the  front  of  the 
leading  section.^  Constant  practice  gave  them  a  pro- 
ficiency in  drill  which  served  them  well  in  emergencies, 
such  as  that  of  Mantinea,*  where  bad  leadership  had 
opened  a  gap  in  their  line  through   which  the   enemy 

1  Thucydides,  v.  68.  -  IK,  iv.  SO. 

^  Riistow,  i.  26,  &c.  '  Thucydides,  v.  72. 


THE   GREEKS  5 

forced  his  way.  At  Thermopylae,  we  are  told,  "  being 
men  perfectly  skilled  in  fighting  opposed  to  men  who 
were  unsldlled,  they  would  turn  their  backs  to  the  enemy 
and  make  a  pretence  of  taking  to  flight." ' 

On  the  march  each  man  was  allowed  G  feet,  both  in 
breadth  and  depth,  but  ranks  and  files  closed  up  for  the 
fight,  and  even  locked  shields.  A  battle  was  regarded 
as  a  duel,  and  the  tactics  were  of  the  simplest,  a  direct 
advance  and  engagement  along  the  whole  line.  But 
there  was  always  a  tendency  to  drift  to  the  right,  each 
man  seeking  protection  for  his  unshielded  side,^  and  this 
habitually  led  to  the  outflanking  of  the  left  of  each  army 
by  the  other. 

In  advancing  to  the  attack,  "  the  Lacedremonians  moved 
slowly  and  to  the  music  of  many  flute  players,"  ^  in  order 
that  they  might  keep  their  ranks  even,  and  deliver  their 
blow  as  a  whole.  The  battle  was  a  festival,  to  be  entered 
upon  in  choicest  clothing,  with  hair  dressed  and  garlanded, 
but  there  must  be  no  disorderly  eagerness  for  the  fray. 
After  victory  they  did  not  follow  fast  or  far  in  pursuit. 
They  disliked  fighting  on  rough  ground,  or  breaking 
through  artificial  obstacles,  where  disorder  was  inevitable. 
They  were  essentially  line-of-battle  troops.  In  the  third 
Messenian  war  they  invited  the  Athenians  to  aid  them 
in  taking  Ithome  because  of  their  greater  skill  in  siege 
operations.* 

War  demands  other  things  besides  discipline  and 
stubborn  courage.  The  Athenians,  with  their  quicker 
intelligence  and  more  varied  life,  found  compensations  for 
their  inferiority  at  "  push  of  pike."  They  were  better 
seamen  and  marines,  and  their  naval  predominance 
brought  them  wealth   with   which    to   hire  mercenaries, 

'  Herndntiis,  vii.  211.  '  Thnoyilidi'?,  v.  71. 

'  Jb.,  ti'J.  '  JO.,  i.  102. 


6  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

and  support  their  fighting  men.  They  had  learnt  the 
vahie  of  bowmen  from  the  Persians,  whom  they  had 
been  the  first  to  encounter.  It  seems  probable  that 
Marathon,  which  has  been  ranked  among  the  decisive 
battles  of  the  world,  was  really  little  more  than  a  rear- 
guard action.  The  greater  part  of  the  Persian  army, 
including  the  cavalry,  had  re-embarked,  when  Miltiades 
saw  his  opportunity  and  fell  upon  the  covering  force. 
There  is  nothing  to  show  that  the  Athenians  suffered 
much  from  the  Persian  archery,  in  fact  their  whole 
loss  is  put  at  less  than  200  men ;  but  when  they  met 
the  same  invaders  again  at  Plataea,  eleven  years  after- 
wards, they  were  provided  with  bowmen  procured  from 
Crete. 

Either  on  this  account,  or  because  he  thought  Athenian 
no  match  for  BcBotian  hoplites,  Pausanias  proposed  that 
the  Athenians  should  face  the  Persians  and  the  Lace- 
daemonians should  deal  with  the  renegade  Greeks  who 
formed  the  right  wing  of  the  invading  army;  but  the 
Boeotians  frustrated  this  arrangement.  When  the  Lace- 
djemonians  found  themselves  assailed,  first  by  clouds  of 
mounted  archers,  and  then  by  foot  archers,  Pausanias 
sent  an  urgent  message  to  the  Athenian  commanders  to 
lend  him  their  bowmen  if  they  could  not  come  them- 
selves to  help  him.  The  Athenians  had  their  own  hands 
full,  and  the  Lacedaamonians,  charging  the  line  of  wicker 
shields  which  covered  the  foot  archers,  drove  the  Persians 
back  to  their  intrenched  camp ;  but  it  was  not  till  the 
Athenians  came  up  after  defeating  the  Boeotians  that 
the  camp  itself  was  carried. 

The  Athenians  soon  had  bowmen  of  their  own,  drawn 
from  the  lowest  class  of  citizens,  who  did  not  serve  as 
hoplites.  At  the  beginning  of  the  Peloponnesian  war 
their  field  forces  mustered  13,000  hoplites,  1200  horse- 


THE   GREEKS  7 

men,  and  IGOO  arcliers.i  They  also  hired  Rhodian  and 
Thessalian  .slingers,  TEtolian  and  Acarnanian  javelin-men, 
and  Thracian  peltasts,  who  fought  hand  lo  hand  with 
sword  and  buckler.  The  sea  was  the  Athenian  element, 
and  whether  for  naval  actions,  or  for  descents  upon  the 
coast,  a  mixture  of  light  and  heavy  armed  troops  was 
essential.  The  aflair  of  Sphacteria  (425  B.C.)  illustrated 
their  co-operation.  A  body  of  420  Lacedaemonians,  of 
whom  less  than  half  were  Spartans,  was  blockaded  in  a 
small  island,  from  which  they  could  not  escape.  After 
trying  in  vain  to  starve  them  out,  the  Athenians  landed 
800  hoplites,  and  some  thousands  of  light  troops,  to 
make  an  end  of  them.  The  Lacediomonians,  few  as  they 
were,  tried  to  close  with  the  hoplites ;  "  but  having  light- 
armed  adversaries  both  on  their  flank  and  rear,  they 
could  not  get  at  them  or  profit  by  their  own  military 
skill,  for  they  were  impeded  by  a  shower  of  missiles  from 
both  sides.  Meanwhile  the  Athenians,  instead  of  going 
to  meet  them,  remained  in  position,  while  the  light-armed 
again  and  again  ran  up  and  attacked  the  Lacedaemonians, 
who  drove  them  back  where  they  pressed  closest.  But 
though  compelled  to  retreat,  they  still  continued  fighting, 
being  lightly  equipped  and  easily  getting  the  start  of 
their  enemies.  The  ground  was  difficult  and  rough, 
the  island  having  been  uninhabited;  and  the  Lacedss- 
monians,  who  were  encumbered  by  their  arms,  could  not 
pursue  them  in  such  a  place."  -  At  length  when  the 
Lacedtemonians  were  completely  .surrounded,  and  one- 
third  of  their  number  had  been  killed,  the  remainder 
surrendered;  and  it  says  much  for  the  Spartan  prestige 
that  this  should  have  been  regarded  as  a  serious  blow 
to  it.  "  It  was  universally  imagined  that  the  Lacedte- 
monians  would  never  give  up  their  arms,  either  under 

>  Thucydides,  ii.  13.  ■'  lb.,  iv.  33. 


8  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

pressure  of  famine,  or  in  any  other  extremity,  but  would 
fight  to  the  last,  and  die  sword  in  hand."  ^ 

The  duration  of  the  Peloponnesian  war  increased  the 
demand  for  mercenaries,  and  made  soldiering  a  profession. 
At  first  only  light  troops,  they  soon  began  to  serve  also 
as  heavy  infantry,  especially  when  they  were  maintained 
as  a  standing  force  by  Persian  satraps  or  other  despotic 
rulers.  They  were  usually  raised  as  companies  of  about 
100  men.  They  received  good  pay,  but  had  to  pro- 
vide their  own  arms  and  equipment.  In  the  contingent 
which  accompanied  the  younger  Cyrus  to  Cunaxa  there 
were  11,000  hoplites  and  2000  light-armed  men.  During 
the  subsequent  retreat  of  the  Ten  Thousand,  the  prolonged 
service  in  the  field,  the  variety  of  enemies  encountered 
and  of  countries  traversed,  suggested  changes  in  tactical 
formations  and  in  individual  equipment.  There  was 
need  of  something  more  flexible  and  mobile  than  the 
simple  hoplite  phalanx,  and  there  was  frequent  occasion 
for  the  combined  action  of  the  different  arms.  The 
hoplites  were  formed  into  small  company  columns  with 
a  depth  of  sixteen  men,  and  with  wide  intervals  between 
them.  The  peltasts  and  archers  were  sometimes  in  front, 
sometimes  in  the  intervals.-  It  was  also  found  advisable 
to  provide  a  reserve  in  some  cases,  by  posting  bodies  of 
200  men  behind  the  wings  and  centre.  Corps  of  cavalry 
and  slingers  had  to  be  improvised,  for  they  had  formed 
no  part  of  the  Greek  contingent.^ 

The  influence  of  this  more  varied  campaigning  may  be 
traced  in  the  reforms  introduced  by  Iphicrates.  He  was 
an  Athenian  and  a  leader  of  mercenaries,  who  first  saw 
service  in  Thrace,  perhaps  under  Xenophon.  About 
390  B.C.  he  astonished  Greece  by  routing  a  Lacedisemonian 

'  Thucydides,  iv.  40.  ^  Xenophon,  Aimbasis,  iv.  8,  v.  4,  vi.  5. 

■■>  lb.,  iii.  3. 


THE   GREEKS  9 

battalion  of  600  men  near  Lechanim.  It  was  on  the 
march,  unaccompanied  by  cavalry  or  light  troops,  when 
he  attacked  it  with  his  peltasts,  supported  by  some 
Athenian  hoplites.  The  younger  men  of  the  battalion 
were  ordered  out  to  drive  the  peltasts  away,  but  the  latter 
fell  back  on  their  own  hoplites,  and  then  returned  to  the 
assault  with  fresh  volleys  of  javelins.  Some  cavalry 
joined  the  Lacedemonians,  but  proved  of  little  assistance, 
as  instead  of  pursuing  boldly,  it  kept  abreast  of  the  foot. 
The  Lacedemonians  made  a  stand  on  a  hillock  for  a  time, 
but  on  the  approach  of  the  Athenian  hoplites  they  fairly 
took  to  flight,  with  a  loss  of  nearly  half  their  men  and 
lasting  damage  to  their  reputation.' 

The  credit  which  Iphicratos  won  by  this  achievement 
was  enhanced  by  the  admirable  training  and  discipline 
of  his  men,  and  by  many  instances  of  his  wiliness  and 
resource.  He  taught  his  soldiers  to  be  prepared  for  every 
emergency  by  false  alarms,  ambuscades,  panics,  and 
feigned  desertions,  for  war  had  by  this  time  become  an 
affair  of  stratagems  rather  than  a  duel.  He  altered  their 
equipment,  making  it  cheaper — an  important  point  for 
mercenaries — and  lighter,  so  that  they  could  carry  pro- 
visions on  the  march  and  move  more  rapidly  on  the  field 
of  battle.  He  gave  them  quilted  linen  jerkins  and  leather 
boots.  The  small  round  shield,  or  pelta,  2  feet  in  diameter, 
worn  on  the  left  arm,  left  both  hands  free  to  wield  the 
spear;  and  this  enabled  him  to  increase  the  length  of 
the  spear  to  12  feet  or  more,  giving  advantage  of  reach 
over  the  hoplite,  and  better  protection  against  cavalry. 
The  sword  was  also  lengthened  to  3  feet ;  the  hoplite's 
sword  was  little  more  than  a  dagger. 

It  has  been  suggested^  that  the  long  spear  and   long 

'   Xonojihon,  Iklknka,  iv.  .'').  1.'?,  &i;. 
'^  Ru8tow  and  Kochly,  p.  1(!3. 


lo  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

sword  were  not  given  to  the  same  men ;  that  there  were 
two  classes  of  peltasts,  one  armed  with  spears  and  the 
other  with  javelins  and  swords  for  hand-to-hand  fight- 
ing. But  there  is  no  positive  evidence  of  this  distinction. 
They  seem  to  have  formed  a  medium  infantry,  available 
as  light  troops  or  as  infantry  of  the  line,  and  they  may 
have  chosen  their  weapons  according  to  the  occasion. 

As  light  troops  came  to  play  a  more  important 
part,  so  also  did  cavalry.  Greek  horsemen  had  no 
stirrups  and  were  easily  unhorsed.  They  could  do 
nothing  against  unbroken  hoplites  except  annoy  them 
with  darts.  They  fought  in  loose  order  and  made  little 
use  of  shock,  but  tried  to  fall  unawares  upon  a  flank. 
Thessaly  and  Bceotia  with  their  more  open  valleys  fur- 
nished the  best  cavalry ;  that  of  the  Lacedemonians  was 
the  worst.  The  Boeotians  attached  a  footman  to  each 
horseman,  and  the  intermixture  of  horse  and  foot  by 
placing  small  parties  of  light-armed  men  in  the  intervals 
between  the  troops  was  a  recognised  practice.  The  strength 
of  a  troop  was  about  sixty  men.  The  best  weapons  for 
horsemen,  according  to  Xenophon,  were  a  short  stabbing 
sword  and  a  pair  of  cornel-wood  spears,  one  of  which 
might  be  hurled  as  a  javelin. 

However  serviceable  the  new  type  of  infantry  might  be 
for  minor  warfare,  the  Laceda3monian  hoplite  retained  his 
supremacy  in  pitched  battles  in  the  open  field.  Even  to 
repulse  him  was  reckoned  a  great  achievement.  The 
Athenians  put  up  a  statue  to  Chabrias  to  celebrate  such  a 
success.  In  378  b.c.  their  troops  in  concert  with  the 
Thebans  awaited  the  attack  of  the  Lacedasmonian  phalanx. 
The  front  ranks  dropped  on  the  right  knee  and  propped 
their  shields  against  the  left,  and  such  a  hedge  of  spear- 
points  was  presented  by  the  long  spears  that  Agesilaus 
thought  it  prudent  to  draw  off  his  men.     But  seven  years 


THE   GREEKS  ii 

afterwards,  at  Leuctra,  Thebes  won  a  very  difterent  sort  of 
victory,  and  robbed  the  Spartans  of  their  pro-eminence. 

A  well-fed  race,  with  rich  pastures  and  no  commerce,  the 
Bceotians  had  always  shown  themselves  strong  and  stub- 
born soldiers.'  Three  hundred  of  them  had  turned  the 
scale  at  Syracuse.  Thebans  were  Boeotians  and  something 
more.  They  were  "  a  conquering  caste  in  an  alien  land," 
with  an  infusion  of  Phoenician,  or  at  all  events  non- 
Hellenic  blood.  The  military  organisation  of  Sparta  is 
said  to  have  owed  much  to  Timomachus,  who  came  from 
Thebes,  and  claimed  descent  from  Cadmus.  There  was 
perhaps  some  far-off  kinship  between  Hannibal  and 
Epaminondas. 

It  was  a  Theban  custom,  of  which  the  origin  is  un- 
explained, to  fight  in  deep  formation.  At  Delium  (424 
B.C.)  their  phalanx  was  formed  in  twenty-five  ranks,  and 
this  massive  column  broke  through  the  Athenian  left, 
while  the  Athenian  right  got  the  better  of  the  other 
Boeotians.  The  timely  appearance  of  some  cavalry,  which 
the  Theban  commander  had  sent  round  a  hill  unperceived 
to  support  the  left  wing,  decided  the  day.  At  Corinth 
and  at  Coronea  (394  B.C.)  the  Thebans  had  to  deal  with 
the  Lacedaemonians.  Placed  on  the  right  of  the  army, 
in  each  case  they  defeated  the  allies  of  Sparta,  but  were 
themselves  defeated  by  the  Lacedicmonians,  who  had  been 
equally  successful  on  the  other  wing,  and  whose  discipline 
enabled  them  to  wheel  promptly  and  attack  their 
enemies  in  succession.  At  Coronea  the  Thebans,  aban- 
doned by  their  allies  and  hard  pressed  by  Agesilaus, 
succeeded  in  cutting  their  way  through,  though  with 
heavy  loss. 

After  the  recovery  of  the  Cadmea  the  Sacred  Band 
was    formed,    a    military    brotherhood    of    300    chosen 

'  Thucydidcp,  vii.  43. 


12  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

Thebans,  quartered  there  and  maintained  at  the  public 
expense,  that  they  might  devote  themselves  to  military 
exercises.  In  375  B.C.  Pelopidas  at  the  head  of  this  band 
encountered  two  Lacedaemonian  battalions,  as  he  was 
marching  along  the  shore  of  the  Copais  Lake.  Forming 
his  men  in  column,  he  boldly  charged  them,  though  they 
were  three  times  his  own  number,  and  not  content  with 
breaking  through,  he  completely  routed  them. 

Epaminondas,  then,  had  troops  on  whom  he  could  rely, 
and  who  were  accustomed  to  fight  in  deep  formation, 
when  he  persuaded  his  colleagues  to  risk  a  pitched  battle 
in  the  open  field  near  Leuctra  (371  B.C.)  He  had  only 
6000  hoplites,  Cleombrotus  had  10,000,  but  only  4000 
were  Lacedaemonians.  Of  these,  the  Spartans,  who  had 
been  one-half  at  Platijea,  were  now  little  more  than  one- 
sixth.  But  if  the  Theban  column  was  no  novelty,  Epami- 
nondas used  it  in  a  way  that  was  new.  Hitherto  battle  after 
battle  had  followed  the  same  course :  each  side  successful 
on  the  right  wing,  each  side  defeated  on  the  left.  In  the 
final  collision  between  the  two  victorious  wings  the  better 
discipline  of  the  Lacediemonians  had  always  prevailed. 
To  obtain  something  more  than  a  local  and  temporary 
success,  Epaminondas  determined  to  direct  his  column, 
while  it  was  fresh  and  in  good  order,  against  the  best 
troops  of  the  enemy.  These  were  always  on  the  right,  or 
near  it,  and  were  in  this  case  drawn  up  twelve  deep.^  So 
he  placed  the  Theban  column  on  the  left  of  his  line,  and 
he  gave  it  a  depth  of  fifty  ranks.  But  this  massing  of 
troops  on  the  left  weakened  the  centre  and  right,  especi- 
ally as  he  was  largely  outnumbered.  To  postpone  collision 
with  the  enemy  on  that  side,  he  adopted  an  echelon 
formation,  an  "  oblique  phalanx,"  introducing  for  the 
first  time  the  distinction  of  an  offensive  and  a  defensive 

1  Hdlcnica,  vi.  4,  12. 


THE   GREEKS  13 

wing.  Vegetins  compares  this  order  of  battle  to  a 
builder's  level,  or  in  other  words  to  a  right-angled 
triangle  of  which  one  side  would  be  in  the  original 
alignment.' 

Such  dispositions  would  be  of  no  avail  unless  they  took 
the  enemy  by  surprise.  Accordingly  Epaminondas  began 
the  battle  by  a  cavalry  engagement,  not  as  usual  upon 
the  wings,  but  in  the  space  between  the  two  armies.  The 
Lacedemonian  cavalry,  according  to  Xenophon,  had  never 
been  in  wor.se  condition.  They  were  soon  driven  in  upon 
the  infantry  of  the  centre,  causing  some  confusion ;  and 
before  the  mischief  was  repaired  the  Theban  column  was 
at  hand.  It  struck,  not  upon  the  extreme  right  of  the 
enemy,  but  upon  the  junction  of  right  and  centre,  that  is 
to  say,  the  left  of  the  Lacedaemonian  corps. 

This  necessarily  exposed  the  column  to  attack  on  its 
outer  flank  while  checked  in  front,  as  the  Imperial  Guard 
was  attacked  by  the  Fifty-Second  at  Waterloo.  The 
Spartan  king,  Cleombrotus,  attempted  such  a  movement, 
but  Epaminondas  had  provided  against  it  by  detaching 
the  Sacred  Band  under  Pelopidas.  These  picked  troops 
fell  upon  the  Lacedaemonians  while  they  were  wheeling, 
and  the  Theban  column,  pressing  on  unhindered,  broke 
through  and  separated  them  from  their  allies,  who  were 
ready  enough  to  leave  the  field.  One-fourth  of  the 
Laced;emonians  and  more  than  half  of  the  Spartans  fell. 

The  victory  gave  the  Thebans  a  primacy  which  lasted 
only  up  to  the  death  of  Epaminondas  at  Mantinea 
(•"362  B.C.).  In  that  battle  nearly  all  the  Greek  peoples 
had  a  share.  Athenians  and  Lacedaemonians  fought  side 
by  side,  but  the  Thebans  with  their  allies  outnumbered 
them.  Epaminondas'  tactics  were  in  the  main  the  same 
as  at  Leuctra,  but  this  time  he  surprised  the  enemy  by 

'  Vegetius,  iii.  20, 


14  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

leading  them  to  believe  that  he  had  no  intention  of 
fighting  that  day.  Under  cover  of  a  hill  he  drew  files 
from  his  wings  and  moved  them  to  the  front  to  form 
his  "ram."  Then  he  led  his  army  forward,  using  his 
cavalry  and  light  troops  to  occupy  the  attention  of  the 
Athenians  who  were  on  the  left,  and  prevent  their  send- 
ing assistance  to  the  Lacedemonians  on  the  right.  He 
reserved  a  body  of  horse  and  foot  intermixed  to  cover 
the  left  flanks  of  his  column. 

The  charge  of  that  column  is  likened  by  Xenophon  to 
the  impact  of  a  trireme  end-on.^  Where  it  struck  the 
enemy's  line  it  shattered  it,  as  at  Leuctra,  and  their 
whole  army  took  to  flight.  But  Epaminondas'  death 
in  the  moment  of  victory  paralysed  his  troops,  and  the 
battle  was  practically  a  drawn  one.  It  is  doubtful 
whether  Xenophon's  metaphor  is  to  be  taken  to  imply 
that  the  head  of  the  column  was  wedge-shaped,  like  the 
beak  of  a  ship.  We  know  that  later,  among  the  Romans, 
there  was  a  formation  known  as  cuneus  or  caput 
porcinum  which  was  really  wedge-shaped,^  although  the 
word  cuneus  was  also  constantly  used  for  troops  in  mass 
irrespective  of  shape.  "  Column  "  in  its  military  sense  is 
a  modern  term,  but  it  seems  safe  to  say  that  it  was  a 
column  rather  than  a  wedge  that  won  the  victories  of 
Leuctra  and  Mantinea. 

Philip  of  Macedon  spent  some  years  in  Thebes  while 
Epaminondas  lived,  and  afterwards  turned  to  account 
not  only  the  lesson  of  those  victories,  but  the  im- 
provements in  the  military  art  which  more  than  half 
a  century  of  war  had  developed  in  Greece.  The  Mace- 
donian tribes,  when  they  had  been  welded  into  a  nation, 

1  HcUcnka,  vii.  5,  23. 

-  e.rj.  JSMa.n,  cap.  47.  Something  of  the  kind  was  observed  among  the 
Arabs  in  their  attack  upon  the  British  square  at  Abuklea.     See  Wilson, 

From  Korti  to  Khartum,  p.  27, 


THE  grp:eks  is 

furnished  him  an  abundance  of  hardy  and  docile  recruits, 
as  Russia  did  to  Peter  the  Great.  His  wars  with  his 
immediate  neighbours  gave  his  troops  field  training, 
enlarged  his  territories  and  his  recruiting  ground,  and 
enriched  him  with  gold  and  silver  mines.  His  wealth 
enabled  him  to  maintain  a  standing  force.  The  world 
was  familiar  with  armies  that  were  national  but  not  stand- 
ing, such  as  the  Greek  burgher  levies,  and  with  armies  that 
were  standing  but  not  national,  such  as  the  mercenaries 
in  Persian  or  Carthaginian  service ;  but  a  national  stand- 
ing army,  a  professional  army  with  a  national  spirit,  was 
something  new.^ 

His  standing  force  of  infantry,  known  as  Jlypa^ists, 
corresponded  to  the  medium  infantry  of  Iphicrates,  but 
had  short  spears  which  allowed  of  greater  activity.  They 
numbered  perhaps  6000  men  (six  battalions)  in  time  of 
war.  For  "shot,"  to  use  the  old  expression,  he  had 
Macedonian  bowmen  and  Thracian  javelin-men.  His 
heavy  uafantry  of  the  line  was  furnished  by  a  general 
levy  of  freemen  not  of  noble  birth,  organised  in  six 
territorial  brigades  of  3000  to  4000  men.  It  was  a 
provincial  militia  called  out  for  war  and  bound  to  serve 
for  a  fixed  time.  This  was  the  famous  Macedonian 
phalanx.  The  normal  depth  of  formation  was  sixteen 
ranks,  and  the  units  were  the  file  of  sixteen  men,  the 
section  of  four  files,  the  company  of  sixteen  files,  and 
the  battalion  (ehiliarchia)  of  sixty-four  files.  If  the 
numbers  fell  short,  the  depth  was  reduced  to  perhaps 
twelve  men  in  a  file. 

The  Macedonian  hoplite  wore  a  leather  jacket  with 
metal  plates,  light  greaves,  and  a  round  hat.  He  had  a 
short  sword  and  a  small  shield,  but  a  very  long  spear 
{sariaaa).     According  to    Polybius,   the   length  was   14 

1  Hocrarth,  p.  .<;]. 


1 6  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

cubits  (21  feet),  of  which  10  cubits  were  to  the  front 
and  4  to  the  rear  of  the  hoplite  when  the  spear  was 
levelled.!  Hence  five  rows  of  spear-points  would  show 
beyond  the  front  of  the  phalanx.  The  eleven  hinder 
ranks  held  their  sarissse  inclined  upwards  over  the 
shoulders  of  the  men  in  front  of  them,  to  intercept 
missiles.  They  added  weight  to  the  charge,  and  made 
it  impossible  for  the  front  ranks  to  face  about. 

The  cavalry  was  of  two  kinds,  heavy  and  light.  The 
former  was  recruited  from  the  Macedonian  nobility,  and 
seems  to  have  formed  fifteen  territorial  squadrons  of 
about  200  men,  in  addition  to  the  royal  squadron  or 
horseguards,  made  up  of  youths  who  had  served  as 
pages  at  court.  The  sarissophori  or  lancers,  perhaps 
1000  strong,  were  armed  with  a  light  sarissa  longer 
than  the  spear  of  the  heavy  cavalry. 

The  battle  of  Chreronea  (3.38  B.C.)  crowned  the  work  of 
twenty  years  by  which  Philip  had  been  gradually  securing 
for  himself  the  headship  of  Greece.  His  task  was  made 
easier  by  the  decline  of  Sparta,  the  jealousies  of  the  lead- 
ing states,  and  the  growing  distaste  of  the  Athenians  for 
personal  military  service.  At  Chseronea  he  had  only  to 
deal  with  Theban  and  Athenian  troops.  We  know  little 
of  the  details  of  the  battle.  The  numbers  on  each  side 
were  about  equal — over  30,000  men — and  the  fighting  was 
prolonged;^  but  it  is  said  that  Philip  purposely  delayed 
the  issue,  as  he  knew  that  his  troops  had  more  staying 
power  than  the  impetuous  Athenians.     It  was  on  the  left, 

1  Polybius,  xviii.  29,  30.  He  sa3's  that  originally  the  length  was  16 
cubits.  So  also  ^lian  (cap.  xiv.)  and  Polya;nus  (II.  xxix.  2).  It  has 
been  urged  by  Riistow  and  Kochly  (p.  238)  that  such  spears  would  be 
quite  unmanageable,  and  that  we  should  read  feet  for  cubits  ;  but  there 
are  said  to  be  lances  of  German  landesknechts  which  have  shafts  24  feet 
long  (Demmin,  Ams  and  Armour,  p.  416). 

=  Frontiuus,  II.  i.  9. 


THE   GREEKS  17 

where  Alexander  commanded  against  the  Thcbans,  that 
victory  first  declared  itself,  and  the  vigorous  use  of  the 
cavalry  in  pursuit  marked  a  new  departure  in  Greek 
warfare.     The  Theban  Sacred  Band  was  cut  to  pieces. 

Some  years  before,  Demosthenes  had  told  the  Athenians 
that  Phihp  made  war  in  a  diiferent  manner  from  their 
old  enemies ;  he  was  regardle.ss  of  seasons,  and  he  fought 
with  light  troops.  Probably  he  referred  to  the  Hypas- 
pists  among  others.  "  It  is  altogether  a  mistake  to  say, 
as  is  so  often  done,  that  the  phalanx  formed  the  kernel  of 
the  Macedonian  army.  It  was  the  bulk  of  the  army,  but 
not  its  kernel."  1  It  was  the  piece  de  risistance.  Alex- 
ander, when  he  invaded  Asia,  followed  the  example  of 
Epaminondas,  dividing  his  army  into  an  offensive  and  a 
defensive  wing,  and  making  his  advance  in  echelon. 
But  the  two  wings,  instead  of  differing  in  depth,  differed 
in  composition.  The  offensive  wing  consisted  of  light 
infantry  (chiefly  Thracian),  the  Hypaspists,  and  the  Mace- 
donian cavalry,  supported  by  some  brigades  of  the  phalanx. 
The  greater  part  of  the  phalanx  formed  the  defensive  wing, 
which  was  covered  on  its  outer  flank  by  Thessalian  and 
other  Greek  cavalry.     He  had  5000  horse  to  30,000  foot. 

Alexander  had  to  do  with  an  enemy  vastly  superior  in 
numbers,  but  inferior  in  quality  and  in  manoeuvring 
powers.  This  determined  him  to  deliver  his  attack  on 
one  wing,  that  he  might  not  be  enveloped.  Alike  at  the 
Granicus,  at  Issus,  and  at  Arbela,  he  struck  with  his  right. 
At  Issus  the  supporting  brigades  of  the  phalanx  had  a 
severe  struggle  with  the  Greek  mercenaries  in  Persian 
pay  until  the  Hypaspists  and  cavalry,  having  routed  the 
Persian  left,  took  the  mercenaries  in  flank.  At  Arbela  the 
defensive  wing  was  so  hardly  pressed  by  Indian  and 
Persian  cavalry  that  Parmenio  had  to  send  to  Alexander 

•  Riistow  and  Kiichlv,  p.  2Ciii. 


1 8  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

for  help.  In  the  battle  on  the  Hydaspes  against  Porus 
the  left  of  the  enemy  was  again  selected  for  attack; 
Hypaspists  and  light  troops  seem  to  have  been  the  only 
infantry  engaged.  When  Alexander  reorganised  his  army 
after  his  return  from  India,  he  proposed  to  use  Orientals 
for  the  phalanx  to  the  extent  of  three-fourths.  Only  the 
three  leading  men  and  the  last  man  of  each  file  were  to  be 
Macedonians;  the  rest  were  armed  with  bows  and  javelins. 

In  the  wars  of  Alexander's  successors  armies  were  more 
alike  in  numbers  and  quality,  and  mobility  lost  some  of 
its  importance.  But  the  increasing  use  of  elephants  went 
along  with  a  deterioration  of  infantry.  Posted  at  inter- 
vals of  50  yards  or  so  along  the  whole  front  of  each  army 
with  shot  between  them,  they  made  any  general  advance 
and  engagement  of  the  foot  difficult.  Practically  the 
fighting  was  done  by  the  cavalry  on  the  wings,  and  the 
infantry  of  the  line  only  served  to  fill  the  space  between 
them.  What  had  hitherto  been  the  best  elements  of  the 
infantry  were  attracted  to  the  cavalry,  and  their  places 
were  taken  by  mercenaries  or  subject  races. 

In  Europe  this  was  not  the  case  to  the  same  extent  as 
in  Asia.  Value  continued  to  be  attached  in  Greece  to 
heavy  infantry,  but  it  was  concentrated  upon  the  phalanx. 
"  What  had  formed  in  the  time  of  Philip  and  Alexander 
merely  a  solid  base  for  the  free  activity  of  the  other  kinds 
of  foot,  now  came  to  be  regarded  as  the  instrument  for 
deciding  the  issue,  and  obtaining  the  victory."  i  Men  tried 
in  vain  to  make  it  flexible  and  mobile  without  forfeiting 
its  own  special  characteristic,  impenetrability.  The  im- 
possibility of  this  was  shown  at  Cynos-cephaLe  (197  B.C.) 
and  Pydna  (168  B.C.)  when  the  Macedonian  phalanx  was 
worsted  by  the  Roman  legions ;  but  these  actions  may  be 
better  dealt  with  as  incidents  of  Roman  history. 

'  Riistow,  i.  22. 


II 

THE    ROMANS 

One  result  of  the  battle  of  Pydna  was  that  a  number 
of  leading  members  of  the  Achaean  league  were  exiled 
to  Italy,  on  a  charge  of  hostility  to  Rome.  Among  these 
was  Polybius,  to  whom  we  owe  the  best  account  of  the 
Roman  army.  He  was  tutor  of  the  younger  Scipio 
Africanus,  and  was  afterwards  with  him  at  the  destruction 
of  Carthage.  He  set  himself  to  write  the  history  of  the 
half-century  in  the  course  of  which  '•  almost  the  Avhole 
inhabited  world  "  had  been  brought  under  the  dominion 
of  Rome,  and  he  talked  with  men  who  had  fought  against 
Hannibal. 

When  Polybius  describes  the  army  which  conquered 
Carthage  and  Greece  we  are  on  firm  ground.  How  it 
came  to  be  what  it  was  is  a  more  obscure  matter,  but 
one  which  cannot  be  altogether  passed  over.  There  is  a 
significant  contrast  between  Athenian  and  Roman  names, 
between  Themistocles  or  Pericles  and  C.  Julius  Csesar 
or  M.  TuUius  Cicero.  At  Athens  personality  was  de- 
veloped ;  at  Rome  the  individual  was  one  of  a  clan  and 
existed  for  the  State.  The  son  was  bound  to  reverence 
the  father,  the  citizen  to  reverence  the  ruler,  and  all 
to  reverence  the  gods.  Religion  was  of  a  practical  kind, 
an  affair  of  ritual,  the  due  discharge  of  which  would  bring 
its  reward  to  the  community.  It  supplemented  police 
regulations,  and  powerfully  reinforced  the  claims  of  the 
State  on  the  individual. 


20  THE   HISTORY  OF   INFANTRY 

These  features  were  not  peculiar  to  Rome :  they  were 
common  to  the  Latin  peoples  of  Central  Italy.  But  Rome 
enjoyed  special  advantages  which  helped  to  give  her 
predominance.  Planted  on  hills  on  the  northern  border 
of  Latium  and  on  the  banks  of  the  Tiber,  she  became 
both  a  frontier  fortress  and  a  centre  for  trade.  The 
unhealthiness  of  the  Campagna  may  have  tended  also 
to  increase  her  population,  by  drawing  to  the  city 
farmers  who  would  otherwise  have  lived  on  their  land.i 
Owing  to  some  such  causes  Rome  grew,  and  the  Romans 
got  the  better  of  neighbours  of  the  same  sturdy  stock 
as  themselves.  But  to  maintain  and  extend  their 
authority  all  their  energies  had  to  be  bent  towards 
military  efficiency.  Only  on  one  point  did  they  sacrifice 
it:  they  changed  their  commanders  frequently,  and 
substituted  untried  for  tried  men,  lest  the  too  successful 
leader  should  become  a  danger  to  the  State.  Their  native 
sense  of  law  and  order  gave  stability  to  their  institutions, 
and  laid  a  firm  foundation  for  their  future  empire,  a 
foundation  which  grew  broader  with  each  successive 
conquest. 

A  normal  Latin  township  was  reckoned  to  consist  of  ten 
wards  {curim),  each^comprising  ten  families  (gentes)  or  one 
hundred  households.  Each  household  had  to  furnish 
one  foot  soldier  (miles,  one  of  a  thousand),  and  each 
family  one  horseman  (eques).  But  in  the  earliest  days 
the  three  tribes  of  Rome  yielded  a  levy  (legio)  of  three 
times  that  strength,  3000  foot  and  300  horse.-  Before  long 
the  one  legion  was  increased  to  four.  The  reforms  which 
bear  the  name  of  Servius  extended  the  duty  of  military 
service,  and  its  privileges,  from  the  original  burgher 
families  to  later  comers.  A  property  classification  was 
introduced  :     the   first   three   classes    formed   the  heavy 

1   Mommsen,  vol.  i.  p.  49.  -  lb.,  p.  72. 


THE   ROMANS  21 

infantry,  but  only  the  first  class  was  bound  to  be  fully 
equipped  with  arras  and  armour.  It  furnished  the  front 
ranks  of  the  legions,  which  were  drawn  up  for  battle 
six  deep  in  continuous  line,  like  the  Greek  phalanx. 
The  fourth  and  fifth  classes  served  as  light  troops 
(rorarii),  armed  with  slings  and  darts.  Men  were  liable 
to  military  service  from  seventeen  to  sixty  years  of  ago, 
but  the  seniors  (those  over  forty-six)  were  reserved  as 
a  rule  for  garrison  duty.  The  liability  of  the  juniors  was 
discharged  by  sixteen  campaigns  on  foot  or  ten  on  horse- 
back. The  cavalry,  which  was  held  in  high  estimation, 
was  increased  to  1800,  or  15  per  cent,  of  the  heavy 
infantry.  The  poorest  class  (proletarii)  was  exempt 
from  taxation,  and  from  military  service,  except  in 
great  emergencies,  when  they  were  equipped  at  the  cost 
of  the  State.  Carpenters,  smiths,  and  musicians  were 
attached  to  the  legions,  and  also  a  certain  number  of 
light-armed  substitutes  to  take  the  place  of  disabled 
legionaries. 

It  is  supposed  to  have  been  during  the  Samnite  wars 
that  the  Romans  made  a  fundamental  change  in  their 
tactical  formation.  The  extended  line  was  ill  adapted 
to  mountain  warfare.  The  disaster  of  the  Caudine  forks 
(321  B.C.)  was  the  result  of  an  attempt  to  march  a  Roman 
army  through  the  Southern  Apennines  into  Apulia.  It 
found  itself  caught  in  a  trap,  with  defiles  which  it  could 
not  force  before  and  behind  it.  Whether  as  a  result  of 
this  disaster  or  not,  continuous  lines  were  given  up,  and 
the  legion  was  subdivided  into  thirty  maniples  which 
were  placed  chequerwise  in  three  lines  (luistati,  principes, 
triarii)  so  that  the  maniples  of  the  second  line  were  op- 
posite intervals  in  the  first  line.  It  was  a  handy  flexible 
formation  which  adapted  itself  readily  to  broken  ground, 
and  aftordud  strong  reserves.     It  was  in  fact  something 


22  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

like  that  which  Xenophon's  Greeks  had  to  improvise  in 
forcing  their  way  through  the  mountains  of  Kurdistan. 

The  maniples  of  the  first  two  lines  were  normally  120 
strong,  those  of  the  third  line  60.  The  men  seem  to  have 
been  drawn  up  six  deep,  as  before  ;  but  after  a  time  light 
troops,  better  armed  and  organised  than  before,  and  re- 
named velitcs,  were  incorporated  in  the  maniples,  and 
formed  a  seventh  and  eighth  rank  when  not  detached. 
They  numbered  1200.^ 

The  triarii  were  the  oldest  soldiers.  They  were  some- 
times called  pilani,  and  the  others  antepilani,  and  these 
names  seem  to  be  survivals  from  the  earlier  phalanx  for- 
mation, when  the  front  ranks  had  spears  and  the  men 
behind  threw  javelins.  The  best  men,  the  principes, 
would  then  form  the  two  front  ranks.^  But  when  the 
manipular  organisation  was  introduced  the  youngest  men 
were  sent  to  the  front,  and  while  they  retained  the  name 
hastati  they  were  armed  with  the  pilum.  The  principes 
became  the  supporting  line,  and  were  similarly  armed. 
The  veterans  now  became  a  reserve,  and  exchanged  the 
pilum  for  the  spear. 

The  primary  weapon  of  the  Roman  soldier  was  the 
sword.  Polybius  says  that  the  Romans  surpassed  all 
other  people  in  their  readuiess  to  adopt  foreign  fashions 
when  they  were  better  than  their  own ;  they  had  borrowed 
their  sword  from  Spain.  It  was  a  straight,  two-edged 
weapon,  2  feet  or  less  in  length.  It  had  a  very  sharp 
point,  and  was  used  for  thrusting  rather  than  cutting.  It 
hung  on  the  right  side,  and  there  was  a  dagger  on  the 
left.  The  shield,  said  to  have  been  borrowed  from  the 
Samnites,  was  rectangular,  4  feet  long  and  2^  feet  wide, 
curved  in  its  width.  It  was  of  wood,  covered  with  canvas 
and  hide,  bound  and  bossed  with  iron. 

I  Marquardt,  p.  40,  &c.  "  lb.,  p.  13. 


THE   ROMANS  23 

The  pilum,  a  javelin  nearly  7  feet  long,  was  given  to 
the  men  of  the  two  front  lines  to  enable  them  to  close 
with  adversaries  armed  with  long  spears,  especially  the 
Macedonian  sarissa.  According  to  Polybius,^  each  man 
had  two,  a  heavy  pilum  with  a  shaft  3  inches  thick, 
and  a  lighter  one  like  an  ordinary  hunting-spear.  The 
latter  became  afterwards  the  only  pattern.-  The  head 
was  barbed,  and  various  methods  were  adopted  to  secure 
it  to  the  shaft,  and  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  throwing 
the  javelin  back,  or  disengaging  it  from  his  shield.  Thrown 
by  hand  at  30  paces,  it  would  go  through  an  inch  of  fir 
or  half  an  inch  of  oak.  By  the  use  of  a  leather  thong 
{amentum)  the  range  could  be  doubled. 

The  legionaries  had  brass  helmets,  with  lofty  plumes  to 
add  to  their  height  and  "strike  terror  into  the  enemy," 
leather  corslets  with  iron  rings  forming  a  sort  of  chain 
mail,  or  in  default  of  these,  metal  breast-pieces,  9  inches 
square,  and  greaves  or  leggings.  The  light  troops  had 
round  bucklers  and  leather  head-pieces.  They  were 
armed  with  a  sword  and  several  darts,  which  were  about 
half  the  length  of  the  pilum.  From  the  time  of  the  long 
siege  of  Veil  (406  B.C.)  it  had  become  the  practice  to  give 
pay  for  military  service,  and  this  made  it  possible  to  exact 
something  like  uniformity  of  equipment.  The  horse 
soldier  received  three  times  as  much  as  the  foot  soldier.^ 

To  allow  the  foot  soldier  to  use  his  weapons  freely 
6  feet  of  front  was  given  to  each  file ;  so  that  a  maniple 
occupied  40  yards,  and  a  legion  half  a  mile,  of  front.  Two 
legions  with  a  corresponding  force  of  allies  made  up  a 
consular  army.  The  two  Roman  legions  formed  the  centre 
of  the  line,  and  the  allies  the  wings.  In  cavalry  the  pro- 
portions were  unequal.  There  were  300  horse  to  each 
Roman  legion,  and  600  to  each  legion  of  the  allies ;   in 

'   Book  vi.  22.  '  Marquardt,  p.  31.  ^  Polybius,  vi.  .^9. 


24  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

addition  to  which  the  allies  also  furnished  extr aor dinar ii, 
picked  troops  (both  horse  and  foot)  for  special  use.  The 
strength  of  a  consular  army,  therefore,  was  nearly  19,000 
foot  and  2400  horse. 

Six  military  tribunes  were  appointed  for  each  legion. 
They  superintended  the  enrolment  of  it,  and  commanded 
it  in  turn.  The  men  of  the  legion  then  elected  sixty 
centurions,  two  for  each  maniple,  and  the  centurions  chose 
lieutenants  to  assist  them.  The  latter  were  posted  on  the 
right  and  left  of  the  rear  rank,  the  centurions  on  the  right 
and  left  of  the  front  rank. 

The  Romans  had  an  uniform  pattern  of  camp  which 
Polybius  describes.  He  remarks  that  the  Greeks  disliked 
the  toil  of  digging,  and  thought  no  defences  so  good  as 
those  afforded  by  nature ;  so  they  took  pains  to  choose  a 
site  of  great  natural  strength,  and  varied  the  arrangements 
of  their  camp  to  suit  it.  But  the  Romans  preferred  to 
expend  great  labour  in  intrenching  that  they  might  secure 
a  plan  of  encampment  which  should  be  convenient  and 
familiar  to  all.^ 

In  280  B.C.  Pyrrhus  came  to  Italy,  invited  by  the 
Tarentines  to  help  them  against  Rome,  and  the  first 
collision  between  Greeks  and  Romans  took  place  at 
Heraclea.  It  was  ten  yeai's  after  the  close  of  the  last 
Samnite  war,  and  in  the  interval  the  Romans  had  been 
fighting  successfully  against  Etruscans  and  Cisalpine 
Gauls,  so  that  "  they  came  to  the  contest  like  trained 
and  experienced  gladiators."  ^  The  battle  was  an  obstinate 
one,  and  Pyrrhus  owed  his  victory  to  his  elephants,  who 
scared  the  Roman  horses  and  drove  them  back  in  con- 
fusion upon  their  foot. 

Next  year  he  won  a  second  victory  at  Asculum.  The 
battle  was  again  fought  in  an  open  plain,  well  suited  to 
1  Polybius,  vi.  42.  «  lb.,  ii.  20. 


THE   ROMANS  25 

his  phalanx  and  his  elephants.  The  laltcr  it  was  his 
custom  to  keep  in  reserve,  to  decide  the  action.  He  had 
intermixed  bands  of  Italians  (probably  Samnites)  with 
the  divisions  of  his  phalanx,  that  he  might  be  able  to 
fight  the  Romans  in  their  own  fashion.*  In  this  case, 
however,  the  phalanx  vindicated  itself.  The  Romans 
tried  in  vain  to  open  gaps  in  the  serried  lines  of  pikes, 
hacking  at  them  with  their  swords,  or  seizing  them  with 
their  hands.  At  length  they  gave  way,  and  the  elephants 
coming  up  put  them  to  the  rout.  It  has  been  conjectured 
that  it  was  this  experience  which  led  to  the  adoption  of 
the  pilum  by  the  hastati  and  principes. 

Little  came  of  this  victory.  It  cost  Pyrrhus  many  men 
whom  he  could  not  easily  replace,  while  fresh  legions  were 
always  forthcoming.  He  took  his  troops  away  to  Sicily, 
and  it  was  not  till  four  years  afterwards  (275  B.C.)  that  he 
again  tried  conclusions  with  the  Romans.  At  Beneventum 
the  elephants  proved,  as  they  were  apt  to  do,  a  broken 
reed.  At  first  they  drove  the  Romans  back  to  their  camp 
on  one  wing,  but,  wounded  by  missiles,  they  turned  round 
and  broke  through  the  phalanx,  opening  a  way  for  the 
legionaries,  who  won  a  complete  victory.  Pyrrhus  re- 
treated to  Tarentum,  and  went  back  to  Epirus. 

The  further  trials  of  strength  between  the  Greek  and 
Roman  infantry  took  place  in  Greece  three-quarters  of 
a  century  afterwards.  Meanwhile  Rome,  mistress  of 
Italy,  had  to  deal  with  her  most  formidable  antagonist, 
Carthage.  Drawn  together  for  a  time  by  common  danger 
from  Pyrrhus,  the  two  States  soon  quarrelled  after  his 
departure.  "  How  fair  a  battlefield  we  are  loavino-  for  the 
Romans  and  Carthaginians,"  he  said,  as  he  left  Italy. 
WeU  matched  in  strength,  the  two  powers  were  quite 
unlike,  as  unhke  as  the  Swiss  to  the  Venetians.      Car- 

'  Polj'biiis,  xviii.  28. 


26  THE   HISTORY  OF   INFANTRY 

thage  had  a  population  of  nearly  three-quarters  of  a 
million,  and  could  furnish  at  need  a  citizen  militia  of 
40,000  men.  But  the  citizens,  essentially  traders,  had 
no  taste  for  war.  They  furnished  officers,  but  the  rank 
and  file  was  made  up  of  subject  races  or  mercenaries. 
"There  were  in  the  army  Iberians  and  Celts,  men  from 
Liguria  and  the  Balearic  Islands,  and  a  considerable 
number  of  half-bred  Greeks,  mostly  deserters  and  slaves ; 
while  the  main  body  consisted  of  Libyans."  ^  Carthage 
carried  on  war  as  a  trade,  and  from  her  conquests  she 
drew  recruits  for  her  army,  as  well  as  tribute  and  products 
for  trade.  But  Polybius  points  out  how  wide  is  the  dis- 
tinction "between  the  character  of  troops  composed  of 
a  confused  mass  of  uncivilised  tribes,  and  of  those  which 
have  had  the  benefit  of  education,  the  habits  of  social 
life,  and  the  restraints  of  law."^  This  is  said  with  im- 
mediate reference  to  a  mutiny  which  broke  out  among 
the  Carthaginian  mercenaries  after  the  close  of  the  first 
Punic  war,  and  which  developed  into  a  ferocious  mer- 
cenary war  lasting  more  than  three  years ;  but  it  has  a 
wider  bearing. 

The  first  Punic  war  was  fought  for  the  mastery  of 
Sicily,  and  ended  in  favour  of  the  Romans  owing  to 
the  astonishing  energy  and  success  with  which  they 
created  a  navy,  and  defeated  Carthage  on  her  own 
element.  "  The  two  nations  engaged  were  like  well-bred 
game-cocks  that  fight  to  their  last  gasp,"  ^  and  the  peace 
made  after  twenty-three  years  of  war  was  little  more 
than  a  truce  to  recover  breath.  On  land  Rome  met 
with  one  disaster,  the  destruction  of  the  army  of  Regulus 
near  Tunis  (255  B.C.).  He  had  15,000  foot  but  only 
500  horse,  while  the  Carthaginians  mustered  12,000  foot 
and  4000  horse,  with  100  elephants.  They  had  given 
1  Polybius,  i.  67.  '^  lb.,  i.^ii.     C/.  vi.  52.  '  Jb.,  i.5H. 


THE  ROMANS  27 

the  command  to  a  Lacedaemonian,  Xanthippus,  who 
t'oniicd  a  line  of  elephants  in  front  of  the  heavy  infantry, 
and  placed  the  cavalry  and  light  infantry  on  the  wings. 
Instead  of  the  usual  chequerwise  order  of  the  legion, 
Regulus  drew  up  his  maniples  in  deep  columns  ynih 
lanes  between  them  through  which  the  elephants  might 
pass.  This  so  far  proved  successful  that,  though  many 
men  were  trampled  down,  the  columns  forced  their 
way  through  the  line  of  elephants,  and  reached  the 
Carthaginian  phalanx.  But  there  they  were  checked, 
and  the  hinder  ranks  had  to  face  about  to  engage  the 
Carthaginian  cavalry,  which  had  easily  routed  the  Roman 
horse  and  fell  on  the  rear  of  the  legions.  Only  about 
2000  men  escaped,  and  for  some  years  afterwards  the 
Romans  took  care  not  to  tight  battles  in  the  open  field 
where  they  would  have  to  face  an  elephant  charge." 

Carthage  found  in  Spain  compensation  for  the  loss  of 
Sicily,  and  it  was  from  Spain  that  Hannibal  set  out  in 
218  li.c.  to  invade  Italy.  He  passed  the  Pyrenees  with 
50,000  foot,  9000  horse,  and  37  elephants.  The  infantry 
was  three-tifths  Libyan  and  two-fifths  Spanish,  and  the 
cavalry  mainly  Numidian.  This  army  had  shrunk  to 
20,000  foot  and  6000  horse  when  it  reached  the  valley 
of  the  Po;-  but  he  was  joined  there  by  some  Cis- 
alpine Gauls,  and  he  had  also  some  light-armed  troops, 
Ligurians  and  Balearic  slingers.  Altogether  he  had  38,000 
men,  of  whom  one-fourth  were  mounted,  when  he  en- 
countered a  Roman  army  of  about  equal  strength,  but 
much  weaker  in  cavalry,  on  the  Trebia. 

Hannibal  was  a  master  of  stratagem.     By  the  time  the 

battle  began   the  Romans  were   chilled   by  fording   the 

river  and  faint  for  want  of  food,  and  they  had  used  up 

many  of  their  javelins  in  skirmishing  with  the  Numidian 

'  Polybius,  i.  39.  2  Jb.,  iii.  35,  56 


28  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

horse.  His  own  heavy  infantry  was  fresh  and  well  fed. 
His  cavalry  on  the  wings  soon  routed  the  Roman  cavalry, 
and  fell  upon  the  flanks  of  their  infantry.  His  light 
troops  and  elephants  joined  in  these  flank  attacks,  and 
an  attack  was  also  made  on  the  Roman  rear  by  a  force 
of  1000  horse  and  1000  foot  which  had  been  placed  in 
ambush.  But  in  spite  of  all  these  adverse  circumstances 
the  legionaries  were  so  much  the  better  men  that  10,000 
of  them  cut  their  way  through  the  middle  of  the  Cartha- 
ginian army,  and  finding  it  impossible  to  regain  their 
own  camp,  marched  in  close  order  to  Placentia. 

In  the  following  year  (217  B.C.)  Hannibal  surprised  a 
Roman  army  in  the  defile  of  Trasimene.  It  found  itself 
blocked  in  front  and  rear,  as  in  the  Caudine  valley  a 
century  before.  Here  again  6000  men  succeeded  in 
breaking  through  the  troops  enveloping  them,  though 
they  were  overtaken  and  forced  to  surrender  next  day. 
The  Libyan  infantry  was  rearmed  in  the  Roman  manner 
from  the  spoils  of  this  battle. 

The  moral  effect  of  these  victories  and  confidence  in 
his  own  skill  made  Hannibal  gladly  accept  battle  against 
odds  of  nearly  two  to  one.  At  Cannae  (216  B.C.)  he  had 
40,000  infantry  and  10,000  cavalry.  The  two  consuls 
opposed  to  him  had  eight  Roman  legions  with  their  quota 
of  allies,  numbering  80,000  foot  and  6000  horse ;  but  the 
heavy  losses  of  the  two  previous  years  must  have  told 
severely  on  their  quality.  Each  consul  commanded  in 
chief  on  alternate  days,  ^milius  Paullus,  a  tried  soldier, 
was  resolved  to  avoid  battle  in  the  open  plain  on  account 
of  the  enemy's  superiority  in  horse ;  but  Terentius  Varro, 
who  was  rash  and  inexperienced,  thought  otherwise,  and 
played  into  Hannibal's  hands.  He  left  10,000  men  in  a 
camp  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Aufidus,  took  the  rest  of 
the  army  across,  and  drew  it  up  facing  south  with  its 


THE   ROMANS  29 

right  resting  on  the  river.  Hannibal  followed  suit,  and 
drew  up  his  army  opposite,  with  Cannto  to  his  loft  roar.i 
The  Numidian  cavalry  was  on  the  Carthaginian  right,  the 
Spanish  and  Gallic  cavalry  on  the  left.  Of  the  infantry,  the 
Gauls  and  Spaniards  were  intermixed  in  the  centre,  and 
the  Libyans  were  to  right  and  left  of  them.  He  pushed 
forward  his  centre  and  made  his  line  of  battle  convex, 
in  order  that  the  Gauls  and  Spaniards  might  be  first 
engaged,  and  the  African  troops  be  held  in  reserve.  The 
Gauls  were  armed  with  a  broad  sword,  and  used  the 
edge  only,  not  the  point.  Open  order  was  necessary  for 
them  to  wield  their  weapon,  and  their  line  was  long  and 
thin.  The  Roman  order  on  the  contrary  was  very  deep. 
The  maniples  were  closer  together  than  usual,  and  the 
depth  of  each  maniple  was  several  times  greater  than 
its  front."  This  was  probably  due  to  want  of  space  for 
their  large  numbers.  It  seems  to  imply  that  their  front- 
age was  not  more  than  one-fourth  of  what  was  customary, 
so  that  the  whole  of  their  infantry  would  not  occupy 
more  than  two  miles. 

While  the  cavalry  were  engaged  with  one  another  on 
the  wings,  there  was  a  skirmish  of  light-armed  troops 
in  the  centre.  When  these  fell  back,  the  Roman  line 
began  to  press  upon  the  convex  front  of  the  Gauls  and 
Spaniards.  It  yielded  and  gradually  became  concave ; 
the  maniples  of  the  Roman  centre  pushed  onward,  and 
those  of  the  wings  drew  towards  the  centre,  where  the 
stress  of  the  battle  lay.  It  seemed  as  though  the  Cartha- 
ginian army  would  be  cut  in  two,  as  at  the  Trebia.  But 
the  Libyans  on  the  wings  were  now  faced  left  and  right, 

'  On  this  vexed  question  I  have  adopted  the  view  taken  by  Mr.  Strachan- 
Davidson  in  his  Selections  from  Polyhius,  which  is  supported  by  Sir 
Edward  Fry  (English  Bittorical  Review,  October  1897). 

*  Polyhius,  iii.  113. 


30  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

and  wound  inwards  and  rearwards  as  the  Gauls  and 
Spaniards  fell  back,^  until  as  pincers  they  had  fairly 
enclosed  the  Roman  wedge,  when  they  fell  with  fury 
upon  its  flanks. 

By  this  time  the  Carthaginian  cavalry  on  the  left  wing 
had  routed  the  Roman  cavalry  opposed  to  it,  had  joined 
the  Numidians  on  the  right,  and  defeated  the  allied 
cavalry.  Leaving  the  Numidians  to  pursue,  it  had  then 
fallen  upon  the  rear  of  the  legions.  Surrounded  on  all 
sides,  the  Romans  seem  to  have  lost  hope.  They  made 
no  vigorous  effort  to  break  through,  but  were  pressed 
together  and  gradually  cut  down.  Five-sixths  of  their 
whole  army  perished,  while  the  Carthaginian  loss  was 
under  6000.  Polybius  regards  the  battle  as  "a  lesson  to 
posterity  that  in  actual  war  it  is  better  to  have  half  the 
number  of  infantry,  and  the  superiority  in  cavalry,  than 
to  engage  your  enemy  with  an  equality  in  both,"  but  he 
recognises  elsewhere  that  it  was  to  the  skill  and  genius  of 
Hannibal  that  the  Romans  owed  their  defeats.- 

The  Carthaginians  would  have  crucified  Varro ;  the 
Romans  thanked  him  for  not  despairing  of  the  Republic  ; 
but  they  took  more  care  in  future  to  secure  competent 
commanders.  Their  demeanour  after  so  crushing  a  blow 
explains  better  than  anything  else  how  they  came  to 
conquer  the  world.  Napoleon  has  endorsed  the  often 
expressed  opinion  that  if  Hannibal  had  marched  on  Rome 
after  Cannse  it  would  have  fallen  into  his  hands.  On  the 
other  hand,  Polybius  makes  the  general  reflection  that  he 
should  have  reserved  his  attack  upon  the  Romans  until  he 
had  first  subdued  other  parts  of  the  world.*    The  two  criti- 

'  "  Paulatim  invicem  sinuantibus  procedentibusque  ad  prjeceptum 
cornibus,  avide  insequentem  hostem  in  mediam  aciem  suam  recepit." — 
Frontinus,  II.  iii.  7. 

2  Polybius,  iii.  117,  xviii.  28.  ^  lb.,  xi.  19. 


THE   ROMANS  31 

cisms  may  be  said  to  cancel  one  another.  So  solidly 
based  a  power  was  not  to  be  overturned  at  a  stroke.  It 
could  only  be  crushed  by  a  well-compacted  coalition  of 
the  various  peoples  which  it  had  subdued  one  by  one. 
For  such  a  coaUtion  Hannibal's  small  army  offered  a 
nucleus.  Yet  in  spite  of  his  brilliant  victories,  attach- 
ment to  Rome,  or  fear  of  her,  prevented  any  such  general 
adhesion  as  he  hoped  for.  Capua  joined  him,  but  on 
condition  that  its  citizens  should  not  have  to  fight  for 
him.  Other  cities  closed  their  gates,  and  he  had  not  the 
means  for  successful  sieges.  Carthage,  which  might  have 
furnished  them,  sent  him  mere  driblets,  and  as  his  army 
wasted  away,  it  had  to  be  recruited  from  the  men  ot 
Southern  Italy. 

Polybius  was  filled  with  admiration  of  the  skill  which 
enabled  Hannibal  to  maintain  himself  for  sixteen  years 
in  Italy,  with  an  army  of  many  races  which  never  showed 
disaffection,  but  obeyed  him  alike  in  good  and  bad  fortune, 
and  was  never  beaten  in  any  important  action.  But  he 
was  equally  struck  with  the  energy  of  the  Romans,  who 
while  they  were  threatened  by  their  great  enemy,  carried 
the  war  into  Spain  and  Sicily,  and  finally  into  Africa.  It 
was  to  their  mixed  constitution  that  he  attributed  the 
high  spirit  and  unity  of  purpose  which  carried  them  in 
this  and  other  cases  through  disaster  to  empire :  the 
partition  of  power  between  consuls,  senate,  and  people.^ 

In  202  B.C.  Hannibal  was  recalled  to  Africa  to  defend 
Carthage,  and  met  with  his  first  defeat  at  Zama.  The 
Romans  had  been  careful  since  Canna;  to  avoid  pitched 
battles  in  the  open  field.  Hannibal  seems  to  have  had 
slightly  the  advantage  in  numbers,  and  the  difference  in 
quality  must  have  been  very  marked  that  led  Scipio  to 
refuse  the  terms  he  offered.     The  Romans  had  secured 

'  Polybius,  xi.  19,  viii.  3,  vi.  18. 


32  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

Massinissa  and  his  Numidian  horsemen  as  alUes,  and  in 
cavalry  Hannibal  was  outnumbered  by  two  to  one.  As 
usual,  the  weaker  cavalry  were  soon  driven  off  the  field, 
and  the  conquerors,  after  pursuing  them  for  some  distance, 
fell  upon  the  rear  of  the  infantry.  That  infantry  was 
of  three  kinds.  In  first  line  Hannibal  placed  12,000 
mercenaries,  in  second  line  Libyans  and  Carthaginians, 
and  behind  them  again  the  veterans  whom  he  had 
brought  with  him  from  Italy.  In  front  of  all  was  a  line 
of  more  than  80  elephants. 

To  encounter  the  elephants,  Scipio  did  as  Regulus  had 
done ;  he  placed  the  principes  behind  the  hastati,  and 
the  triarii  behind  the  principes,  leaving  lanes  (tem- 
porarily occupied  by  velites)  for  the  elephants  to  pass 
through.  He  also  left  wide  spaces  between  the  lines  of 
maniples.  The  elephants  charged  without  much  effect, 
and  did  as  much  harm  to  their  own  side  as  to  the  enemy. 
When  they  were  gone  the  infantry  of  the  two  armies 
closed.  "As  the  combatants  used  their  swords  and  not 
their  spears,  the  superiority  was  at  first  on  the  side  of  the 
dexterity  and  daring  of  the  mercenaries,  which  enabled 
them  to  wound  a  considerable  number  of  the  Romans. 
The  latter,  however,  trusting  to  the  steadiness  of  their 
ranks  and  the  excellence  of  their  arms,  still  kept  gaining 
ground,  their  rear  ranks  keepmg  close  up  with  them  and 
encouraging  them  to  advance;  while  the  Carthaginians 
did  not  keep  up  with  their  mercenaries,  nor  support 
them,  but  showed  a  thoroughly  cowardly  spirit."^ 

There  was  not  much  hope  for  a  city  whose  citizens 
behaved  so  badly,  even  when  sandwiched  between  better 
troops.  At  length  the  mercenaries  gave  way,  and  in  their 
retreat  killed  many  of  the  Carthaginians,  who  fled  along 
with    them.      On    the    approach   of   this    mixed    mass, 

1  Polybius,  XV.  13. 


THE   ROMANS  33 

Hannibal  had  to  order  his  veterans  to  lower  their  spears 
that  their  ranks  might  not  be  broken  through.  After  an 
interval  came  the  final  struggle  between  these  veterans 
and'Scipio's  legions.  Principcs  and  triarii  were  moved  up 
into  line  with  the  hastati  before  the  charge  was  made. 
"Being  nearly  equal  in  numbers,  spirit,  courage,  and 
arms,  the  battle  was  for  a  long  time  undecided,"  but  the 
Roman  cavalry  with  Massinissa's  Numidians  decided  it  by 
attacking  Hannibal's  troops  in  rear.  The  Carthaginian 
army  was  destroyed,  20,000  being  killed,  and  nearly  as 
many  made  prisoners,  while  the  Roman  loss  was  reckoned 
at  1500.1 

It  was  by  Hannibal's  advice  that  Carthage  at  once 
submitted  after  this  defeat;  we  may  be  sure,  therefore, 
that  she  had  no  alternative.  The  nation  of  shopkeepers 
had  not  the  staying  power  of  the  nation  of  farmers.  She 
was  not  of  one  mind :  there  was  a  peace  party  as  well  as 
a  war  party.  There  was  a  wide  interval  between  rich 
and  poor,  and  small  love  between  herself  and  her  subjects. 
Above  all,  her  citizens  had  learnt  to  depend  on  hiring 
others  to  fight  for  them,  instead  of  fighting  for  them- 
selves. "  I  do  affirm,"  says  Machiavelli,^  "  'tis  not  money 
(as  the  common  opinion  will  have  it)  but  good  soldiers 
that  is  the  sinews  of  war;  for  money  cannot  find  good 
soldiers,  but  good  soldiers  will  be  sure  to  find  money." 
Hannibal's  own  career  shows  that  this  is  too  absolute; 
but  at  all  events  mercenaries  must  not  be  able  to  despise 
those  who  hire  them. 

The  submission  of  Carthage  left  the  Romans  free  to  turn 
their  attention  to  Greece.  Philip  V.  of  Macedon  had  made 
a  treaty  with  Hannibal  after  Canna3,  and  a  small  con- 
tingent of  his  troops  had  taken  part  in  the  battle  of 
Zama.     Rome  declared  war  against  him,  and  at  Cynos- 

'  Polybius,  XV.  14.  -  Discourses  on  Livy,  II.  ,x. 


34  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

cephalee  (197  B.C.)  the  legion  was  again  pitted  against  the 
phalanx.  The  battle  developed  itself  accidentally  out  of 
an  encounter  of  light  troops,  and  on  hilly  ground  ill  suited 
to  the  phalanx.  Philip  had  formed  only  part  of  his  army 
on  the  top  of  the  hill,  when  the  approach  of  the  legions, 
driving  his  light  troops  before  them,  obliged  him  to 
attack.  Their  arms  and  the  depth  and  closeness  of  their 
formation,  together  with  the  fall  of  the  ground,  gave  the 
Macedonians  the  advantage  in  the  first  onset,  and  they 
forced  back  the  Romans  in  their  front.  But  the  Roman 
right  wing,  headed  by  some  elephants,  pushed  up  to  the 
top  of  the  hiil  where  the  rest  of  the  Macedonians  were  in 
the  act  of  forming,  and  easily  dispersed  them.  A  tribune 
with  twenty  maniples  then  fell  on  the  rear  of  the  division 
which  was  pressing  the  Roman  left.  "  The  nature  of  the 
phalanx  is  such  that  the  men  cannot  face  round  singly 
and  defend  themselves:  this  tribune,  therefore,  charged 
them  and  killed  all  he  could  get  at ;  until,  being  unable 
to  defend  themselves,  they  were  forced  to  throw  down 
their  shields  and  fly;  whereupon  the  Romans  in  their 
front,  who  had  begun  to  yield,  faced  round  again  and 
charged  them  too."' 

Polybius  follows  up  his  account  of  this  battle  by  a  com- 
parison of  the  Roman  and  Macedonian  modes  of  fighting. 
A  charge  of  the  phalanx  was  irresistible  so  long  as  it  kept 
its  order ;  for  the  Romans  being  at  6  feet,  the  others  at 
3  feet  intervals,  each  legionary  of  the  front  rank  had 
ten  spears  to  encounter.  But  the  ground  must  be  level 
and  free  from  obstacles,  and  even  on  such  ground  the 
order  of  the  phalanx  was  apt  to  be  broken  by  success  as 
well  as  by  failure,  and  it  was  no  longer  fit  to  meet  an 
attack.  Besides  it  must  be  used  as  a  whole,  and  was 
unsuited  to  the  emergencies  of  war,  to  seizing  points  of 

'  Polybius,  xviii.  26. 


THE   ROMANS  35 

vantage,  to  haphazard  collisions,  and  to  siege  warfare. 
"The  Roman  order,  on  the  other  hand,  is  flexible:  for 
every  Roman,  once  armed  and  on  the  field,  is  equally  well 
equipped  for  every  plan,  time,  or  appearance  of  the  enemy. 
He  is,  moreover,  quite  ready  and  needs  to  make  no  change, 
whether  he  is  required  to  light  in  the  main  body,  or  in 
detachment,  or  in  a  single  maniple,  or  even  by  himself."  ^ 
These  remarks  were  borne  out  by  the  battle  of  Pydna 
(168  B.C.),  when  Perseus,  the  son  of  Philip,  met  with  a 
crushing  defeat  from  L.  ^milius  PauUus.  The  phalanx, 
fighting  on  level  ground,  bore  all  before  it,  and  drove  the 
legions  back  upon  a  hill  near  the  Roman  camp.  Here 
the  fortune  of  the  day  changed.  The  ranks  of  the  phalanx 
had  become  disordered  in  the  hurry  of  pursuit;  small 
bodies  of  the  Romans  broke  in  at  the  gaps,  while  others 
attacked  it  m  flanks  and  rear.  In  hand-to-hand  fighting 
the  Macedonians  were  at  a  disadvantage  both  as  to  sword 
and  shield,  and  in  the  end  they  were  routed. 

While  Greece  and  Spain,  North  Africa  and  Asia  Minor 
were  being  gradually  brought  under  Roman  rule,  the 
Roman  army  underwent  a  change.  The  small  farmers 
who  had  been  its  backbone  disappeared  from  its  ranks. 
War  had  lessened  their  numbers  and  mterfered  with  their 
work,  especially  prolonged  war  in  foreign  lands.  The 
population  of  the  city  increased,  food  was  imported  and 
sold  at  a  low  price,  money  became  plentiful,  and  the  small 
farmers  found  themselves  forced  to  sell  their  land  to 
wealthy  men  who  cultivated  it  by  slave  labour,  or  turned 
it  into  pasture. 

While  the  middle  class  was  disappearing,  the  upper 
class,  grown  rich  and  luxurious,  disliked  military  service 
except  in  high  command.     Subject  provinces  furnished 

'  Polybius,  xviii.  32. 


36  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

special  troops :  heavy  cavalry  from  Thrace,  light  cavalry 
from  Africa,  light  infantry  from  Liguria  and  the  Balearic 
Isles ;  and  the  poorer  townsfolk  were  ready  and  eager  to 
serve  in  the  legions.  The  property  qualification  had  been 
lowered  by  the  middle  of  the  second  century  B.C.,  and  by 
the  end  of  that  century  it  was  done  away  with  altogether. 
When  Marius  raised  an  army  for  the  war  against  Jugurtha, 
the  senate  allowed  him  to  accept  all  free-born  citizens 
who  offered  themselves.  A  few  years  later,  Roman 
citizenship  was  conferred  on  all  Italians,  and  the  dis- 
tinction between  Romans  and  aUies  was  no  longer  main- 
tained in  the  legions. 

This  changed  the  character  of  the  Roman  soldiery. 
The  farmer  or  burgess  militiaman  had  been  eager  to  get 
back  to  civil  life;  the  enlisted  proletarian  depended  on 
his  pay,  the  camp  wfid  his  home,  and  he  prolonged  his 
service  to  the  utmost.  The  usual  term  was  twenty-five 
years,  and  he  was  not  allowed  to  marry.  As  Gibbon  put 
it:  "War  was  gradually  improved  into  an  art  and  de- 
graded into  a  trade."  The  soldiers  looked  to  their  own 
general,  and  based  their  hopes  on  him,  without  concerning 
themselves  much  about  the  Republic. 

As  the  army  became  more  professional,  a  more  thorough 
drill  was  introduced,  based  on  the  training  of  gladiators. 
The  organisation  of  the  legion  was  altered  by  Marius,  or 
rather  the  Roman  legions  were  brought  into  conformity 
with  those  of  the  allies.  Instead  of  thirty  maniples,  they 
were  made  to  consist  of  ten  cohorts.  The  distinction  of 
velites,  hastati,  principes,  and  triarii  was  swept  away; 
henceforward  there  was  only  one  kind  of  legionary  soldier 
for  all  purposes,  armed  with  sword  and  pilum,  and  only 
one  standard,  the  eagle.  Cavalry  ceased  to  form  part  of 
the  legion.  The  cohorts  were  disposed  in  three  lines 
according  to  the  general's  discretion.      The  number  of 


THE   ROMANS  37 

ranks  in  a  cohort  was  sometimes  increased  to  ten,  and  the 
tiles  were  made  closer ;  so  that  a  legion  with  four  cohorts 
in  lirst  line  might  occupj^  onl}-  a  quarter  of  a  mile  of  front, 
instead  of  half  a  mile.  The  larger  units  and  the  closer 
formation  may  have  been  the  result  of  Marius's  experience 
against  the  hordes  of  Cimbri  and  Teutones,  or  of  the 
greater  numbers  which  it  had  become  habitual  to  bring 
into  the  Held. 

Each  cohort,  being  made  up  of  three  maniples  or  six 
centuries,  had  six  centurions,  who  might  rise  to  the 
position  of  primipUus,  or  first  centurion  of  the  legion, 
but  seldom  obtained  any  further  promotion.  Each 
cohort  had  its  own  ensign,  and  a  silver  eagle  was  given 
to  the  legion.  On  the  march  the  legionary  was  loaded 
"like  a  sumpter  mule,"  with  clothing,  rations,  cooking 
implements,  and  intrenching  tools.  To  carry  these  more 
conveniently,  Marius  provided  him  with  a  forked  pole, 
which  was  known  as  Marius's  mule,  and  is  represented 
on  Trajan's  column.  The  soldier  had  often  to  carry 
also  three  or  four  stakes,  with  side  shoots  that  might 
be  intertwisted,  to  form  a  stout  palisade.^  Yet  he  was 
expected  to  march  twenty  miles  or  more  in  a  day. 

If  the  professional  soldier  of  the  later  days  of  the 
Republic  was  inferior  in  some  respects  to  the  citizen- 
soldier  of  earlier  times,  if  he  was  less  patriotic  and 
religious,  and  looked  more  to  plunder  and  promotion, 
he  was  as  enduring  and  stout-hearted  as  ever,  and  he 
knew  his  business  better.  He  was  incessantly  employed 
either  in  military  exercises  or  on  civil  works.  Josephus, 
a  century  after  the  downfall  of  the  Republic,  was  full  of 
admiration  of  the  Roman  soldiers  that  Titus  led  against 
Jerusalem.  "Neither  can  any  disorder  remove  them 
from  their  usual  regularity,  nor  can  fear  affright  them 
'  Polybius,  xviii.  18. 


38  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

out  of  it,  nor  can  labour  tire  them."  Body  and  soul 
were  strengthened  by  exercises  and  hardened  by  fear; 
for  death  was  the  penalty,  not  only  of  running  away, 
but  of  sloth.  "  When  they  come  to  a  battle  the  whole 
army  is  but  one  body,  so  well  coupled  together  are  their 
ranks,  so  sudden  are  their  turnings  about,  so  sharp  their 
hearing  as  to  what  orders  are  given  them,  so  quick  their 
sight  of  the  ensigns,  and  so  nimble  are  their  hands  when 
they  set  to  work;  whereby  it  comes  to  pass  that  what 
they  do  is  done  quickly,  and  what  they  suffer  they  bear 
with  the  greatest  patience."  ^ 

Examples  of  their  behaviour  under  all  conditions  of 
warfare  are  to  be  found  in  Csesar's  Commentaries.  Their 
readiness  to  endure  privation  was  shown  at  Avaricum 
(52  B.C.).  When  Cajsar  offered  to  raise  the  siege  if  they 
found  the  scarcity  of  food  intolerable,  they  assured  him 
they  would  rather  bear  anything  than  fail  to  avenge  the 
slaughter  of  their  fellow-countrymen.^  The  labours  they 
would  undertake  were  exemplified  at  Alesia  (52  B.C.), 
where  the  lines  of  circumvallation  and  contravallation 
were  together  25  miles  in  length,  and  had  to  be 
guarded  by  50,000  men  against  a  more  numerous  enemy 
within,  and  a  very  much  larger  relieving  army  outside.^ 
Even  bolder,  though  less  successful,  were  the  lines  by 
which  Cffisar  invested  Pompey's  army  at  Dyrrhachium, 
shortly  before  Pharsalia :  a  chain  of  twenty-four  redoubts 
with  a  circuit  of  15  miles,  to  which  an  outer  chain  was 
afterwards  added.* 

Nothing  tests  troops  more  than  a  surprise.  Six 
legions  were  intrenching  their  camp  on  the  Sambre 
(57  B.C.),  two  others  with  the  baggage  train  were  still 
on  the  march  in  rear,  the  cavalry  and  light  troops  had 

1  Jewish  War,  iii.  cli.  5.  -  De  hello  gallico,  vii.  17. 

^  II.,  p.  71,  &c.  ■■  De  hello  drill,  iii.  44. 


THE   ROMANS  39 

been  sent  over  the  river  and  were  skirmishing  on  the 
fringe  of  a  wood  in  which  the  Nervii  and  their  allies, 
numbering  some  60,000,  lay  concealed.  Suddenly  the 
Gauls  issued  from  the  wood,  forded  the  Sambre,  driving 
the  Roman  horse  before  them,  and  fell  upon  the  legions 
at  work.  "So  short  was  the  time  allowed  us,  and  so 
eager  for  fight  was  the  enemy,  that  the  men  not  only 
could  not  fix  their  plumes,  but  could  not  even  put  on 
their  helmets  and  take  the  covers  off  their  shields.  Each 
man  joined  the  nearest  ensign  rather  than  search  for  his 
own  company  when  he  might  be  fighting."  ^ 

The  two  legions  in  the  centre  soon  repulsed  their 
assailants  and  followed  them  to  the  river.  The  two  on 
the  left  did  more ;  they  crossed  the  river  in  pursuit,  and 
took  the  enemy's  camp.  But  meanwhile  the  Nervii,  the 
bravest  of  the  tribesmen,  had  enveloped  the  legions  on 
the  right  (Seventh  and  Twelfth)  and  gained  possession 
of  the  unfinished  camp  of  the  Romans.  Ctesar,  on  join- 
ing his  right  wing,  found  the  men  crowded  together  and 
discouraged,  with  no  reserve  to  help  them.  He  retired 
them  a  little  and  placed  them  back  to  back,  to  show 
a  double  front  to  the  enemy.  The  two  legions  that 
formed  the  rearguard  hurried  up,  and  the  Tenth  legion 
(one  of  those  which  had  taken  the  enemy's  camp)  was 
sent  back  to  give  assistance.  The  cavalry  rallied,  and  at 
length  by  united  efforts  the  Nervii  were  overpowered 
and  cut  to  pieces,  after  fighting  obstinately  behind  a 
i-ampart  of  dead  bodies. 

Sometimes  Cajsar  had  to  check  the  ardour  of  his  men, 
sometimes  to  reprove  their  rashness,  greed  for  booty,  and 
disregard  of  orders."  Occasionally,  as  at  D3Trhachium, 
they  gave  way  to  panic  which  even  he  was  unable  to 
overcome,  or  broke  out  into  mutiny  {e.g.  the  legions  in 

'   Bd.  gal.,  ii.  16-28.  «  lb.,  vii.  19,  52. 


40  THE   HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

Campania,  when  ordered  to  Africa).  But  on  the  whole, 
as  Mommsen  says,  "perhaps  there  never  was  an  army 
which  was  more  perfectly  what  an  army  ought  to  be."  i 

Its  quality  was  shown  at  Pharsalia  (48  B.C.),  where  it 
encountered  an  army  of  more  than  twice  its  numbers, 
trained  in  the  same  fashion,  and  commanded  by  a  general 
whom  some  people  are  disposed  to  rank  even  higher  than 
Caesar.  Pompey  had  7000  horsemen,  Caesar  only  1000 ; 
but  the  latter  intermixed  infantry  with  his  cavalry,  and 
formed  a  corps  of  six  cohorts  to  support  them.  These 
cohorts,  using  their  pila  as  spears,  charged  Pompey's 
cavalry  as  it  was  preparing  to  fall  upon  the  flank  of  the 
legions,  and  drove  it  off  the  field.  Then  they  wheeled 
round  the  enemy's  left,  and  assisted  Ca3sar's  front  attack 
by  an  attack  in  rear. 

Pompey,  distrusting  his  infantry,  kept  them  halted, 
that  they  might  be  fresh  and  in  good  order  when  Caesar's 
men  arrived  fatigued  and  out  of  breath.  But,  as  Caesar 
says,  "  there  is  a  certain  alacrity  and  ardour  of  mind 
planted  by  nature  in  every  man  which  is  inflamed  by 
the  desire  of  fighting,  and  which  commanders  ought  not 
to  repress,  but  to  excite.  Nor  was  it  idly  laid  down  of 
old  that  the  trumpets  should  sound,  and  the  whole  army 
raise  a  shout,  whereby,  as  they  reckoned,  the  enemy 
would  be  struck  with  terror  and  our  own  men  en- 
couraged." ^  He  had  the  advantage  of  this  stimulus 
without  disordering  his  troops,  for  they  were  well  enough 
in  hand  to  halt  and  recover  breath  before  closing.  The 
Pompeian  legions,  assailed  on  both  sides,  held  their 
ground  for  a  time,  but  at  length  fled  to  their  camp. 
The  battle  had  lasted  till  noon  and  the  weather  was 
extremely  hot,  yet  Caesar  persuaded  his  troops  to  storm 
the  camp,  and  to  pursue  the  enemy  for  several  miles, 

1  Mommsen,  iv.  366.  -  Bel.  civ.,  iii.  92. 


THE   ROMANS  41 

twice  intrenching  themselves  in  the  course  of  their 
advance. 

The  reduction  of  the  legionaries  to  a  single  type,  a 
"  handy  man  "fit  for  any  job,  even  to  attack  cavalry, 
was  not  without  its  drawbacks.  The  auxiliaries  on 
whom  dependence  was  placed  for  cavalry  and  light 
troops  often  failed,  and  the  legionary  had  to  deal  with 
a  more  mobile  enemy  whom  he  could  not  bring  to  close 
combat.  In  his  second  invasion  of  Britain  Ctesar  found 
this  the  case,  and  shortly  afterwards  the  troops  under 
Sabinus  and  Gotta  were  destroyed  on  the  march  by 
the  desultory  tactics  of  Ambiorix,^  as  the  legions  of 
Varus  were  afterwards  destroyed  by  Arminius.  In  the 
African  war  (4G  B.C.)  Caesar  found  himself  enveloped 
in  an  open  plain  near  Ruspina  by  a  great  force  of 
cavalry  and  light  troops,  chiefly  Numidian.  He  had 
oO  cohorts,  but  only  400  horsemen  and  1.50  archers. 
The  enemy  closed  in  and  threw  darts  into  the  cohorts. 
When  the  latter  charged,  the  horsemen  retired,  and 
waited  for  their  opportunity  when  the  ranks  should  be 
broken  in  pursuit  or  in  combat  with  the  light  troops. 
C;esar  had  to  check  the  sallies  of  his  men,  and  they 
were  gradually  pressed  together  into  a  circle ;  a  good 
target  for  missiles.  Caesar  saw  that  he  must  break  the 
enemy's  ring  surrounding  him ;  so  he  drew  his  troops 
out  in  as  long  a  line  as  he  could,  made  alternate  cohorts 
face  about,  burst  the  ring  with  his  flank  cohorts,  and 
then  charged  the  two  halves  of  it.  He  was  then  able 
to  make  good  his  retreat  to  his  camp.2 

The  army  of  Crassus,  attacked  in  similar  fashion  by 
the  Parthians  near  Carrha;  (53  B.C.),  was  not  so  fortunate. 
It  consisted  of  seven  legions  with  4000  cavalry  and  4000 
slingers  and  archers.     It  was  in  the  open  desert  between 

'   Ikl.  (jal.,  V.  It;,  ;i.-).         -  BMum  Africa,  pp.  14-17.     Cf.  Stoflfel,  ii.  287. 


42  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

the  Euphrates  and  Tigris,  when  it  found  itself  un- 
expectedly in  presence  of  the  Parthian  army,  which 
consisted  wholly  of  mounted  archers  and  lancers.  The 
legions  were  formed  into  a  square,  and  the  archers  were 
sent  forward ;  but  they  were  soon  overpowered,  not  only, 
by  numbers,  but  by  the  greater  range  of  the  Parthian 
bow.  P.  Crassus  with  a  select  corps  of  6000  horse 
and  foot  charged  the  enemy  as  they  were  closing  round 
the  square.  The  Parthians  fled  before  him,  and  when 
his  ardour  had  carried  him  far  from  the  main  body, 
they  turned  upon  his  corps,  surrounded  it  and  destroyed 
it.  Then  going  back  to  the  square,  they  poured  arrows 
into  it  for  the  rest  of  the  day.  At  night  they  left  it, 
and  the  remains  of  the  Roman  army  escaped  to  Carrhte, 
where  there  was  a  Roman  garrison.  Further  losses  were 
incurred  in  continuing  the  retreat  from  Carrhfe,  and  only 
one-fourth  of  the  army  reached  Syria.^ 

The  professional  army  initiated  by  Marius  extended  the 
Roman  dominion  to  the  Rhine  and  the  Euphrates,  but  it 
inflicted  on  the  commonwealth  two  generations  of  civil 
war.  It  was  an  instrument  in  the  hands  of  ambitious 
leaders  who  took  sides  for  or  against  class  privilege. 
The  soldiers  were  no  longer  the  soldiers  of  the  Re- 
public, but  the  soldiers  of  Sylla  or  Marius,  Pompey  or 
Caesar.  The  establishment  of  the  empire  brought  about  a 
change  in  this  respect.  Following  the  example  of  Julius, 
Augustus  took  the  title  of  Imperator,  and  the  army  had 
henceforward  a  permanent  commander-in-chief  to  whom 
it  swore  obedience.  He  appointed  permanent  chiefs, 
his  legates,  to  the  several  legions,  instead  of  letting  the 
command  fall  to  the  military  tribunes  in  rotation. 

The  aim  of  Augustus  was  to  consolidate,  not  to  enlarge, 

•  Mommsen,  iv.  331. 


THE   ROMANS  43 

the  empire;  and  though  some  annexations  were  found 
necessary  to  obtain  a  scientific  frontier,  the  army  became 
a  means  of  defence  rather  than  a  means  of  conquest.  It 
became  a  standing  army,  for  it  had  to  meet  an  ever- 
present  danger  from  the  peoples  beyond  the  frontier. 
The  legions  had  grown  numerous  during  the  civil  wars ; 
they  were  reduced  to  twenty-five,  and  were  practically 
localised.  Under  Tiberius  there  were  eight  on  the  Rhine, 
six  in  the  countries  south  of  the  Danube,  four  in  Syria, 
four  in  Africa,  and  three  in  Spain.  To  make  them  fit 
to  act  separately,  120  horsemen  were  added  to  each 
legion. 1 

Auxiliary  troops  raised  in  the  provinces  were  attached 
to  the  legions  and  were  commanded  by  their  legates. 
They  were  cohorts  of  .500  or  1000  men,  some  wholly  of 
foot,  others  including  horsemen  to  the  extent  of  one- 
fourth.  Some  were  armed  according  to  the  custom  of 
their  country  with  bows,  slings,  &c. ;  others  were  equipped 
and  trained  in  the  Roman  manner.  There  were  also 
bodies  of  horsemen  of  about  the  same  strength  as  the 
cohorts. 

In  the  armies  of  the  Republic  there  had  been  a  body- 
guard for  the  commander-in-chief  which  was  styled  the 
praatorian  cohort.  This  corps  was  raised  to  nine  cohorts 
by  Augustus,  and  did  guard  duty  in  Rome,  and  at  the 
imperial  residences  elsewhere.  It  comprised  horse  and 
foot,  grew  by  degrees  to  50,000  men,  and  played  a 
prominent  part  in  the  making  and  unmaking  of  em- 
perors till  it  was  abolished  by  Constantine. 

Under  the  system  adopted  by  Augustus  and  his  suc- 
cessors, the  empire  "  presented  to  its  foes  a  hard  shell 
and  a  soft  kernel."  -  There  were  no  reserves  of  troops 
in  the  interior,  and  when  legions  were   drawn  from  the 

'  Marquanlt,  p.  lUH.  -  Oman,  p.  (i. 


44  THE   HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

frontier  to  support  rival  claimants  to  the  imperial  title, 
the  outer  barbarians  broke  through  the  shell.  The 
Goths  crossed  the  Danube,  stormed  Philippopolis,  and 
destroyed  the  emperor  Decius  and  his  army  (a.d.  251). 
A  few  years  afterwards  another  emperor,  Valerian,  had  to 
surrender  to  the  Persians,  who  overran  Syria  and  stormed 
Antioch. 

When  order  was  restored  by  Diocletian  at  the  end  of 
the  century,  new  corps  were  formed  to  serve  as  an 
imperial  field  force.  The  legions  of  these  Palatini  and 
Coviitatenses  numbered  only  1000  men,  and  comprised 
both  horse  and  foot.  They  had  auxiliary  cohorts  attached 
to  them,  and  themselves  contained  a  large  barbarian 
element  which  increased  as  time  went  on.  They  were 
moved  from  one  region  to  another  as  occasion  arose. 
The  older  legions,  left  as  garrison  troops  on  the  frontiers, 
gradually  became  bodies  of  military  colonists  rather  than 
soldiers.  Service  in  them  was  unpopular,  for  the  work 
was  hard,  discipline  severe,  and  rewards  tardy.i  The 
cavalry  was  again  withdrawn  from  them  and  separately 
organised.  From  one-tenth  it  rose  to  about  one-third 
of  the  infantry.  The  strength  of  the  frontier  army  is 
reckoned  at  060,000  by  Mommsen,  and  the  field  force,  or 
emperor's  army,  at  something  under  200,000,  making  a 
total  of  more  than  half  a  million  of  men,  of  whom  nearly 
160,000  were  mounted. 

The  provinces  were  crushed  under  the  burden  of  such 
a  provision  for  defence,  aggravated  as  it  was  by  lavish 
expenditure  on  public  works  and  public  sports.  Hope, 
energy,  courage,  and  enterprise  died  out,  and  the  people 
looked  to  Ca3sar  for  everything.  The  increase  of  cavalry 
was  partly  to  make  up  for  the  deterioration  of  the  in- 
fantry, partly  to  meet  the  swarms  of  barbarian  horsemen, 
'  Vegetius,  ii.  3. 


THE   ROMANS  45 

but  it  did  not  always  serve  its  purpose.  At  Adrianople 
(378  A.D.)  the  emperor  Valens  met  the  fate  of  Decius,  and 
his  army  was  cut  to  pieces  by  the  Goths.  His  successor, 
Theodosius,  adopted  the  dangerous  expedient  of  enhsting 
the  Gothic  horsemen,  not  as  individual  recruits,  but  as 
bands  under  their  own  chiefs,  and  with  their  help  he 
subdued  the  Gallic  legions  which  had  rebelled  against 
him. 

The  Goths  themselves  were  worsted  by  Belisarius  a 
century  and  a  half  afterwards,  but  he  attributed  his 
success  to  his  mounted  archers,  borrowed  from  Asiatic 
warfare.  Procopius  has  described  these  troops  :  "  They 
come  to  the  fight  cuirassed  and  greavcd  to  the  knee. 
They  bear  bow  and  sword,  and  for  the  most  part  a  lance 
also,  and  a  little  shield  slung  on  the  left  shoulder,  worked 
with  a  strap,  not  a  handle.  They  are  splendid  riders, 
can  shoot  while  galloping  at  full  speed  and  keep  up  the 
arrow  flight  with  equal  ease  whether  they  are  advancing 
or  retreating.  They  draw  the  bow-cord  not  to  the  breast, 
but  to  the  face  or  even  to  the  right  ear,  so  that  the 
missile  flies  so  strongly  as  always  to  inflict  a  deadly 
wound,  piercing  both  the  shield  and  cuirass  with  ease."  ^ 

The  bow  was  also  becoming  more  and  more  the  weapon 
of  the  foot  soldier,  and  foimd  its  way  into  the  ranks  of  the 
legion.  A  fragment  of  Arrian,  who  was  governor  of 
Cappadocia  in  the  time  of  Hadrian,  shows  how  he  pro- 
posed to  draw  up  his  troops  to  meet  a  Scythian  enemy. 
His  two  legions  were  to  be  formed  eight  deep,  the  four 
front  ranks  armed  with  the  pilum,  the  others  with 
spears.  Behind  them  there  was  to  be  a  rank  of  foot 
archers,  and  in  rear  of  these  the  horse  archers,  who  were 
to  shoot  over  their  heads.  There  were  to  be  bodies  of 
light  troops  (Armenian  archers,  &c.)  on  each  wing,  with 

'  Oman,  p.  23. 


46  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

heavy  infantry  in  front  of  them.  The  cavalry  which  was 
armed  with  lance  and  sword  was  to  be  in  rear,  prepared  to 
meet  flank  attacks.  The  enemy's  charge  was  to  be  met 
with  a  general  volley  of  arrows,  darts,  and  stones.  If  it 
was  nevertheless  pushed  home,  the  second  and  third 
ranks  must  close  up,  and  with  the  first  rank  must  pre- 
sent the  points  of  their  pila  to  the  horses,  while  those 
behind  them  threw  their  weapons.^ 

With  this  we  may  compare  the  rules  given  by  Vegetius  - 
three  centuries  afterwards  for  the  drawing  up  of  infantry. 
It  is  true  that  he  habitually  "  mixes  up  and  confuses  the 
rules  and  habits  of  his  own  and  of  earlier  times"  (Lipsius), 
but  in  this  case  he  had  evidently  the  warfare  of  his  own 
day  in  view.  The  men  were  to  be  formed  in  six  ranks. 
The  two  front  ranks  should  be  armed  and  armoured  for 
hand-to-hand  fighting,  but  the  men  of  the  second  rank 
should  also  have  bows.  Light-armed  men  with  bows, 
darts,  &c.,  formed  the  third  and  fourth  ranks,  and  slingers 
the  fifth ;  while  the  sixth,  like  the  triarii  of  old,  was  to 
consist  of  the  most  trusty  and  best-equipped  men,  as  a 
reserve.  The  light-armed  troops  should  run  out  and 
engage  the  enemy,  but  if  they  failed  to  drive  him  back 
they  should  take  shelter  behind  the  front  ranks,  whose 
duty  it  was  to  stand  immovable  as  a  Avail. 

Such  a  formation  would  hardly  resist  a  very  serious 
shock.  A  happier  combination  was  tried  by  Narses  at 
Tagina;  (5.52  a.d.).  He  dismounted  his  heavy  cavalry — 
Lombards,  Heruli,  &c. — and  placed  them  in  the  centre  of 
his  line,  between  wings  of  foot  archers  wheeled  up  to  cross 
fire  in  their  front.  Repeated  charges  of  the  Gothic  horse- 
men were  repulsed,  and  when  at  length  they  gave  way, 
the  Roman  cavalry,  which  had  been  held  in  reserve, 
completed  the  victory.^     This  was  an  anticipation  of  the 

1  Guischardt,  ii.  152,  &c.  =  Vegetius,  iii.  14.  ^  Oman,  p.  34. 


THE   ROMANS  47 

English  tactics  of  the  fourteenth  century,  but  it  stands 
alone.  Infantry  continued  to  decline  in  general  esti- 
mation, and  came  to  be  regarded  as  only  fit  for  mountain 
warfare  or  garrison  duty. 

Vegetius  ^  complained  that  the  armour  which  had  been 
cheerfully  borne  in  earlier  times  was  discarded  in  his  day. 
It  was  probably  found  to  give  only  partial  protection  from 
missiles,  and  to  be  seldom  needed  for  anything  else ;  but 
its  discontinuance  became  a  reason  for  avoiding  hand-to- 
hand  combat. 


Ill 

THE   MIDDLE   AGES 

While  the  Goths,  Lombards,  and  other  races  which  had 
settled  in  the  plains  of  Eastern  Europe  became  nations 
of  horsemen,  the  races  which  occupied  North  Germany 
and  Scandinavia  were  accustomed  to  fight  on  foot. 
Tacitus  says  that  the  chief  strength  of  the  Germans 
was  in  their  infantry ;  their  cavalry  was  not  well  mounted, 
and  had  no  skill  in  evolutions.^  It  was  the  same  with 
the  Franl^s.  As  described  by  Agathias  in  the  sixth 
century,  "  they  wear  neither  mail-shirt  nor  greaves,  and 
their  legs  are  only  protected  by  strips  of  linen  or  leather. 
They  have  hardly  any  horsemen,  but  their  foot  soldiery 
are  bold  and  well  practised  in  war.  They  bear  swords 
and  shields,  but  never  use  the  sling  or  bow.  Their 
missiles  are  axes  and  barbed  javelins."  ^  The  francisca 
was  their  special  weapon,  as  the  seax  or  short  sword 
was  the  weapon  of  the  Saxons.  It  was  a  single-bladed 
axe  with  a  curved  edge,  which  could  be  either  thrown 
or  wielded,  like  a  tomahawk. 

Theodebert,  the  grandson  of  Clovis,  invaded  Italy  with 
an  army  of  100,000  men  in  539  a.d.,  when  Belisarius 
was  at  war  with  the  Goths.  Both  sides  made  overtures 
to  the  king  of  the  Franks,  but  he  fell  upon  both  and 
scattered  them.  Fifteen  years  afterwards  the  Franks 
again  descended  into  Italy,  but  Narses  obtained  a  com- 
plete victory  over  them  at  Casilinum  by  means  of  his 

I  Ocrmania,  p.  6.  =  Oman,  p.  52. 


THE   MIDDLE   AGES  49 

mounted  archers.  Formed  in  a  dense  mass,  checked  in 
front,  and  threatened  on  both  flanks,  they  were  a  helpless 
target  for  arrows  for  some  hours,  but  at  length  broke  and 
were  cut  to  pieces.  They  fared  better  at  the  battle  of 
Poictiers  (732  a.d.).  They  stubbornly  resisted,  "as  if 
they  were  frozen  to  the  ground,"  all  the  assaults  of  the 
Moorish  cavalry,  and  turned  back  the  tide  of  Saracen 
invasion. 

But  in  two  or  three  centuries  this  sturdy  infantry  had 
become  a  thing  of  the  past.  Mounted  men-at-arms  were 
the  only  soldiers  of  any  account  in  France;  and  it  was 
nearly  a  thousand  years  before  French  infantry  recovered 
their  reputation.  General  Susane  begins  his  history  of 
it  by  remarking  that  infantry  always  shares  the  lot  of 
the  mass  of  the  population.  When  men  are  slumbering, 
careless  or  brutalised,  under  the  weight  of  their  chains, 
it  is  abject  and  despised ;  and  it  only  shows  what  it  is 
capable  of  when  privilege  and  inequality  have  been 
displaced  by  a  social  system  which  pays  more  respect 
to  the  dignity  of  man.  Whether  or  not  this  is  true  as 
an  universal  proposition,  it  is  certainly  true  of  French 
infantry.  It  declined  with  the  growth  of  the  feudal 
system,  and  was  at  its  best  after  the  Revolution. 

The  germ  of  feudalism  is  to  be  seen  in  Tacitus's 
description  of  the  German  tribes,  though  the  fruit  was 
slow  in  forming :  "  It  is  the  renown  and  glory  of  a 
chief  to  be  distinguished  for  the  number  and  valour  of 
his  followers.  ...  To  defend,  to  protect  him,  to  ascribe 
one's  own  brave  deeds  to  his  renown,  is  the  height  of 
loyalty.  The  chief  fights  for  victory ;  his  vassals  fight  for 
their  chief  .  .  .  men  look  to  the  liberality  of  their  chief 
for  their  war-horse  and  their  blood-stained  and  victorious 
lance.  Feasts  and  entertainments,  which,  though  inelegant, 
are  plentifully  furnished,  are  their  only  pay.    The  means  of 

D 


THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 


50 

this  bounty  come  from  war  and  rapine It  is  a  duty 

among  them  to  adopt  the  feuds  as  well  as  the  friendships 
of  a  father  or  a  kinsman."  ^ 

Bands  held  together  by  ties  of  this  kmd  might  co 
for  a  time  into  an  army,  but  they  fought  for  pe 
not  for  national  objects.    Their  chiefs  claimed  the  ngh 
of  private  war,  and  courts  of  justice  were  --ely  court 
of  conciliation  whose  awards  were  not  bmdmg.    In  the 
rudest   times   there  was  little   difference  of  equipment 
between  one  man  and  another,  but  the  conquest  of  the 
Roman  provinces  put  wealth  and  technical  skill  at  their 
disposal,  and  the  art  of  the  armourer  fostered  inequal  y^ 
The  weight  of  armour  tempted  men  to  ride,  and  rapidity 
of  movement  was  important  for  the  forays  and  skirmishes 
of  which  private  war  mainly  consisted.    Hence  the  chief 
and  his  chosen  followers  became  mounted  men-at-arms 
Those  who  had  neither  horses  nor   armour  fought   at 
great  disadvantage   and  were  held   in   contempt      The 
Ly  name  "infantry"  is  significant.     It  dates  from   a 
time  when  those  who  went  afoot  were  the  lads  m  attend- 
ance on   armoured   horse   soldiers  for  whom  the  term 
miles  came  to  be  reserved. 

Charlemagne  resisted  this  tendency.  While  exacting 
due  service  from  his  vassals,  and  doing  his  best  to  secure 
a  large  and  well-armed  force  of  cavalry,  he  msisted  on 
the  old  principle  of  the  "ban,"  that  every  IVeeman  was 
bound  to  serve  at  the  king's  summons.  In  order  to 
obtain  a  well-equipped  infantry  militia  instead  of  a  mere 


horde  of  peasants,  such  as  would  be  yielded  by  a  levy 
en  .nassX  provided  that  the  smaller  owners  sho^d 
be   grouped,  and   that  one   of  them   should   eo   as  the 


reVesentati;e  of  the  group,  armed  at  their  joint  cost. 
But  under  his   successors   this  militia  fell  mto  disuse. 

1  Gerinania,  pp.  13,  &c. 


THE   MIDDLE   AGES  51 

Something  more  mobile  and  efficient  was  required  to 
meet  sudden  descents  of  the  Danes  upon  the  coasts 
which  formed  the  chief  danger  to  the  peace  of  the 
kmgdom.  In  86G  a.d.  Charles  the  Bald  issued  an  edict 
that  all  freeholders  who  had  or  might  have  horses  should 
jom  the  host  mounted,  but  by  the  end  of  the  tenth 
century  it  had  become  exclusively  a  feudal  host,  made 
up  of  the  contingents  of  lords  who  had  received  grants 
of  land  as  fiefs  or  benefices,  and  were  under  contract  to 
bring  their  quota  of  mounted  men  into  the  field. 

Fiefs  and  offices  (dukes,  counts,  &c.)  which  were  at  first 
revocable   or  for  life  only,  became   hereditary,  and   the 
inroads  of  the  Northmen  gave  the  holders  of  them  an 
opportunity   to   buUd   strongholds   in   which   they  could 
defy  the  king  himself.     CivU  wars  among  the  Carolingian 
prmces  weakened  their  authority,  and  enabled  some  of 
their  vassals  to  become  stronger  and  more  independent. 
In   the  general  struggle   for  existence  the  weaker  lords 
sought    safety    by    "commending    themselves"    to    the 
stronger   lords,   surrendermg   their  lands,   and   receiving 
them  back  as  fiefs.     The  freemen  of  the  conquered  (Gallo- 
Roman)  race  fared  worse.     Some  of  them  were  allowed 
to  contmue  to  hold  land  subject  to  a  quit-rent,  but  the 
bulk  of  them  became  serfs.     After  a  time  there  was  no 
land  without  its  lord,  and  the  lords  took  care  not  to  aive 
arms  or  training  to   an  alien   and  oppressed  peasantry. 
Froissarts  description  of  the  Jacquerie^  shows  how  the 
pea.sants,  unarmed  as  they  were  except  with  knives  and 
staves,  would  now  and  then  rise,  and  revenge  themselves 
on  theu-  lords  by  fearful  outrages. 

Besides    the  valets   of  the    men-at-arms,    foot   archers 
and  crossbowmen  were  required,  especially  for  garrisons 
and  sieges.     These  were  mostly  mercenaries  drawn  from 
i.  182. 


52  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

various  quarters,  and  the  term  solidarii  (soldiers)  came 
into  use  for  hired  men  early  in  the  eleventh  century .^ 
The  army  of  adventurers  with  which  William  of  Nor- 
mandy invaded  England  comprised  not  only  bowmen, 
but  some  mail-clad  infantry  armed  with  spears  and 
swords.  The  Crusader  armies  also  were  largely  composed 
of  foot,  and  they  had  the  more  need  for  missile  weapons 
as  they  had  to  deal  with  an  enemy  skilled  in  the  use 
of  the  bow.  The,  earlier  Crusaders  suffered  much  from 
their  inferiority  in  this  respect.  In  1104  a.d.  they  met 
with  a  disaster  on  the  very  ground,  near  Carrhie,  where 
the  Parthians  had  routed  Crassus's  legions.^ 

The  victories  of  Cceur  de  Lion  were  due  to  skilful  co- 
operation of  heavy  cavalry  and  crossbowmen,  whose  bolts 
were  further  ranging  and  more  deadly  than  the  Turkish 
arrows.*^  So  deadly  were  they  that  in  1139  A.D.  the 
second  Lateran  Council  condemned  the  use  of  the  cross- 
bow, except  against  infidels ;  but  it  spread  nevertheless, 
especially  in  France,  Italy,  and  Germany.  Borrowed 
from  the  balista,  it  seems  to  have  been  made  available 
as  a  hand  weapon  only  about  the  beginning  of  the 
eleventh  century. 

About  this  time  a  burgher  militia  began  to  grow  up 
in  the  French  towns.  They  obtained  charters,  either  by 
purchase  from  their  lords,  who  were  in  want  of  money 
for  Crusades,  or  by  appeals  to  the  king.  "The  king 
has  been  said  to  be  the  founder  of  the  communes,  but 
the  reverse  is  more  nearly  the  truth  ;  it  is  the  communes 
that  established  the  king,"  says  Michelet.  They  were 
enabled  by  their  charters  to  maintain  a  well-armed 
force,  which  was  liable  to  be  summoned  for  the  king's 
service,   though  it  was   seldom  willing  to  go  far  from 

'  Hallam,  Middle  Ages,  i.  2G2.  =  Oman,  p.  321. 

3  Jb.,  pp.  306-317. 


THE  MIDDLE   AGES  53 

home.  The  towns  of  Picardy  sent  companies  of  cross- 
bowmen  to  the  army  with  which  Philip  Augustus  won 
the  battle  of  Bouvines  (1214  a.d.).  But  he  owed  his 
victory  to  his  men-at-arms.  The  French  communal 
troops  proved  no  match  for  the  Flemish  foot.  The  men 
who  distinguished  themselves  most  were  some  Braban9on 
mercenaries  in  King  John's  pay,  who  refused  to  surrender 
and  were  cut  to  pieces. 

The  wealthy  and  turbulent  cities  of  Flanders  provided 
a  sturdy  militia,  whose  reputation  gained  greatly  by  their 
victory  at  Courtrai  (1302  a.d.).  It  was  something  new 
and  marvellous,  as  Villani  says,  for  a  feudal  army  of 
50,000  men,  including  7500  cavalry  and  10,000  crossbow- 
men,  to  be  beaten  by  20,000  burghers.  The  result  was 
due  to  that  arrogance  and  eagerness  to  be  foremost  which 
was  so  often  fatal  to  the  French  chivalry.  The  flanks 
as  well  as  the  front  of  the  Flemings  were  covered  by  a 
ditch.  The  leaders  of  the  Italian  mercenaries  proposed 
to  march  round  and  post  their  men  where  they  could 
intercept  supplies.  "  The  Flemings,"  they  said,  "  are 
great  eaters  and  drinkers ;  if  we  keep  them  long  fasting, 
they  will  grow  faint.  They  will  quit  their  ground ;  and 
then  the  cavalry  can  charge  and  rout  them  without  risk." 
But  these  "  Lombard  counsels  "  were  scouted.  The  foot 
were  not  to  be  allowed  to  have  the  honour  of  the  vic- 
tory. The  men-at-arms  dashed  to  the  front,  floundered 
into  the  ditch,  and  were  speared  or  struck  down  by 
"  godendags,"  long-handled  maces  with  iron  spikes,  like 
the  Swiss  "  morning-star."  * 

But  two  years  afterwards  it  was  shown  near  Lille  that 
a  much  larger  number  of  Flemish  burghers  was  no  match 
for  a  feudal  army  properly  handled,  and  this  was  con- 
firmed at  Cassel  in  1328,  and  again  at  Roosebecke  in 


54  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

1382,  when  Van  Artevelde  was  killed  with  25,000  men. 
If  infantry  was  to  recover  its  old  position  it  must  combine 
excellence  in  the  use  of  missiles  with  excellence  in  hand- 
to-hand  fighting,  and  it  was  the  association  of  the  English 
archer  with  the  dismounted  man-at-arms  that  gave  the 
first  real  shock  to  the  feudal  military  system. 

In  England  armies  had  passed  through  the  same 
changes  as  in  France,  but  the  soil  was  less  congenial 
to  feudalism.  Jutes  and  Anglo-Saxons  came  over  in 
bands  from  different  districts,  and  were  only  by  slow 
degrees  amalgamated  into  a  nation.  The  Britons  were 
mostly  driven  westward,  instead  of  forming  a  subject 
population.  The  "folk"  of  each  tribe  controlled  its 
affairs,  and  imposed  restrictions  on  the  right  of  private 
war.  For  war  with  other  tribes,  or  defence  against  a 
foreign  enemy,  there  was  a  general  levy,  the  "  fyrd."  "  The 
folk-moot  was  in  fact  the  war-host,  the  gathering  of  every 
freeman  of  the  tribe  in  arms.  .  .  .  But  the  strength  of 
an  English  army  lay  not  only  in  these  groups  of  villagers. 
Mingled  with  them  were  the  voluntary  war  bands  that 
gathered  round  distinguished  chiefs."  ^  These  bands  of 
retainers  were  better  equipped  and  more  serviceable  than 
the  men  of  the  fyrd,  and  superseded  it  in  the  time  of 
stress  caused  by  the  inroads  of  the  Norsemen.  The 
sufferings  of  the  people  added  to  the  power  of  the  kings, 
who  gave  grants  of  land  to  their  companions  or  "  thegns," 
subject  to  the  obligation  of  military  service.  The  larger 
landlords  made  similar  grants  to  their  "  cnihts  " ;  '^  some- 
times weapons  were  provided  as  well  as  land.  In  Alfred's 
time  it  was  enacted  that  all  owners  of  5  hides  of  land 

'  Green,  pp.  172-173.     Cf.  Chadwick,  p.  159. 

^  Maitland,  pp.  298,  304.  In  England  "knight"  came  to  stand  for 
the  highest  class  of  soldiery,  while  in  Germany  it  dropped  down  to  camp- 
followers.  The  knight  was  miles,  not  cqucs,  while  his  equivalent  abroad 
was  "  Ritter  "  or  "  chevalier." 


THE   MIDDLE   AGES  55 

(probably  600  acres)  should  be  reckoned  as  thegns  and 
bound  to  thegn  service,  while  smaller  owners  must  com- 
bine to  furnish  an  armed  man  for  every  5  hides. 

In  England  as  in  France,  danger  led  the  smaller  land^ 
owners  tojlace  themselves  under  the  protection  of 
greater  men,  and  to  take  an  oath  of  fealty  pledging 
themselves  to  be  faithful  and  true,  to  love  all  that 
their  lord  loves  and  eschew  all  that  he  eschews.*  The 
overlords  took  a  similar  oath  to  the  king,  and  the  king 
looked  to  them  to  bring  the  due  number  of  armed  men 
into  the  field.  In  this  way  something  very  like  the 
feudal  system  was  to  be  found  in  England  before  the 
Conquest,  but  it  was  developed  by  William  I.,  who  made 
grants  to  his  followers  on  feudal  tenure,  and  fixed  the 
number  of  knights  they  were  to  furnish  without  much 
regard  to  hidage,  by  units  of  five  or  ten.  The  feudal 
force  of  England  a  century  after  the  Conquest  is  estimated 
at  5000  knights.- 

The  coming  of  the  Normans  brought  depression  of  the 
peasantry.  A  good  deal  of  the  land  became  the  lord's 
domain-land,  and  "churls"  mostly  saiak  into  "villeins," 
serfs  bound  to  the  soil.  Nevertheless,  the  divisions  be- 
tween classes  were  less  sharp  than  in  France.  Between 
lords  and  villeins  there  were  sokemen,  who  were  freemen 
and  freeholders  in  a  limited  sense;  they  served  in  the 
wars,  and  formed  the  yeoman  class,  described  by  Raleigh 
as  "an  order  of  men  which  generally  have  composed 
our  better  sort  of  foot  soldiers,  and  with  which  few  parts 
of  the  world  besides  England  are  acquainted."  ^  The 
Norman  kings  were  not  obliged  or  disposed  to  give  their 
great  vassals  the  independence  and  power  which  they 
enjoyed  in  France.    William  and  his  successors  always 

•  Maitland,  p.  69.  ■  Round,  pp.  261,  289-293. 

'  Orrery,  p.  62.     Cf.  Bacon,  Essay  xiix. 


56  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

had  mercenary  troops  in  their  pay,  which  might  be  used 
against  rebellious  lords,  and  they  encouraged  the  pay- 
ment of  scutage  in  lieu  of  military  service  as  it  furnished 
them  with  the  means  of  hiring  knights.  Private  war 
was  restricted,  and  few  nobles  had  strong  castles  except 
during  the  years  of  anarchy  which  preceded  the  rule  of 
Henry  II.  The  barons,  when  resisting  aggressions  of  the 
crown,  and  the  king,  when  upholding  the  royal  authority, 
felt  the  need  of  help  from  the  lower  classes,  and  had 
to  buy  it  by  concessions.  As  time  went  on  the  status 
of  the  villeins  improved,  the  services  due  from  them  to 
their  lords  were  defined,  they  became  well-to-do,  and 
were  able  to  commute  their  obligations  for  money  which 
was  readily  accepted  by  lords  bound  on  Crusades  or 
distant  expeditions.  By  the  middle  of  the  fourteenth 
century  a  large  proportion  of  the  peasantry  had  become 
hired  labourers  instead  of  villeins.  There  is  a  ring  of 
good  fellowship  which  would  have  seemed  strange  to  a 
French  prince  in  the  speech  of  the  Black  Prince  to  his 
archers  before  the  battle  of  Poitiers.* 

The  armies  which  Edward  III.  led  to  France  were 
national  armies  of  paid  soldiers.  The  drawbacks  of  feudal 
service  had  been  keenly  felt  by  Edward  I.  m  his  Welsh 
and  Scottish  wars.  It  yielded  an  ill-trained  and  undis- 
ciplined host  which  was  not  bound  to  remain  more  than 
forty  days  in  the  field.^  The  twelfth  century  alternative, 
to  accept  scutage  and  hire  foreign  mercenaries,^  had  been 
checked  by  Magna  Carta,  and  could  only  be  adopted  on 
a  small  scale,  as  in  the  case  of  Gascon  crossbowuien.  The 
king  might  bargain  with  his  vassals  that  they  should 
furnish  him  with  a  reduced  number  of  knights  for  an 
increased  period,  and  so  obtain  a  more  useful  force ;  but 
this  method  did  jiot  prove  sufficient,  and  Edward  I.  intro- 
1  Baker,  p.  146.  "  Scott,  i.  244,  ii.  333.  '  Morris,  p.  35. 


THE   MIDDLE   AGES  57 

duced  thesystem  of  payment  in  spite  of  the  opposition  of 
the  greater  lords.i  Of  the  2400  men-at-arms  which  he 
took  with  him  to  Scotland  in  1298,  more  than  half  were 
receiving  wages  from  him.-  In  the  fourteenth  century 
this  developed  into  the  indenture  system,  under  which 
tEe  king  made  contracts  with  certain  leaders  to  furnish 
so  many  men  at  fixed  rates  of  pay. 

For  the  foot  English  kings  depended  mainly  on  county 
levies.  Military  service,  which  was  tending  to  become  a 
matter  of  privilege  abroad,  was  insisted  on  as  the  duty  of 
all  freemen.  The  arms  and  equipment  which  they  were 
bound  to  have,  according  to  their  means,  were  specified 
by  Henry  II.  in  the  Assize  of  Arms  of  1181.  The  rules 
were  revised  by  Henry  III.  in  1252,  and  by  the  Statute  of 
Wmchester  (1285);  the  bow  was  introduced  among  the 
weapons,  and  periodical  inspection  of  arms  was  provided 
for.  When  a  war  broke  out,  commissioners  of  array  were 
sent  to  the  counties  to  take  over  from  the  sherifts  the 
number  of  men  called  for,  and  to  see  that  they  were  well 
chosen.^  Acts  of  Parliament  provided  that  men  sent 
abroad  on  the  king's  service  should  be  at  the  king's 
wages  (1344),  and  that  no  one  should  be  forced  to  serve 
without  the  sanction  of  Parliament,  unless  he  was  bound 
by  the  terms  of  his  tenure  (1351).^  The  foot  were  formed 
into  bands  of  a  score,  a  hundred,  or  a  thousand,  under 
vintcnars,  centenars,  and  millenars.  The  muster  rolls  of 
1339  show  that  out  of  a  levy  of  11,200  men  (exclusive  of 
men-at-arms)  half  were  armed  with  hand  weapons  and 
the  other  half  were  archers.'' 

The  bow  was  little  used  in  England  before  the  Conquest. 
It  always  played  an  important  part  in  naval  warfare,  and 
just  as  the  Athenians  and  the  Genoese  were  quick  to  re- 

«  Morris,  pp.  57,  68.  ^  lb.,  p.  202.  »  lb.,  p.  92. 

*  Scott,  i.  264,  ii.  332.  '•  Oman,  p.  593. 


58  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

cognise  its  value,  so  the  Vikings  of  the  north  made  it  one 
of  their  weapons,  and  prided  themselves  on  their  skill 
with  it.i  They  seem  to  have  dropped  it  when  they 
settled  in  England.  The  "  huscaiies "  or  bodyguard  of 
Canute  were  armed  with  the  two-handed  Danish  axe,  and 
that  weapon  largely  superseded  the  Saxon  spear.  At 
Hastings  Harold's  best  troops  fought  in  the  Danish 
fashion,  on  foot,  armed  with  axes,  and  awaiting  attack 
behind  a  stockade.-  They  may  have  hung  their  shields 
on  the  stockade,  as  was  done  on  the  bulwarks  of  ships. 
But  William  was  well  provided  with  bowmen  and  cross- 
bowmen,  as  well  as  with  mailed  horsemen,  and  it  was  by 
the  co-operation  of  archers  and  cavalry  that  the  battle 
was  won.  "  The  Saxon  mass  was  subjected  to  exactly  the 
same  trial  which  befell  the  British  squares  in  the  battle  of 
Waterloo — incessant  charges  by  a  gallant  cavalry  mixed 
with  a  destructive  hail  of  missiles."  ^  The  stockade  gave 
little  protection  against  the  curved  flight  of  arrows,  espe- 
cially when  they  were  aimed  high,  as  the  duke  directed. 
Darts,  axes,  and  stones  made  a  feeble  reply  to  them ;  and 
sorties  upon  the  assailants,  sometimes  provoked  by  feigned 
flights,  ended  in  the  rout  of  the  men  who  made  them.  At 
length  the  Norman  horsemen  forced  an  entrance,  and  the 
English  broke  up. 

From  that  time  forward  archers  formed  an  important 
part  of  English  armies,  and  archery  was  encouraged  as  a 
national  sport.  Fitzstephen  speaks  of  it  as  one  of  the 
pastimes  of  Londoners  in  the  time  of  Henry  11.^  Richard 
I.  took  a  thousand  bowmen  with  him  when  he  went  to 
Palestine.^  Henry  III.  m  the  Assize  of  Arms  of  1252 
required  all  forty-shilling  freeholders  to  provide  them- 
selves with  bow  and  arrows,  and  arrows  were  sometimes 

'  Oman,  p.  92.  -  EwjHsh  Historical  Review,  ix.  (1894),  pp.  1,  208,  &c. 

^  Oman,  p.  161.  ^  Brand,  ii.  392.  ^  Scott,  ii.  78. 


THE   MIDDLE   AGES  59 

exacted  for  the  tenure  of  lands.  But  the  Norman  bow 
was  under  live  feet  in  length,  and  had  no  great  range  or 
penetration.  The  early  Plantagenets  preferred  the  cross- 
bow. The  six-foot  long-bow  with  its  cloth-yard  shaft 
dates  from  the  time  of  Edward  I.,  and  probably  from  his 
wars  in  Wales. 

According  to  Giraldus  Cambrensis,  the  South  Welsh, 
especially  the  men  of  Gwent,  excelled  in  archery.  They 
had  bows  of  elm  so  stout  that  they  would  serve  for 
cudgels,  and  could  send  the  point  of  an  arrow  through 
a  three-inch  door.i  It  became  a  rule  in  later  days  that 
the  length  of  a  bow  should  equal  the  archer's  reach  with 
his  arms  outstretched,  and  Welshmen  are  abnormally 
long  in  the  arm.  Three  hundred  Welsh  archers 
formed  part  of  the  first  expedition  to  Ireland ;  and 
the  secret  of  success  in  Irish  warfare,  Gerald  says, 
lay  in  mixing  archers  with  the  troops  of  knights.^ 
The  spear  was  the  weapon  of  the  men  of  North 
Wales.  The  South  Welsh  were  Edward's  allies,  and 
in  the  first  war  against  Llewelyn  (1277)  there  were 
special  corps  of  sagittarii  nearly  all  of  whom  came 
from  Gwent. 3 

At  Falkirk  (1298)  five-sixths  of  the  foot  in  Edward's 
army  were  Welsh.  They  numbered  more  than  10,000 
men.  Falkirk  was  a  repetition  of  Hastings.  \y'allace's 
horsemen  and  light  troops  were  soon  driven  away,  and 
the  solid  rings  or  "  schlldrons "  of  his  spearmen  were 
at  length  demoralised  and  broken  by  the  combined 
action  of  the  English  heavy  cavalry  and  archers.  At 
Bannockburn    (i:;l-±)    a    much    larger    English    army — 


'  Works,  vi.  54,  177.  In  a  trial  made  before  Edward  VI.  in  1550, 
some  archers  shot  through  a  one-inch  board  of  well-seasoned  timber 
(Longman,  p.  431). 

-  Morris,  p.  18.  '  lb.,  p.  ^4. 


6o  THE   HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

though  its  numbers  must  have  been  vastly  exaggerated  by 
the  chroniclers — was  less  skilfully  handled  and  met  with 
disaster.  The  Scottish  and  English  accounts  differ,  and 
may  be  best  reconciled  by  supposing  that  Baker  describes 
what  took  place  on  the  English  right,  Barbour  what 
occurred  on  the  left.  On  the  right,  then,  the  English 
cavalry  advanced  along  the  Roman  road  with  bogs  on 
either  side  of  them,  and  floundered  into  the  pits  or 
trenches  which  the  Scots  had  dug  in  front  of  their 
position  covered  with  grass  and  brushwood.  The  archers 
whom  they  had  left  behind,  were  brought  up  to  help 
them,  but  did  more  harm  than  good  ;  for  being  in  rear 
instead  of  on  a  flank,  most  of  their  arrows  fell  short  of 
the  enemy  and  wounded  their  own  horsemen.^  On  the 
left  there  was  firmer  ground,  and  there  the  archers 
were  thrown  out  on  the  flank,  after  crossing  the  burn,  to 
prepare  and  support  the  advance  of  the  knights.  But 
they  were  rolled  up  and  swept  away  by  a  well-timed 
charge  of  a  small  body  of  light  horsemen. 

At  Halidon  Hill  (1333)  the  tables  were  turned. 
Edward  III.  was  besieging  Berwick ;  the  Scots  marched 
to  its  relief,  and  were  obliged  to  be  the  assailants. 
Adopting  a  plan  which  had  proved  successful  the  year 
before  at  Dupplin  Muir,  Edward  made  his  knights  dis- 
mount, and  formed  them  in  three  bodies  or  "  battles " 
with  wings  of  archers.  The  archers  were  posted  in 
marshy  ground  which  probably  secured  them  from 
direct  attack.  The  Scots  were  blinded  by  the  rain  of 
arrows  as  they  advanced,  and  though  they  began  to 
mount  the  slope  on  which  the  men-at-arms  were  drawn 
up,  their  courage  failed,  and  they  fled.  Edward  re- 
mounted his  men  and  pursued  them  for  several  miles. 
The   chronicler    says:    "Ibi   didicit   a   Scotis   Anglorum 

1  Baker,  p.  8. 


THE   MIDDLE   AGES  6i 

generosilas  dextrarios  reservare  venacioni  fugienciuin 
et  contra  antiquatum  morem  suorum  patruni,  pedes 
pugnare."  ^ 

But  it  was  by  no  means  a  new  departure  for  English 
knights  to  fight  on  foot.  To  say  nothing  of  the  times 
before  the  Conquest,  Henry  I.  won  two  victories  with 
dismounted  knights:  Tenchebrai  (1106)  over  his  brother 
Robert,  and  Bremule  (1119)  over  Louis  VI.  of  France. 
At  Tenchebrai  he  followed  Robert's  example  in  making 
his  knights  dismount  "ut  constantius  pugnarcnt,"  but 
he  kept  a  small  body  of  French  knights  on  horseback 
and  posted  them  at  some  distance  on  his  right,  to  charge 
the  flank  and  rear  of  the  enemy.  At  Bremule  (according 
to  Ordericus  Vitalis)  he  dismounted  400  knights  out  of 
500  in  an  open  plain,  and  awaited  the  charge  of  the 
French  knights,  who  as  usual  preferred  to  fight  on 
horseback.  They  won  some  success  at  first,  perhaps 
against  Henry's  mounted  detachment,  but  they  could 
not  break  the  men  on  foot ;  many  of  their  horses  were 
killed,  and  the  riders  made  prisoners ;  the  rest  fled, 
including  Louis  himself.  The  Anglo-Norman  knights 
remounted,  and  pursued  them  so  vigorously  that  the 
French  king  was  driven  to  take  refuge  in  a  wood,  and 
his  horse  and  banner  were  captured. 

Again  at  the  Battle  of  the  Standard  (1138)  the  EngHsh 
knights  fought  on  foot,  drawn  up  with  the  Yorkshire 
levies  of  spearmen  and  archers  that  had  been  brought 
together  to  check  the  Scotti.sh  invasion.  The  Highlanders 
refused  to  let  King  David's  knights  lead  the  way,  and 
claimed  the  front  place.  Their  wild  rush  made  only  a 
momentary  impression  on  the  armoured  spearmen,  and 
they  bristled  like  hedgehogs,  we  are  told,  from  the 
arrows  of  the  archers.     Their  ardour  was  quenched,  and 

»  Baker,  p.  51. 


62  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

the  Scottish  army  melted  away  to  the  rear,  in  spite  of 
some  success  achieved  by  a  small  body  of  mounted 
knights.^ 

Three  years  later,  at  the  battle  of  Lincoln,  Stephen 
fought  on  foot  with  the  greater  part  of  his  knights  and 
with  the  burghers  of  the  city.  He  had  two  bodies  of 
horsemen,  but  they  were  routed  and  driven  off"  the  field, 
and  the  horse  and  foot  of  the  two  earls  (Gloucester  and 
Chester)  then  combined  against  the  king's  corps,^  the 
foot  charging  it  in  front,  while  the  horse  fell  upon  its 
flanks  and  rear.  After  a  stout  resistance  it  broke  up, 
many  of  the  men  seeking  refuge  in  the  city,  and  Stephen, 
who  continued  fighting  by  his  standard,  was  overthrown 
and  made  prisoner. 

Considering  the  weight  of  armour,  it  must  have  been 
a  disagreeable  necessity  for  knights  to  fight  on  foot. 
There  seem  to  have  been  two  motives  for  it :  to  encourage 
and  stiffen  bodies  of  less  well-armed  footmen  which  had 
been  brought  into  the  field,  or  to  make  a  stand  against  an 
enemy  to  whom  they  were  unequal  as  cavalry,  either  in 
numbers  or  quaUty.  The  French  knights  were  said  to  be 
terrible  on  horseback,  but  little  to  be  feared  on  foot.^  The 
Germans  were  described  as  unskilful  horsemen,  and  better 
able  to  strike  with  the  sword  than  to  thrust  with  the 
lance,*  and  it  became  recognised  as  a  Teutonic  custom  to 
dismount  in  grave  emergencies.  But  probably  it  was  a 
question  of  horses  rather  than  of  men.  Matthew  Paris 
speaks  of  English  knights  being  mounted  "  in  equis  satis 
bonis,  licet  non  Hispanis,  vel  Italicis,  vel  aliis  preciosis."  ^ 
William  the  Conqueror  had  a  Spanish  charger,  and  the 
infusion  of  Arab  blood  made  the  horses  of  Southern 
Europe  generally   sought    after ;     but   in   England   only 

1  Oman,  pp.  386-391.  -  lb.,  p.  394.  ^  Scott,  ii.  511. 

'  Delpech,  ii.  24,S.  ^  lb.,  i.  439. 


THE   MIDDLE   AGES  63 

the  richest  barons  and  knights  could  afford  them.  In 
the  thirteenth  century  plate  armour  began  to  come  into 
use,  superseding  mail.  As  it  developed  the  weight  to 
be  carried  by  a  barded  war-horse  increased,  and  became 
something  over  25  stone.^  Flanders  and  the  north  of 
France  produced  the  animals  best  suited  to  such  heavy 
loads ;  -  they  could  not  move  rapidly  for  any  distance,  but 
men  on  lighter  horses  were  at  a  great  disadvantage  in 
direct  collision. 

Such  considerations  as  these,  together  with  his  previous 
experience  at  Halidon  Hill,  led  Edward  III.  to  make  his 
Knights  dismount,  when  he  turned  to  offer  battle  to  Philip 
of  Valois  at  Crecy  (1346).'  Hejiad  about  4000  cavalry, 
but  nearly  half  of  these  were  "  hobelars,"  light-armed  men 
mounted  on  little  nags  :  and  of  the  men-at-arms  only 
one-fourth  were  "  knights  "  in  the  restricted  sense  which 
the  word  had  reached  by  that  time.  The  rest  were 
variously  described  as  squires,  sergeants,  &c.  In  Philip's 
army  there  were  12,000  men-at-arms,  of  whom  two-thirds 
were  "gentils  gens,"^  and  about  60,000  foot,  mainly  com- 
munal troops,  but  including  6000  Genoese  crossbowmen 
and  other  mercenaries.  The  English  army  was  under 
20,000  men  all  told,  but  there  were  10,000  archers,  of 
whom  one-fourth  were  mounted.^ 

To  make  up  for  the  disproportion  of  numbers  an 
advantageous  position  was  chosen  between  Crecy  and 
Wadicourt,  fronting  south-cast.  The  right  flank  was 
covered  by  the  forest  of  Crecy.  There  was  a  shallow 
valley  in  front,  and  in  rear  there  was  a  small  wood,  by 
the  side  of  which  the  king  caused  a  park  to  be  made, 
"and  there  was  set  all  carts  and  carriages,  and  within 
the  park  were  all  their  horses,  for  every  man  was  afoot ; 

'  Scott,  i.  219.  '  Delpech,  i.  412.  "  Chandos  Herald,  p.  310. 

*  English  Historical  Review,  xiv.  7G7. 


64  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

and  into  this  park  there  was  but  one  entry."  i  The 
men-at-arms  were  formed  in  three  "battles"  with  corps 
of  archers,  as_  at  Halidon  Hill ;  that  of  the  Prince  of 
Wales  was  in  front,  that  of  Lord  Northampton  (rather 
weaker  than  the  others)  was  in  immediate  support  "on 
a  wing,"  and  that  of  the  king  was  in  reserve  on  higher 
ground.     Thus  they  were  in  echelon  right  in  front. 

At  the  battle  of  Bouvines  (1214)  the  French  cavalry 
were  told — "One  knight  should  not  make  another  his 
shield;  draw  up  so  that  all  the  knights  may  be  in  the 
front  line."  ^  It  seems  likely  that  this  was  the  general 
rule,  and  that  at  Crecy  (as  at  Agincourt)  the  English 
men-at-arms  were  four  deep.  Behind  them  there  would 
be  hobelars,  and  other  men  less  well  armed,  "  rascals 
that  went  afoot  with  great  knives,"  Welsh  or  Irish. 
Villani  says  that  the  English,  when  fighting  on  foot, 
formed  a  compact  body,  almost  round  (like  a  Scottish 
schildron),  and  that  each  lance  was  held  by  two  men.^ 
An  eighteen-foot  lance  was  unwieldy  for  a  single  man 
on  foot,  but  the  common  practice  was  to  cut  it  down 
to  a  length  of  five  feet,  that  dimension  referring  no 
doubt  only  to  the  part  in  front  of  the  hand-grip. 

According  to  Baker  of  Swynbrook,  the  archers  were 
placed,  not  in  front  of  the  men-at-arms,  but  at  the  sides 
of  the  king's  army,  like  wings,  so  that  they  might  not 
get  in  the  way  of  the  men-at-arms,  nor  meet  the  enemy 
face  to  face,  but  discharge  their  arrows  at  his  flanks. 
Similarly  a  Valenciennes  chronicler  says  that  King 
Edward  "ne  fist  que  deux  batailles  d'archiers  a  deux 
costes  en  la  maniere  d'un  escut ;  et  au  milieu  d'eulx 
se  tenoit  le  prince  de  Galles."  *    Froissart,  on  the  con- 

'  Froissart,  book  i.  chap.  128  (Lord  Berners'  translation). 
=  Oman,  p.  469.  '  Scott,  i.  311. 

*  English  Historical  Revieio,  xii.  432. 


THE   MIDDLE   AGES  65 

trary,  says  of  the  Prince's  "battle"  that  the  archers 
were  placed  in  front  in  the  form  of  a  "herse,"  and  the 
men-at-arms  at  the  back.^  He  mentions  that  in  the 
course  of  the  fight  some  of  the  French  knights  went 
round  the  archers,  and  others  broke  through  them,  and 
fought  hand  to  hand  with  the  Prince's  men-at-arms. 
King  Philip  would  gladly  have  done  the  same,  but 
there  was  such  a  great  hedge  of  archers  and  men-at- 
arms  in  front  that  he  could  not. 

Sir  John  Smythe,  who  wrote  when  archers  were  still 
to  be  seen  in  the  field,  and  described  how  they  were 
drawn  up  by  "our  most  skilful  and  warlike  ancestors," 
helps  us  to  reconcile  these  conflicting  statements.  He 
says  they  were  formed  "  into  hearses — that  is  broad  in 
front  and  narrow  in  flank,  as  for  example  if  there  were 
25,  30,  35,  or  more  or  fewer  archers  in  front,  the  flanks 
did  consist  but  of  seven  or  eight  ranks  at  the  most.  .  .  . 
They  placed  their  hearses  of  archers  either  before  the 
front  of  their  armed  footmen,  or  else  in  wings  upon  the 
corners  of  their  battles,  and  sometimes  both  in  front  and 
wings."  ^  A  contemporary  plate  of  the  battle  of  Pinkie 
(1547)  shows  the  archers  extended  across  the  whole  front 
of  the  three  corps  which  are  advancing  to  attack  the 
Scots.^  George  Monk,  writing  during  the  Civil  War, 
shows  how  musketeers  forming  wings  to  a  body  of  pike- 
men  should  be  moved  forward  and  spread  out  across  its 
front  for  more  eft'ective  fire.*  We  may  conclude  that 
the  archers  at  Crecy  were  formed  by  companies  of  100 
men  in  oblongs  not  more  than  eight  men  deep,  with  open 
ranks  and  files,  that   their  normal  position  was  on  the 

'  "  Missent  les  archiers  tout  devant  en  fourme  de  une  eroe,  et  les  gens 
d'armes  ou  fons "  (Rome  MS.,  Luce's  edition,  iii.  416).  The  other 
versions  are  not  quite  so  definite.  Cf.  Erujliah  Historical  Rericw,  x.  538, 
733,  and  xii.  427. 

"  .Smythe,  p.  .SO.  '  Cockle,  p.  8.  ■*  Monk,  chap.  xv. 

E 


66  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

flanks  of  the  men-at-arms  and  a  little  in  advance  of 
them,  but  that  they  may  also  have  formed  a  continuous 
screen  in  their  front,  at  all  events  at  the  beginning  of 
the  action.  Shallow  pits  were  dug  in  front  of  the  line 
of  battle,  and  would  give  the  archers  some  protection 
from  charging  horsemen. ' 

It  was  late  in  the  afternoon  when  the  French  army 
came  up,  but  the  impetuosity  of  the  lords,  each  eager 
to  be  foremost,  disregarded  Philip's  orders  to  halt.  The 
Genoese  crossbowmen  were  sent  forward,  weary  from  a 
long  march,  and  their  bowstrings  wet  from  rain,  for 
they  could  not  be  taken  off'  and  put  under  cover  like 
the  string  of  the  longbow.  As  they  came  on  they  gave 
great  shouts  at  intervals  to  scare  the  English,  and  when 
they  reckoned  themselves  within  range  they  shot  fiercely; 
but  their  bolts  fell  short.  "  Then  the  English  archers 
stept  forth  one  pace  and  let  fly  their  arrows  so  wholly 
and  so  thick  that  it  seemed  snow.  When  the  Genoese 
felt  the  arrows  piercing  through  heads,  arms,  and  breasts, 
many  of  them  cast  down  their  crossbows  and  did  cut 
their  strings  and  returned  discomfited."  - 

The  French  men-at-arms  charged  through  the  cross- 
bowmen  by  the  king's  orders,  spearing  and  trampling 
them,  but  they  were  themselves  shot  down  by  English 
arrows,  or  overthrown  by  one  another  in  the  press.  As 
King  Edward  wrote,  there  died  more  than  1500  knights 
and  esquires  in  the  part  of  the  field  where  the  armies 
first  came  together.  Nevertheless  "the  battle  was  very 
tough  and  lasted  long,  for  it  lasted  from  before  the 
hour  of  vespers  till  evening,  and  the  enemy  bore  them- 
selves very  nobly  and  often  rallied."  *  They  made  three 
main  attacks,  directing  their  efforts  against  the  English 

1  Baker,  p.  84.  '  Froissart,  book  i.  chap.  130. 

»  Edward  to  Sir  T.  Lucy  (Chandos  Herald,  p.  ."ilO). 


THE   MIDDLE   AGES  67 

inen-al-aniis,  and  apparently  neglecting  the  archors.  The 
Prince's  "  battle  "  was  so  hard  pressed  that  Northampton 
moved  up  to  its  assistance,  and  the  king  also  sent  some 
twenty  or  thirty  knights  in  reply  to  an  urgent  appeal. 
But  the  "battles"  remained  unbroken,  the  English  losses 
were  trifling,  and  in  the  course  of  the  night  the  French 
army  melted  away,  leaving  many  thousands  on  the 
field. 

It  was  not  the  first  time  that  crossbow  and  longbow 
had  been  pittied  one  against  the  other,  but  the  conditions 
at  Crecy  made  the  most  of  the  advantages  which  be- 
lopged  to  the  latter.  The  six-foot  bow  had  longer  range 
than  the  ordinary  crossbow,  and  three  or  four  times 
tEielrate15T  Hre.  A  good  archer  could  shoot  two  arrows  . 
in  a  minute ;  he  would  seldom  miss  at  2:^0  yards  (the 
standard  practice  range)  and  could  send  his  arrows  twice 
that  distance.  On  the  other  hand,  the  crossbow  required 
less  strength  and  skill;  it  could  be  used  lying  down  or 
Uadeir  cover;  its  bolts  were  much  cheaper  than  arrows, 
and  much  more  plentiful.  The  archer  in  the  field  had 
only  his  sheaf  of  twenty-four  arrows,  and  in  provisioning 
a  place  for  a  siege  the  allowance  of  bolts  for  each  cross- 
bow was  ten  times  that  of  arrows  for  each  longbow.  At 
.short  ranges  the  crossbow  was  reckoned  the  more  ac- 
curate weapon,  and  Edward  III.  told  the  Sherifi's  of 
London  in  1349  to  encourage  the  use  of  it,  as  well  as 
the  use  of  the  longbow.^ 

The  French  learnt  at  Crecy  that  they  must  be  ready 
to  fight  on  foot;  but  they  did  not  learn  to  choose  the 
defensive,  nor  did  they  provide  themselves  with  better 
shot.  In  the  army  of  50,000  men  with  which  Philip's 
successor,  John,  attacked  the  Black  Prince  near  Poitiers 
(September  19,  1356)  there  seem  to  have  been  only 
'  Scott,  ii.  110. 


68  THE  HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

2000  crossbowmen,  and  their  shooting  had  no  great 
fi-o.t  Fdward  was  returning  from  his  raid  to  the 
loS:  Hetad  only  BOOO  men  (English  ^d  Gas.n 
of  whom  3000  were  men-at-arms  and  2000  archers^ 
Findtg  himself  overtaken,  he  chose  a  strong  position 
on  the  ric^ht  bank  of  the  Miosson,  "  among  hedges,  vines 
a^d  bush;."  The  English  were  short  of  food  and  migh 
Tave  been  starved  out,  if  John  had  sent  a  force  to  ^he 
left  side  of  the  stream  to  bar  their  hne  of  retreat.  Ap- 
pth  n  ive  of  this,  they  were  in  the  act  of  crossing  the 
r'am  when  the  battle  began,  and  the   rearguard   was 

nrrita  continuous  hedge  along  ^^  front  of  t.^ 
position  except  for  one  gap  where  the  road    o  the  ford 
pa  sed    trough  it.    The  hedge   was  lined  with  archer  . 
Td  a  stone-rthrow  behind  the  gap  Salisbury's  men-at^ 
..0.S  were  drawn  up  on  foot,  with  their  archers   n  f.n 
of  them  "  in  manner  of  a  herse."     On  the  left  was  War 
ik'      "battle,"   while   that  of  the  Prince  was  held  m 
eserve      The    French    army    was    also  in   three  mam 
bod  es    the  right  under  Orleans,  the  left  under  Normandy, 
afd  L  reserve  under  the  king.     Most  of  the  men  - 
arms  were   dismounted,  but   mounted   corps  of    a    few 
Tndred  men  on  barded  horses  were  sent  aW  t    ", 
th.  archers       The  horse-armour  proved  ot  httle 
eTvL      r    he  :^hers  extended  and  struck  the  horses 
rrnk     They  became  unmanageable,  and  caused  con- 
Lion    n  the  rinks  of  foot  behind   them      The  Prince 
made  better  use  of  his  cavalry,  sending  -a  1  corps  ^f 
to  charge  the  enemy  in  flank  and  rear,  while  they  were 
en.ageS      There  were  collisions  between  the  bodies  of 
UsXntecl  men-at-arms,  but  on  a  narrow  front    where 
personal  strength  told  for  more   than  --^^^    J^^^ 
English    were    nearly    worn    out    by   repeated   assaults. 


THE   MIDDLE   AGES  69 

and   many   of   the   archers    had   spent   all    their   arrows, 
before  the  battle  was  won.' 

Though  the  treaty  of  Bretigny  made  peace  between 
France  and  England,  French  and  English  bands  con- 
tinued to  tight  with  one  another  as  auxiliaries  in  other 
quarrels.  The  war  had  produced  one  great  French  leader, 
Bertrand  du  Guesclin.  At  Cocherel  (1364),  finding  his 
enemy  strongly  posted  on  a  hill,  he  took  care  not  to 
repeat  the  mistake  of  Poitiers.  He  feigned  a  retreat, 
and  owing  to  the  impetuosity  of  the  captain  of  the 
English  contingent,  he  drew  them  down  from  the  hill, 
and  engaged  them  on  equal  terms.  When  the  English 
saw  the  French  turning  on  them,  "  a  little  they  recoiled 
back  and  assembled  together  all  their  people,  and  then 
they  made  way  for  their  archers  to  come  forth  on 
before,  who  as  then  were  behind  them.  And  when  the 
archers  were  forward  then  they  shot  fiercely  together, 
but  the  Frenchmen  were  so  well  armed  and  so  strongly 
pavised  that  they  took  but  little  hurt."  -  There  were 
only  300  archers,  one-fourth  of  the  total  of  the  men-at- 
arms.  The  Captal  de  Buch,  who  was  in  chief  command, 
came  down  from  the  hill  with  the  rest  of  his  men,  to 
support  the  English;  but  he  was  captured  by  a  chosen 
band  of  Breton  horsemen  told  off  to  fall  on  his  rear, 
and  after  an  obstinate  light  nearly  all  his  men  were 
killed  or  taken  prisoners.^ 

At  Auray  in  the  same  year  Du  Guesclin  was  less 
fortunate.  He  was  with  Charles  of  Blois,  one  of  the 
claimants  of  the  Duchy  of  Brittany.  Montfort,  the  rival 
of  Charles,  had  Chandos  to  assist  him,  and  followed 
his  advice  that  "  it  is  better  to  act  on  the  defensive,  for 

'  Baker,  pp.  113-153;  Chandos  Herald,  pp.  Gl-32;  Fioissart,  book  i. 
chap.  lr)9-l(;c. 

•  Kroissart,  i.  chap.  221.  '   Luce,  pp.  44-1-44S. 


70  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

those  who  attack  first  generally  get  the  worst  of  it." 
The  victory  was  won,  not  by  the  English  archers,  who, 
as  at  Cocherel,  made  little  impression  on  the  plate 
armour  of  the  dismounted  men-at-arms,  but  by  the 
judicious  use  of  a  small  reserve  which  Chandos  had  pro- 
vided. Its  leader,  Calverley,  had  been  most  unwilling 
to  be  left  behind,  but  he  kept  his  men  well  in  hand, 
reinforcing  one  weak  point  and  then  another.  Charles 
of  Blois  was  killed,  and  Du  Guesclin  was  made  prisoner. 

Three  years  later  he  was  again  taken  prisoner  at  Najera 
(1367)  after  fighting  gallantly  as  the  ally  of  the  Castilians 
against  the  army  of  the  Black  Prince.  Here  again 
English  and  French  fought  on  foot,  and  the  novel 
feature  of  the  battle  was  the  encounter  of  the  Spanish 
genetours  or  light  horsemen  with  the  English  men-at- 
arms  and  archers.  The  arrows  of  the  latter  soon  drove 
the  genetours  ofi'  the  field,  for  their  horses  were  un- 
armoured,  and  they  could  not  get  near  enough  to  throw 
their  javelins. 

Du  Guesclin  was  made  constable  in  1370.  He  made  it  a 
rule  to  avoid  pitched  battles  with  the  English,  but  in 
a  few  years  of  harassmg  warfare  he  expelled  them  from 
nearly  all  the  French  territory  which  they  had  gained. 
The  lesson  was  soon  forgotten,  and  at  Agincourt  (1415) 
another  constable  gave  Henry  V.  the  opportunity  to 
outdo  Poitiers.  Henry  was  marching  north  to  Calais 
with  an  army  reduced  to  less  than  10,000  men.  The 
constable,  D'Albret,  had  declined  opportunities  of  attack- 
ing him,  but  took  up  a  position  barring  his  road  with  an 
army  six  times  as  numerous.  Between  the  woods  of 
Agincourt  and  Tramecourt  there  was  half  a  mile  of 
ploughed  land  through  which  the  road  ran,  and  the 
French  army  was  posted  a  little  to  the  north,  closing 
the  mouth  of  this  defile. 


THE   MIDDLE   AGES  71 

St.  Remy  says :  "  They  had  sufficient  archers  and 
crossbowmen,  but  they  were  unable  to  use  their  bows 
from  the  narrowness  of  the  place,  which  did  not  aflbrd 
room  for  more  than  the  men-at-arms."  There  were 
three  corps,  one  behind  another,  in  very  deep  formation ; 
and,  as  usual,  each  of  the  French  knights  claimed  to  be 
in  front.  All  were  on  foot  with  the  exception  of  the 
rearguard,  and  of  two  bodies  of  about  600  horsemen 
in  front  of  each  wing,  who  were  to  ride  down  the  English 
archers. 

Henry  took  care  not  to  play  his  opponent's  game  by 
trying  to  force  a  passage.  He  drew  up  his  army  about 
a  mile  to  the  south,  in  front  of  Maisoncelle.  He  had  only 
about  a  thousand  men-at-arms,  and  narrow  as  the  field 
was,  he  was  obliged  to  place  his  van  and  rearguard  in 
line  with  his  main  body,  leaving  himself  no  reserve,  and 
having  nowhere  more  than  four  ranks.  In  the  intervals 
between  the  corps  he  placed  masses  of  archers;  but  just 
before  the  battle  began,  their  marshal,  by  the  king's 
order,  led  the  archers  forward,  and  posted  them  in 
advance  of  the  line  in  two  wings  {au  froncq  devant  en 
deux  ellcs)}  Some  days  before  the  king  had  told  them 
to  provide  themselves  with  stout  stakes,  six  feet  long, 
and  these  they  planted  at  a  slope  in  front  of  them  as 
chevaux  de  frise? 

For  some  hours  of  St.  Crispm's  day  (October  15)  the 
two  armies  faced  one  another  without  moving,  each 
waiting  for  the  other  to  attack.  At  length,  finding  it 
was  necessary  to  sting  the  French  into  action,  Henry 
made  his  men  advance  slowly  "  in  fine  order,"  giving 
a  great  shout  as  they  halted  from  time  to  time,  until 
the  archers  came  within  extreme  bow-shot  of  the  enemy. 
As  soon  as  the  mounted  men  who  were  in  front  of  the 

'  St.  Kumy,  i.  253.  -  Gesta,  pp.  12,  Cd. 


72  THE  HISTORY   OF  INFANTRY 

wings  of  the  French  army  began  to  feel  the  English 
arrows,  they  charged;  but  the  ground  was  sodden,  and 
under  the  rain  of  arrows  few  of  them  were  able  to  reach 
the  stakes,  which  the  archers  had  refixed.  Most  of  them 
found  their  horses  unmanageable,  and  rode  back  upon 
their  own  vanguard,  which  was  toiling  after  them,  and 
in  which  they  caused  much  confusion.  It  pressed  on,  but 
not  with  an  even  front:  "either  from  fear  of  the  arrows, 
...  or  that  they  might  more  speedily  penetrate  our 
ranks  to  the  banners,  they  divided  themselves  into  three 
troops,  charging  our  lines  in  the  three  places  where  the 
banners  were." ' 

The  English  men-at-arms  were  forced  to  give  ground, 
but  soon  recovered  themselves.  Meanwhile  the  archers 
plied  the  flanks  of  the  enemy  with  their  arrows,  and 
when  the  arrows  were  expended  they  "quitted  their 
stakes,"  and  fell  on  with  swords,  axes,  and  hammers. 
Archers  and  men-at-arms  together  hewed  their  way 
through  the  ranks  of  the  French  vanguard,  and  into  the 
corps  behind  it.  The  rearguard  being  still  mounted, 
and  seeing  the  fate  of  the  two  first  lines,  took  to  flight. 
Even  French  writers  estimate  the  French  loss  at  10,000 
men,  six  times  as  much  as  that  of  the  English. 

The  following  is  the  comment  of  Jean  de  Eueil,- 
whose  father  and  uncles  fell  at  Agincourt,  and  who  was 
himself  a  distinguished  captain  in  later  years :  "  The 
night  before,  they  (the  French)  lay  in  a  field  where 
they  were  up  to  the  knees  in  mud,  and  next  morning 
they  marched  across  a  stretch  of  ploughed  land  to  meet 
their  enemy;   and  they  went  so  far  to  seek  them  that 

■  Gesta,  p.  53. 

^  Le  Jouvencel,  part  ii.  chap.  xvii.  This  is  a  i-omance  written  uiidor  his 
supervision,  and  founded  on  his  own  career,  describing  the  education  of 
a  soldier  of  the  fifteenth  century. 


THE   MIDDLE   AGES  73 

when  it  came  to  fighting  they  arrived  few  in  numbers, 
one  after  another,  and  were  out  of  breath,  and  were 
discomfited.  And  therefore,  a  corps  on  foot  should  never 
march,  but  should  always  await  the  enemy  standing  still. 
For  when  they  march,  as  they  are  not  all  of  the  same 
strength,  they  cannot  keep  their  order.  A  mere  bush 
is  enough  to  break  them  up.  A  power  which  marches 
against  another  power  is  undone,  unless  God  help  it. 
So  let  him  who  can,  choose  a  good  position  and  without 
loss  of  time." 

Elsewhere  ^  Bueil  considers  the  question  how  a  leader 
is  to  act  if  his  enemy  adopts  these  defensive  tactics. 
He  should  select  the  best  position  he  can  find  near 
them,  and  get  command  of  the  river,  if  there  is  one ; 
for  it  will  not  only  serve  as  a  protection,  and  to  water 
the  horses  and  cattle,  but  it  makes  provisioning  easier. 
He  should  deprive  the  enemy  of  these  facilities,  and 
should  make  raids  round  them  to  intercept  their  sup- 
plies, so  that  they  may  be  forced  to  move,  and  either 
to  attack  him  on  his  chosen  ground,  or  give  him  the 
opportunity  of  attacking  them  on  the  march. 

If  the  enemy  are  weaker  than  he  and  are  likely  to 
escape,  and  the  leader  therefore  decides  to  attack  them 
in  position,  he  should  choose  the  weakest  side,  and  make 
feigned  attacks  on  other  sides.  Instead  of  closing  with 
the  enemy,  he  should  force  them  to  close  with  him,  or 
be  killed  off  man  by  man;  and  he  should  leave  their 
rear  open  for  flight,  for  the  cowards  will  make  off  and 
will  dismay  the  brave,  and  the  fugitives  can  be  over- 
taken afterwards.  Men-at-arms  should  be  formed  in 
a  solid  mass  (grosne  toarhe)  to  enable  them  to  break 
through  the  enemy's  corps ;  for  a  corps  broken  through 
is  lost,  and  if  it  is  thin  it  is  easy  to  break.     Horsemen 

'  chap.  ix. 


74  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

should  never  be  put  in  front  of  foot,  but  always  on  the 
wings. 

Such  were  some  of  the  lessons  learnt  in  the  forty  years 
of  war  which  ended  in  the  second  expulsion  of  the 
English  from  France.  The  French  had  found  it  neces- 
sary to  follow  the  English  example,  and  the  war  was 
carried  on,  not  by  feudal  armies,  but  by  bands  of  paid 
soldiers  under  chiefs  who  had  a  contract  with  the  king. 
In  time  of  truce  their  pay  ceased,  and  they  went  in 
search  of  employment  and  plunder.  After  the  peace  of 
Bretigny  (1360)  several  thousand  men  who  had  been  in 
English  pay  found  their  way  to  Italy,  where  they  were 
known  as  the  White  Company,  and  played  a  part  in  the 
wars  between  Florence  and  her  neighbours.  Their  leader, 
John  Hawkwood,  won  great  renown,  and  founded  a 
school  of  condottieri.  Similarly,  after  the  truce  of  1444, 
the  Dauphin  (afterwards  Louis  XI.),  to  relieve  France 
of  the  burden  of  the  Ecorcheurs,  as  some  of  these  bands 
were  significantly  called,  led  an  army  of  them  against 
the  Swiss.  Bueil,  who  had  learnt  his  trade  under  La 
Hire,  and  had  become  a  leading  captain,  was  in  imme- 
diate command  of  the  troops  which  won  the  battle  of 
St.  Jacob.  Some  2000  Swiss  rashly  crossed  the  Birs, 
and  assailed  a  force  many  times  their  own  strength.' 
They  were  cut  to  pieces,  but  at  a  cost  which  led  Louis 
to  hold  them  in  great  respect  ever  after. 

It  was  on  the  return  of  the  bands  from  this  campaign 
that  Charles  VII.  entered  upon  a  reorganisation  which 
laid  the  foundation  of  the  French  standing  army.  Fifteen 
companies  of  100  "  lances "  each,  making  a  total  of  9000 
men,  were  taken  into  permanent  pay  as  regular  troops 
{compagnies  d'ordonnance),  and  the  rest  of  the  men 
were  disbanded.^ 

'  Bueil,  i.  p.  cvi.  '  lb.,  p.  exxviii. 


THE   MIDDLE   AGES  75 

Three  years  afterwards  Charles  tried  to  raise  a  militia 
of  bowmen.  He  ordered  each  parish  to  provide  a  "  free 
archer."  This  force  was  reorganised  by  Louis  XL  in 
1-4G9,  and  was  formed  into  four  corps  each  consisting  of 
eight  companies  of  .^00  men.  Some  were  armed  with 
bills  or  pikes,  others  with  bows  or  crossbows.  But  the 
men  had  no  common  bond  and  no  exercise  in  time  of 
peace ;  the  men-at-arms  made  a  mock  of  them,  and  after 
their  misbehaviour  at  Guinegate  *  (1479)  Louis  found  it 
better  to  take  money  from  the  parishes  and  to  hire 
Swiss.  An  earlier  attempt  of  the  same  kind  had  been 
made  at  the  end  of  the  fourteenth  century.  Orders  had 
been  given  that  in  France,  as  in  England,  all  the  people 
should  learn  the  use  of  the  bow,  and  practise  it  as  a 
pastime ;  but  the  nobles,  it  is  said,  became  alarmed  at 
their  proficiency,  and  the  orders  were  cancelled.^ 

Some  of  the  professional  soldiers  were  of  course  drawn 
from  the  lower  classes,  but  it  was  held  in  France  that 

"  Pour  vestir  fer  et  en  armes  combattre, 
Dieu  et  nature  ont  noblesse  ordonnee."^ 

The  industrial  classes  contributed  little  directly  in  the 
way  of  men,  but  they  found  money.  The  suliermgs  of 
France  made  the  people  rally  round  the  king,  and  their 
support  enabled  Charles  VIL  to  transform  the  taille  into 
a  tax  payable  to  the  crown,  instead  of  the  feudal  lord, 
and  variable  at  the  king's  pleasure.  This  gave  him  and 
his  successors  the  means  of  maintaining  a  standing  army. 
It  paved  the  way  for  absolute  monarchy  in  France,  as 
French  kings  had  not  to  promise  redress  of  grievances 
in  order  that  their  chambers  might  vote  supplies. 
One  immediate  result  was  that,  with  the  help  of  the 

'  Susane,  i.  43,  is,  74.  -  Napoleon  III.,  iv.  hl'.l. 

'  ]iueil,  i.  p.  xxviii. 


ye  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

brothers  Bureau,  Charles  was  able  to  provide  himself 
with  a  train  of  artillery  for  which  medieval  fortifications 
were  no  match.  The  towns  and  castles  of  Normandy 
were  retaken  from  the  English  with  astonishing  rapidity, 
and  guns  began  to  count  for  something  even  in  the 
open  field.  At  Formigny  (1450)  a  force  of  5000  English, 
who  had  chosen  a  good  position  and  intrenched  it,  were 
so  galled  by  two  culverins  that  they  sallied  out,  and  in 
the  mAUe  which  ensued  three-fourths  of  them  were 
killed.  Three  years  afterwards,  when  Jean  de  Bueil 
was  besieging  Castillon  in  Guienne,  the  aged  Talbot 
tried  to  storm  the  French  intrenchments  in  order  to 
raise  the  siege.  But  his  horse  was  killed  by  a  culverin 
shot,  his  men  were  repulsed,  and  he  was  himself  de- 
spatched by  an  archer  as  he  lay  on  the  ground.^ 

While  the  chivalry  oi  France  was  being  taught  by  the 
English  that  it  was  best  to  fight  on  foot  and  to  await 
attack,  and  that  well-equipped  men-at-arms,  with  the 
help  of  archers,  could  hold  their  ground  against  great 
odds,  the  Swiss  were  giving  the  knights  of  Germany 
still  stranger  lessons.  Few  in  number,  with  scanty 
armour,  and  with  little  use  of  missiles,  they  charged 
and  overthrew  them  whether  mounted  or  on  foot.  At 
Morgarten  (1315)  the  success  of  the  Swiss  might  be 
explained  by  the  ground;  they  caught  the  Auslrians  at 
advantage  between  lake  and  mountain.  But  at  Laupen 
(1339)  the  country  was  fairly  open  and  fit  for  cavalry. 
Yet  900  men  of  the  forest  cantons  held  their  own  against 
three  times  their  number  of  heavy  horsemen,  until  the 
men  of  Berne,  after  routing  the  Burgundian  foot,  came 
to  their  assistance. 

When  Leopold  of  Austria  encountered  the  Swiss  at 
Sempach   (1386)   he    made    his    knights   dismount   and 


THE   MIDDLE   AGES  jj 

await  attack,  according  to  the  approved  English  prac- 
tice. The  Swiss  were  outnumbered  (by  three  to  one, 
according  to  their  own  account),  but  they  charged  down 
upon  the  Austrian  Hne  in  a  single  deep  column.  They 
were  repulsed,  but  the  Austrians  made  no  counter- 
attack. The  Swiss  tried  again  and  again,  each  of  the 
four  cantonal  contingents  taking  the  head  of  the  column 
in  turn,  and  at  length  Arnold  of  Winkelried  broke  the 
Austrian  array.  When  once  intermingled,  lances  were  no 
match  for  halberds ;  Leopold  and  half  his  men  were  killed. 

Having  won  freedom  at  home,  the  Swiss  soon  sought 
to  win  money  abroad.  Following  the  example  of  the 
free  companies,  bands  of  them  descended  into  Italy. 
A  body  of  -iOOO  was  met  and  worsted  at  Arbedo  (1422) 
by  Milanese  troops  under  Carmagnola,  one  of  the  best 
of  the  condottieri.  Finding  that  his  horse  could  make 
no  impression  on  them,  he  caused  them  to  dismount, 
"  and  engaging  them  (the  Swiss)  smartly  in  that  posture, 
he  put  them  all  to  the  rout  and  most  of  them  to  the 
sword."  1  This  led  the  Council  of  Lucerne  to  decree 
"  that  as  things  had  not  gone  altogether  well  with  the 
Confederates,"  there  should  be  a  larger  proportion  of 
pikes  in  future. 

The  league  of  the  three  forest  cantons,  formed  in  1315, 
had  become  a  league  of  eight  cantons  by  the  middle  of 
the  fourteenth  century,  and  included  two  important 
towns,  Berne  and  Zurich.  The  combination  of  townsfolk 
with  peasantry  added  to  their  strength.  The  halberd — 
which  had  the  edge  of  an  axe,  the  spike  of  a  spear,  and 
usually  a  hook  at  the  back,  with  a  six-foot  staff — was  at 
first  the  principal  weapon ;  but  some  of  the  men,  chiefly 
townsmen,  had  pikes  ten  feet  long.  The  forces  of  the 
urban  cantons  were  made  up  of  two  classes,  the  citizens, 

■  Machiavelli,  p.  452, 


78  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

and  the  men  of  the  dependent  communes,  who  were 
sometimes  officered  by  the  citizens.  The  communes 
formed  separate  mihtary  units,  unless  they  were  small; 
the  townsmen  were  organised  by  guilds.  A  Zurich 
muster-roll  of  1444  shows  that  in  a  levy  of  2770  men 
(of  whom  639  were  townsmen)  three-fifths  had  halberds, 
one-fifth  pikes,  and  one-fifth  missile  weapons.  These 
were  mostly  crossbows,  but  there  were  61  hand-guns.^ 
Body  armour  was  almost  confined  to  breast-plates  and 
head-pieces;  many  of  the  men  had  none.  The  propor- 
tion of  mounted  men  was  very  small,  consisting  only 
of  the  wealthier  citizens.  The  fighting  value  of  the 
Swiss  lay,  not  in  drill  or  equipment,  but  in  their  indi- 
vidual courage,  strength,  endurance,  and  activity,  and 
in  the  national  spirit  developed  among  them.  Their 
ferocity  helped  to  make  them  formidable.  The  taking 
of  prisoners  was  forbidden  unless  they  were  likely  to 
yield  large  ransoms. 

The  full  levy  of  a  canton  was  called  a  "banner,"  as 
it  had  the  cantonal  banner  with  it,  borne  in  the  middle 
of  the  main  body,  and  guarded  by  files  of  halberdiers. 
About  one-fourth  of  the  levy  formed  vanguard  and  rear- 
guard, and  these  comprised  all  the  shot,  and  a  large 
proportion  of  pikes.  If  van  and  rear  closed  on  the  main 
body  the  whole  would  form  a  cross,  which  is  mentioned 
by  Machiavelli  as  a  Swiss  formation ;  but  habitually  the 
three  bodies  were  kept  apart  and  in  echelon,  so  that 
they  might  be  the  better  able  to  make  flank  attacks  or 
to  guard  against  them.  When  a  great  confederate  army 
was  formed  by  several  cantons,  it  was  also  divided  into 
three  bodies,  each  capable  of  fighting  independently,  and 
having  its  own  vanguard  and  rearguard.  The  depth  of 
the  files  varied  with  the  numbers,  for  the  several  corps 
'  Kustow,  i.  1()3. 


THE   MIDDLE   AGES  79 

were  made  approximately  squares,  in  order  that  they 
might  be  handier  for  manoeuvres,  and  ready  to  meet 
attacks  from  any  quarter.  A  communal  unit  furnished 
so  many  files,  according  to  its  strength,  and  the  men  of 
a  file  were  commonly  armed  alike. 

If  a  foreign  prince  asked  for  Swiss  mercenaries,  and 
the  request  was  granted  by  the  diet  of  the  League,  the 
diet  fixed  the  contingent  of  each  canton ;  the  cantonal 
governments  settled  how  many  men  should  be  furnished 
by  each  commune,  and  the  men  were  chosen  by  the 
municipal  officers  or  the  captains.  There  were  always 
more  men  willing  to  go  than  were  needed.  When  the 
whole  force  came  together  it  chose  its  leaders.  The  price 
of  mercenaries  was  about  four  florins  a  month.  Payment 
was  made  to  the  diet,  which  divided  the  sum  received 
among  the  cantons." 

Reference  has  abeady  been  made  to  the  fight  of 
St.  Jacob  (1444)  between  the  French  ^cwcheurs  and 
the  Swiss.  "  Noblemen  who  had  been  present  in  many 
engagements  with  the  English  and  others  have  assured 
me,"  says  a  French  writer  (quoted  by  Michelet),  "that 
they  never  saw  or  met  with  men  who  defended  them- 
selves so  stoutly,  or  exposed  their  lives  so  daringly  and 
rashly."  Louis  saw  that  it  was  better  to  have  such  men 
as  allies  than  as  enemies.  He  contrived  to  bring  them 
into  the  field  against  his  rival,  Charles  of  Burgundy 
(known  as  Charles  the  Bold  in  his  earlier  years,  but 
latterly  as  Charles  the  Rash);  and  he  afterwards  hired 
6000  of  them  himself,  setting  an  example  which  his 
successors  followed  for  three  centuries. 

Charles,  though  a  bad  general,  was  an  indefatigable 
soldier  and  a  painstaking  organiser.  Dissatisfied  with  the 
feudal  militia,  he  set  to  work  in  1471^  to  form  a  standing 

■   Kohler,  p.  2:i. 


8o  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

army  like  that  which  had  been  initiated  by  Charles  VII.  in 
France.  This  rose  to  the  number  of  2200  "  lances,"  each 
consisting  of  eight  men,  viz.  a  man-at-arms,  a  coutillier, 
three  mounted  archers,  and  three  men  on  foot,  armed 
■with  pike,  crossbow  or  culverin.  They  were  divided  into 
companies  of  100  lances.  The  mounted  men  and  the 
infantry  formed  separate  companies,  but  acted  together, 
the  pikes  being  drawn  up  in  line  or  square  in  front  of 
the  archers,  and  reinforced  by  dismounted  men-at-arms. 
In  addition  to  these  18,000  regulars  {ordonnances'^)  who 
were  mostly  recruited  from  abroad,  he  had  more  than 
2000  English  archers,  and  other  mercenaries,  and  a  large 
train  of  artillery.  The  wealthy  cities  of  the  Low  Coun- 
tries groaned  under  his  exactions  for  the  maintenance  of 
troops  which  failed  him  when  they  were  put  to  the  test. 

The  aggressions  of  Charles  had  raised  enemies  on  all 
sides,  and  among  these  was  Berne,  which  dragged  the 
rest  of  the  cantons  along  with  it.  While  the  duke  was 
besieging  Neuss,  in  1474,  the  Swiss  helped  to  defeat  his 
lieutenant  in  Franche  Comte ;  and  in  the  following  year, 
while  he  was  annexing  Lorraine,  they  attacked  his  ally, 
the  Duchess  of  Savoy.  At  the  beginning  of  1476  he 
crossed  the  Juras  with  25,000  men,  declaring  that  he 
would  teach  those  peasants  what  war  was  like.  He  took 
Granson,  on  the  lake  of  Neuchatel,  hanged  the  garrison, 
and  then  marched  along  the  lake  to  meet  the  army  of  the 
Confederates,  which  was  coming  up  to  save  the  town.  It 
numbered  about  16,000  foot  and  500  horse.  The  Bur- 
gundian  cavalry  charged  the  Swiss  vanguard,  but  it  was 
reinforced  and  stood  its  ground.  There  was  no  room  for 
cavalry  to  manoeuvre  between  the  hills  and  the  lake,  and 
they  masked  the  fire  of  the  guns,  so  Charles  told  them  to 
fall  back  to  more  open  country.     As  soon  as  the  two  wings 

'  Toutey,  p.  '20i  71. 


THE   MIDDLE  AGES  8i 

of  cavalry  were  seen  to  be  wheeling  off  to  the  rear,  the 
infantry  drawn  up  behind  them  took  it  as  a  signal  for 
retreat,  and  made  off  with  all  haste,  leaving  the  guns  on 
the  field.  Charles  tried  to  rally  them  in  vain,  and  the 
cavalry  soon  followed  them.  It  was  a  victory  won,  not  by 
hard  fighting,  but  by  the  prestige  of  the  Swiss  and  the 
bad  handling  of  the  Burgundians.  The  Swiss  were  apt  "  to 
strike  their  enemies  with  terror  at  their  mere  approach," 
as  the  people  of  Strassburg  had  said  when  they  asked 
Berne  to  send  them  400  men  a  few  months  before. 

Charles  himself,  however,  was  not  cowed,  and  in  three 
months  he  had  got  together  a  larger  army  than  that 
which  was  scattered  at  Granson.  He  reorganised  his 
regulars  in  eight  battalions  of  2000  men  each,  of  whom 
only  one-fifth  was  mounted.  In  June  he  laid  siege  to 
Morat,  and  on  the  22nd  he  was  attacked  there  by  the 
Confederate  army  sent  to  raise  the  siege.  Including 
auxiliaries  from  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  it  numbered  25,000 
men  or  more.  The  advance  of  the  Swiss  was  screened  by 
woods ;  it  took  Charles  by  surprise,  and  his  men  were  not 
in  their  places.  He  had  made  an  intrenchment,  and 
mounted  guns  to  guard  the  flank  of  the  position  which 
covered  his  principal  camp ;  but  the  Swiss  worked  round 
it,  and  the  Burgundian  battalions  which  were  first  brought 
up  found  themselves  assailed  both  in  front  and  in  flank. 
They  gave  way,  and  Charles  tried  in  vain  to  fall  back  to  a 
fresh  position.  His  men  broke  and  fled ;  but,  hemmed  in 
by  the  lake,  it  was  not  easy  for  them  to  escape,  and  the 
Burgundian  army  was  practically  destroyed.  Its  loss  is 
reckoned  at  22,000.  The  Swiss  owed  their  victory  partly 
to  the  tactical  skill  of  their  Austrian  leader,  Herter,  but 
mainly  to  their  rapidity  of  movement  and  impetuosity  in 
attack. 

There  was  little  chance  that  the  fortune  of  war  would 

F 


82  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

be  reversed  when   Charles  met   the   Swiss  for  the  last 
time  near  Nancy  (January  5,  1477).     He  had  raised  a 
fresh  army,  but  it  had   dwindled  during   the  siege  of 
Nancy  to  10,000  men  or  less,  of  whom  not   more  than 
half  could  be  trusted.    Rene,  the  dispossessed  Dukeot 
Lorraine,  brought  up  nearly  double  that  number  to  raise 
the   siege,  and  his  force   included   8000   Swiss,   enlisted 
with  the  approval  of  the  League,  but  not  under  "  banners. 
Against  advice,  Charles  determined  to  fight,  and  chose 
a    position   south-east   of  Nancy  with  his  left   on   the 
Meurthe.    There  were  woods   on  his   right,  and   these 
toc^etherwith  a  snowstorm,  concealed  the  movements  of 
Rene's   army.      While  half  of  it  attacked  in  front    the 
other  half  fell  upon  the  right  flank  of  the  Burgundians. 
Soon  both  flanks  were  turned,  the  guns  were  taken,  the 
cavalry  rode  off,  and  the  infantry  were  cut   to   pieces 
Charles  disappeared;    a  body  said  to  be  his  was  found 
some  days  afterwards,  and  was  buried  at  Nancy      One 
of  his  principal  officers,  Campobasso,  had  deserted  before 
the  battle,  and  helped  to  intercept  the  fugitives. 

The  armies  of  Charles  the  Rash  cannot  be  regarded 
as  the  best  type  of  medieval  armies.  Every  race  and 
every  weapon  were  to  be  found  in  their  ranks  but  they 
were  held  together  only  by  a  cash  nexus,  ihere  was 
no  common  or  prevailing  nationality,  and  httle  attach- 
ment to  the  duke  or  confidence  in  him.  Yet  the  down- 
fall of  the  house  of  Burgundy,  "the  most  flourishing 
and  celebrated  of  any  m  Christendom,-  when  it  seemed 
to  be  on  the  point  of  establishing  a  middle  kmgdom 
between  France  and  Germany,  made  a  deep  impression. 
After  this  achievement  of  the  Swiss  peasantry  it  was  idle 
to  say  that  the  wearmg  of  armour  and  the  use  of  weapons 
was  reserved  by  God  and  nature  for  persons  of  quahty. 


1  Commines,  i.  34£ 


IV 

THE   SIXTEENTH   CENTURY 

GuizOT  has  remarked  that  in  the  sixteenth  century  the 
history  of  Europe  becomes  essentially  diplomatic.  Kings 
who  had  hitherto  been  engaged  in  putting  their  own 
houses  in  order,  now  found  leisure  to  look  abroad.  To 
bring  other  countries  under  their  rule  by  wars  or  mar- 
riages became  their  chief  business  ;  and  while  the  stronger 
powers  aimed  at  predominance,  the  weaker  sought  to 
maintain  the  balance  of  power.  This  interest  in  foreign 
politics  was  the  cause  as  well  as  the  effect  of  the  growth 
of  royal  authority.  It  demanded  more  highly  organised 
armies,  capable  of  prolonged  service  abroad,  and  available 
for  crushing  resistance  at  home ;  and  means  for  the 
maintenance  of  such  armies  were  furnished  by  the 
wider  dominions  and  greater  wealth  of  the  jDrincipal 
states. 

The  Swiss  had  shown  that  good  infantry  could  win 
battles,  either  alone  or  with  a  small  proportion  of  horse ; 
and  the  comparative  cheapness  of  foot  soldiers  made  all 
countries  try  to  obtain  troops  on  the  Swiss  model  or  up 
to  their  standard.  The  Swiss  retained  their  pre-eminence 
for  some  time.  "  They  are,  to  speak  the  truth,  a  very 
warlike  people,"  says  Montluc, "  and  serve  as  it  were  for 
bulwarks  to  an  army :  but  then  they  must  never  want 
either  money  or  victuals ;  for  they  are  not  to  be  paid 
with  words."  They  were  apt  to  "  carry  themselves  very 
frowardly  and  obstinately  "  towards  their  employers,  and 


84  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

sometimes  failed  them.  They  were  enhsted  either  as 
independent  bands,  or  by  agreement  with  the  cantons 
or  the  Confederation.  In  the  latter  case  they  carried 
banners,  and  no  man  might  fight  against  the  banner  of 
his  own  canton  or  that  of  the  Confederation  under  pain  of 
death.  On  this  ground  the  Swiss  hired  by  Ludovico 
Sforza  refused  to  fight  the  French  army  at  Novara,  in 
1500 ;  they  could  not  do  it,  they  said,  without  the  leave  of 
their  lords. 

The  earliest  competitors  of  the  Swiss  as  mercenaries 
were  the  German  landsknechts  (lansquenets).  It  is  said 
that  they  were  finer-looking  men  than  the  Swiss,  and 
better  equipped,  but  not  so  stout-hearted,  or  well  disci- 
plined.^ They  were  freely  enlisted  in  bands  under  well- 
known  captains,  and  owed  their  development  in  the  first 
instance  to  Maximilian,  who  recruited  them  in  his 
hereditary  states.  Most  of  them  were  armed  with  swords 
and  pikes,  which  soon  increased  in  length  from  10  feet 
to  1 8  feet  or  more,  but  some  had  halberds  and  some  had 
firearms.  In  the  Swiss  bands  also  there  were  three 
times  as  many  pikes  as  halberds  by  the  end  of  the 
fifteenth  century. 

The  French  kings  were  mainly  dependent  on  Swiss 
and  German  mercenaries  for  their  infantry.  Henry  VII. 
of  England  told  his  Parliament  in  1491:  "France  hath 
much  people  and  few  soldiers.  They  have  no  stable 
bands  of  foot.  Some  good  horse  they  have."  And 
Machiavelli  reported,  when  on  a  mission  to  France  in 
1510 :  "  All  the  nobility  are  devoted  to  military  life, 
hence  the  French  men-at-arms  are  of  the  best  in  Europe. 
The  foot  soldiers  on  the  other  hand  are  bad,  being  com- 
posed of  rabble  and  labouring  folk  subject  to  the  barons, 
and  so  oppressed  in  every  act  of  life  that  they  are  vile. 

^  Commines,  ii.  260. 


i 


THE  SIXTEENTH   CENTURY  85 

Exception,  however,  must  be  made  of  the  Gascons,  who 
being  near  to  Spain,  have  something  of  the  Spaniard, 
and  are  a  trifle  better  than  the  others,  although  in  recent 
times  they  have  proved  themselves  rather  thievish  than 
valiant.  Yet  they  behave  well  in  the  defence  and  attack 
of  fortresses  though  badly  in  the  open  field.  In  this,  too, 
they  are  the  reverse  of  the  Germans  and  Swiss,  who  are 
unrivalled  in  the  field,  but  worth  nothing  in  attack  or 
defence  of  fortified  places."  ^ 

The  bands  of  I'icardy  and  Piedmont,  the  first  raised  by 
Louis  XI.  in  1 180,  the  second  by  Louis  XII.  in  1507,  were 
the  beginning  of  the  native  French  infantry.  Bayadr 
took  charge  of  a  company  of  500  foot,  which  played  a 
principal  part  in  the  capture  of  Genoa,  and  many  men- 
at-arms  served  under  him.  After  the  Swiss  had  failed 
Francis  I.  at  Pavia  (1525)  he  tried  to  provide  a  native 
substitute  for  them  by  the  creation  of  his  "  Legions," 
seven  provincial  corps  of  which  the  strength  was 
fixed  at  6000  each.  But  the  legionaries  proved  poor 
soldiers,  and  would  not  fight  without  Swiss  or  Germans 
to  support  them  ;  the  gentry  complained  of  their  mis- 
behaviour, and  it  was  found  better  to  revert  to  a  money 
tax  in  lieu  of  personal  service.-  These  provincial  troops 
survived,  however,  as  a  militia  until  the  Revolution. 
They  were  occasionally  called  out,  and  were  of  some 
service  to  Louis  XIV.  in  his  later  wars. 

In  1506  Machiavelli  persuaded  the  Florentines  to  raise 
a  militia  for  the  defence  of  their  liberties,  instead  of 
trusting  to  mercenaries.  It  behaved  well  when  Florence 
was  besieged  in  1529,  but  was  not  able  to  prevent  the 
restoration  of  the  Medici.  Itahans  ranked  high  as  officers 
and  engineers,  owing  to  their  alert  intelligence  and  large 
practical  experience  of  war ;  but  as  mere  fighting  material 

'  Villari,  i.  477.  »  Vaissiere,  p.  i^H. 


86  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

they  were  no  match  for  Swiss  or  Germans.  With  Spain 
the  case  was  different.  Spaniards,  unsurpassable  in  fight- 
ing behind  walls,  have  not  generally  shone  in  the  open 
field.  At  Najera  in  the  fourteenth  century  as  at  Tala- 
vera  in  the  nineteenth,  they  compared  unfavourably  with 
French  and  English.  Wellington  found  them  "  children  in 
the  art  of  war  "  ;  but  Gonzalo  of  Cordova  showed  in  Italy, 
as  Hannibal  had  shown  before  him,  that  they  could  hold 
their  own  with  any  troops  in  Europe. 

"  The  Great  Captain "  and  his  officers  had  learnt  their 
trade  in  the  ten  years'  war  of  Granada  (1481-1491).  A 
corps  of  Swiss  mercenaries  was  employed  in  it ;  and  in  the 
small  army  which  Gonzalo  took  to  Naples  in  1495  there 
was  a  proportion  of  pikes,  which  was  increased  to  one-third 
at  the  end  of  his  first  campaign.  But  the  bulk  of  his  foot 
were  armed  with  sword  and  buckler;  hardy  and  active, 
they  were  excellent  light  troops,  but  unused  to  fighting  in 
close  order.  It  was  in  Calabria  and  the  Southern  Apen- 
nines that  he  won  his  first  successes,  which  helped  to 
drive  the  French  out  of  Naples.  In  1502  war  broke  out 
again  between  French  and  Spaniards  in  Southern  Italy, 
and  Gonzalo  was  blockaded  in  Barletta.  A  Spanish  force 
on  its  march  to  him  from  Reggio  was  intercepted  by 
D'Aubigny,  one  of  the  French  commanders,  but  "  by  the 
help  of  their  bucklers  and  the  agility  of  their  bodies, 
having  got  under  their  pikes,  and  so  near  that  they  could 
come  at  them  with  their  swords,  the  Spaniards  had  the 
day  with  the  slaughter  of  most  of  the  Swisses."  ^  A  week 
afterwards  (April  27)  Gonzalo,  unaware  of  this  victory, 
and  hard  pressed  for  food,  marched  out  from  Barletta  and 
intrenched  himself  on  a  hill  at  Cerignola.  He  had  3000 
Spanish  foot  and  2000  Germans.  Nemours,  the  French 
viceroy,  attacked  him  with  a  force  of  Swiss  and  Gascons ; 
'  Machiavelli,  p.  53. 


THE   SIXTEENTH   CENTURY  87 

but  the  attacks  were  repulsed,  Nemours  was  killed,  the 
French  army  was  routed,  and  the  Spaniards  gained  pos- 
session of  Naples. 

At  the  battle  of  Ravenna  (1512)  artillery  for  the  first 
time  played  a  decisive  part  in  the  field.  The  cavalry  of 
the  Spanish  army  was  so  galled  by  the  French  guns  that 
they  left  their  position  and  advanced  to  the  attack, 
followed  by  the  foot.  The  French  won  a  complete  vic- 
tory, yet  the  manner  in  which  the  Spanish  infantry, 
under  Peter  of  Navarre,  made  good  their  retreat  added 
to  their  reputation.  "At  the  first  encounter  with  the 
Lance-knights  they  were  somewhat  shaken  by  the  firm 
and  close  order  of  the  pikes,  yet  coming  afterwards  to 
the  sword's  point,  many  of  the  Spaniards  covered  with 
their  targets,  running  with  their  daggers  and  short 
weapons  between  the  legs  of  the  Lance-knights,  they 
came  with  a  wonderful  slaughter  almost  to  the  very 
midst  of  their  squadron." '  Finding  the  day  was  lost, 
they  retired  slowly,  beating  off  all  the  charges  of  the 
French,  and  killing  Gaston  de  Foix,  who  himself  led  one 
of  them.  Peter  of  Navarre  (the  man  who  first  showed 
what  might  be  done  with  gunpowder  in  mines)  was  taken 
prisoner. 

The  increased  use  of  firearms,  and  especially  of  artillery, 
was  detrimental  to  the  shock  tactics  of  the  Swiss.  They 
resisted  change,  and  made  it  their  rule  to  go  straight 
for  the  guns.  Death  was  the  penalty  for  any  man  who 
broke  rank,  or  even  showed  signs  of  fear.  At  Novara 
(1514)  they  redeemed  the  credit  which  they  had  lost  there 
fourteen  years  before,  by  a  night  sortie  in  which  they 
routed  the  French  besieging  army  and  took  their  guns. 
At  Melegnano  (1515)  they  attacked  the  French  army 
with  the  same  impetuosity,  and  in  greater  force,  but  not 

'  Guicciardini,  p.  41b. 


88  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

under  cover  of  darkness.  The  country  was  intersected 
with  ditches,  which  furnished  successive  lines  of  defence, 
and  hindered  movement.  They  forced  the  French  to  fall 
back,  but  the  guns  and  the  Gascon  crossbowmen  inflicted 
heavy  loss  on  them  and  kept  them  in  check,  until 
(oQ  the  second  day  of  the  fighting)  the  approach  of 
the  Venetian  army  obliged  them  to  retreat  to  Milan, 
whence  they  returned  to  their  own  country  with  lessened 


Having  re-entered  the  service  of  France,  they  met  with 
another  reverse  at  the  aifair  of  La  Bicocca  (1522).  Some 
8000  of  them  insisted  on  trying  to  storm  Lntrenchments 
held  by  Spanish  shot,  without  waiting  for  the  turning 
movement  which  their  commander,  Lautrec,  wished  to 
make.  They  broke  in,  but  before  they  could  re-form 
they  were  charged  by  landsknechts,  and  were  beaten 
with  a  loss  of  nearly  half  their  number.  It  was  perhaps 
from  the  discouragement  of  this  affair  that  three  years 
afterwards  at  Pavia  the  Swiss  "did  nothing  answer  the 
valour  they  had  been  accustomed  to  show  in  battles."  ^ 
Attacked  by  the  Spaniards  both  in  front  and  flank,  they 
broke  and  fled ;  owing  to  their  behaviour,  to  the  effec- 
tiveness of  the  Spanish  infantry  fire,  and  to  his  own 
impetuosity,  Francis  I.  lost  the  day  and  became  the 
prisoner  of  Charles  V. 

In  his  dialogues  on  the  Art  of  War,  Machiavelli  com- 
pared the  Swiss  pikemen  to  the  Macedonian  phalanx 
and  the  Spanish  sword-and-bucklermen  to  the  Roman 
legionaries.  He  thought  that  the  phalanx  was  bound 
to  fail,  as  it  had  failed  in  ancient  times,  against  good 
infantry  armed  with  weapons  better  suited  for  hand-to- 
hand  fighting.  He  would  give  swords  and  bucklers  to 
half  his  foot,  pikes  to  one-third,  and  the  remaining  sixth 
'  Guicciardini,  p.  636. 


THE   SIXTEENTH   CENTURY  89 

should  be  light  troops,  armed  with  harquebuses,  cross- 
bows, partizans  or  halberds.  Brantome  speaks  slightingly 
of  "  ce  bon  galant  de  Machiavel,  mauvais  instructour  de 
guerre  certes  " ;  but  he  says  the  Duke  of  Guise  told  him 
that  he  would  give  a  good  account  of  a  battalion  of 
5000  or  6000  Swiss  if  he  had  1500  young  and  active 
soldiers  (Basques,  Gascons,  or  Spaniards)  armed  with 
good  harquebuses  and  long  daggers,  and  formed  in  four 
or  five  bands,  to  attack  and  retire  alternately  after  the 
Arab  fashion.^  Soldiers  of  repute  in  later  days — Maurice 
of  Nassau,  Rohan,  and  MontecucoUi — bad  a  leaning 
towards  bucklermen.  Nevertheless  the  long  pike  (5^ 
to  6  yards)  prevailed,  and  for  two  centuries  held  the 
first  place  among  hand  weapons.  The  Spaniards  them- 
selves discarded  their  bucklers,  and  halberds  became 
confined  to  the  colour-guard  and  the  sergeants.  They 
were  more  convenient  to  carry  and  to  use  in  a  me'Zee, 
but  they  were  not  so  well  suited  to  orderly  fighting  in 
close  formation,  and  were  at  any  rate  reserved  for  the 
rear  ranks. 

Sir  John  Smythe,  writing  at  the  end  of  the  sixteenth 
century,  described  how  pikes  should  charge.  There 
should  be  no  fencing  with  the  enemy,  but  the  first  four 
ranks  should  close  up,  and  level  their  pikes.  "Moving 
forward  together  pace  with  pace  and  step  with  step, 
carrying  their  pikes  firmly  with  both  their  hands  breast 
high,  their  points  full  in  their  enemy's  faces,  they  do 
altogether  give  a  puissant  thrust."  If  this  does  not 
overthrow  the  enemy  they  must  drop  their  pikes  or 
throw  them  forward  into  the  enemy's  ranks,  and 
attack  with  sword  and  dagger,  one  in  each  hand.'-  The 
Spanish  sword,  which  was  longer  and  more  sharp-pointed 
than   those   of    the   Swiss   and  Germans,   found    favour 

'  Susane,  i.  177.  =   /nstntcUuna  ami  (Inlcrs  Military,  \\\\.  25,  &c. 


90  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

generally;  Smythe  complained  that  good  old-fashioned 
broadswords  of  three-quarters  of  a  yard  were  being  super- 
seded by  rapiers  of  a  yard  and  a  quarter. 

The  Spaniards  made  more  use  of  defensive  armour  than 
the  Swiss,  and  this  gave  them  an  advantage  in  close  fight- 
ing. Their  pikemen  wore  morions,  gorgets,  corslets,  and 
tasses  (jointed  thigh-pieces);  and  other  nations  followed 
their  example  in  so  far  as  the  individual  soldier  could  be 
persuaded  to  bear  the  burden.  Men  grew  impatient  of  it 
as  firearms  became  more  effective,  for  the  armour  increased 
in  weight  and  was  a  doubtful  protection. 

Hand-guns  may  be  traced  back  to  the  fourteenth 
century.  They  were  small  cannon  mounted  on  sticks, 
with  a  touch-hole  to  which  a  match  was  applied.  They 
were  chiefly  used  in  sieges,  and  in  the  fifteenth  century 
they  came  to  be  known  as  hand-culverins.  They  threw 
leaden  bullets  of  an  ounce  or  two,  and  weighed  about 
10  lbs.  Charles  of  Burgundy  attached  a  "  coulevrinier  " 
to  each  lance,  and  Edward  IV.,  when  he  landed  at 
Ravenspur  in  1471,  brought  with  him  300  culverin-men 
whom  Charles  had  obtained  for  him.  The  Swiss  also 
were  well  provided  with  them.  In  the  latter  part  of  the 
fifteenth  century  the  hand-gun  was  made  into  a  match- 
lock by  the  addition  of  a  cock  to  hold  the  match  and  a 
trigger  to  bring  it  down  on  the  pan.  The  stock  was  also 
curved  or  crooked,  so  that  the  piece  could  be  aimed  and 
fired  [  from  the  shoulder.  "  Hakenbiichse,"  or  simply 
"  haken,"  was  the  name  given  to  such  arms  in  Germany. 
This  became  hackbuss  or  haquebut  in  England,  as  im- 
ported direct,  and  harquehos  after  passing  through  Italy 
and  France.  The  latter  name,  especially  in  its  Latinised 
form,  arciis  husus,  suggests  connection  with  the  cross- 
bow; but  this  was  probably  mistaken  etymology,  like 
"  Lance-knights." 


THE   SIXTEENTH   CENTURY  91 

Germans  and  Spaniards  took  readily  to  firearms,  while 
the  English  preferred  the  longhow,  and  the  Gascons 
the  crossbow.  There  was  groat  variety  in  the  length, 
weight,  and  calibre  of  the  firearms.  There  were  demi- 
haques,  probably  for  use  on  horseback;  and  again  there 
were  haquebuts  and  harquebuses  a  croc,  that  is  to  say, 
with  a  hook  to  catch  on  a  wall  or  stand,  and  take  the 
recoil.  These  wall-pieces  sometimes  weighed  as  much 
as  50  lbs.,  and  had  bullets  of  3  or  4  ounces,  while 
the  ordinary  harquebus  bullet  weighed  about  1  ounce. 
In  1520  the  Spaniards  took  an  important  step  by  the 
adoption  of  a  portable  fork.  This  enabled  them  to  bring 
into  the  field  an  arm  6  feet  long  and  weighing  about 
15  lbs.,  which  fired  a  2-ounce  bullet  and  had  an 
effective  range  of  400  paces.  This  weapon  soon  became 
known  as  the  musket  {i.e.  sparrow-hawk).  Musketeers 
carried  fifteen  rounds  of  ammunition,  the  charges  being 
in  separate  wooden  cases  hung  from  a  bandoleer.  Ten 
men  per  company  of  the  Spanish  shot  at  Pavia  were 
armed  with  muskets,  and  helped  to  win  the  battle,  for 
the  unwonted  penetration  of  their  bullets  disordered  the 
ranks  of  the  French  men-at-arms.  The  Spaniards  were 
broken  up  into  small  parties,  which  moved  about  rapidly, 
"donnant  des  tours  et  faisant  des  voltes  de  ra  et  de 
lit,  d'une  part  et  d' autre."  ' 

Bayard  had  been  killed  by  a  harquebus  ball  the  year 
before ;  and  though  firearms  were  less  accurate  than  the 
crossbow,  and  took  longer  to  load,  French  leaders  soon 
found  it  best  to  adopt  them  for  half  their  shot.  Montluc 
helped  to  bring  this  about,  though  he  regarded  the 
harquebus  as  "  the  Devil's  invention  to  make  us  murther 
one  another,"  and  wished  to  God  that  this  accursed 
engine  had  never  been  inv(!nted.     The  French  harque- 

'  Brantome,  i.  2!t7. 


92  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

buses  were  often  light,  taking  bullets  of  less  than  an 
ounce  in  weight.  Those  that  were  of  normal  bore  came 
to  be  distinguished  as  arquebuses  de  calibre,  and  were 
called  in  England  calivers.i 

There  were  mounted  harquebusiers  in  the  army  with 
which  Charles  VIII.  invaded  Italy  in  1494.  The  use  of 
firearms  by  mounted  men  increased,  and  as  the  lighted 
match  was  embarrassmg  on  horseback,  a  wheel-lock 
which  struck  sparks  was  introduced  for  their  benefit, 
though  it  was  too  expensive  for  general  use.  Wheel- 
lock  pistols  (so  called  because  their  bore  corresponded 
to  the  coin)  became  a  favourite  weapon  for  cavalry  by 
the  middle  of  the  sixteenth  century.  The  proportion  of 
horse  to  foot  decreased,  and  the  character  of  the  horse 
changed.  The  "  furnished  lance  " — the  man-at-arms  with 
his  attendants — died  out.  The  German  heavy  cavalry 
(Reiters)  were  mostly  individual  troopers,  formed  in  very 
deep  squadrons,  sometimes  of  fifty  ranks,  and  armed  with 
pistols.  They  were  supplemented  by  separate  bodies  of 
light  horsemen  armed  with  lance  or  harquebus.  The 
Reiters  wore  armour  proof  against  the  harquebus,  and 
this  led  Alva  to  raise  the  proportion  of  musketeers  in 
a  company  to  one-fourth  of  the  shot;  in  time  they 
became  more  than  half. 

The  excellence  of  the  Spanish  infantry  was  generally 
recognised.  La  None  held  them  up  as  an  example  to  his 
countrymen  for  their  subordination  and  good-fellowship, 
for  the  pains  taken  by  the  older  soldiers  to  teach  the 
young  ones  their  duty,  and  for  their  strictness  in  regard 
to  the  wearing  of  armour."  Sir  Roger  Williams,  Avho  had 
served  with  them  and  against  them,  spoke  of  the  careful 
selection  of  officers,  and  declared  that  "  no  army  that  ever 
I  saw  passes  that  of  Duke  de  Parma  for  discipline  and 

'  Grose,  ii.  295.  -  La  Noue,  p.  174. 


THE   SIXTEENTH   CENTURY  93 

good  order."  As  for  the  race  from  which  they  sprang,  he 
said  it  was  well  known  that  they  were  the  basest  and  most 
cowardly  of  people :  one  Englishman  was  a  match  for 
three  Spaniards.  But  practice  had  made  them  perfect. 
"Their  state  is  governed  with  two  sorts  of  people,  captains 
and  clergy.  As  the  captains'  ambition  persuades  the  king 
to  increase  his  wars  to  maintain  their  estate  in  wealth  and 
greatness ;  so  doth  the  clergy  persuade  him  also  to  wars 
to  maintain  their  state  against  them  of  religion.  By  this 
means  the  state  of  Spain  during  this  government  can 
never  be  without  wars  ;  continual  wars  must  make  expert 
soldiers."  »  None  but  trained  soldiers  were  brought  into 
the  field,  their  places  in  the  Spanish  garrisons  being  taken 
by  recruits  {besonios). 

WiUiams's  insular  contempt  for  the  raw  material  was 
unwarranted.  The  Spanish  recruit,  drawn  chiefly  from 
the  more  rugged  provinces  of  the  north,  was  hardy,  tem- 
perate, patient  of  fatigue  and  privation,  quick  to  learn  the 
use  of  arms,  and  apt  for  all  kmds  of  service  under  good 
leadership.  He  respected  authority,  but  he  was  greedy  of 
money,  and  mutinied  if  he  was  kept  long  without  pay  or 
plunder.  But  the  main  causes  of  the  excellence  of  the 
Spanish  infantry  at  this  particular  time  are  those  which 
Williams  indicated.  The  long  struggle  with  the  Moors 
had  thrown  the  whole  energy  of  the  nation  into  a  military 
channel,  while  intensifying  its  stress  on  creed.  War  was 
the  only  fit  occupation  for  an  hidalgo,  unless  he  turned 
monk;  and  every  one  wished  to  pass  for  an  hidalgo. 
There  was  a  general  distaste  for  trade  and  agriculture. 
The  discovery  of  America  opened  fresh  fields  for  adven- 
ture, and  the  gold  that  came  from  it  made  industry  less 
imperative.  Devotion  to  church  and  king  had  become  a 
passion,  and  to  serve  in  the  wars  was  to  serve  both.     The 

'  Williams,  p.  11. 


94  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

bond  of  comradeship  was  developed  by  prolonged  service 
among  alien  peoples  in  Italy  or  the  Low  Countries,  and 
also  the  bond  of  attachment  to  their  officers.  The  officers 
were  the  pick  of  the  nation,  for  men  of  the  highest  rank 
were  proud  to  have  the  charge  of  a  company  of  foot,  and 
often  preferred  it  to  a  cavalry  command. 

The  battle  of  Mook  (1574),  though  a  small  aifivir,  showed 
the  superiority  of  the  Spaniards  to  the  French  and  Ger- 
man mercenaries  which  the  Nassau  princes  at  first  brought 
against  them.  Lewis  of  Nassau  was  trying  to  join  his 
brother,  William  of  Orange,  with  6000  foot  and  2000  horse 
when  he  was  intercepted  by  Sancho  d'Avila,  who  had 
only  4000  foot  and  less  than  1000  horse.  D'Avila  attacked 
the  Nassau  army,  though  its  front  was  covered  by  in- 
trenchments,  and  its  left  rested  on  the  Meuse ;  and  after 
some  hard  fighting  he  completely  routed  it,  killing  the 
commander  and  half  his  men.^  Next  day  the  Spaniards 
mutinied,  elected  a  chief  according  to  their  custom, 
marched  to  Antwerp  and  quartered  themselves  on  the 
wealthiest  citizens,  until  they  received  a  sufficient  instal- 
ment of  the  arrears  of  pay  that  were  due  to  them. 

With  the  best  troops  in  Christendom,  the  widest 
dominions,  and  a  stream  of  gold  and  silver  flowing  in 
from  America  it  seems  strange  that  Philip  II.  should 
have  failed  to  crush  the  insurrection  in  the  Low  Countries, 
and  that  his  failure  should  have  been  due  to  want  of 
money.  There  is  no  better  example  of  the  extent  to 
which  industrial  efficiency  lies  at  the  root  of  military  effici- 
ency. Industry  of  all  kinds  was  despised  and  neglected 
in  Spain,  and  trade  suffered  from  Government  restric- 
tions. The  treasure  that  came  from  the  other  side  of  the 
Atlantic  soon  found  its  way  to  other  countries  where  it 
could  be  used  as  capital  for  production.     It  did  little  per- 


THE   SIXTEENTH   CENTURY  95 

manent  good  to  the  Spaniards,  and  its  abundance  raised 
prices.  The  share  of  it  that  went  into  the  king's  coftcrs 
seems  to  have  been  under  a  miUion  of  ducats  a  year. 
When  Alva  left  the  Netherlands  in  1573  the  war  was 
costing  more  than  seven  millions  a  year.  His  army 
numbered  62,000  men,  but  of  these  only  8000  were 
Spimiards,  for  the  scanty  population  of  the  Peninsula 
could  not  bear  the  continuous  drain  upon  it.  Many  pro- 
vinces were  exempt  from  service  abroad,  so  that  the 
burden  fell  mainly  on  Castile. 

Even  before  war  began  in  the  Netherlands  the  expendi- 
ture was  in  excess  of  the  revenue,  and  the  loans  raised 
by  Philip  and  his  father  had  mounted  up  to  thirty-five 
millions,  or  aliout  seven  years'  income.  A  third  of  the 
revenue  came  from  the  Low  Countries,  and  was  cut  off  by 
the  war.  Half  of  the  provinces  were  lost  to  Spain,  and  the 
other  half  were  ruined.  Antwerp,  the  centre  of  the  world's 
trade,  and  the  richest  city  in  Philip's  dominions,  was 
throttled  by  the  Dutch  and  sacked  by  the  Spaniards. 
It  lost  half  its  population,  and  its  trade  passed  to 
Amsterdam,  furnishing  the  United  Provinces  with  fresh 
means  of  resistance,  and  helping  the  Dutch  to  gain 
a  predominance  at  sea  which  ultimately  secured  their 
independence. 

The  burghers  of  Holland  were  even  less  able  than 
German  mercenaries  to  face  Spanish  troops  in  the  field 
But  they  could  fight  behind  walls,  and  their  cities,  even  if 
taken,  cost  the  Spaniards  losses  which  they  could  ill  afford 
Things  looked  black  for  the  States  in  1585,  when 
William  the  Silent  had  been  killed,  Parma  had  retaken 
Antwerp,  and  Elizabeth  was  at  length  moved  to  inter- 
vene. Yet  the  Englishmen  who  went  out  with  Leicester 
were  astonished  at  the  flourishing  aspect  of  the  United 
Provinces,  the  wealth  of  the  cities,  and  the  industry  of  the 


96  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

people ;  while  Parma  was  telling  Philip  that  no  language 
could  describe  the  misery  of  the  "  reconciled  provinces  " — 
Artois,  Hainault,  and  Flanders.  Practice  and  regular 
pay  soon  raised  the  quality  of  the  Dutch  troops,  and 
the  methodical  genius  of  Maurice  of  Nassau  developed  a 
mode  of  warfare  in  which  the  spade  played  a  leading  part, 
and  formed  a  new  school  of  tactics. 

The  bands  or  companies  of  hired  soldiers  raised  by 
captains  were  combined  into  larger  units  under  the 
"regiment"  of  a  captain-general  or  colonel.  The  latter 
name  at  first  denoted  the  body,  not  the  chief,  and  seems 
to  have  been  derived,  like  cornet,  from  "  corno,"  a  horn ; 
for  the  wings  sometimes  protruded  like  horns.^  Follow- 
ing the  Spanish  custom,  the  word  was  at  first  spelt 
coronell  in  England,  and  it  is  still  pronounced  accordingly. 
The  strength  and  number  of  companies  in  a  regiment 
varied  widely.  In  1526  Frundsberg  formed  a  regiment 
of  thirty- five  companies  with  a  total  of  12,000  men ;  but 
ten  companies  of  300  men  each  was  the  normal  strength 
of  German  regiments.  The  French  and  Spanish  com- 
panies were  smaller.  Alva  took  with  him  to  the  Nether- 
lands forty-nine  companies  of  foot  averaging  180  men  each. 
They  formed  four  Tercios,  a  name  borrowed  originally 
(according  to  Hexham  and  Lord  Orrery)  from  the  three 
divisions  of  an  army— van,  battle,  and  rear. 

Regiments  were  administrative,  not  tactical  units.  The 
tactical  unit  was  the  battalion,  a  square  or  rectangle 
formed  of  the  pikes  of  so  many  companies,  drawn  up 
side  by  side,  with  their  shot  variously  disposed  inside  or 
outside.  "  When  the  enemy  are  superior  in  horse  and 
we  few  or  none,  it  is  good  to  get  the  four  fronts  of  the 
battle  of  equal  resistance  both  to   ofiend   and   defend," 


THE   SIXTEENTH   CENTURY  97 

says  an  Irishman  ^  who  served  with  the  Spaniards. 
Apprehension  of  cavalry  caused  a  preference  for  large 
squares.  When  Charles  V.  marched  against  the  Turks 
in  1532  his  pikemen,  numbering  70,000,  are  said  to  have 
been  formed  into  three  vast  squares.  At  Dreux  (1562) 
the  5000  Swiss  of  the  Catholic  army,  "  beset  on  all  sides, 
but  standing  firm  in  a  close  order  and  doubled  battalia  "  - 
(('.('.  twice  as  many  men  in  rank  as  in  file),  beat  oft'  the 
repeated  charges  of  some  4000  Huguenot  horse  supported 
by  harquebusiers,  and  shattered  a  regiment  of  lands- 
knechts.  Their  obstinate  resistance  allowed  Guise  with 
the  other  division  of  the  CathoHc  army  to  win  the  day. 

But  large  squares  were  slow  and  unwieldy,  especially  on 
broken  ground  ;  and  they  offered  good  targets  for  artillery, 
as  was  shown  at  St.  Quentin  (1557).  La  Noue  argued  that 
two  squares  of  2000  men  supporting  one  another  would  be 
better  able  to  cross  open  country  in  face  of  cavalry  than 
a  single  square  of  4000  men.  The  increasing  numbers  of 
shot,  and  the  larger  part  they  came  to  play,  affected  the 
question.  Large  hollow  squares  afforded  them  a  better 
refuge  when  they  were  driven  in,  for  by  doubling  the 
number  of  files  of  pikes  the  interior  space  was  increased 
fourfold.  But  it  took  time  to  get  a  large  number  of  men 
into  and  out  of  a  square,  and  while  they  were  inside  they 
could  be  practically  of  no  use ;  nor  did  a  mere  envelope  of 
pikes  offer  the  resistance  of  a  solid  body.  It  was  found 
better  to  form  the  shot  round  the  square  as  an  "  impale- 
ment" of  three  or  four  ranks,  so  that  they  could  be 
sheltered  from  cavalry  by  the  projecting  pikes  and  could 
use  their  weapons.  Small  squares  served  better  for  this 
disposition  than  large  ones,  and  placed  chequerwise  they 
formed  "cross-battles,"  with  space  between  them  for 
baggage. 

'  Barry,  p.  1.30.  «  Davila,  p.  82. 

G 


98  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

The  proportion  of  shot  in  the  infantry  rose  in  the  course 
of  the  century  from  one-fourth  to  three-fifths,  even  with 
well-organised  troops  like  the  Spaniards.  In  the  Hugue- 
not and  Catholic  levies  of  the  French  wars  of  religion  it 
sometimes  amounted  to  nine-tenths.  Chiefs  of  experience, 
like  Montluc  and  La  Noue,  opposed  the  current  in  vain. 
"  Harquebusiers  without  pikes,"  said  the  latter,  "  are  arms 
and  legs  without  a  body."  Frenchmen  generally  disliked 
the  pike  and  the  corslet.  As  a  French  captain  explained, 
"  we  have  not  such  personable  bodies  as  you  Englishmen 
have  to  bear  them ;  neither  have  we  them  at  that  com- 
mandment as  you  have ;  but  are  forced  to  hire  other  nations 
to  supply  our  insufficiency."  i  As  usual  in  civil  wars,  raids 
and  surprises  played  a  prominent  part,  and  for  such  expedi- 
tions harquebusiers  and  light  horsemen  were  best  fitted. 

Troops  that  were  weak  in  pikes  or  heavy  cavalry 
avoided  pitched  battles,  and  if  they  were  forced  to  fight 
they  sought,  by  choice  of  ground  or  use  of  intrenchments, 
to  delay  collision  and  develop  fire-effect.  This  was 
especially  the  case  in  the  Low  Countries  after  the  early 
defeats  incurred  by  the  princes  of  Nassau.  If  cavalry 
charges  on  flank  or  rear  could  be  guarded  against,  the 
depth  of  formation  might  be  reduced  and  the  front 
broadened.  The  normal  order  of  a  battalion  was  a  central 
body  of  pikes  with  sleeves  or  wings  of  shot,  as  with  the 
men-at-arms  and  archers  of  the  fourteenth  century.  The 
shot  were  thrown  forward  to  skirmish  as  the  enemy 
approached,  and  covered  the  front  of  the  pikes,  falling 
back  on  either  hand  when  collision  was  imminent.  If  the 
units  were  large  and  the  sleeves  consequently  wide,  cavalry 
could  break  through  them  on  a  broad  front.  This  was 
another  reason  for  preferring  small  battalions,  some  of 
which  could  be  held  in  reserve  and  brought  up  quickly. 

'  Scott,  ii.  60. 


THE  SIXTEENTH  CENTURY  99 

Miuhiavclli  at  the  beginning  of  the  century  had  recom- 
mended battaKons  of  400  men,  formed  in  three  lines  after 
the  Roman  fashion.  Maurice,  who  was  also  a  careful 
student  of  the  Greek  and  Roman  writers  on  tactics,  came 
to  much  the  same  conclusion.  Putting  aside  the  notion 
of  a  square,  large  or  small,  he  regulated  the  depth  of  his 
formation  by  what  was  needed  for  attack  and  defence. 
Ten  ranks  gave  sufficient  solidity  to  the  pikes,  and  also 
suited  the  shot,  as  they  gave  sufficient  time  for  reloading. 
"  Our  discipline  of  embattailing  our  army,"  wrote  Lord 
Burgh  in  1595,  "is  according  to  the  Roman  dizeniers, 
every  tenth  man  knowing  his  place,  and  the  soldiers 
distributed  into  lines  after  their  tenths,  who  going  before 
them  bring  them  to  their  ranks.  Our  form  is  curious  and 
ready ;  I  would  the  exercise  against  our  enemy  might 
commend  our  order."  1  Count  Lewis  William  of  Nassau, 
stadtholder  of  Friesland,  with  whom  Maurice  discussed 
these  questions,  and  who  had  written  a  work  on  the 
second  Punic  war,  thought  the  new  order  too  shallow ; 
he  preferred  to  follow  the  Emperor  Leo,  and  form  the 
infantry  sixteen  deep. 

Events,  however,  justified  Maurice.  Hexham,  who  has 
given  the  best  Enghsh  description  of  the  Low  Country 
practice,  says:  "The  fittest  number  of  men  to  make  a 
division  of  is  accounted  to  be  500  pikes  and  musketeers, 
that  is  25  files  of  pikes  and  25  files  of  musketeers,  or  more 
or  less  of  one  or  of  the  other  as  they  fall  out.  This 
number  being  so  embattled  makes  an  agile  body,  and  the 
best  to  be  brought  to  fight,  and  two  of  them  being  joined 
near  one  another  can  best  second  and  relievo  each  other, 
better  than  your  great  phalanges,  which  are  unwieldy 
bodies."  ^  The  three  divisions  of  the  infantry  (van,  battle, 
and  rear)  each  constituted  a  brigade,  and  each  brigade 
'  HutfieldiMSS.,  v.  288.  ^  Hexham,  i).  IS). 


loo  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

was  formed  in  three  lines,  with  a  space  of  100  yards 
between  the  first  and  second,  and  200  yards  between  the 
second  and  third.  The  battalions  of  each  line  stood  in 
echelon  to  those  in  front  of  thera,  and  were  single  or  in 
pairs  according  to  the  strength  of  the  brigade.  It  had 
been  the  custom  for  the  ranks  of  musketeers  to  relieve 
one  another  after  firing  by  the  countermarch  of  files,  and 
the  intervals  between  files  were  made  wide  enough  for 
this.  Maurice  formed  his  musketeers  into  sections  of 
about  four  files,  with  passage-ways  between  the  sections, 
and  made  the  men  countermarch  by  ranks. 

"  The  true  rules  of  war,"  says  a  soldier  trained  in  the 
Dutch  school,  "  are  never  to  fight  but  upon  two  occasions : 
the  one  being  upon  a  great  advantage,  the  other  on  a 
great  necessity." '  Regardless  of  sneers  at  "  these  digging 
moles  whom  with  undeserved  fame  the  spade  hath 
raised,"  ^  Maurice  avoided  battles ;  and  his  new  order  was 
first  put  to  the  test  against  his  will.  He  had  invested 
Nieuport  (1600)  when  the  Spaniards  came  up  unexpectedly 
to  its  relief.  The  two  armies  were  nearly  equal  in  num- 
bers, about  10,000  foot  and  1500  horse.  The  dimes  or 
sandhills  east  of  the  haven  formed  the  central  part  of  the 
position  which  Maurice  took  up.  They  had  a  width  of 
about  a  quarter  of  a  mile.  On  the  left,  between  the 
dunes  and  the  sea,  there  was  a  strip  of  shore  which  nar- 
rowed to  30  yards  as  the  tide  rose ;  and  on  the  right  there 
was  a  level  space  of  150  yards  between  the  dunes  and  the 
field  enclosures,  known  as  the  greenway.  The  position, 
therefore,  had  a  front  of  less  than  half  a  mile,  and  the 
central  part  of  it  was  unsuited  to  cavalry.  This  enabled 
Maurice  to  draw  up  his  army  with  its  three  brigades,  one 
behind  another  instead  of  side  by  side.  The  vanguard, 
commanded  by  Francis  Vere,  was  in  front ;  it  consisted  of 
'  Dalton,  ii.  403.  -  Hatfield  MSS.,  v.  285. 


THE  SIXTEENTH  CENTURY  loi 

1600  English  (24  companies)  and  2500  Frisians  (17  com- 
panies). Two  companies  of  Maurice's  guards  were  added 
to  it.  According  to  the  order  of  battle  (as  given  by 
Hexham)  the  English  were  to  form  two  pairs  of  battalions 
in  front  line,  and  the  Frisians  two  pairs  of  battalions  in 
second  line,  the  latter  bemg  placed  in  echelon  on  the 
outer  flanks.  There  was  to  be  no  third  line,  as  the  other 
brigades  furnished  reserves. 

This  symmetrical  arrangement  had  to  be  modified  to 
fit  the  ground.  Vere  describes  the  dunes  as  "so  con- 
fusedly packed  together,  so  brokenly  and  steeply,  that 
the  troops  could  neither  well  discover  what  was  done 
a  stone's  oast  before  them,  nor  advance  forward  in 
any  order,  to  second  if  need  were."  '  He  placed  300  men 
on  a  prominent  hillock,  and  200  on  another  which  was 
100  yards  in  rear  of  it  and  rather  higher.  These  east 
and  west  hills  were  connected  by  saddles  on  the  north 
and  on  the  south.  On  the  south  saddle  Vere  posted  500 
Frisian  musketeers,  to  fire  upon  any  horse  that  might 
advance  along  the  greenway.  On  the  north  saddle  he 
posted  700  of  the  English,  so  forming  a  cross-battle  of 
1700  men.  The  rest  of  the  English  (650)  were  placed 
on  the  sands  in  two  battalions,  and  behind  them,  nearer 
to  the  sea,  were  the  rest  of  the  Frisians  (2000)  in  two 
pairs  of  battalions,  guarding  a  battery  of  six  guns  which 
.swept  the  shore. 

The  archduke  Albrecht  who  commanded  the  Spaniards 
tried  first  to  push  along  the  shore,  but  his  cavalry  was 
driven  back  by  the  fire  of  the  battery.  His  chief  reliance 
was  upon  his  foot,  so  he  turned  towards  the  dunes,  and 
his  van  attacked  the  troops  posted  on  east  hill.  His 
pikemen  were  massed  in  four  large  squares  of  more  than 
1000  men  each,  one  forming  the  van,  two  the  centre,  and 

'  Vere,  p.  MS. 


102  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

one  the  rear.  The  centre  battalions  came  up  on  the 
left  of  the  van,  and  the  rear  on  the  left  of  the  centre 
but  were  checked  by  the  fire  of  the  Frisian  musketeers 
There  was  an  obstinate  fight  for  the  east  hill.  Vere 
called  up  all  his  English  troops,  but  he  was  overmatched, 
and  was  not  reinforced  by  the  other  brigades.  He  was 
wounded,  and  his  men  were  driven  down  to  the  battery 
on  the  shore.  A  charge  of  cavalry  checked  the  Spaniards 
in  their  pursuit  and  saved  the  guns.  The  English  rallied 
and  advanced  again,  and  Maurice  moved  up  the  centre 
brigade  upon  their  right.  The  reserve  cavalry  charged 
along  the  greenway,  and  routed  the  Spanish  horse  on 
that  side.  The  heavy  masses  of  the  Spanish  foot,  dis- 
ordered by  prolonged  fighting  on  broken  ground,  and 
wearied  by  a  long  march  under  a  July  sun,  at  length 
gave  way.  The  admiral  of  Aragon,  who  was  one  of  the 
prisoners  taken,  ascribed  the  victory  to  Maurice's  judg- 
ment in  placing  his  artillery  and  in  husbanding  his 
infantry  and  cavalry,  instead  of  engaging  them  all  at 
once,  as  the  Spaniards  did. 

"If  you  intend  to  have  a  well-commanded  army  you 
must  pay  them  punctually,  and  then  your  general  can 
with  justice  punish  them  severely."  i  Regular  pay  and 
good  administration,  as  against  systematic  neglect,  was 
transferring  to  the  Dutch  the  pre-eminence  which  had 
belonged  to  the  Spaniards.  Antonio  Donato  pronounced 
the  States'  soldiers  to  be  the  best  in  the  world,  and  gave 
the  first  place  to  the  English  infantry,  "  best  beloved  by 
the  natives;  brave,  patient  veterans."^  The  war  in  the 
Low  Countries  was  indeed,  as  some  one  wrote  to  Wal- 
singham  in  1585,  "  a  school  to  breed  up  soldiers  to  defend 
the  freedom  of  England,  which  through  these  long  times 

1  Monk,  p.  22.  -  Motley,  iv.  520. 


THE  SIXTEENTH  CENTURY  103 

of  peace  axid  quietness  is  brought  into  a  most  dangerous 
estate  if  it  should  be  attempted."  '  The  character  of 
the  English  people  is  described  by  Meteren  and  Rohan 
nmch  as  it  was  described  by  Frolssarl  two  centuries 
before:  they  were  stout-hearted  and  vehement,  proud, 
cruel,  and  suspicious  of  strangers.  But  under  the  Tudors 
they  had  fallen  behind  other  countries  in  military  prac- 
tice. There  was  no  standing  army,  and  the  county  militia 
(or  trained  bands)  was  worth  little.  In  1574  Elizabeth 
had  occasion  to  intimate  to  one  of  the  lord-lieutenants 
that  "besides  the  lack  of  furniture  of  armour,  Her 
Majesty  also  perceiveth  that  in  the  whole  realm  there 
is  lack  of  men  exercised  and  trained  in  feats  of  war, 
either  to  wear  their  armour,  to  use  their  weapons,  to 
march  in  order,  to  do  such  things  as  be  requisite";^  and 
the  case  was  no  better  at  the  time  of  the  Armada. 

When  a  force  was  raised  for  service  abroad,  the  men 
were  no  longer  as  of  old  the  retainers  or  tenantry  of  their 
leaders.  The  Tudors  had  done  their  best  to  destroy  the 
feudal  bond,  and  no  badges  were  allowed  but  the  St. 
George's  cross.  The  companies  for  the  Low  Countries 
were  raised  largely  by  "press,"  in  default  of  volunteers; 
the  press  was  sometimes  "so  disorderly  performed  .  .  . 
that  it  is  a  grievance  at  home  and  a  scandal  abroad  " ;  ^ 
and  the  better  sort  of  the  men  pressed  provided  "paddy 
persons"  as  their  substitutes.  Leicester's  muster-master 
complained  to  Walsingham  of  the  bands  sent  out  as  raw, 
weak,  ill-equipped,  and  ill-armed,  and  said  that  "  if  they 
should  be  carried  to  the  field  no  better  trained  than  yet 
they  are,  they  would  prove  much  more  dangerous  to  their 
own  leaders  and  companies  than  any  ways  serviceable  on 
their  enemies."  ^    The  wastage  from  death,  disease,  and 

>  Scott,  i.  .379.  2  76.,  ,350. 

»  Dalton,  i.  82.  «  Motley,  i.  371. 


104  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

desertion  was  very  large,  sometimes  75  per  cent,  in  a 
year;  yet  these  men  with  proper  handling  were  turned 
into  excellent  soldiers. 

Spears,  bills,  and  bows  were  the  English  weapons  for 
the  greater  part  of  the  century.  A  few  foreign  harque- 
busiers,  horse  and  foot,  fought  under  Somerset  at  Pinkie 
(1547),  and  by  degrees  firearms  superseded  bows,  and 
pikes  superseded  the  shorter  hand  weapons.  The  best  of 
the  London  trained  bands  had  discarded  the  bow  by  1559, 
and  all  of  them  had  done  so  by  1588.  In  1595  the  Privy 
Council  decided  that  it  should  be  disused  altogether  by 
the  regular  trained  bands  throughout  the  country.  It 
had  its  advocates,  however,  then  and  for  long  after- 
wards; foremost  among  them  being  Sir  John  Smythe, 
who  had  served  under  Alva  and  Montmorency,  and  dis- 
liked the  new  fashions  brought  over  from  the  Low 
Countries. 

He  claimed  for  the  bow  that  it  was  much  lighter  than 
the  musket,  and  had  a  longer  range  and  more  accuracy 
than  the  harquebus  or  caliver,  which  was  of  no  account 
beyond  four  score  paces.  It  could  shoot  four  or  five 
times  as  fast,  and  was  much  less  apt  to  fail  or  to  get  out 
of  order  in  bad  weather.  Arrows  made  worse  wounds 
than  bullets,  and  many  ranks  of  archers  could  shoot  at 
one  time,  instead  of  two  ranks  only. 

A  more  practical  soldier,  Sir  Roger  Williams,  took  the 
other  side,  resting  his  case  on  the  musket  rather  than  the 
harquebus.  When  men  had  been  three  months  in  the 
field,  he  said,  not  one  in  ten  had  strength  enough  to 
shoot  much  beyond  a  furlong.  Bowmen  were  afraid  of 
musketeers,  and  in  shooting  from  cover  they  were  much 
more  exposed.  Arrows  hurt  horses,  but  could  not  pene- 
trate good  armour,  like  the  musket-ball.  They  could  not 
be  so  readily  supplied  in  the  field  as  powder  and  bullets. 


THE  SIXTEENTH   CENTURY  105 

He  considered  that  500  musketeers  would  be  of  more  use 
than  1500  archers. 

"As  for  shooting  four  for  one,"  says  another  writer, 
"  there  is  no  archer  that  can  shoot  two  for  one,  if  the 
harquebuzier  be  perfect  and  well  trained."  1  This,  how- 
ever, seems  to  rest  on  a  strange  underestimate  of  what 
could  be  done  with  the  bow,  for  he  claims  that  with  a 
harquebus  he  could  fire  forty  shots  an  hour.  For  the 
liarquchus  a  croc  the  rate  of  tire  was  even  slower,  twenty- 
tive  shots  an  hour;  while  a  good  archer  could  .shoot  ten 
arrows  in  a  minute.  But  whatever  we  may  think  of  the 
weight  of  argument  on  each  side,  the  longbow  went  the 
way  of  the  crossbow,  and  the  English  people  lost  a  valuable 
asset.  "  When  I  was  in  the  French  king's  service,  amongst 
the  old  bands  of  footmen,"  says  Barwick,  "I  did  greatly 
commend  the  force  of  the  longbow,  but  how  was  I 
answered :  to  be  short  even  thus,  '  Non,  non,  Anglois, 
vostre  cause  est  bien  salle,  car  dieu  nous  a  donnes  moyen 
de  vous  encountrer  apres  un  autre  sorte  que  en  temps 
passe.'  .  .  .  Now,  saith  he,  the  weakest  of  us  are  able  to 
give  greater  wounds  than  the  greatest  and  strongest 
archer  you  have."^ 

'  Barwick,  p.  17.  -  Ih.,  p.  14. 


THE   SEVENTEENTH   CENTURY 

The  Dutch  war  of  independence  was  practically  brought 
to  an  end  by  the  truce  of  1609.  From  its  character  and 
conditions,  infantry  had  played  the  chief  part  in  it,  and 
the  fire-action  of  infantry  had  been  greatly  developed. 
Cavalry  had  won  some  victories  [e.g.  Turnhout)  and  con- 
tributed to  others,  but  it  had  nevertheless  declined  in 
numbers  and  in  general  estimation.  In  1567,  6000  Swiss 
escorted  Charles  IX.  from  Meaux  to  Paris  undeterred 
by  the  Huguenot  horse  which  hung  round  them.  Sir 
Roger  Williams  knew  no  reason  why  2000  pikemen  and 
1000  musketeers  should  not  be  able  to  make  good  their 
retreat  across  ten  miles  of  open  country  in  spite  of  3000 
horsemen,  however  well  equipped.^  Gerard  Barry,  who 
served  with  the  Spaniards,  held  that  good  cavalry  "are 
not  comparable  to  deal  with  resolute  foot,  except  upon 
manifest  and  great  advantages,  and  in  place  or  ground  of 
great  favour  for  them." "  Lord  Wimbledon  deplored  the 
distaste  which  Englishmen  had  taken  to  service  on  horse- 
back, for  which  their  national  character  so  well  fitted 
them.3 

When  the  twelve  years'  truce  expired,  and  Maurice  and 
SpLnola  again  faced  one  another  on  the  lower  Rhine,  the 
cavalry  of  the  two  armies  numbered  only  10,000  out  of  a 
total  of  60,000.  The  war  which  was  then  resumed  in 
the  Low  Countries,  and  went  on  till  1648,  was  of  much 

1  Williams,  p.  43.  -  Barry,  p.  135.  ^  Dalton,  ii.  329. 


THE   SEVENTEENTH   CENTURY  107 

the  saiiie  character  as  before,  a  war  of  sieges  and  in- 
trenched positions.  But  it  was  now  merely  one  section  of 
the  Thirty  Years'  war,  the  great  coUision  between  the  Pro- 
testants of  the  north  and  the  Cathohcs  of  the  south,  and 
the  most  eventful  fighting  took  place  elsewhere.  The  Ger- 
man war  of  religion  was  carried  on  largely  by  adventurers 
and  mercenaries,  who  had  no  base,  no  system  of  supplies, 
but  lived  upon  the  country.  For  such  soldiering  mounted 
men  were  most  fitted,  because  of  their  mobility ;  and  for 
the  same  reason,  the  lighter  classes  of  cavalry  were  prefer- 
able to  the  heaviest  class.  Full  armour  must  be  made 
intolerably  heavy  to  be  even  pistol-proof,  and  if  it  was  not 
proof  the  broken  fragments  of  it  made  wounds  worse.  It 
wore  out  the  horses,  and  if  the  riders  were  dismounted 
they  were  helpless.  It  was  generally  reduced,  therefore, 
to  back  and  breast  plates,  with  a  pot-helmet  or  skull-cap. 
Leather  in  the  form  of  buff-coats  and  top-boots  replaced 
arm-guards,  thigh-pieces,  greaves,  and  solerets  of  steel. 

The  lance  was  laid  aside,  and  shock  tactics  were  super- 
seded by  fire  tactics.  Cavalry  charged  at  the  trot,  and 
when  close  to  the  enemy  caracolled ;  that  is  to  say,  suc- 
cessive ranks  fired,  turned  to  the  left,  and  filed  off  to  the 
rear.  Only  when  the  enemy  was  shaken  by  this  fire,  did 
they  push  in  and  engage  hand  to  hand.  In  dealing  with 
infantry  the  carbineers  or  harquebusiers  charged  first, 
and  the  cuirassiers,  if  there  were  any,  followed  in  support, 
to  take  advantage  of  any  disorder  which  the  others  might 
cause.i     They  were  armed  with  sword  and  pistols. 

Dragoons  (or  dragooners),  so  named  from  their  weapon, 
which  was  a  short  piece  of  musket  calibre,  now  began  to 
form  a  recognised  part  of  an  army.  "  The  dragoons,"  says 
Ward,-  "  are  no  less  than  a  foot  company  consisting  of 
pikes  and  muskets,  only  for  their  quicker  expedition  they 
'  Ward,  p.  317.  -  Ih.,  p.  294. 


io8  THE  HISTORY    OF  INFANTRY 

are  mounted  upon  horses."  Monk  lays  down  that  there 
should  be  a  troop  of  dragooners  to  every  regiment  of  horse. 
Sometimes  the  cavalry  soldiers  took  up  musketeers  be- 
hind them,  and  Maurice  (in  1603)  had  3000  pack-saddles 
or  "cushions"  made,  for  two  musketeers  each.  The 
causes  which  led  to  the  introduction  of  mounted  infantry, 
led  also  to  the  equipment  of  cavalry  for  fighting  on  foot, 
e.g.  the  "  mousquetaires  "  of  the  guard  of  Louis  XIII. 

In  the  desultory  fighting  of  the  wars  of  religion  light 
horsemen  proved  very  useful ;  Croats  and  Hungarians 
(Hussars)  trained  on  the  Turkish  frontier  came  to  be  in 
request  elsewhere,  and  were  even  taken  into  the  French 
service.  Altogether  it  appears  that  in  the  middle  of  the 
Thirty  Year.s'  war  nearly  one-third  of  the  soldiers  who 
took  part  in  it  were  mounted ;  on  the  battle-fields  the 
proportion  was  larger,  owing  to  the  detachment  of  foot  for 
garrison  duties.  At  Freiburg  in  1644  there  were  as  many 
horse  as  foot  on  both  sides.  Montecuccoli  put  the  mounted 
men  at  two-fifths  of  an  army.  Monk  (who  had  served  in 
the  Low  Countries,  and  wrote  in  1646)  was  of  much  the 
same  opinion  :  for  the  open  field  there  should  be  two  foot 
to  one  horseman,  besides  dragoons ;  but  "  where  the  ser- 
vice of  your  army  shall  be  most  in  sieges,"  the  proportion 
might  be  three  or  even  four  to  one.*  Rohan  would  have 
three  to  one  for  an  open  country,  five  to  one  for  a  close 
country.- 

The  proportion  was  four  to  one  in  the  army  which 
Gustavus  Adolphus  brought  to  Germany  in  1630. 
Sweden  was  a  poor  country  and  horses  were  scarce. 
When  the  British  Government  talked  of  withdrawing 
its  troops  from  the  Peninsula  in  1811,  Wellington  replied 
that  the  choice  lay  between  fighting  the  French  abroad 
or  at  home.  Similarly  it  was  in  self-defence  that 
»  Monk,  p.  35.  -  Rohan,  p.  265. 


THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY     109 

Gustavus  went  to  the  aid  of  the  German  Protestants. 
If  they  were  crushed  by  the  Catholic  powers  his  own 
turn  would  come  next.  As  he  wrote  to  Oxenstiern : 
"  We  must  remove  the  seat  of  war  to  some  other  quarter 
than  Sweden,  for  we  are  nowhere  weaker  than  in  Sweden." ' 
His  intention  at  first  was  to  "  clear  the  seaside  "  between 
the  Elbe  and  the  Oder,  and  make  that  country  the  base  of 
his  further  operations.  But  success  depended  on  his 
rallying  to  him  the  disheartened  Protestant  princes,  and 
he  found  himself  obHged  to  cut  loose  from  his  base  and 
to  plunge  into  Southern  Germany.  His  achievements 
swelled  his  numbers.  He  had  nearly  50,000  men  under 
his  immediate  command  at  Nuremberg  in  1632,  besides 
garrisons  and  detachments;  and  more  than  one-third  of 
his  men  were  mounted.  Mobility  was  essential  for  his 
method  of  warfare. 

Gustavus  was  only  thirty-five  years  of  age  when  he 
came  to  Germany,  but  he  had  been  fighting  for  his 
crown  for  half  that  term ;  and  in  Poland  he  had  had  to 
do  with  an  enemy  strong  in  cavalry,  and  a  country 
which  favoured  its  use.  He  had  done  his  best  to  adapt 
horse,  foot,  and  artillery  to  fighting  under  such  condi- 
tions. His  horse  consisted  of  cuirassiers  and  dragoons. 
The  latter  were  light  cavalry  capable  of  service  on  foot, 
rather  than  mounted  infantry.  The  cuirassiers  had 
breast-plates  and  head-pieces,  but  their  equipment  was 
otherwise  light.  They  were  armed  with  sword  and  pistols, 
and  sometimes  with  the  old  Gothic  weapon,  the  war- 
hammer.  They  were  formed  three  deep,  in  squadrons  of 
about  300  men.  The  caracole  system  of  the  German 
Reiters  was  discarded  by  Gustavus.  Fire  might  be  used 
to  bewilder  the  enemy  at  the  moment  of  collision,  but 
horse  and  sword  should  settle  the  business.  The  men 
'  Geijer,  p.  258. 


no  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

of  the  first  rank,  or  first  and  second  ranks,  might  dis- 
charge one  of  their  pistols  when  they  were  near  enough 
to  see  the  whites  of  their  enemies'  eyes,  but  must  then 
draw  swords  and  close,  and  the  charge  was  made  at 
speed. 

In  order  that  they  might  act  upon  these  rules,  and 
yet  not  forfeit  the  support  of  firearms,  detachments  of 
musketeers  were  posted  in  the  intervals  between  the 
squadrons.  At  Leipzig  we  are  told:  "The  horsemen  on 
both  wings  charged  furiously  one  another,  our  horsemen 
with  a  resolution  abiding  unloosing  a  pistol  till  the 
enemy  had  discharged  first,  and  then  at  a  near  distance 
our  musketeers  meeting  them  with  a  salvo ;  then  our 
horsemen  discharged  their  pistols,  and  then  charged 
through  them  with  swords;  and  at  their  return  the 
musketeers  were  ready  again  to  give  the  second  salvo  of 
musket  amongst  them."i 

The  Swedish  infantry  was  raised  by  compulsory  levy. 
The  nobility  and  their  personal  servants  were  exempt 
from  service  on  foot.  From  the  rest  of  the  population 
one  man  in  ten  was  chosen,  "fresh  and  sound,  strong  of 
limb,  and,  so  far  as  can  be  discerned,  courageous,  in 
years  from  eighteen  to  thirty  and  upwards."  -  As  the 
whole  population  was  less  than  a  million  and  a  half,  a 
levy  yielded  under  15,000  men.  The  native  contingent 
had  to  be  supplemented  by  foreign  recruits,  and  half  of 
the  infantry  which  Gustavus  took  to  Germany  consisted 
of  Scots  and  Germans.  His  revenues  were  insufficient 
for  the  maintenance  of  his  army,  but  he  received  sub- 
sidies from  England,  France,  and  Holland ;  and  in  course 
of  time  so  much  was  brought  in  by  local  requisitions 
that  war  became  the  chief  industry  of  the  State. 

The  Swedish  foot,  if  few  in  numbers,  was  of  excellent 
•  Monro,  p.  GH.  -  Geijer,  p.  .224. 


THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY  m 

quality.  It  was  drawn  chielly  from  a  thriving  and  sturdy 
peasantry,  staunchly  Protestant,  and  bound  to  its  king 
by  a  century  of  conflict  with  foreign  princes  and  the 
privileged  orders  of  Sweden.  Gustavus  was  a  happy 
compound  of  impetuosity  and  shrewdness,  originality  and 
sound  judgment.  He  neglected  nothing,  great  or  small, 
that  had  to  do  with  the  efficiency  of  his  troops,  and  was 
not  more  distinguished  as  a  leader  than  he  was  as  an 
organiser.  His  Polish  experience  led  him  to  adopt  a 
new  tactical  formation  for  his  infantry,  a  modification 
of  the  Dutch  order.  His  ^battalions  consisted  of  four 
companies  with  a  normal  strength  of  54  pikemen  and 
72  musketeers,  but  one-third  of  the  musketeers  were 
detached,  either  to  guard  the  baggage  or  for  other 
employment.  He  was  content  with  six  ranks  instead 
of  ten,  and  his  battalions  had,  therefore,  36  files  of  pikes 
and  32  files  of  musketeers,  making  408  men  in  all.^ 

Instead  of  being  coupled  as  they  were  by  Maurice, 
the  battalions  were  grouped  by  threes  into  brigades,  the 
middle  one  being  pushed  forward  a  little  beyond  the 
alignment  of  the  other  two,  so  that  they  made  three 
limbs  of  a  cross.  The  musketeers  took  post  according 
to  circumstances  in  front,  in  rear,  or  on  the  flanks.  The 
brigades  were  drawn  up  in  two  lines,  and  those  of  the 
second  line  could  readily  move  up  into  or  through  the 
intervals  of  the  first  line,  which  were  equal  to  the  frontage 
of  the  pikes  of  a  brigade  (108  yards).  This  wedge-like 
formation  of  the  brigades,  a  sort  of  combination  of  line 
and  column,  helped  them  both  m  attack  and  defence ; 
and  at  the  same  time  it  facihtated  the  prompt  extension 
and  retirement  of  the  nmsketeers.  The  author  of  "the 
Swedish  Discipline"  (1632)  claims  for  it  that  one  part 
so   fences,  so   backs,  so  flanks  another,  is  so   ready  to 

'  .Swedish  Discipline,  pp.  79,  &c. 


112  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

second  or  relieve  another,  that  though  the  men  may 
indeed  be  killed,  very  hardly  shall  the  whole  order  be 
routed. 

The  number  of  companies  in  a  regiment  was  raised 
from  eight  to  twelve  in  order  that  the  battalions  of  one 
regiment  might  form  a  brigade.  But  the  wastage  in 
the  course  of  a  campaign  often  made  this  impracti- 
cable; the  Scots  brigade  which  fought  at  Leipzig  was 
made  up  of  four  regiments.  Clothing  was  not  uniform,^ 
but  coloured  scarves  or  badges  were  used  to  distinguisli 
regiments  from  one  another.  Besides  the  "  commanded  " 
musketeers,  i.e.  the  men  detached  from  their  battalions, 
there  were  some  regiments  which  consisted  exclusively 
of  musketeers.  These  usually  marched  in  the  vanguard 
and  were  specially  employed  on  expeditions.  Taking 
them  into  account,  the  musketeers  formed  two-thirds  of 
the  Swedish  infantry. 

By  adopting  a  musket  rather  lighter  than  the  Spanish 
one,  with  a  calibre  of  12  bullets  to  the  pound,  Gustavus 
was  able  to  dispense  with  the  fork.  In  the  Polish  war 
he  had  provided  his  men  with  "  Swedish  feathers,"  iron- 
pointed  stakes  which  served  as  a  rest  for  the  musket 
and  a  fence  against  horsemen,  like  the  stakes  of  the 
archers ;  but  he  discarded  them  in  Germany,  where  his 
movements  were  rapid.  For  bandoleers  and  charge-cases 
he  substituted  pouches  and  paper-cartridges,  which  allowed 
of  quicker  loading. 

To  render  his  artillery  more  effective  and  more  mobile, 
he  made  his  guns  shorter  and  adopted  cartridges  and 
case-shot.  In  1626  he  introduced  the  so-called  leather 
guns,  4-pounders  (or  less)  which  weighed  only  1  cwt., 
and  could  be- handled  by  two  men.  They  had  copper 
barrels  reinforced  with  iron  hoops  and  rope,  and  an  outer 

"  Geijer,  p.  229. 


THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY     113 

skin  of  leather.  Five  years  afterwards  he  replaced  them 
by  iron  guns  which  were  heavier  but  would  bear  a  larger 
charge.  These  pieces  weighed  about  5  cwt. ;  two  of  them 
were  attached  to  each  regiment  of  infantry,  and  they 
could  fire  three  shots  while  a  musketeer  fired  two.^ 

The  battle  of  Breitenfeld  or  Leipzig  (16^.1)  was  won 
mainly  by  the  Swedish  cavalry  and  artillery ;  the  infantry 
of  the  first  line  were  hardly  engaged.  The  Saxons,  who 
formed  the  left  half  of  the  Protestant  army,  were  worsted 
by  the  Imperialist  horse,  and  Tilly  followed  up  the  suc- 
cess with  his  infantry.  Having  routed  the  Saxons,  he 
fell  on  the  left  flank  of  the  Swedes.  To  hold  him  in 
check,  Gustavus  sent  a  regiment  of  cavalry,  and  two 
brigades  of  foot  from  his  second  line.  They  drove  off 
the  Croats  and  engaged  the  Imperialist  infantry.  The 
encounter  is  described  bj'  Lieut.-Colonel  Muschamp, 
who  commanded  the  musketeers  of  a  Scottish  regi- 
ment: "First  giving  fire  unto  three  little  field  pieces 
that  I  had  before  me,  I  suffered  not  my  musketeers  to 
give  their  volleys  till  I  came  within  pistol-shot  of  the 
enemy;  at  which  time  I  gave  order  to  the  three  first 
ranks  to  discharge  at  once,  and  after  them  the  other 
three ;  which  done  we  fell  pell-mell  into  their  ranks, 
knocking  them  down  with  the  stock  of  the  musket  and 
our  swords."  - 

Meanwhile  on  the  other  wing  the  Swedish  cavalry 
under  Gustavus  himself  drove  Pappenheim's  horse  off 
the  field:  "The  enemy  being  fierce  and  furious,  while 
as  ours  were  stout  and  slow,  the  enemy  was  made  weary 
when  ours  were  fresh."  "  Tilly's  guns,  which  were  on  high 
ground  behind  his  original  line  of  battle,  were  taken,  and 

'  Pruit  (Its  campaynes  de  Guitave  Adolphe  (Brussels,  18S7).  This  book 
contains  a  useful  list  of  works  dealing  with  these  campaigns,  and  with 
subsequent  wars  down  to  the  present  day. 

*  Swedish  Discipline,  p.  24.  ■■  Monro,  p.  69. 

H 


114  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

were  turned  upon  his  own  troops.  Gustavus  fell  upon 
their  rear,  and  the  Imperialists  broke  and  fled. 

Elsewhere,  as  here,  we  find  the  musketeers  engaging 
freely  in  hand-to-hand  fighting  without  the  aid  of  pikes. 
In  the  storming  of  Frankfort-on-the-Oder  fifty  musketeers 
were  the  first  to  enter  the  town ;  they  were  charged  by 
horse,  but  with  their  backs  against  a  wall  drove  them 
ofi  by  volleys.  In  the  desperate  fighting  which  took 
place  when  Gustavus  attacked  the  camp  of  Wallenstein 
near  Nuremberg,  the  musketeers  had  the  chief  part. 
The  rapid  strokes  by  which  Gustavus  effected  so  much 
were  actually  made  with  cavalry  and  musketeers  alone. 

The  special  brigade-formation  described  above  was 
hardly  put  to  the  test  until  his  final  victory  at  Llitzen 
(1632).  There  the  Swedish  infantry  attacked  the  big 
battalions  of  the  Imperialists,  not  (as  at  Leipzig)  in 
some  disorder,  but  in  a  well-prepared  position.  It  was 
the  counterpart  of  Nieuport,  and  showed  the  advantage 
of  small  units  for  attack  no  less  than  for  defence. 
Wallenstein's  infantry  was  formed  in  squares  of  about 
3000  men  with  bands  of  musketeers  at  the  angles. 
Four  of  these  squares  were  drawn  up  as  a  cross  in  the 
centre ;  the  fifth  was  with  the  cavalry  of  the  right  wing. 
There  was  a  battery  of  seven  guns  in  front  of  the  centre, 
and  one  of  fourteen  guns  near  some  windmills  on  the 
right.  In  front  of  the  batteries  ran  the  road  from 
Llitzen  to  Leipzig ;  its  ditches  had  been  deepened  and 
were  manned  by  a  double  line  of  musketeers.  The 
garden  walls  of  Liitzen  were  also  held  by  musketeers, 
and  covered  the  right  of  the  Imperialists;  while  their 
left  rested  on  the  Flossgraben,  which  was  fordable  but 
had  high  banks.^ 

'  See  Colonel  Stammfort's  plan,  attached  to  the  French  translation  of 
Gualdo's  History  (Berlin,  1772). 


THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY     115 

These  obstacles  on  the  flanks  hampered  the  Swedish 
cavalry,  and  the  infantry  was  ordered  forward  without 
waiting,  as  usual,  for  the  defeat  of  the  enemy's  horse 
on  the  two  wings.  There  were  four  brigades  in  first 
line  and  four  in  second  line,  making  a  total  of  about 
10,000  men.  The  centre  battalion  of  each  brigade,  the 
point  of  the  wedge,  seems  at  Llitzen  to  have  been  twice 
as  strong  as  the  flank  battalions.  The  companies  were 
much  below  their  normal  strength,  but  there  were  about 
sixteen  of  them  in  each  brigade.  Crossing  the  road, 
three  brigades  of  the  first  line  seized  the  seven-gun 
battery,  and  then  fell  upon  the  leading  square  of  the 
Imperial  foot  and  upon  the  one  Avhich  stood  on  its 
left  rear.  Both  these  heavy  masses  were  shaken  and 
disordered,  though  in  numbers  they  were  nearly  twice 
as  strong  as  their  assailants. 

The  fourth  brigade  of  the  Swedish  first  line  consisted 
of  German  troops  under  Bernhard  of  Saxe-Weimar.  It 
was  not  able  to  keep  pace  with  its  fellows,  being  checked 
by  the  guns  of  the  windmill  battery  and  a  convergent 
fire  of  musketry.  The  cavalry  to  the  left  of  it  was  also 
checked;  and  Piccolomini's  cuirassiers  found  themselves 
free  to  go  to  the  help  of  the  .shaken  infantry  in  the 
centre.  Charged  by  cavalry  and  attacked  by  the  two 
other  squares  of  foot,  the  three  Swedish  brigades,  reduced 
by  this  time  to  about  one-fourth  of  their  strength,  were 
driven  back  across  the  road.  It  was  in  hastening  to 
remedy  this  reverse  that  Gustavus  was  killed.  He  had 
been  leading  the  cavalry  of  his  right  wing,  which  had 
met  with  some  success  but  was  now  obliged  to  retire. 

The  advantage  lay  with  the  Imperialists,  but  Wallen- 
stein's  unwieldy  bodies  confined  themselves  to  a  passive 
defence,  and  allowed  Bernhard  (who  succeeded  to  the 
command  of  the  Swedish  army)  to  make  his  preparations 


ii6  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

for  another  attack.  The  weakened  first  line  of  infantry 
was  reinforced  by  two  brigades  from  the  second  line,  and 
was  supported  by  the  other  two  brigades  and  by  four 
squadrons  of  horse.  The  second  advance  met  with 
success  both  on  the  wings  and  in  the  centre.  The 
arrival  of  Pappenheim  with  eight  regiments  of  horse 
threatened  to  turn  the  scale  once  more  in  favour  of  the 
Imperialists ;  but  he  was  killed,  and  by  nightfall  Wallen- 
stein's  army  was  in  full  retreat,  leaving  6000  men  on 
the  field.  The  Swedish  victory  is  said  to  have  been 
largely  due  to  Kniphausen's  handling  of  the  two  reserve 
brigades,  "  doing  no  niore  with  them  than  fair  and  softly 
advance  them  towards  the  enemy  at  such  time  as  he 
saw  the  brigades  of  the  van  to  get  any  ground  of  them. 
The  distance  of  his  rear  from  the  front  was  about 
600  paces,  and  at  that  scantling  he  still  kept  him- 
self behind  the  other."  ^  This  gave  confidence  to  the 
fighting  line;  and  at  length  he  brought  up  his  brigades 
into  it,  to  meet  the  final  eftbrt  of  the  Imperialists  to 
keep  their  hold  of  the  windmills. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  point  to  any  three  campaigns 
which  have  made  such  a  mark  on  the  art  of  war  as  those 
of  Gustavus  in  Germany.  He  united  the  merits  of  his 
two  predecessors,  Maurice  of  Nassau  and  Henri  IV.  The 
excellent  organisation  of  all  arms,  the  skill  with  which 
they  were  combined,  the  boldness  of  his  conceptions,  the 
admirable  discipline  which  he  maintained,  the  masterly 
handling  of  his  troops  on  the  field  of  battle,  set  a  new 
standard  for  the  conduct  of  armies.  The  Scot,  Monro, 
waxes  eloquent  in  his  praise,  and  gives  us  a  vivid  picture 
of  his  personality :  ever  impatient  when  works  were  not 
advanced  to  his  mind ;  misliking  an  officer  that  was  not 
as  capable  of  understanding  his  directions  as  he  was  ready 

'  Swedish  Intelligencer  (1633),  part  3,  p.  147. 


THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY     117 

in  giving  them,  yet  always  making  sure  that  they  were 
understood;  always  able  to  do  himself  what  he  ordered 
to  be  done ;  of  wonderful  judgment  in  the  "  point  of 
recognoscing,"  and  thinking  nothing  of  this  kind  could 
be  well  done  which  he  did  not  himself;  careful  of  the 
health  of  his  men,  and  gaining  his  ofiicers'  love  by 
sharing  their  labours  and  dangers. 

The  reputation  of  the  Swedes  survived  Gustavus. 
Under  Baner  and  Torstenson  they  continued  to  show 
themselves  more  than  a  match  for  the  Imperialists. 
The  campaigns  of  Charle.s  Gustavus  in  Poland  and 
Denmark  (1650-59)  gave  fresh  proof  of  their  excellence ; 
and  the  astonishing  career  of  Charles  XII.  was  due  to 
the  quality  of  the  troops  which  he  found  ready  to  his 
hand.  He  was  himself  pre-eminent  in  courage  and 
fortitude,  but  his  reckless  demands  of  men  and  money 
exhausted  his  country.  No  population  could  stand  a 
continuous  drain  of  5  per  cent,  for  the  army.  Discontent 
weakened  the  royal  authority,  and  in  the  eighteenth 
century  Sweden  became  less  military  as  she  became 
more  republican. 

The  wedge-shaped  brigade  of  Gustavus  soon  dropped 
out  of  use,  for  the  massive  formations  against  which  it 
was  directed  were  abandoned  before  the  middle  of  the 
seventeenth  century.  Linear  formations  became  general, 
though  the  size  of  units  and  width  of  intervals  varied. 
France  succeeded  Sweden  as  the  leading  power  in  the 
coalition  against  the  house  of  Habsburg,  and  many 
soldiers  trained  in  the  Swedish  discipline  were  brought 
into  the  French  service  by  Richelieu.  One  of  the  first 
of  these  was  Sir  John  Hepburn,  who  formed  a  regiment 
(Hebron)  out  of  the  remains  of  the  Scottish  regiments 
which  had  fought  under  Gustavus.  It  passed  into  the 
British   service   on   the   restoration   of  Chaiies   II.,   and 


ii8  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

survives  with  an  unmatclied  record  of  service  as  the 
Royal  Scots.  Richelieu's  subsidies  enabled  Bernhard  of 
Saxe- Weimar  to  conquer  Alsace,  and  at  his  death  in 
1639  his  troops  passed  into  French  pay  and  served 
under  a  French  commander. 

Louis  XIV.  found  at  his  accession  139  regiments  of 
foot,  of  which  20  were  foreign.  Of  the  native  regiments 
those  formed  out  of  the  "  old  bands  " — Picardie,  Piemont, 
and  some  others — were  good,  but  the  rest  were  not  to 
be  depended  on.  "Men  were  enlisted  by  force,"  says 
Sully,  "and  made  to  march  by  the  stick.  Their  pay 
was  wrongfully  kept  back,  they  were  continually 
threatened  with  prison,  and  the  gallows  were  ever 
before  their  eyes."  They  shrank  from  service  abroad, 
and  it  was  difficult  to  persuade  them  to  cross  the  Rhine. 
The  men  deserted,  and  the  officers  complained  of  the 
hardships  of  campaigning.^  Rohan,  it  is  true,  showed 
in  the  Valtelline  how  much  might  be  done  with  French 
infantry  in  a  kind  of  warfare  which  suited  them ;  but  in 
the  line  of  battle  they  were  apt  to  prove  unsteady  {e.g. 
Marfee,  1641). 

Rocroy  (1643),  the  first  great  victory  won  by  the  French 
over  a  foreign  enemy  for  nearly  a  century,  was  won  by  the 
skilful  handling  of  the  cavalry  and  the  coup  d'mil  of 
their  leader ;  the  defeated  infantry  acquitted  themselves 
more  creditably  than  the  infantry  of  the  winning  side. 
The  latter  began  to  give  way  as  soon  as  the  cavalry  on 
their  left  were  beaten.  The  word  went  round — "La 
journee  est  perdue!  en  retraite!"  The  rearward  move- 
ment was  only  stopped  by  the  vigorous  efforts  of  Sirot, 
who  commanded  the  reserve.  Meanwhile  Enghien  (after- 
wards Conde)  had  routed  the  Spanish  left  and  fell  on 
the  rear  of  their   infantry.      But  when  all  other   units 

»  Bourelly,  i.  54,  66. 


THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY     119 

had  been  broken  up  and  driven  oiF  the  field,  five  Spanish 
regiments  of  foot  stood  their  ground.  Drawn  up  in  an 
oblong  of  (3000  men  enclosing  their  guns  they  beat  oil 
three  attacks,  and  it  was  only  when  their  gun-ammuni- 
tion was  exhausted  that  a  fourth  attack,  prepared  by 
artillery  and  made  by  horse  and  foot  in  concert  upon 
three  sides,  proved  successful.  Three-fourths  of  the 
Spaniards  were  killed  or  wounded,  and  if  their  sun  set, 
it  set  gloriously  at  Rocroy.^ 

The  French  owed  much  to  the  Dutch  school  as  well 
as  to  the  Swedes.  Many  of  their  best  officers  came  from 
it.  Turenne  served  a  five  years'  apprenticeship  under 
his  uncle,  Frederick  Henry,  and  learned  the  art  of  sieges 
before  Bois  le  Due.  The  Dutch  exercises  were  adopted 
in  France  early  in  the  reign  of  Louis  XIII.  The  normal 
strength  of  French  regiments  was  twenty  companies  of 
fifty  men  each,  one  regiment  forming  one  battalion,  but 
there  were  wide  variations.  Two-thirds  of  the  men  were 
musketeers,  some  of  whom  were  detached  to  support  the 
cavalry.  According  to  the  elder  Puysegur,'  a  battalion 
of  800  men  six  deep  required  rather  more  than  100  paces 
of  front.  If  it  were  stronger  the  depth  of  the  files  should 
be  increased,  not  the  frontage.  The  intervals  between 
battalions  should  be  equal  to  their  front,  so  that  first 
line  and  second  line  could  pass  through  one  another 
without  hindrance.  The  second  line  should  be  300  to  400 
paces  from  the  first,  and  the  reserve  600  to  700  paces  from 
the  second. 

In  England,  when  the  civil  war  broke  out,  there  were 
no  regular  troops  except  a  few  small  garrisons.  The 
militia  or  "  trained  bands,"  which  were  relied  upon  for 
home  defence,  were  raw  recruits  unwilling  to  serve  out- 

•  Aumale,  iv.  79,  &c. 

«  Instrucliom  militaircs  {1<;59). 


I20  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

side  their  own  counties;  and  with  the  exception  of  the 
London  trained  bands  they  played  a  small  part  in  the 
war.  On  both  sides  regiments  of  volunteers  were  raised, 
and  there  was  a  great  demand  for  officers  of  some  military 
experience  to  lead  them.  Many  Scots  who  had  served  in 
Germany  were  employed,  though,  as  Clarendon  remarks, 
"  it  was  no  easy  thing  to  value  that  people  at  the  rate 
they  did  set  upon  themselves."  Of  the  English  leaders, 
Essex  and  Waller,  Goring  and  Hopton  had  seen  some- 
thing of  war,  mostly  in  the  Low  Countries ;  and  this  was 
the  case  also  with  Monk  and  with  the  major-generals  of 
the  armies,  Astley  and  Skippon,  who  were  well  versed  in 
the  practice  of  the  Nassau  school. 

As  usual  in  civil  wars,  discipline  was  slack  at  first 
and  the  foot  was  not  of  high  quality.  It  was  thought 
a  wonder  that  the  City  trained  bands  should  beat  off 
Rupert's  horse  on  Newbury  Heath.  Newcastle's  white- 
coats  showed  remarkable  tenacity  at  Marston  Moor,  and 
so  did  the  Welshmen  at  Naseby.  On  the  whole  the 
Royalist  foot  was  better  than  the  Parliamentary  foot. 
Colonel  Slingsby  describes  how  his  regiment  repulsed  three 
charges  of  horse  at  Cheriton  (March  23,  1643) :  "  The 
foot  keeping  their  ground  in  a  close  body,  not  firing  till 
Avithin  two  pikes'  length,  and  then  three  ranks  at  a  time, 
after  turning  up  the  butt  end  of  their  muskets,  charging 
their  pikes,  and  standing  close,  preserved  themselves  and 
slew  many  of  the  enemy."  ' 

It  was  cavalry  that  played  the  decisive  part  in  the 
battles  of  the  civil  war.  Here  also  the  Royalists  had  the 
advantage,  until  Cromwell's  rare  capacity  as  an  organiser 
and  leader  of  horse  made  itself  felt.  He  alone,  according 
to  Clarendon,  knew  how  to  make  his  men  charge  home 
without  letting  them  get  out  of  hand ;  and  after  driving 
'  Hopton,  p.  102. 


THE   SEVENTEENTH   CENTURY  121 

the  enemy's  cavalry  off  the  field  he  fell  on  the  flank  or 
rear  of  their  infantry.  His  Ironsides  charged  Ln  close 
order  at  a  "  round  trot,"  and  "  disputed  it  with  sword  and 
pistol"  till  they  found  a  gap  by  which  they  could  break 
into  the  squadrons  opposed  to  them.  Rupert,  who  had 
served  with  the  Swedes,  caused  the  Royalists  to  adopt 
Swedish  tactics,  including  the  "  interhning  "  of  the  horse 
with  platoons  of  musketeers,  and  the  reserving  of  the 
horsemen's  own  fire  that  there  might  be  no  check  to 
their  speed.  On  both  sides  the  Swedish  practice  of  draw- 
ing up  cavalry  in  three  ranks  and  infantry  in  six  ranks 
was  generally  followed.     Both  sides  made  use  of  dragoons. 

The  Parliament  had  much  more  command  of  money 
than  the  king,  and  its  troops  were  better  paid  and 
equipped  than  the  Cavaliers.  It  was  believed  at  first 
that  the  kmg  would  be  unable  to  raise  an  army  at  all; 
but  owing  to  local  and  personal  jealousies  the  war  went 
on  for  three  years  without  decisive  result.  In  1645 
Parliament  framed  the  new  model  army  to  be  wholly 
at  its  own  disposal.  It  was  to  number  22,000  men,  viz. 
eleven  regiments  of  horse  (6600),  one  regiment  of  dragoons 
(1000),  and  twelve  regiments  of  foot  (14,400).  The  foot 
regiments  consisted  of  twelve  companies  of  100  men,  of 
whom  two-thirds  were  musketeers  and  one-third  pikes. 
Hitherto  clothing  had  been  of  various  colours,  but  in 
the  new  model  army  horse  and  foot  alike  wore  red,  the 
several  regiments  being  distinguished  by  facings.  The 
officers  were  carefully  selected  by  Fairfax,  the  commander, 
and  Skippon,  his  major-general.  Recruits  were  readily 
found  for  the  horse,  but  the  pay  of  a  foot  soldier  was  only 
one-third  of  the  pay  of  a  trooper,  and  impressment  had  to 
be  employed  to  fill  the  ranks  of  the  infiintry  regiments. ^ 

The  cost  of  the  army  was  about  £700,000  a  year;  it  was 

'  Firth,  pp.  34,  &c. 


122  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

assessed  upon  the  counties  which  were  best  able  to  bear 
it,  and  the  men  received  their  pay  with  comparative 
punctuaHty.  As  in  the  Low  Countries  at  the  beginning 
of  the  century,  regular  pay  brought  order  and  discipline, 
and  decisive  success  soon  followed.  After  defeating  the  king 
at  Naseby,  Fairfax  conquered  the  west,  which  welcomed 
relief  from  Cavalier  exactions,  and  in  fifteen  months  of 
continuous  campaigning  he  brought  the  war  to  an  end. 
Local  corps  were  disbanded  or  incorporated  in  the  new 
model,  which  by  1649  had  grown  to  44,000  men,  and  cost 
a  million  and  a  half.  In  Cromwell's  hands  it  became  a 
most  formidable  instrument  for  use  at  home  or  abroad,  as 
was  proved  in  Scotland,  Ireland,  and  the  Low  Countries. 

The  Scots  had  shown  themselves  more  than  a  match 
for  Charles  I.  in  the  Bi'^hops'  wars,  and  as  allies  of  the 
Parliament  they  had  done  their  full  share  of  the  work  at 
Marston  Moor.  But  at  Dunbar  (1G50)  they  were  routed  by 
Cromwell  with  an  army  of  half  their  strength,  an  army 
weakened  by  hardships  and  exposure.  The  victory  was 
largely  due  to  the  carelessness  of  the  Scots,  and  the  skill 
with  which  Cromwell  threw  himself  unexpectedly  upon 
their  right  wing,  attacking  it  both  in  front  and  in  flank. 
But  even  this  would  not  have  led  to  such  decisive  results 
if  the  English  had  not  been  the  better  men,  both  horse 
and  foot.  An  eye-witness  says  :  "  I  never  beheld  a  more 
terrible  charge  of  foot  than  was  given  by  our  army,  our 
foot  alone  making  the  Scots  foot  give  ground  for  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  together."  i  The  Scottish  losses  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  prisoners  exceeded  the  numbers  of  the 
English  army. 

When  there  were  no  more  enemies  to  be  subdued  within 
the  British  Isles  the  army  was  still  maintained  to  uphold 
an  unstable  government  of  its  own  creation.     France  and 

»  Firth,  Tratis.  R.  Hist.  Soc,  xiv.  44. 


THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY  123 

Spain  bid  against  one  another  for  its  services,  and  Crom- 
well chose  alliance  with  France.  At  the  battle  of  the 
Dunes  (1658)  Turenne's  army  included  nearly  GOOO  Eng- 
hsh  foot,  while  three  battalions  of  Royalists  (mainly  Irish) 
were  on  the  opposite  side.i  The  seven  English  regiments 
(m  two  lines)  formed  the  left  of  Turenne's  infantry,  and  as 
the  army  advanced  towards  the  enemy  they  got  ahead  of 
the  right.  In  front  of  them  there  were  four  battalions  of 
old  Spanish  foot  holdmg  a  dominant  and  outlying  sand- 
hill, and  on  the  left  of  these  were  the  Royalists.  Turenne 
says : — 

"  The  English  who  were  in  the  left  wing,  coming  the  first 
to  that  Down  which  was  foremost,  ascended  with  two  bat- 
talions to  attack  it,  and  for  some  time  they  crossed  pikes 
with  the  Spaniards ;  but  the  great  resolution  of  the  former, 
aided  by  a  detachment  of  foot  from  the  English  main 
body  which  came  upon  the  enemy  in  Hank,  put  a  Spanish 
regiment  into  disorder,  and  soon  after  to  flight."  - 

The  Duke  of  York  (afterwards  James  II.),  who  was  in 
command  of  the  Royalists,  was  sent  to  reinforce  the 
Spaniards  on  the  sandhill,  and  was  an  admiring  witness  of 
the  English  attack.  He  says  in  his  Memoirs :  "  They 
advanced  with  a  great  deal  of  confident  courage,  but  with 
so  much  heat  that  they  left  the  French  a  good  way  behind, 
and  might  have  paid  dearly  for  their  temerity,  if  a  right 
use  had  been  made  of  their  imprudence.  ...  It  was  Lock- 
hart's  regiment  which  charged  Boniface's  Spaniards ;  Fen- 
wick,  who  was  lieutenant-colonel  of  it,  being  got  to  the 
foot  of  the  sandhill,  and  finding  it  very  steep,  made  a  halt 
to  give  his  troops  time  to  breathe,  in  order  to  ascend 
afterwards  with  more  vigour.  While  they  were  thus  pre- 
paring themselves,  their  forlorn  hope  opening  to  the  right 
and  left,  to  make  room  for  them  to  mount  the  sandhill, 

•  Firth,  Trans.  R.  Hist.  ISoc. ,  -wii.  67-86.  ^  Ramsay,  ii.  18S. 


124  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

made  an  unintermitted  fire  upon  Boniface;  and  the  moment 
the  regiment  moved  to  the  attack  they  gave  a  great  shout. 
Though  the  lieutenant-colonel  received  immediately  a 
musket-shot  through  the  body,  which  made  him  drop,  yet 
the  major,  one  Hinton,  led  on  the  battalion,  which  made 
no  stop  till  they  were  within  a  pike's  length;  and  not- 
withstanding the  vigorous  resistance  of  the  Spaniards, 
who  had  the  advantage  of  the  upper  ground,  and  were 
fresh,  whereas  the  English  were  fatigued  and  almost  out 
of  breath  with  climbing  the  sandhills,  Boniface  was  driven 
down.  ..."  1 

This  success  was  followed  up  and  the  other  regiments 
of  the  Spanish  army  gave  way  in  succession.  The  Royalists 
lost  more  than  half  their  number.  The  English  claimed 
that  they  won  the  battle  by  themselves ;  -  they  at  all  events 
played  the  leading  part  in  it,  as  Vere's  men  had  done  at 
Nieuport.  Tlic  Enghsh  regiments  were  specially  raised  for 
service  abroad,  but  they  consisted  largely  of  old  soldiers. 
Half  of  the  men  were  pikes,  and  half  musketeers  ;  400 
"  firelocks  "  are  also  mentioned  as  taking  part  in  the  attack 
of  the  sandhill. 

In  1668,  after  the  peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  Louvois 
set  to  work  to  organise,  unify,  and  discipline  the  French 
army.  It  had  grown  in  numbers,  and  by  1672  it 
amounted  to  ]  5.5,000  men,  of  whom  28,000  were  cavalry. 
Its  fundamental  fault  was  the  purchase  system,  which 
prevailed  in  France  and  elsewhere.  Commissions  were 
bought  and  sold,  and  were  in  fact  contracts  granted  to 
the  nobility  to  supply,  feed,  and  equip  men  at  fixed 
rates.  The  men  were  neglected  and  the  State  defrauded. 
Louvois  could  not  do  away  with  this  system,  but  he 
took  measures  to  guard  against  its  abuses.  By  strict 
'  Ramsay,  ii.  501.  -  Clarke  Papers,  iii.  158. 


THE   SEVENTEENTH   CENTURY  125 

inspection  and  heavy  penalties  he  put  down  pn sae-vulantx 
— sham  soldiers  presented  at  musters — insisted  on  proper 
clothing,  arms,  and  equipment,  and  gradually  brought 
about  the  adoption  of  uniform.  The  king's  fondness  for 
reviewing  his  troops  and  the  emulation  of  the  colonels 
contributed  to  this  change,  which  was  also  found  to  be 
a  help  in  maintaining  discipline  and  checking  desertion. 
The  disuse  of  armour  had  something  to  do  with  it.  "  The 
French  temperament,"  says  Feuquieres,  "  does  not  accord 
well  with  the  use  of  defensive  armour,"  and  corslets  were 
given  up  by  the  French  pikemen  before  the  middle  of  the 
seventeenth  century.^ 

A  model  regiment,  the  Regiment  du  Roi,  was  formed 
in  1662,  and  its  lietitenant-colonel.  Martinet,  was  made 
inspector-general  of  infantry  in  1668,  with  sub-inspectors 
under  him.  In  the  instructions  given  to  him  Louvois 
said :  "  It  is  not  enough  that  companies  should  be  up 
to  their  strength,  we  must  try  to  make  them  consist 
of  men  who  are  fit  for  service  as  regards  their  age,  their 
clothing,  and  their  arms.  .  .  .  We  must  not  demand  of 
the  officers  that  all  the  men  shall  be  dressed  alike,  or  in 
clothes  equally  new  ;  that  would  be  asking  too  nmcli ;  but 
on  no  account  must  it  be  permitted  that  their  soldiers 
should  be  ill-shod  or  ill-clad,  or  that  their  arms  should  be 
unserviceable,  whether  from  the  calibre  or  the  quality  of  the 
muskets."  -  Their  drill  and  exercises  were  to  be  watched. 
The  maintenance  of  discipline  and  subordination  among 
the  officers  also  fell  within  the  province  of  the  inspectors. 

By  the  creation  of  infantry  brigadiers,  of  whom  Martinet 
.was  one  of  the  first,  the  charge  of  brigades  was  withdrawn 
from  the  colonels  who  might  happen  to  be  the  seniors, 
and  given  to  specially  selected  men ;  and  at  the  same 
time  a  way  was  opened  by  which  capable  officers  who  had 
'JSusane,  i.  190.  ^  Rousset,  i.  208. 


126  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

not  the  means  to  purchase  a  regiment  might  be  ad- 
vanced to  higher  commands.  The  stress  laid  on  reviews 
led  to  improvements  in  drill.  The  troops  were  taught 
to  take  new  formations  simultaneously  by  word  of  com- 
mand, instead  of  being  placed  in  them  successively  by 
the  sergeant-major.  Drill  instructors  rose  in  estimation, 
but  sometimes  indulged  in  pedantries;  and  the  rigidity 
imposed  by  them  discoiu-aged  individualism,  and  led  to 
the  discontinuance  of  infantry  skirmishing. 

The  successes  of  Louis  XIV.  in  the  latter  half  of  the  seven- 
teenth century  were  largely  due  to  the  increased  efficiency 
of  his  troops,  but  even  more  to  Louvois's  organisation 
of  magazines,  and  the  care  he  bestowed  on  the  supply 
services.  As  Lord  Orrery  wrote  in  1676  :  "  The  French  with 
great  prudence  attack  places  in  the  beginning  of  the 
spring,  when  there  is  no  army  to  relieve  them ;  and  in  the 
summer,  when  the  whole  confederacy  is  in  the  field,  they 
are  usually  on  the  defensive,  and  cover  what  they  have 
took ;  and  in  my  weak  judgment  they  do  at  least  as 
much  by  their  always  providing  well  to  eat,  and  by  their 
intrenched  encampings,  as  by  their  good  fighting,  which 
questionless  is  the  most  hopeful  and  most  solid  way  of 
making  war."  * 

This  method  was  the  more  successful  owing  to  the 
cautious  tactics  which  began  to  find  favour  generally, 
each  side  seeking  to  guard  against  defeat  instead  of 
bidding  for  victory.  The  Swedish  leaders,  confident 
in  the  excellence  of  their  men,  had  liked  to  put  their 
fortune  to  the  touch,  and  to  fight  battles  even  with 
odds  against  them ;  but  it  became  the  rule  for  the 
weaker  side  to  look  out  for  strong  defensive  positions, 
and  only  attack  the  enemy  if  he  could  be  taken  at 
great  disadvantage.     The  state  of  the  country,  especially 

'  Orrery,  p.  1 39. 


THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY     127 

in  South  Germany — the  hills,  woods,  and  swamps— made 
it  easy  to  choose  such  positions,  which  could  be  quickly 
fortified,  and  could  not  be  stormed  without  heavy  loss; 
while  the  bad  roads  and  difficulties  of  supply  made  it 
a  slow  business  to  turn  them.  Enghien's  impetuosity 
made  him  fling  himself  against  intrenched  positions  at 
Freiburg  (1644)  and  Allerheim  (1645),  but  the  results 
were  not  encouraging.  The  risk  of  failure  was  great, 
and  the  fruit  of  victory  was  small. 

One  recommendation  of  this  war  of  positions  was  that 
an  army  gained  strength  as  it  fell  back,  and  lost  strength 
as  it  advanced.  Enghien  and  Turenno  had  28,000  men 
when  they  united  on  the  Rhine  in  July  lG4."i.  They 
had  only  17,000  when  they  attacked  Mercy  at  Allerheim 
a  month  later;  by  that  time  his  numbers  were  nearly 
equal  to  theirs,  and  he  was  very  strongly  posted.  In 
1653  Turenne  paralysed  an  army  much  stronger  than 
his  own  by  shifting  from  one  position  to  another.  In 
1674,  when  he  had  failed  in  his  attack  on  the  Im- 
perialists at  Enzheim,  and  reinforcements  had  brought 
their  numbers  up  to  more  than  twice  his  own,  he  placed 
himself  on  ground  where  they  did  not  venture  to  attack 
him,  and  hindered  them  from  doing  anything  else.  He 
had  learnt,  as  he  said,  method  and  secrecy  from  his 
uncle,  the  Prince  of  Orange ;  and  from  Bernhard  of  Saxe- 
Weimar  he  had  learnt  to  do  great  things  with  small 
means,  and  not  let  his  head  be  turned  by  success.^ 

The  memoirs  of  Montecuccoli,  the  able  opponent  of 
Turenne,  give  us  the  reasoned  views  of  a  soldier  who 
had  seen  varied  service,  against  the  Turks  as  well  as 
against  the  Swedes.  Linear  formations  for  the  infantry 
are  assumed  as  a  matter  of  cour.sc,  but  not  the  small 
tactical  units  and  the  open  spacing  of  Maurice  or  Gus- 
1  Maio,  p.  22. 


128  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

tavus.  A  regiment  forms  one  battalion  of  1500  men,  of 
whom  one-third  should  be  pikes.  If  drawn  up  six  deep 
there  would  be  long  wings  of  musketeers,  through  which 
the  enemy's  cavalry  might  force  their  way  on  a  broad 
front.  The  battalion  is  therefore  formed  ten  deep,  the 
six  ranks  of  pikes  in  the  centre  having  two  ranks  of 
musketeers  in  front  of  them,  and  two  in  rear  of  them. 
Of  the  ranks  in  front  of  the  pikes  one  should  be  armed 
with  swords  and  bucklers  instead  of  muskets.  Assuming 
that  one-sixth  of  the  musketeers  are  detached,  and 
allowing  a  pace  and  a  half  for  each  file,  the  frontage  of 
the  battalion  is  192  paces ;  the  interval  between  bat- 
talions is  18  paces.  A  force  of  24,000  infantry  drawn 
up  on  these  principles,  with  six  battalions  in  first  line, 
six  in  second  line,  and  four  in  reserve,  would  occupy 
only  1400  paces.  To  these  he  would  add  12,000  cavalry, 
2000  dragoons,  and  2000  light  horse,  making  an  army 
of  40,000  men,  of  whom  two-fifths  would  be  mounted. 
The  horsemen  should  be  mainly  on  the  wings,  but 
infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery  should  be  so  joined 
together  or  intermixed  that  they  could  afford  mutual 
succour  when  needed.  The  front  of  the  whole  army 
would  be  about  two  miles. 

The  leading  idea  of  Montecuccoli's  order  of  battle  is 
resistance.  "  The  secret  of  success,"  he  says,  "  is  to  have 
a  solid  body  so  firm  and  impenetrable  that  wherever  it  is 
or  wherever  it  may  go,  it  shall  bring  the  enemy  to  a  stand 
like  a  mobile  bastion,  and  shall  be  self-defensive."  ^  He 
would  only  mvite  a  battle  where  the  chances  of  success 
are  great,  or  where  the  enemy  has  much  to  gain  by  avoid- 
ing it.  In  a  strong  position  and  with  guns  well  placed  for 
effect  he  would  prefer  to  await  the  enemy's  onset ;  but  on 
level  ground  it  is  more  inspiriting  to  be  the  assailant.  In 
1  Montecuocoli,  p.  223. 


THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY     129 

advancing,  the  intervals  must  be  strictly  maintained,  and 
a  continuous  fire  must  bo  kept  up.  If  the  enemy  gives 
way  he  should  be  pursued  by  the  light  horse,  and  by 
detachments  told  oif  for  the  purpose,  but  the  order  of 
battle  must  not  be  broken.  There  must  be  no  caracolling 
by  the  cavalry,  but  the  front  rank  should  have  mus- 
ketoons. 

Montecuccoli's  stress  on  solidity  was  no  doubt  mainly 
due  to  his  experience  against  the  Turks,  an  enemy  superior 
in  numbers  and  mobility  who  were  to  be  beaten  only  by 
order  and  discipline.  In  his  "  Maxims  applied  to  warfare 
against  the  Turk  in  Hungary  "  he  describes  the  character- 
istics of  the  Turkish  armies.  Their  despotic  government, 
their  incessant  wars,  the  high  rewards  (hero  and  hereafter) 
for  military  merit,  and  the  rigorous  punishments  combine 
to  produce  good  leaders  and  good  troops.  The  men  are 
brave,  obedient,  sober,  and  abstemious ;  they  are  healthy 
and  capable  of  great  exertions.  War  being  the  only 
business  they  esteem  there  is  no  lack  of  recruits,  and  they 
can  form  very  large  armies.  They  have  well-filled  maga- 
zines, so  that  they  can  subsist  in  wasted  lands,  and  they 
carry  with  them  a  prodigious  quantity  of  baggage;  but 
they  do  not  begui  a  campaign  till  the  crops  are  forward 
enough  to  provide  forage.  They  make  the  peasants  of  the 
country  furnish  them  with  transport  and  with  pioneers. 
They  all  have  tents,  and  there  is  a  swarm  of  camp- 
followers  and  attendants,  so  that  the  soldiers  have  nothing 
to  do  but  to  fight. 

They  like  to  make  their  wars  short  and  sharp.  They 
court  decisive  battles  in  the  open  field,  and  having  their 
troops  always  ready  they  invade  the  enemy's  territory  at 
once.  On  the  battle-field  they  use  their  large  numbers  to 
envelop  the  enemy,  forming  in  long  lines  curved  like  a 
crescent,  infantry  in  the  centre,  cavalry  on   the  wings. 


I30  THE    HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

They  detach  parties  to  work  round  to  the  rear,  reach  the 
enemy's  baggage  and  cause  disorder.  They  advance  to 
the  attack  with  formidable  shouts,  fall  back  and  advance 
again,  trying  by  every  means  to  loosen  the  order  of  the 
troops  opposed  to  them,  and  to  find  gaps  into  which  they 
may  penetrate. 

But  they  have  defects  of  which  advantage  may  be  taken. 
They  understand  little  about  fortification  or  the  handling 
of  artillery,  and  are  very  inferior  to  the  Imperialists  in 
accuracy  of  drill.  Their  horsemen  have  coats  of  mail  and 
shields,  but  not  cuirasses  ;  their  agility  is  marvellous,  but 
they  cannot  sustain  the  shock  of  a  squadron  in  heavy 
armour  and  close  order.  Their  arms  are  lances,  scimitars, 
maces  and  battle-axes,  together  with  fire-arms,  bows  or 
darts.  Their  horses  and  elephants  may  be  scared  by 
grenades,  and  by  the  fire  of  small  guns  discharged  as  one 
advances.  Their  best  infantry,  the  Janissaries,  are  armed 
with  sabres  and  long  muskets  of  rather  small  bore  ;  they 
have  greater  range  and  penetration  than  the  muskets  of 
the  Imperialists,  but  are  less  accurate,  as  the  men  do  not 
use  forks.  They  have  no  pikes,  and  so  cannot  stand  the 
shock  of  heavy  cavalry  or  of  infantry  with  pikes. 

The  Janissaries  (Yani  chari,  or  new  soldiery)  were  mainly 
drawn  from  the  Christian  population.  A  tribute  of  one 
male  child  in  ten  was  exacted.  The  boys  were  taken  from 
their  parents  at  the  age  of  ten  or  twelve,  made  into  Mus- 
sulmans, lodged  in  barracks  at  Constantinople  and  other 
cities,  and  trained  for  seven  years  before  they  were 
drafted  into  the  army.  Their  devotion  to  the  Sultan 
and  to  the  cause  of  Islam  surpassed  that  of  the  Turks. 

In  the  last  decade  of  the  century  France  fought  single- 
handed  in  the  Netherlands  against  Dutch  and  English, 
Germans,  Danes,  and  Spaniards.  It  was  mainly  a  war  of 
positions  and  sieges;  but  Luxemburg,  who  was  a  better 


THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY     131 

tactician  than  William  III.,  won  three  victories  in  the 
field — Fleurus,  Steenkerquo,  and  Neerwinden  (or  Landen). 
He  owed  them  chiefiy  to  his  cavalry,  which  was  more 
numerous  and  better  than  that  of  the  allies.  The  French 
infantry  was  still  inferior.  At  Fleurus  (1690)  it  is  said 
that  "  the  French  horse  were  forced  to  rally  their  foot 
several  times  and  to  bring  them  up  under  their  covert." 
Luxemburg  was  amazed  at  the  tenacity  of  the  Dutch 
infantry  when  they  were  overmatched  and  enveloped. 
"  The  French  infantry,"  we  are  told,  "  could  not  so  much 
as  dare  look  them  in  the  face;  could  the  Dutch  be  left 
alone  to  them,  they  would  esteem  them  as  nothing."  ^ 

In  1691  Louis  XIV.  sent  Luxemburg  instructions  to 
make  use  of  the  cavalry  rather  than  engage  in  an  infantry 
fight,  "  which  involves  heavy  loss  and  is  never  decisive ; " 
and  in  reporting  his  victory  at  Steenkerque  (1692) 
Luxemburg  explained  that  he  had  been  forced  by  cir- 
cumstances in  that  case  to  depart  from  these  instructions. 
This  battle  was  brought  on  by  an  ill-managed  attempt  at 
surprise  on  the  part  of  the  allies.  Their  vanguard,  con- 
sisting of  English  and  Danish  infantry,  found  itself 
engaged  with  an  increasing  proportion  of  the  French 
army.  It  was  scantily  supported,  and  after  some  success 
it  was  obliged  to  retreat  with  a  loss  of  nearly  half  its  men. 
At  Neerwinden  (1693)  the  French  were  80,000,  the  allies 
50,000.  William's  confidence  in  his  infantry  and  his 
weakness  in  cavalry  led  him  to  stand  his  ground  and 
intrench  his  position.  Luxemburg's  skilful  tactics  con- 
verted odds  of  three  to  two  into  odds  of  three  to  one  at 
the  decisive  point.  The  French  infantry  stormed  the 
villages  on  which  the  right  of  the  allies  rested,  and 
opened  the  way  for  their  cavalry  into  the  heart  of  the 
position.  Apart  from  their  advantage  in  numbers,  the 
'  Sawle,  p.  8. 


132  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

infantry  were  here  employed  by  Luxemburg  in  a  kind  of 
fighting  for  which  they  had  special  aptitude.  Their  dash 
in  attack  and  their  alertness  to  seize  opportunities  found 
scope  in  affairs  of  posts ;  but  when  lines  came  in  collision 
in  the  open  field  the  "close  and  punctual  fire"  of  the 
allied  battalions  was  too  much  for  them. 

It  was  in  Italy,  under  the  leadership  of  Catinat  and 
against  Piedmontese,  Spaniards,  and  Imperialists,  that 
they  showed  to  most  advantage.  After  the  victory  of 
Marsaglia  (1693)  Catinat  wrote  to  the  king:  "  I  believe 
there  never  was  an  action  which  showed  better  what  your 
majesty's  infantry  is  capable  of."  i  They  came  on  hardily 
with  fixed  bayonets,  drove  off  the  squadrons  which  Prince 
Eugene  of  Savoy  had  intermixed  with  his  foot,  and  held 
their  own  against  the  foot  until  the  defeat  of  the  allied 
cavalry  on  the  wings  caused  Eugene  to  retreat.  It  is  said 
to  have  been  the  experience  of  the  French  in  Italy  that 
led  them  to  abandon  the  pike  a  few  years  afterwards.^ 
Pikemen  were  ill-suited  to  operations  in  the  Alpine 
valleys,  and  the  musketeers  learned  to  do  without 
them. 

1  Catinat,  ii.  337.  "-  Saxe,  Reveries,  chap.  7^ 


VI 

THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY  :  I 

I\  the  course  of  the  seventeenth  century  the  firelock 
was  gradually  superseding  the  matchlock  as  an  infantry 
weapon.  The  earliest  form  of  firelock,  the  wheel-lock, 
was  expensive,  and  was  also  found  to  be  "  too  curious 
and  too  soon  distempered  with  an  ignorant  hand."i  It 
made  way  for  the  snaphance  (Schnapphahn  or  snap- 
cock  2)  in  which  a  spark  was  struck  by  flint  and  steel, 
and  which  came  to  be  known,  therefore,  as  the  fusil. 
Adopted  in  the  first  instance  for  fowling-pieces,  it  was 
soon  turned  to  military  use,  especially  for  mounted  men. 
Monk,  writing  in  1646,  recommended  it  for  picked  shots 
in  the  infantry,  as  well  as  for  cavalry  and  dragoons ;  and 
in  1660,  when  he  was  commander-in-chief,  he  ordered 
the  matchlocks  of  his  regiment,  the  Coldstream,  to  be 
exchanged  for  "snaphance  muskets."  In  France,  Louvois 
at  first  set  his  face  against  fusils  for  the  infantry,  and 
ordered  his  inspectors  to  break  up  any  they  found,  and 
replace  them  with  matchlocks  at  the  cost  of  the  captains. 
But  in  1670  a  small  proportion  was  allowed,  and  in  the 
following  year  a  regiment  of  fusiliers  was  formed  to  serve 
as  guards  for  the  artillery. 

On  behalf  of  the  matchlock  it  was  said  that  "  firelocks 
are  apter  to  misgive  than  musket.s  through  the  defect  of 

1  Scott,  ii.  285. 

-  It  is  a  doubtful  point  whether  poachers  and  thieves  (Chcnapans)  gave 
ibuir  name  to  the  weapon,  or  took  their  name  from  it. 


134  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

the  flints  and  springs,"  i  and  that  they  were  less  durable.  On 
the  other  side  it  was  urged  that  the  matchlock  took  longer 
to  "  make  ready " ;  the  priming  was  apt  to  be  deadened 
by  wet,  or  blown  away  by  wind ;  the  store  of  match  was 
heavy  to  carry,  and  troublesome  to  dry :  there  was  great 
risk  of  accidents  from  sparks  of  the  lighted  match,  and 
it  betrayed  men  at  night.  The  butt  of  the  matchlock 
had  to  be  placed  against  the  chest,  six  inches  below  the 
chin,^  while  the  butt  of  the  iirelock  was  brought  to  the 
shoulder,  so  that  the  eye  could  look  along  the  barrel. 
The  fire  of  the  fusil  was,  therefore,  more  accurate  as  well 
as  more  rapid.  Files  could  be  made  closer  when  the  risk 
of  premature  ignition  by  sparks  was  removed.  The  old 
attitude — head  erect,  elbows  high,  left  leg  bent,  right  leg 
stretched  out — was  no  longer  needed:  men  could  fire 
like  sportsmen,  "who  shoot  to  kill,  and  not  merely  to 
make  a  noise."  ^ 

Fault  was  found  with  the  equipment  of  the  musketeer, 
as  well  as  with  his  weapon.  The  cross-belts,  sword-belt, 
and  bandoleer  were  heavy  and  cumbrous;  the  wooden 
charge-cases  attached  to  the  bandoleer  entangled  men 
when  countermarching,  and  rattled  so  much  that  orders 
could  not  be  heard,  and  secrecy  was  out  of  the  ques- 
tion; the  charges  were  apt  to  catch  fire,  or  to  get  wet, 
and  men  could  not  load  with  them  so  quickly  as  with 
cartridges.  By  degrees  bandoleers  were  given  up,  and 
waist-belts  with  cartridge  pouches  came  into  use,  first 
for  fusiliers,  and  then  generally.  The  sword  was  hung 
from  the  waist-belt,  and  was  retained  in  spite  of  com- 
plaints that  it  was  heavy,  tripped  men  up  when  running, 
and  cau.sed  confusion  in  close  order  movements. 

»  Gaya(1678). 

-  Sometimes,  it  seems,  it  was  placed  against  tlie  stomach,  and  the  kick 
of  it  caused  injuries  (Rousset,  iii.  325). 
•'  Puysegur. 


THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY  135 

As  tirc-arms  improved  a  "  charge  "  of  infantry  came  to 
mean  a  tire-fight  at  close  quarters  till  one  side  or  the 
other  gave  way,  rather  than  actual  collision.  Even  on 
the  battle-field  the  part  played  by  pikemen  became  less 
prominent.  There  was  little  scope  for  them  in  the 
attack  or  defence  of  intrenched  positions  ;  and  they 
were  too  slow  for  surprises  and  minor  operations,  especi- 
ally in  broken  country.  To  enable  musketeers  to  face 
cavalry  without  the  aid  of  pikes  various  devices  were 
tried,  such  as  the  Swedish  feathers  adopted,  but  after- 
wards discarded,  by  Gustavus.  Barrifi'e  (who  wrote 
before  the  English  civil  wars)  mentions  that  the  heads 
of  the  forks  were  sometimes  unscrewed,  and  the  stems 
fixed  in  the  muzzles  of  the  muskets.  Daggers,  known 
as  bayonettes,  were  found  better  suited  for  such  use,  and 
Puysegur  sent  out  parties  in  1647  armed  with  bayonets 
instead  of  swords,  the  blade  and  the  handle  being  each 
one  foot  long,  and  the  handle  shaped  for  insertion  in 
the  musket.i  The  regiment  of  fusiliers  formed  in  1671 
was  provided  with  these  plug  bayonets,  and  their  use 
soon  spread.  The  English  troops  at  Tangier  had  had 
them  eight  years  before,  and  a  warrant  of  1672  directs 
their  issue  to  dragoons. 

But  a  bayonet  that  hindered  firing  when  it  was  fixed 
was  inconvenient,  and  sometimes  disastrous,  as  at  Killie- 
crankie  in  1689.  Chevaux  de  frise  offered  another 
means  of  protecting  musketeers  against  cavalry,  and 
were  widely  used,  especially  against  the  Turks.  In  1687 
Louvois  consulted  Vauban  about  them,  and  Vauban  pro- 
po.sed  instead  a  socket  bayonet  which  would  not  prevent 
firing  or  loading.  Instructions  were  issued  in  1689  that 
all  the  French  infantry  in  the  field  should  have  bayonets 
of  this  kind.2    Something  of  the  sort  is  said  to  have  been 

'  Hcott,  ii.  .SI5.  -  Kousset,  iii.  32G. 


136  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

adopted  by  one  regiment  more  than  ten  years  before, 
viz.  a  sword  with  a  copper  ring  instead  of  a  guard,  and 
another  at  the  pummel.  Vauban  also  contrived  a  fusil 
musket  which  could  be  used  either  as  firelock  or  match- 
lock, but  it  was  soon  set  aside.  It  was  at  his  instance 
that  the  use  of  the  pike  was  entirely  abandoned  by  the 
French  infantry  in  1703.'  In  England  the  proportion 
of  pikes  had  dropped  by  that  time  to  a  mere  "  piquet "  ^ 
of  fourteen  men  per  company,  and  the  French  example 
was  soon  followed. 

France  was  behind  other  nations  in  discarding  the 
matchlock.  The  Brandenburg  infantry  adopted  the  fusil 
and  bayonet  in  1689.'  The  Danish  contingent  employed 
in  Ireland  in  1690  was  so  armed.*  So  also  were  the 
British  guards,  and  half  the  musketeers  of  other  regi- 
ments. After  the  battle  of  Steenkerque  the  French 
soldiers  armed  themselves,  so  far  as  they  could,  with 
their  enemies'  firelocks,^  throwing  away  their  pikes  and 
muskets;  and  the  king  gave  orders  that  in  future  half 
the  musketeers  of  regiments  serving  in  the  field  should 
have  fusils.  The  matchlock  was  not  entirely  superseded, 
however,  till  1708.  The  French  muskets  were  of  smaller 
calibre  than  those  of  other  countries,  and  the  lighter 
bullet  (twenty  to  the  pound)  had  no  doubt  something  to 
do  with  the  less  effectiveness  of  their  fire. 

In  the  sieges  of  the  Thirty  Years'  war  much  use  was 
made  of  hand  grenades.  In  1667,  the  year  in  which 
Louis  XIV.  gained  possession  of  Lille,  Tournai,  and  other 
Spanish  fortresses,  he  ordered  that  four  "grenadiers" 
should  be  added  to  each  of  the  twenty  companies  of  the 
regiment  Du  Roi ;  and  three  years  afterwards  those  men 
were  gathered  together  into  a  grenadier  company."    Such 

*  Riistow,  ii.  185.  "  Fortescue,  i.  326.  "  Meyer,  i.  114. 

^  Wallou,  p.  433.  ''  Rousset,  iii.  330.  «  Rustow,  ii.  104. 


I 


THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY  137 

companies  were  added  by  degrees  to  other  infantry  regi- 
ments, and  in  1678  they  were  introduced  into  the  English 
army.  Companies  of  horse  grenadiers  were  also  formed.^ 
Tall,  strong  men  were  chosen  for  grenadiers.  They  carried 
three  grenades  in  their  pouches,  and  were  armed  with 
firelocks,  bayonets,  and  hatchets  to  open  paHsades.  To 
enable  them  to  sling  their  firelocks  more  readily,  and 
leave  their  hands  free  for  their  grenades,  they  had  tall 
caps  instead  of  broad-brimmed  hats.  They  were  expected 
to  play  a  part,  not  only  in  sieges,  but  in  the  field,  and  to 
assist  a  battalion  in  square  to  beat  off  cavalry  charges. 
The  use  of  the  grenades  proved  exceptional ;  but  the 
grenadier  companies  soon  became  picked  corps,  available 
for  arduous  enterprises,  and  survived  for  nearly  two 
centuries. 

Towards  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century  there  were, 
therefore,  four  kinds  of  infantry — pikemen,  musketeers, 
fusiliers,  and  grenadiers.  During  the  war  of  the  Spanish 
succession  these  were  practically  reduced  to  one  kind,  all 
foot  soldiers  being  armed  alike  with  firelock  and  socket 
bayonet.  This  simplified  formations  and  tactics.  Ranks 
were  reduced  to  four,  sometimes  to  three.  This  did  not 
increase  the  frontage  of  a  battalion,  for  the  change  in  the 
fire-arm  allowed  the  width  of  files  to  be  made  two  feet  or 
less  instead  of  three  feet.  The  intervals  between  bat- 
talions were  reduced  to  a  few  paces,  that  the  fire-line 
might  be  as  nearly  continuous  as  possible.  Battalions 
were  no  longer  divided  into  three  bodies,  a  centre  and  two 
wings,  but  into  two,  a  right  wing  and  a  left  wing.  Each 
wing  was  subdivided  into  divisions,  platoons,  and  sections. 
In  the  French  service  a  platoon  was  one-eighth,  in  the 
British  service  it  was  one-sixteenth  of  the  battalion, 
exclusive  of  the  grenadiers.     Fire  had  hitherto  been  given 

'  Fortescue,  i.  325. 


138  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

by  successive  ranks;  it  was  now  delivered  usually  by 
platoons  or  divisions  in  fixed  order,  forming  three  or 
more  "  firings." 

With  three  ranks,  as  in  the  British  service,  the  front 
rank  knelt  and  the  other  two  ranks  closed  up  and  locked. 
The  fire  of  the  front  rank  was  often  reserved.  If  the 
battalion  was  advancing  towards  the  enemy,  it  halted  to 
allow  one  group  of  platoons  to  fire,  and  then  marched 
slowly  on  till  the  order  was  given  for  another  group  to 
make  ready.  Care  was  taken  that  half  the  battalion 
should  always  be  loaded.  After  delivering  a  volley  at 
close  quarters,  an  attack  might  be  made  with  the  bayonet 
under  cover  of  the  smoke ;  "  but  if  you  don't  follow  your 
fire  that  moment,  but  give  them  time  to  recover  from  the 
disorder  yours  may  have  put  them  into,  the  scene  may 
change  to  your  disadvantage."*  Sometimes  all  three 
ranks  fired  standing,  but  accidents  were  apt  to  happen  to 
the  men  of  the  front  rank  from  carelessness  on  the  part  of 
the  third  rank.  The  French  battalions  were  formed  four 
deep,  and  the  rule  with  them  was  that  the  first  and  second 
ranks  should  kneel,  and  the  third  rank  stoop,  when  firing.'-^ 

Brigades  consisted  of  from  four  to  six  battalions.  The 
number  of  brigades  in  each  line  of  infantry  depended  on 
the  strength  of  the  army ;  but  the  line  was  divided  into  a 
right  wing  and  a  left  wing,  each  commanded  by  a  lieu- 
tenant-general. It  remained  the  custom  to  place  the 
infantry  in  the  centre  of  the  line  of  battle,  and  the  cavalry 
on  both  sides  of  it ;  but  where  allied  armies  were  in  the 
field  together  this  held  good  of  each  army  separately,  so 
that  (as  at  Blenheim)  two  wings  of  cavalry  formed  the 
centre  of  the  whole.  The  increasing  size  of  armies  also 
made  it  necessary  sometimes  to  depart  from  the  rule,  to 
suit  the  features  of  the  field  of  1 

1  Bland,  p.  1,33. 


THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY     139 

It  was  with  cavalry  that  Marlborough  won  his  most 
brilliant  victories  in  the  war  of  the  Spanish  succession. 
There  is  nothing  to  show  that  the  French  cavalry  was  not 
what  it  was  under  Luxemburg,  but  it  had  no  longer  such 
preponderance  in  numbers.  The  military  administration 
of  Louis  XIV.  had  begun  to  suffer  from  senile  decay; 
generals  were  chosen  on  other  grounds  than  capacity ;  and 
they  had  to  deal  with  a  man  who,  in  Voltaire's  words,  was 
more  of  a  king  than  William  III.,  as  much  of  a  statesman, 
and  a  far  greater  captain.  Marlborough  was  a  firm  behever 
in  shock  action  for  cavalry.  "  He  would  allow  the  horse 
but  three  charges  of  powder  and  ball  to  each  man  for  a 
campaign,  and  that  only  for  guarding  their  horses  when 
at  grass,  and  not  to  be  made  use  of  in  action."  *  He  re- 
introduced the  wearing  of  breast-plates  which  had  been 
dropped. 

He  had  a  singular  gift  for  detecting  the  weak  point  in 
his  adversary's  line  of  battle,  and  for  misleading  him  about 
his  own  intentions.  He  delivered  his  blow  vigorously  at 
the  right  place  and  took  care  to  bring  up  reserves  for  his 
cavalry,  and  to  give  it  all  needful  support  from  infantry. 
It  was  in  this  way  that  Blenheim  (1704)  and  Ramillies 
(1706)  were  won.  In  the  former  the  French  army  was  cut 
in  two,  in  the  latter  it  was  rolled  up  from  right  to  left. 
In  both  cases  some  battalions  of  infantry  were  intermixed 
with  the  French  squadrons  to  support  them,  according  to 
the  custom  that  prevailed  ;  and  in  both  cases  when  the 
hor-semen  fled  the  foot  were  left,  says  Kane,  "  to  the  fury 
of  our  troops  to  be  cut  to  pieces  to  a  man,  which  is 
generally  the  fate  of  foot  that  are  interlined  with  horse 
when  they  arc  once  routed." - 

It  was  in  the  hard  fought  battle  of  Malplaquct  (1709) 
that  infantry  played  the  most  prominent  part.     In  the 

'   Kanr,  p.  110.  •-•  fh..  pp.  HI,  C(l. 


MO  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

belt  of  woods  which  stretches  for  nearly  ten  miles  south- 
west of  Mons  there  is  a  gap  about  a  mile  and  a  half  wide 
near  Malplaquet.  Villars  was  advancing  by  this  gap  to 
the  relief  of  Mons  when  he  found  Marlborough  in  his 
front  and  decided  to  fight  on  the  defensive.  "  For  choice 
I  should  have  preferred  a  cavalry  action,"  he  wrote 
to  the  king  (September  10),  "but  our  position  is  so 
strong  that  we  have  good  reason  to  hope  for  success  if 
the  enemy  attack  us."  i  Marlborough  and  Eugene  post- 
poned the  battle  till  September  11,  to  give  time  for  all 
their  available  troops  to  come  up ;  and  Villars  had  forty- 
eight  hours  to  prepare  his  position.  He  occupied  the 
gap  with  his  right  and  centre.  The  right,  consisting  of 
sixty-three  battalions,  was  very  strongly  intrenched,  and 
extended  into  the  Bois  de  la  Lainiere,  which  covered  the 
right  flank.  In  the  centre  the  ground  was  better  suited 
for  cavalry  action,  and  here  the  intrenchments  were  made 
with  intervals  through  which  horsemen  could  pass.  They 
were  guarded  by  seventeen  battalions  of  infantry,  -svith 
cavalry  drawn  up  behind  them.  The  left  (thirty-eight 
battalions)  held  the  southern  end  of  the  Bois  de  Sars. 
It  was  thrown  forward,  so  that  it  crossed  fire  with  the 
centre,  and  it  was  covered  by  successive  lines  of  parapet 
and  abattis.  ^ 

Villars  had  60,000  foot  and  more  than  30,000  horse; 
the  allies  were  a  little  stronger  in  infantry,  but  not  so 
strong  in  cavalry.  They  decided  to  make  their  chief 
effort  against  the  French  left  where  the  woods  screened 
a  turning  movement.  Eighty  battalions  were  directed 
against  the  Bois  de  Sars  and  drove  the  French  out  of  it 
after  four  hours'  fighting.  Villars  brought  up  his  reserves 
and  drew  the  infantry  of  his  centre  to  his  left,  but  could 

1  Vault,  ix.  344. 

'  See  the  plans  given  in  vol.  xiii.  of  the  Bevuc  d'llistoirc  (1904). 


THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY      141 

not  regain  his  hold  of  the  wood.  He  was  wonndcd  and 
had  to  leave  the  field. 

The  intrenchnients  of  the  centre  were  now  only  lightly 
held  by  some  of  the  French  guards  detached  from  the 
right.  They  were  easily  carried  by  Lord  Orkney  with 
thirteen  battalions  (British),  and  the  allied  cavalry  followed 
through  the  intervals,  and  formed  on  the  plain  beyond. 
Lord  Orkney  writes :  "  As  our  horse  got  on  the  other 
side,  their  horse  came  very  near  ours.  Before  we  got 
thirty  squadrons  out  they  came  down  and  attacked ;  and 
there  was  such  pelting  at  one  another  that  I  really  never 
saw  the  like.  ...  At  first  we  pushed  them,  but  it  did  not 
last  long ;  for  they  pushed  back  our  horse  again  so  much 
that  many  of  them  run  through  our  retrenchments.  The 
gens  d'armes  .advanced  out ;  the  right  of  my  foot  gave 
them  such  a  fire  that  it  made  all  that  body  retreat 
prodigiously;    and  then  our  horse  pressed  them  again." ^ 

After  some  hours  of  this  work,  Boufflers  (who  had 
succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  French)  saw  that  the 
battle  was  lost  past  recovery,  and  gave  orders  for  retreat. 
These  orders  were  received  with  much  discontent  on  the 
right,  where  thirty  Dutch  battalions  had  been  trying 
with  mistaken  persistence  to  storm  works  held  by  more 
than  twice  their  number.'^  Their  gallantry  had  not  been 
thrown  away,  however,  for  it  had  detained  the  larger  part 
of  the  French  infantry  in  this  part  of  the  field.  It  was 
"a  very  murdering  battle,"  as  Marlborough  said.^  The 
French  lost  11,000  men,  the  allies  twice  as  many,  the 
Dutch  being  the  chief  sufierers.  The  cost  was  out  of 
proportion  to  the  results  achieved.  In  the  words  of 
Marlborough's  apologist,  "  those  who  judged  impartially 
were   of  opinion,  that   all  things  considered,   the  allies 

'  English  HUtorical  Review,  xix.  .320. 

^  Kewx  d'Histoire,  xiii.  61.  ^  Coxe,  ii.  4(52. 


142  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

gained  indeed  a  very  remarkable  and  glorious  victory, 
but  paid  so  dear  for  it  that  some  said,  Uvo  such  victones 
more  ivould  have  undone  them ;  and  on  the  other  hand, 
there  were  not  wanting  those  that  aflSrmed,  that  though 
the  French  were  beaten  from  their  fortified  camp,  and 
lost  the  field  of  battle,  yet  they  retrieved  their  former 
reputation."  ^ 

In  France  the  troops  were  extolled  at  the  expense  of 
their  general.  Villars  was  blamed  for  fighting  on  the 
defensive,  for  presenting  his  flanks  like  horns  to  the 
enemy,  and  weakening  his  centre.  The  battle  became 
a  point  of  departure  for  French  military  criticism.  Folard 
took  it  as  an  instance  of  the  mistake  of  ignoring  the 
temperament  of  troops,  which  in  the  case  of  the  French 
is  so  essentially  aggressive.  The  abandonment  of  the 
pike  had  led  to  mere'  fire  tactics  and  shallow  formations, 
which  suited  foreigners  better  than  Frenchmen.  He 
pointed  out  how  the  infantry  on  the  right,  "  weary  of  a 
passive  attitude,  which  is  never  to  their  taste,  and  crushed 
by  the  fire  of  the  Dutch  battalions,  who  being  better 
drilled,  more  phlegmatic,  and  more  adapted  to  that 
style  of  fighting  were  more  than  a  match  for  them, 
took  counsel  of  their  own  courage;  and  without  orders 
suddenly  made  so  fierce  a  sortie  against  the  firing  lines 
that  they  broke  them  up,  killed  most  of  the  men,  and 
drove  back  the  rest  upon  their  cavalry."  ^  If  they  had 
been  properly  supported  the  battle  would  have  been 
won. 

He  proposed  his  system  of  columns  as  specially  appro- 
priate to  the  French  character,  which  is  "  infinitely  better 
suited  for  shock  and  for  coups  de  main  than  for  standing 
still  and  firing."  Each  column  was  to  consist  of  two  or 
three  battalions ;  it  would  have  a  front  of  twenty -four  to 

'  Hare,  p.  205.  a  Chabot,  i.  335. 


THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY     143 

thirty  files,  and  a  depth  of  forty  or  fifty  ranks.  One-fifth 
of  the  men  were  to  be  armed  with  partisans,  and  placed  on 
the  front  and  flanks.  When  a  column  had  burst  through 
the  enemy's  line,  the  right  half  was  to  face  to  the  right, 
and  the  other  half  to  the  left,  and  they  were  to  roll  up  the 
line  in  both  directions. 

Maurice  de  Saxe,  who  had  also  been  present  at  Mal- 
plaquet  (as  a  boy  of  twelve),  commented  on  it  in  much 
the  same  spirit  in  his  Reveries,  which  were  written  in 
1732,  though  not  published  till  twenty-five  years  after- 
wards. Instead  of  continuous,  or  nearly  continuous,  lines 
of  intrenchment,  he  would  have  placed  three  or  more 
redoubts  in  the  Malplaquct  gap.  This  was  the  method 
applied  so  successfully  by  Peter  the  Great  at  Pultowa  in 
the  same  year  (1709).  It  would  have  effectually  barred 
the  gap  to  the  enemy,  and  would  have  given  space  for 
vigorous  counter-attacks  so  congenial  to  French  troops. 
He  agreed  with  Folard  as  to  the  use  of  columns  for 
attack,  but  he  thought  Folard's  columns  too  large.  His 
"centuries,"  as  he  called  them,  were  to  have  eight  ranks 
and  twenty  files.  They  were  to  be  separated  by  intervals 
equal  to  their  own  front,  and  their  advance  was  to  be 
covered  by  skirmishers  who  would  fall  back  into  these 
intervals. 

He  pictured  his  encounter  with  deployed  battalions: 
"  I  am  eight  deep  against  men  who  are  only  four  deep ;  I 
have  nothing  to  check  me,  no  loss  of  dressing  or  crowding 
up;  I  shall  cover  two  hundred  paces  sooner  than  they 
will  cover  one  hundred  ;  I  shall  be  through  the  enemy  in 
a  moment  if  it  comes  to  cold  steel ;  and  if  he  fires  he  is 
done  for."'  He  made  light  of  fire-effect  in  such  cases, 
and  preferred  plug  bayonets  to  socket  bayonets  because 
they  hindered  firing.     He  even  proposed  to  give  pikes  to 

'  Saxc,  p.  23. 


144  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

the  third  and  fourth  ranks,  and  make  them  sHng  their 
fire-arms ;  because  otherwise  the  front  ranks  must  kneel, 
and  once  down  it  is  not  easy  to  get  them  up  again.  His 
proposals  were  evidently  made  with  an  eye  to  the  special 
characteristics  of  French  troops. 

The  doctrine  that  the  French  should  always  attack 
found  favour,  but  it  was  sometimes  misleading.  At 
Dettingen  (1743)  Noailles  had  succeeded  in  bringing 
George  II.  and  his  army  (Austrians,  British,  and  Hano- 
verians) into  a  very  tight  place.  The  Main  was  on  their 
left,  the  mountains  on  their  right ;  the  French  were 
strongly  posted  in  front  of  them  and  had  occupied 
Aschaffenburg  in  their  rear ;  they  were  short  of  supplies, 
and  were  raked  by  French  batteries  on  the  other  side  of 
the  river.  Instead  of  standing  their  ground,  the  French 
advanced  from  Dettingen  to  meet  the  alUes.  Their 
cavalry  had  some  success  at  first,  but  made  no  serious 
impression  on  the  allied  infantry,  and  sufiered  much  from 
its  fire.  As  for  the  foot,  Noailles  had  to  report  that  few 
regiments  behaved  well,  and  the  Guards  very  ill.  The 
allied  infantry,  he  says,  stood  like  a  wall  of  brass,  "  from 
which  there  issued  so  brisk  and  well  sustained  a  fire  that 
the  oldest  officers  owned  that  they  had  never  seen  any- 
thing like  it,  incomparably  superior  to  ours."  ^ 

The  fire  of  the  British  infantry  is  thus  described  by  an 
officer  of  the  Guards :  "  They  were  under  no  command  by 
way  of  Hyde  Park  firing  [i.e.  by  platoons],  but  the  whole 
three  ranks  made  a  running  fire  of  their  own  accord,  and 
at  the  same  time  with  great  judgment  and  skill,  stooping 
all  as  low  as  they  could,  making  almost  every  ball  take 
place." '^  And  an  officer  of  the  Welsh  Fusiliers  says: 
"What  preserved  us  was  our  keeping  close  order  and 
advancing  near  the  enemy  ere  we  fired.     Several  that 

>  Noailles,  i.  123.  =  Chequers  Court  MSS.  (1900). 


THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY  145 

poppetl  at  one  hundred  paces  lost  more  of  theii*  men  and 
did  less  execution ;  for  the  French  will  stand  fire  at  a  dis- 
tance, though  'tis  plain  they  cannot  look  men  in  the 
face." '  The  French  loss  was  about  one  in  ten,  that  of  the 
allies  one  in  fifteen. 

A  writer  of  the  time  complains  that  the  French,  pre- 
ferring the  use  of  the  bayonet  to  musketry,  were  apt  to 
fix  bayonets  too  soon.  With  bayonets  fixed  only  one 
round  could  be  tired  to  much  purpose ;  for  the  bayonet 
made  it  diflicult  to  ram  down  the  charge,  the  men  put 
in  powder  and  ball  without  ramming,  and  the  eifect  was 
very  small.^  This  is  an  example  of  the  negligence  and 
lack  of  discipline  which  pervaded  all  ranks  of  the  armies 
of  Louis  XV.  "  The  officers  do  not  know  how  to  com- 
mand or  to  secure  obedience,  and  those  who  do  know 
are  often  afraid  to  do  it,  lest  they  should  bring  on  them- 
selves the  hatred  of  their  comrades,  who  believe  that 
punishment  makes  the  men  desert,  or  should  incur 
blame  from  their  colonels,  who  are  not  aware  of  the 
importance  of  discipline,  and  have  usually  no  idea 
of  it : "  ^  so  writes  the  chief  of  Marshal  Saxe's  staff  in 
1744.  If  Saxe  won  victories  nevertheless,  it  was  because 
he  knew  the  strong  and  weak  points  of  his  troops,  and 
had  the  dexterity  to  secure  favourable  conditions  for 
them. 

At  Fontenoy  (1745)  he  had  an  opportunity  of  applying 
his  principles  for  the  preparation  of  a  battle-field.  The 
allies  under  the  Duke  of  Cumberland  were  marching  to 
the  relief  of  Tournay,  and  though  Saxe  had  the  advan- 
tage in  numbers  he  meant  to  fight  on  the  defensive. 
But  instead  of  continuous  intrenchments,  he  made  use 
of  redoubts  and  villages,  with  wide  intervals  for  counter- 
attack.    One  of  these   intervals,  between  Fontenoy  and 

'   Gentleman's  Mayazine,  1743,  p.  38G.         '  CoUd,  i.  163.         »  lb.,  169. 


146  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

Barry  wood,  was  no  less  than  half  a  mile,  and  here  the 
British  and  Hanoverian  infantry  broke  through.  There 
were  twenty  battalions  of  them,  about  13,000  men,  and 
if  drawn  up  as  usual  in  two  lines  they  would  have  a 
front  of  1200  yards.  But  the  narrowness  of  the  space 
and  the  fire  from  both  flanks  restricted  them  to  a  front 
of  three  battalions,  the  brigade  of  Guards ;  the  other 
brigades  were  behind  the  Guards,  or  in  column  on  the 
flanks,  the  whole  forming  three  sides  of  a  square. 

There  were  twenty  battalions  of  French  infantry  drawn 
up  in  two  lines  to  guard  the  interval.  They  were  driven 
back  in  disorder  by  the  volleys  of  successive  units  of 
this  square  which,  in  Voltaire's  words,  "  continually  moves 
on  at  a  slow  pace,  never  getting  into  confusion,  and  re- 
pulsmg  all  the  regiments  which  confront  it  one  after 
the  other."  ^  The  old  rule,  that  battalions  should  halt 
for  each  volley,  had  been  changed  by  this  time.  They 
kept  on  the  move,  but  stepped  short ;  while  the  platoons 
in  their  turn  stepped  out,  halted  and  fired.  The  square 
penetrated  300  yards  into  the  French  position,  and 
reached  the  camp.  But  the  British  cavalry,  which  was 
in  rear,  had  no  room  to  come  forward ;  and  the  French 
cavalry  charged  the  front  and  flanks  of  the  square  again 
and  again,  making  no  impression  on  it,  but  hindermg 
its  advaiice  or  deployment. 

The  Dutch  not  having  succeeded  in  their  attack  on 
Fontenoy,  "we  found  ourselves,"  says  Ligonier,  who  was 
in  command  of  the  British  infantry,  "  under  a  cross-fire 
of  artillery  and  musketry,  as  well  as  fire  from  their  front, 
and  it  was  necessary  to  retire  as  far  as  the  line  between 
Fontenoy  and  the  fort  near  the  wood.  .  .  .  Having  had 
orders  to  make  a  second  attempt,  our  troops  ...  a  second 
time  made   the   enemy  give   way ;  and  they  were  once 

"  Siecle  de  Louis  XV.,  p.  157. 


THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY  147 

more  pushed  as  far  as  their  camp  with  great  loss  of 
men,  which  we  too  felt  on  our  side." '  There  the  square 
was  again  brought  to  a  check ;  Saxe  made  arrangements 
for  a  combined  attack  upon  it  by  horse  and  foot;  and 
at  the  end  of  three  hours  the  word  was  given  for  retreat, 
which  was  carried  out  in  good  order.  About  one-third 
of  the  men  were  left  on  the  field. 

The  lesson  was  not  thrown  away  upon  Saxe.  Five 
years  afterwards,  in  a  letter  to  the  Minister  of  War,  he 
intimated  that  what  the  English  had  done  at  Fontenoy 
was  not  a  thing  that  could  be  done  with  French  troops. 
He  added:  "Our  infantry,  though  the  bravest  in  Europe, 
is  not  fit  to  stand  a  charge  in  a  position  where  infantry 
less  brave,  but  better  drilled  and  in  a  better  formation, 
can  close  with  it;  and  the  successes  we  have  had  in 
battles  can  be  attributed  only  to  chance,  or  to  the  skill 
our  generals  have  shown  in  reducing  engagements  to 
sudden  dashes  or  affairs  of  posts,  where  the  bravery  and 
persistence  of  the  troops  usually  win  if  the  general  takes 
care  to  support  them."  - 

He  was  even  more  frank  with  Frederick  the  Great,  to 
whom  he  wrote  (September  1746):  "The  French  are  what 
they  were  in  Caesar's  time,  and  as  he  has  described  them, 
brave  to  excess  but  unstable ;  capable  of  holding  a  post 
to  the  last  man,  when  the  first  excitement  is  over;  for 
in  affairs  of  posts,  if  you  can  get  them  to  hold  out  for 
a  few  minutes,  they  warm  to  their  work ;  but  bad  at 
manoeuvring  in  open  country.  ...  As  it  is  impossible 
for  me  to  make  them  what  they  ought  to  be,  I  get  what 
I  can  out  of  them,  and  try  to  leave  nothing  of  importance 
to  chance."' 

He  avoided  battles  as  much  as  he  could,  and  won  his 

'  ErujUah  Historical  Review,  xii.  523,  &c. 

«  Grimoard,  v.  297.  =  Jb.,  iii.  1«2. 


148  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

campaigns  mainly  by  outmanceuvring  and  outmarching 
his  enemy.  The  two  offensive  battles  which  he  fought 
and  won,  Rocour  (1746)  and  Laeffelt  (1747),  were  singu- 
larly alike  in  their  general  features.*  In  each  case  he 
had  a  numerical  superiority  of  about  one-third,  and  he 
took  advantage  of  the  fact  that  he  was  dealing  with  an 
army  of  allies,  slow  to  assist  one  another,  to  increase 
this  superiority.  He  made  a  mere  demonstration  against 
the  right,  and  threw  his  whole  weight  against  the  left. 
Both  battles  were  reduced  to  affairs  of  posts  in  which 
the  assailants  were  three  or  four  times  as  strong  as  the 
defenders.  Little  came  of  these  victories,  but  they 
served  his  purpose,  to  satisfy  the  French  demand  with- 
out much  risk  of  disaster.  The  attacks  were  made  by 
columns  of  brigades  with  a  front  of  a  battalion;  and  no 
less  than  forty-nine  battalions  took  part  in  the  final 
assault  on  Laeffelt." 

The  battles  of  Fontenoy  and  Laeffelt  resemble  those 
of  Steenkerque  and  Neerwinden,  fought  half  a  century 
before.  The  British  were  again  beaten  by  the  French, 
alike  in  attack  and  in  defence.  They  showed  their  old 
hard-fighting  qualities  ;  but  they  were  led  by  men  who, 
though  able  and  soldierly,  were  no  match  in  military 
talent  for  Luxemburg  or  Saxe. 

The  English  regiments  which  fought  so  well  at  Fon- 
tenoy had  to  deal  soon  afterwards  with  a  very  different 
enemy.  They  were  recalled  to  meet  the  insurgent 
Highlanders  Avho  had  routed  Cope  at  Prestonpans  and 
were  invading  England.  The  invasion  was  abandoned 
at  Derby  without  a  fight,  and  the  retreating  Jacobite 
army  was  followed  into  Scotland  by  General  Hawley, 
who   engaged   it   at  Falkirk.      In   his   orders,  issued   at 

'  See  Journal  of  R.  U.S.  Institution,  xxxvjii.  1247,  &c.,  "  The  Campaigns 
of  Saxe."  *  Rochambeau,  i.  53. 


THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY     149 

Edinburgh  a  few  days   before   this   action,  he  explained 
to  his  men  the  Highlanders'  way  of  fighting: — 

"They  commonly  form  their  front  rank  of  what  they 
call  their  best  men  or  true  Highlanders,  the  number 
of  which  being  always  but  few,  when  they  form  in 
battalions  they  commonly  form  four  deep,  and  these 
Highlanders  form  the  front  of  the  four,  the  rest  being 
Lowlanders  and  arrant  scum.  Wlien  these  battalions 
come  within  a  large  musket-shot  or  three  score  yards, 
the  front  rank  give  their  fire  and  immediately  throw 
down  their  firelocks  and  come  down  in  a  cluster  with 
their  swords  and  targets,  making  a  noise  and  endeavour- 
ing to  pierce  the  body  or  battalion  before  them,  becoming 
twelve  or  fourteen  deep  by  the  time  they  come  up  to 
the  people  they  attack.  The  sure  way  to  demolish  them 
is  at  three  deep  to  fire  by  ranks  diagonally  to  the  centre 
where  they  come,  the  rear  rank  first,  and  even  that 
rank  not  to  fire  till  they  are  within  ten  or  twelve  paces ; 
but  if  the  fire  is  given  at  a  distance  you  will  probably 
be  broke,  for  you  never  get  time  to  load  another  cartridge, 
and  if  you  give  way  you  may  give  your  foot  for  dead,  for 
they  being  without  a  firelock  or  any  load  no  man  with  his 
arms,  accoutrements,  &c.,  can  escape  them,  and  they  give 
no  quarter ;  but  if  you  will  but  observe  the  above  direc- 
tions they  are  the  most  despicable  enemy  that  are."  ' 

His  precepts  were  sound  enough,  but  he  placed  his  men 
under  every  disadvantage  for  acting  on  them.  He  had 
three  regiments  of  dragoons  and  twelve  battalions  of 
infantry,  besides  militia.  He  drew  them  up  on  a  hillside, 
with  the  rain  driving  in  their  faces,  and  with  their  left 
overlapped  by  the  enemy's  line.  He  had  left  his  guns 
behind,  and  he  sent  forward  his  dragoons  to  charge  the 
unbroken  front  of  the  Jacobite  army.    They  were  driven 

'   U.S.  Magazine,  April  1897. 


ISO  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

back  on  the  left  wing  of  the  infantry,  and  the  Highlanders 
followed  hard  upon  them.  The  foot  regiments,  assailed 
both  in  front  and  flank,  gave  a  feeble  volley  from  their 
wet  firelocks,  and  then  broke  and  ran,  one  after  another. 
Only  three  regiments  on  the  right  stood  their  ground, 
and  covered  the  flight  of  the  rest. 

Three  months  afterwards  musket  and  bayonet  vindi- 
cated themselves  as  more  than  a  match  for  sword  and 
buckler.  At  Culloden  it  was  the  Highlanders  that  fought 
at  disadvantage.  They  were  jaded  with  a  fruitless  night 
march,  and  there  were  many  absentees.  The  English 
guns,  distributed  by  pairs  in  the  intervals  between  the 
infantry  battalions,  galled  them  into  a  charge  which  was 
made  without  orders  or  concert.  Nevertheless  their  right 
wing  had  some  success.  It  broke  through  the  interval 
between  the  two  regiments  on  the  left  of  the  line,  tempo- 
rarily capturing  the  guns  there,  and  killing  or  wounding 
more  than  200  men.  But  it  was  repulsed  by  the  second 
line,  and  scattered  by  the  dragoons.  The  battle  was  over 
in  half-an-hour,  and  the  Highland  army  was  dissolved. 

Cumberland,  writing  to  Ligonier,  said :  "  Sure  never 
were  soldiers  in  such  a  temper.  Silence  and  obedience 
the  whole  time,  and  all  our  manreuvres  were  performed 
without  the  least  confusion  ...  it  was  pretty  enough  to 
see  our  little  army  form  from  the  long  march  into  three 
lines  twice  on  our  march,  and  each  time  in  ten  minutes."  ^ 
He  had  issued  instructions  that  in  using  their  bayonets 
the  men  should  thrust,  not  at  their  own  assailants  who 
could  parry  with  their  targets,  but  at  the  assailants  of 
their  right-hand  men. 

By  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  Prussia  had 
stepped   into    the  position  which   Sweden  had   held   a 

'  Stowe  MSS. 


THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY     151 

century  before  as  the  pattern  of  excellence  in  infantry. 
The  earher  victories  of  Frederick  the  Great  were  due, 
as  he  himself  freely  admitted,  to  the  soldiers  which  he 
found  ready  to  his  hand.  The  sufferings  which  Branden- 
burg underwent  in  the  Seven  Years'  war  had  prepared  it 
to  make  sacrifices  for  self-defence.  The  people  owed 
much  to  their  princes,  who  had  in  fact  formed  the 
country  by  drainage  works  and  settlement.  The  Hohen- 
zoUerns  had  a  high  sense  of  national  duty,  and  were  not 
obliged  to  defer  to  a  nobility,  or  to  respect  municipal 
rights.  It  was  only  in  his  outlying  possessions  that  the 
Great  Elector  met  with  opposition  to  the  paternal  des- 
potism which  he  established.  His  scattered  territories 
without  natural  frontiers  depended  on  good  troops  for  their 
security,  and  it  was  only  by  the  most  careful  husbanding 
of  the  country's  resources  that  money  could  be  raised 
to  pay  the  troops.  He  managed  to  maintain  an  army 
of  24,000  men,  which  played  a  creditable  part  in  the 
German  resistance  to  Louis  XIV.,  and  beat  the  Swedes 
at  Fehrbellin  (1675).  He  added  Magdeburg  and  a  large 
part  of  Pomerania  to  the  dominions  which  passed  to  his 
successor  in  1688,  and  became  the  kingdom  of  Prussia 
in  1700. 

The  Prussian  troops  wore  among  the  best  elements  in 
the  composite  armies  of  the  allies  during  the  war  of  the 
Spanish  succession.  They  were  largely  subsidised  by 
richer  countries ;  but  when  Frederick  William,  "  the 
Serjeant-king,"  acceded  to  the  throne,  he  made  it  his 
great  aim  to  maintain  a  large  army  without  the  help 
of  subsidies.  In  the  course  of  his  reign  (1713-1740)  he 
raised  its  numbers  from  30,000  to  nearly  80,000  men, 
and  this  with  a  population  of  two  millions  and  a  quarter 
and  a  revenue  not  much  exceeding  one  million  sterling. 
Four-fifths  of  his  revenue  was  spent  on  the  army.    France 


152  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

with  ten  times  the  population  and  eight  times  the  revenue 
had  an  army  only  twice  as  large. 

To  keep  up  this  force  Frederick  William  had  to  do  as 
the  Swedes  had  done,  to  combine  the  compulsory  service 
of  his  own  subjects  with  the  enhstment  of  foreigners. 
In  1733  he  introduced  a  canton  system  by  which  each 
regiment  was  assigned  to  a  particular  district  whence 
it  drew  the  native  portion  of  its  recruits.  There  was  a 
general  roll  on  which  all  males  were  inscribed,  and  from 
this  roll  the  men  were  chosen  by  the  captains  of  com- 
panies and  the  headmen  of  cantons  conjointly.  To  ease 
the  burden  on  industry,  there  was  exemption  for  certain 
classes,  such  as  skilled  labourers,  and  for  certain  towns, 
as  Berlin.  The  men  chosen  continued  to  serve  as  long 
as  they  were  fit  for  service,  but  they  were  sent  home 
on  furlough  as  soon  as  they  had  been  trained,  and  were 
only  called  up  for  two  or  three  months  of  each  year. 
They  received  no  pay  while  on  leave,  but  the  captains 
were  allowed  to  draw  pay  for  them,  and  this  went  to 
cover  the  cost  of  bounties  for  the  foreign  recruits. 

The  proportion  of  foreigners  was  at  first  one-third,  but 
afterwards  rose  to  one-half.  They  were  drawn  chiefly 
from  the  smaller  German  states.  A  service  in  which 
economy  of  administration  was  carried  to  the  highest 
pitch  offered  little  that  was  attractive.  The  pay  of  the 
foot  soldier  was  only  three  halfpence  a  day,  the  food, 
clothing,  and  quarters  were  rough,  and  whatever  the 
term  of  engagement  it  was  practically  for  life.  Prussian 
recruiting  agents  were  widely  spread,  and  resorted  to  all 
methods,  including  kidnapping,  to  catch  recruits.*  The 
men  once  caught  were  carefully  guarded  lest  they  should 

'  This  was  especially  the  case  with  tall  men,  for  whom  the  king  had  a 
passion.  It  is  reckoned  that  he  spent  nearly  two  millions  sterling  on 
recruits  for  his  giant  grenadiers. 


THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY     153 

desert,  if  only  to  re-enlist  for  a  fresh  bounty.  Many  of 
them  were  of  bad  character,  controllable  only  by  strict 
discipline  and  severe  punishments. 

"  All  that  can  be  done  with  the  soldier,"  .says  Frederick 
ui  his  military  testament,  "  is  to  give  him  esprit  de  corps, 
i.e.  a  higher  opinion  of  his  own  regiment  than  of  all  the 
other  troops  of  the  country,  and  since  the  officers  have 
sometimes  to  lead  him  into  the  greatest  dangers  (and  he 
cannot  be  influenced  by  a  sense  of  honour)  he  must  be 
more  afraid  of  his  officers  than  of  the  dangers  to  which  he 
is  expo.sed."  >  So  argued  Xerxes,  as  Herodotus  tells  us 
(book  vii.  c.  10.'!). 

The  officers,  drawn  almost  wholly  from  a  poor  and 
prolific  nobility,  had  little  sympathy  with  their  men. 
But  as  compared  with  the  officers  of  other  armies  their 
professional  standard  was  high.  They  learned  their  busi- 
ness thoroughly,  and  promotion  went  by  seniority  and 
merit,  not  by  family  or  favour.  They  were  assisted  by 
excellent  under-officers  (sergeants,  corporals,  &c.),  most  of 
whom  were  promoted  from  the  ranks,  but  some  came  from 
the  cadet  schools  and  rose  to  be  officers.^ 

The  characteristics  of  the  Prussian  army  influenced  its 
tactics.  At  the  outset  of  Frederick's  instruction  to  his 
generals  (issued  in  17.")3),  he  says:  "Our  regiments  con- 
sist, half  of  our  own  people,  and  half  of  foreigners,  who 
have  enlisted  for  money.  The  latter,  having  no  further 
ground  of  attachment  to  the  state,  try  to  get  away  at  the 
first  opportunity.  The  prevention  of  desertion  becomes, 
therefore,  an  object  of  importance."  ^  On  this  account 
encampments  shouhl  not  be  near  woods,  and  may  even 
be  intrenched ;  there  should  be  frequent  roll  calls  and 
patrols ;  marauding  should  be  severely  punished ;  men 
should  not  be  allowed  to  fall  out  on  the  march;  night 
'  Friedrich,  p.  204.  -  Colin,  i.  I'.'j.  '  Kiiediich,  p.  3. 


154  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

marches  and  night  attacks  should  be  avoided.  It  was 
partly  for  the  same  reason  that  loose  fighting  and  indi- 
vidual initiative  were  discouraged,  rigidity  and  mechanical 
precision  were  aimed  at. 

But  there  were  other  reasons  for  precision.  Leopold 
of  Anhalt,  "  the  old  Dessauer,"  whom  Frederick  called  the 
creator  of  the  Prussian  army,  had  fought  with  distinction 
under  Eugene  at  Blenheim  and  Malplaquet,  and  against 
Charles  XII.  at  Stralsund.  He  was  cousin  of  William  III., 
and  was  of  kin,  therefore  (like  Turenne),  to  Maurice  of 
Nassau.  His  experience  of  war  and  his  disposition  led 
him  to  favour  offensive  tactics ;  at  the  same  time  he  laid 
great  stress  on  fire  effect.  "  Good  shooting,  quick  loading, 
intrepidity,  and  vigorous  attack : "  ^  these  were  his  deside- 
rata. The  fourth  rank  was  of  hardly  any  value  for  fire ;  it 
was  looked  to  chiefly  to  stiffen  and  reinforce  the  other 
three  ranks.  Holding  that  it  was  not  needed  for  such 
infantry  as  the  Prussian,  Leopold  persuaded  Frederick 
William  to  do  away  with  it.  With  closer  files  the  dress 
hitherto  worn  was  inconvenient ;  the  men  entangled  one 
another  in  turning  or  kneeling.  So  the  ample  skirts  and 
loose  folds  of  the  coat  were  trimmed  away ;  the  sabre  was 
shortened  and  drawn  up  to  the  thigh.'-* 

Loading  was  accelerated  by  the  general  adoption  of  iron 
ramrods.  They  had  long  been  in  use  for  pistols  and 
carbines,  and  file-leaders  had  them  to  deal  with  obstinate 
bullets;  but  for  the  common  soldier  wooden  ramrods 
were  thought  good  enough,  and  these  were  apt  to  break  if 
they  were  not  carefully  handled.  In  1698  Leopold  pro- 
vided all  the  men  of  his  own  regiment  with  iron  ramrods, 
and  twenty  years  afterwards  they  were  ordered  to  be 
supplied  to  the  whole  of  the  Prussian  infantry.  The  men 
were  taught  to  load  so  .smartly  that  they  could  fire  five 

1  Jahus.  p.  1664.  =  Colin,  i.  176. 


THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY  155 

rounds  a  minute ;  though  it  seems  doubtful  whether  the 
rate  actually  attained  in  the  field  with  ball  cartridge  was 
more  than  four  rounds  a  minute.  The  ordinary  rate  in 
other  armies  at  that  time  and  for  long  afterwards  was  two 
or  three  rounds  a  minute.  Napoleon  reckoned  that  sixty 
shots  could  be  fired  in  thirty  minutes  or  even  in  twenty, 
but  one  shot  in  every  six  or  seven  would  be  a  misfire.^ 

"  There  is  no  necessity  for  firing  very  fast ;  a  cool  well- 
levelled  fire  with  the  pieces  carefully  loaded  is  much 
more  destructive  and  foi-midable  than  the  quickest  fire  in 
confusion."  This  was  Wolfe's  opinion;-  and  the  small 
number  of  rounds  carried  by  the  soldier  made  it  neces- 
sary to  be  sparing  of  rapid  fire.  The  British  infantry  at 
Fontenoy  had  twenty-four  rounds  per  man.  The  Prussians 
carried  thirty  rounds,  and  after  Mollwitz  (where  they 
ran  short  of  ammunition)  Frederick  gave  orders  that 
an  additional  thirty  rounds  should  be  carried  by  the 
regimental  transport,  and  issued  before  a  battle.  But 
the  time  of  trial  for  the  soldier's  nerves  was  the  time 
during  which  he  was  unloaded,  and  an  abridgment  of 
the  loading  process  had  a  value  apart  from  the  actual 
number  of  rounds  fired.  As  Saxe  wrote  shortly  before 
his  death :  "  Troops  that  have  fired  are  undone,  if  those 
opposed  to  them  have  reserved  their  fire."  ^ 

So  far  as  fire  effect  is  concerned,  troops  advancing  must 
be  at  a  disadvantage]  compared  with  troops  standing  still. 
The  compensation  lies  in  the  moral  effect  of  attack,  the 
threat  of  hand-to-hand  encounter.  Saxe  held  that  "it 
is  no  use  wishing  to  do  two  things  at  once:  I  mean, 
to  charge  and  to  stand  fast.  In  the  one  case  fire  is 
necessary,  in  the  other  not  at  all,  and  yet  it  is  not  so 
easy  to  prevent  it."  *    On  this  account  he  preferred  plug 

'  Napoleon  I.,  xxxi.  4H().  -  yinyth,  p.  377. 

'  Griraoard,  v.  2'Jli.  ■■  liCvirics,  p.  32. 


1S6  THE   HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

bayonets.  Leopold  liad  a  more  phlegmatic  infantry  to 
deal  with,  more  amenable  to  discipline.  He  trusted  to 
the  method  which  the  English  exemplified  at  Dettingen 
and  Fontenoy,  steady  and  continuous  advance  in  slow 
time,  with  volleys  at  intervals.  The  men  of  the  first 
rank  were  made  to  load  and  fire  with  bayonets  fixed, 
and  Frederick  (in  1742)  extended  the  rule  to  all  three 
ranks. 

Great  pains  were  taken  to  deliver  the  attack  before 
the  enemy  was  ready  for  it,  and  this  was  to  be  done, 
not  by  hurry,  but  by  precision  of  movement.  "  Although 
the  general  movements  of  the  infantry  may  appear  slow 
and  solemn,  yet  they  are  so  accurate  that,  no  unnecessary 
time  being  lost  in  dressing  or  correcting  distances,  they 
arrive  sooner  at  their  object  than  any  other,  immediately 
form,  and  at  the  same  time  proceed  in  perfect  order  to 
the  attack." '  The  fullest  advantage  was  taken  of  the 
reduction  in  the  number  of  ranks,  and  the  closing  in 
of  ranks  and  files,  which  followed  from  the  change 
of  weapons  of  the  infantry  {vide  p.  137).  Leopold  re- 
introduced marching  in  step,  which  had  been  used  by 
the  Greeks  and  Romans,  the  Swiss  and  the  Swedes,  but 
had  not  been  general  hitherto.  It  became  necessary  if 
men  were  to  move  in  close  order,  and  without  it  (as  Saxe 
said)  it  was  impossible  to  make  a  vigorous  charge :  "  one 
will  always  reach  the  enemy  with  open  ranks." 

In  the  seventeenth  century  a  force  in  column  of  march 
had  a  length  two  or  three  times  as  great  as  it  had  in  line 
of  battle.  It  took  a  long  time  for  the  rear  to  close  up, 
and  for  the  force  to  form  line.  But  when  the  ranks  were 
reduced  to  three,  and  the  distance  between  them  to  one 
pace,  it  became  possible  to  form  columns  with  a  front 
suited   to  ordinary  roads  without   exceeding  the  length 

'  Dandas,  p.  9. 


THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY     157 

in  line.  The  Prussians  marched  usually  in  column  of 
sections  (thirty  men  or  ten  tiles),  or,  if  the  roads  were 
narrow,  in  column  of  subsections,  and  could  wheel  at  once 
into  line.  The  celerity  with  which  they  formed  in  order 
of  battle  at  Mollwitz  and  elsewhere  was  in  marked  con- 
trast to  the  leisureliness  of  other  nations.  In  former 
days,  says  Dundas  (writing  in  1788), "  hours  were  taken  up 
in  forming  in  line  of  battle  in  the  processional  manner, 
which  was  then  the  only  one  known ;  and  when  such  line 
was  once  formed,  it  was  difficult  to  make  any  considerable 
alteration  in  it  without  much  previous  explanation  and 
endangering  the  order  of  the  whole." ' 

The  Prussian  regiments  consisted  of  two  battalions, 
each  of  which  had  five  companies  of  "musketeers"  and 
one  company  of  "grenadiers."  In  the  field  the  four 
grenadier  companies  of  two  regiments  were  grouped  as 
a  grenadier  battalion.  The  musketeers  were  formed  into 
four  divisions,  each  of  two  platoons,  the  platoon  consist- 
ing of  seventy-five  men  or  twenty-five  files.  In  presence 
of  the  enemy  movements  were  made  in  column  of 
divisions  or  platoons,  and  line  was  formed  either  (a)  to 
a  flank,  by  the  simultaneous  wheel  of  the  divisions,  or  (b) 
to  the  front,  by  halting  the  leading  division  and  march- 
ing the  rest  half-right,  or  half-left,  into  the  alignment. 
Frederick  preferred  the  former  method  when  it  could  be 
used  without  exposing  his  flank  to  the  enemy.  Squares 
were  formed  from  line  by  wheeling,  the  two  centre 
platoons  standing  fast. 

Each  battalion  was  divided  into  two  firings,  viz.  odd 
and  even  platoons.  The  platoons  of  each  firing  fired  in 
succession  from  right  to  left.  When  the  attack  was  made 
by  a  brigade  or  a  whole  wing,  the  firing  was  by  battalions 
instead  of  platoons.  Fire  was  opened  at  200  paces  from 
'  Dundas,  p.  7. 


158  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

the  enemy.  There  were  battahon  guns  in  the  intervals 
between  battalions,  which  kept  a  little  in  front  of  the  line, 
and  fired  as  they  moved  forward.  The  intervals  were 
much  too  small  to  allow  the  second  line  to  advance 
through  them.  It  could  only  relieve  the  first  line  by  a 
"  passage  of  lines " :  the  first  line  filing  to  the  rear  by 
platoons  through  gaps  made  m  the  second  hne  by  break- 
ing off  files.i  This  was  a  manoeuvre  hardly  to  be  executed 
when  there  was  real  need  for  it;  it  was  tried,  but  found 
impracticable  by  Girard's  corps  at  Albuera. 

The  weapon  forged  by  Leopold  showed  its  quality  at 
Mollwitz(1741),  though  Frederick  had  not  yet  learnt  how 
to  handle  it.  The  Austrians  had  10,000  foot  and  8500 
horse ;  the  Prussians  16,800  foot,  but  only  4500  horse. 
The  Austrians  were  taken  by  surprise,  and  to  gain  time 
their  cavalry  charged  the  Prussian  right,  routed  the  horse 
on  that  wing,  and  took  the  guns.  They  broke  in  between 
the  lines  of  infantry,  and  at  the  end  of  two  hours  the 
situation  was  so  grave  that  Schwerin  persuaded  the  king 
to  leave  the  field.  But  when  asked  about  the  line  of 
retreat,  Schwerin's  answer  was,  "Over  the  body  of  the 
enemy."  He  led  the  infantry  steadily  forward :  "  The 
whole  front  seemed  to  be  moved  by  a  single  impulse," 
says  an  Austrian  account ;  "  it  came  on  step  by  step  with 
astonishing  uniformity.  At  the  same  time  their  artillery 
[the  battalion  pieces]  was  served  without  intermission 
with  shot  and  case,  and  as  soon  as  they  were  within  good 
range  their  musketry  fire  was  not  silent  for  a  moment, 
but  was  like  a  continuous  roll  of  thunder."  ^  The  Austrian 
infantry  could  not  be  brought  to  charge  them,  but  gathered 
into  deep  masses  round  the  colours ;  and  at  length  Neip- 
perg  gave  orders  for  retreat,  which  was  covered  by  the 
cavalry. 

1  Riistow,  ii.  234.  ^  Kriege  Friedrichs,  i.  400. 


THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY  159 

According  to  Frederick,  the  victory  was  largely  due  to 
the  happy  chance  that  he  had  placed  some  spare  battalions 
on  the  right  of  the  infantry,  between  the  first  and  second 
lines.  He  had  also  posted  two  battalions  of  grenadiers 
among  the  squadrons  of  the  right  wing,  to  make  up  for 
their  inferiority  in  number.  Instead  of  breaking  and 
letting  themselves  be  cut  to  pieces  when  the  horsemen 
were  routed,  these  battalions  faced  some  of  their  men 
about,  so  as  to  show  front  in  opposite  directions,  beat  off 
the  Austrian  horse,  and  eventually  rejoined  the  rest  of  the 
infantry. 

At  Hohenfriedberg  (1745)  the  honours  were  divided 
between  the  general  and  his  troops.  By  artifice  and  by 
rapidity  of  movement  Frederick  succeeded  in  surprising 
the  Austro-Saxon  army,  and  routed  the  Saxons,  who 
formed  its  left  wing,  before  the  Austrians  were  in  line. 
The  latter  were  then  attacked  in  flank  as  well  as  in  front, 
and  were  beaten  with  a  loss  of  more  than  10,000  men.  The 
Prussian  cavalry  had  a  brilliant  share  in  this  victory. 
Frederick  says  that  he  found  it  at  his  accession  more  pon- 
derous and  less  spirited  than  that  of  any  European  army ; 
but  he  had  taken  great  pains  with  it  after  Mollwitz.  The 
men  were  not  good  riders,  and  had  been  trained  to  fight  on 
foot  with  fire-arms.  Frederick  declared  he  would  cashier 
any  officer  who  waited  to  be  attacked,  instead  of  attacking. 
It  was  the  old  German  fashion  to  charge  at  the  trot,  and 
the  French  fashion  to  charge  at  the  gallop  but  in  loose 
order  (en  faurrageurs^).  Speed  was  regarded  as  incom- 
patible with  closeness  of  formation.  With  the  help  of 
Seydlitz,  Frederick  taught  his  cavalry  to  increase  their 
pace  gradually  as  they  neared  the  enemy,  and  yet  keep 
knee  to  knee. 

At  Kesselsdorf  (1745)  "  the  old  Dessauer "  had  a  last 
»  Guibert,  i.  74,  369. 


i6o  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

opportunity,  two  years  before  his  death,  ot  showing  how  to 
use  the  troops  he  had  trained.  He  had  30,000  men ;  the 
Saxons  (assisted  by  an  Austrian  corps)  had  less  cavalry, 
but  rather  more  infantry,  and  were  strongly  posted.  Two 
attacks  on  the  village  of  Kesselsdorf  failed;  but  the  Saxons, 
issuing  for  a  counterstroke,  masked  their  own  guns. 
Leopold  brought  his  cavalry  down  on  them,  and  his 
infantry  rallied  and  stormed  the  village.  He  pushed 
his  success  so  promptly  and  skilfully  that  nearly  7000 
prisoners  were  taken. 

"  Such  an  army  was  capable  of  getting  a  general  out  of 
a  scrape,  and  the  king  has  owned  that  he  was  more  than 
once  indebted  to  it  in  that  way : "  so  wrote  Frederick  in 
his  memoirs,!  and  Soor  (1745)  was  an  example  of  it.  He 
found  the  Austrian  army  unexpectedly  on  his  right  flank, 
but  the  hesitation  of  the  enemy  and  the  mobility  of  his 
own  troops  enabled  him  to  form  front  to  that  flank  and  to 
win  the  victory. 

The  Silesian  wars  were  no  sooner  over  than  Frederick 
set  himself  to  note  what  he  had  learnt  from  them.  In 
1748  he  wrote  his  "general  principles  of  war  applied  to 
the  tactics  and  discipline  of  the  Prussian  army,"  which 
was  issued  confidentially  five  years  afterwards,  and  is 
commonly  known  as  his  "  military  instruction  to  his 
generals."  He  points  out  that  Prussian  wars  should  be 
short  and  vigorous :  "  a  prolonged  war  would  gradually 
undermine  our  admirable  discipline,  depopulate  the 
country,  and  exhaust  our  resources."  The  Prussians, 
therefore,  should  take  the  offensive :  "  the  whole  strength 
of  our  troops  lies  in  attack,  and  we  act  foolishly  if  we 

1  CEuvres,  i.  176.  Wellington  is  reported  to  have  said  the  same  : 
"  quand  je  me  mets  dans  I'embarras,  men  arm(5e  m'en  retire  "  (Wood, 
Cavalry  in  the  Waterloo  Campaign,  p.  193). 


THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY      i6i 

renounce  it  without  good  cause."  '  The  attack  of  villages 
and  intrenchments  should  be  avoided  if  possible,  for 
they  cost  many  men,  the  flower  of  the  infantry.  It  is 
in  battles  in  the  open  field  that  Prussian  troops  find 
their  opportunit}-. 

The  one  aim  of  their  drill  is  to  enable  them  to 
niana'uvre  and  form  up  more  quickly  than  the  enemy, 
to  attack  him  with  energy  while  he  is  unprepared,  and 
to  settle  the  affair  more  speedily  than  has  hitherto  been 
the  custom.  Cavalry  is  to  be  hurled  at  him  with  such 
impetuosity  that  even  the  cowards  must  needs  do  their 
duty.  The  infantry  must  march  briskly  forward,  with  a 
good  countenance  and  in  good  alignment.  They  should  not 
fire  till  the  enemy  begins  to  give  way ;  then  they  should 
pour  in  volleys  by  battalions. 

This  was  a  change  in  Prussian  practice,  and  was  in 
fact  a  counsel  of  perfection  which,  as  Frederick  was  aware, 
could  not  always  be  carried  out.  After  describing  a  new 
order  of  battle  of  his  contrivance,  he  remarks :  "  It  will 
be  said  that  I  forbid  shooting,  and  yet  that  the  way  in 
which  I  draw  up  my  troops  hinges  on  nothing  else  than 
the  fire  of  my  infantry.  To  this  I  answer  that  one  of 
two  things  will  happen :  either  my  infantry  will  fire 
although  it  is  forbidden,  or  my  orders  will  be  obeyed  and 
the  enemy  will  give  way."  -  He  told  a  French  visitor 
(the  Comte  de  Gisors)  that  the  Prussian  fire  which  was 
so  much  talked  of  was  the  thing  which  he  himself  cared 
least  about,  because  those  fine  volleys  which  gave  so 
much  pleasure  at  drill  were  soon  out  of  the  question 
in  a  real  engagement.^  Even  with  Prussian  troops,  it 
was  not  always  easy  to  get  them  forward  when  they 
had  once  begun  to  fire,  as  Prince  Augustus  found  at 
Auerstedt. 

'   Krie<lricli,  pp.  GO,  HG.  -  Ih.,  p.  81.  '  Rousset,  p.  lO.'J. 

L 


1 62  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

In  the  new  order  of  battle  referred  to  above  some 
battalions  were  to  be  placed  at  the  extremities  of  the 
wings  to  support  the  cavalry,  and  to  be  used  afterwards 
to  take  the  enemy  in  flank.  They  were  to  be  assisted 
in  this  by  the  three  battalions  which  the  experience  of 
Mollwitz  had  taught  him  to  place  at  each  end  of  his 
two  lines  of  infantry,  to  close  the  space  between  them. 
In  the  second  line  of  infantry  there  were  to  be  some 
squadrons  of  dragoons,  to  fall  on  the  enemy's  foot  as 
soon  as  it  began  to  cluster  round  the  colours,  as  the 
Austrian  battalions  were  apt  to  do.  The  main  thing, 
he  says  (in  his  Gedanken  of  1755  ^),  is  that  one  arm 
should  be  supported  by  another,  that  cavalry  should  be 
stiffened  by  infantry  and  artillery,  and  that  one  should 
always  have  cavalry  on  the  spot  to  help  the  infantry. 

But  he  had  already  thought  out  another  order  of 
battle,  his  "  oblique  order,"  as  he  called  it,  which  proved 
to  be  his  chief  means  of  victory.  In  this  "you  refuse 
one  wing  to  the  enemy  and  strengthen  the  one  which  is 
to  attack.  With  the  latter  you  do  your  utmost  against 
one  wing  of  the  enemy  which  you  take  in  flank.  An 
army  of  100,000  men  taken  in  flank  may  be  beaten  by 
30,000  in  a  very  short  time.  .  .  .  The  advantages  of  this 
arrangement  are  (1)  a  small  force  can  engage  one  much 
stronger  than  itself;  (2)  it  attacks  the  enemy  at  a 
decisive  point;  (3)  if  you  are  beaten,  it  is  only  part  of 
your  army,  and  you  have  the  other  three-fourths  which 
are  still  fresh  to  cover  your  retreat."  - 

This  oblique  order  might  be  brought  about  by  two 
methods,  or  by  a  combination  of  them.  The  line  of 
battle  might  be  formed  parallel  to  the  enemy,  and  the 
attack  delivered  in  echelon  at  one  end  of  the  line, 
being  headed  by  a  picked  corps.      In  open  country  this 

>  Friedricb,  p.  140.  -  lb.,  p.  64. 


THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY  163 

might  be  the  only  course  available,  and  it  was  at  least 
as  old  as  Epaminondas.  But  where  the  ground,  fog,  or 
darkness  gave  concealment,  the  line  might  be  formed  at 
an  inclination  to  that  of  the  enemy,  and  overlapping 
it,  and  this  made  the  attack  much  more  effective.  It 
needed  coup  d'osil  on  the  part  of  the  general,  a  capable 
staff,  and  troops  that  could  form  quickly  and  accurately 
on  the  line  chosen.  It  might  be  done  by  deployment, 
or  by  a  wheel  into  line  from  column.  Frederick  preferred 
the  latter  method  (as  already  mentioned)  when  he  could 
make  use  of  it  without  lending  his  own  flank  to  the 
enemy.' 

>  Friedricb,  p.  3G. 


VII 

THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY  :  II 

In  the  Seven  Years'  war  Frederick  found  that  the  Austrian 
generals  had  learnt  his  maxim  :  "  Always  try  to  do  what 
the  enemy  wants  you  not  to  do."  Instead  of  playing  into 
his  hands  by  fighting  battles  in  the  open  field,  they  chose 
strong  positions  and  fortified  them.  Their  artillery  was 
more  numerous  than  his,  was  better  served,  and  had  a 
longer  range.  As  he  afterwards  wrote  from  bitter  ex- 
perience :  "  The  attack  of  a  well-defended  position  is  a 
tough  job  :  you  may  easily  be  repulsed  and  beaten.  It 
will  at  all  events  cost  you  some  15,000  or  20,000  men, 
which  makes  a  cruel  breach  in  an  army.  Recruits,  sup- 
posing you  can  get  enough  of  them,  will  make  up  the 
number,  but  not  the  quality,  of  the  soldiers  you  have  lost. 
Your  country  becomes  depopulated  in  renewing  your  army ; 
your  troops  deteriorate ;  and  if  the  war  is  a  long  one,  you 
find  yourself  at  the  head  of  peasants,  ill-drilled  and  ill-dis- 
ciplined, with  whom  you  hardly  dare  to  face  the  enemy."  i 
The  two  first  battles  of  1757— Prague  (May  6)  and 
Kolin  (June  18)^cost  him  nearly  one-third  of  the  100,000 
men  which  he  had  brought  into  Bohemia.  In  each  case 
he  found  the  Austrians  strongly  posted,  and  marched 
along  their  front  to  turn  their  right.  In  each  case  the 
rearward  part  of  his  army  was  drawn  prematurely  into 
action  during  the  march  owing  to  its  nearness  to  the 
enemy.     His  object  was  frustrated :  the  battle  raged  more 


THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY  165 

or  less  along  the  whole  front,  and  the  attack  on  the 
enemy's  right  was  ill-supported.  At  Prague  the  numbers 
were  nearly  equal.  The  Austrians  on  the  right,  after 
repulsing  the  Prussians,  followed  them  up,  became  sepa- 
rated from  the  left,  and  gave  Frederick  an  opportunity 
of  cutting  their  army  in  two.  At  Kolin  the  Prussians 
were  very  inferior  in  numbers,  especially  in  infantry. 
They  were  beaten  after  four  hours  of  hard  fighting  which 
cost  them  40  per  cent,  of  their  strength. 

But  if  flank  marches  were  hazardous  for  Prussian  troops, 
much  more  were  they  hazardous  for  inferior  troops  against 
Prussians,  even  if  they  were  made  at  safer  distance.  At 
Rossbach  (November  5,  1757)  Frederick  with  less  than 
22,000  men  was  in  presence  of  a  Franco-German  army 
nearly  three  times  as  numerous.  Its  commanders,  finding 
he  would  not  attack  thorn,  resolved  to  force  him  back  by 
turning  his  left.  They  swept  round  to  the  south  of  his 
position,  and  seeing  his  troops  march  off,  they  were  per- 
suaded that  the  Prussians  were  in  full  retreat.  They 
hurried  on  ;  but  suddenly  the  Prussian  cavalry  came  over 
a  ridge,  and  charged  like  a  wall  upon  the  front  and  flank 
of  the  German  horse  which  formed  the  head  of  the  allied 
army  in  its  order  of  march.  The  horse,  though  reinforced, 
were  driven  ofi'  the  field.  The  French  infantry  began  to 
deploy,  under  fire  of  Prussian  guns  on  higher  ground  ;  but 
before  it  could  complete  its  deployment,  it  was  attacked 
by  the  Prussian  infantry  which  advanced  in  echelon  from 
the  left. 

Alterations  had  been  made  recently  in  the  French  evolu- 
tions, and  as  Voltaire  says,  "  the  soldier  did  not  know 
where  he  was :  his  old  way  of  fighting  was  changed,  and 
he  was  not  used  to  the  new  way."  '  Some  of  the  battalions 
wore  in  line,  and  some  in  column.  Under  the  fire  of  the 
'  Siecle  de  Louis  XV.,  p.  ;J4'J. 


1 66  THE    HISTORY    OF   INFANTRY 

Prussian  infantry,  which  struck  them  both  m  front  and 
flank,  "  one  saw  their  columns,"  says  Frederick,  "  crowding 
towards  the  left;  they  soon  squeezed  up  the  deployed 
battalions  between  them  ;  the  mass  of  this  infantry  became 
every  moment  denser,  more  unwieldy,  and  more  confused ; 
the  more  it  threw  itself  to  the  left,  the  more  was  it  out- 
flanked by  the  Prussian  front."  ^  They  gave  way,  and  a 
charge  by  Seydlitz's  squadrons  completed  their  discom- 
fiture. The  other  troops  followed  their  example,  and  the 
Franco-German  army  was  routed  with  a  loss  of  8000  men. 
The  Prussian  loss  was  541 :  only  seven  Prussian  battalions 
were  actually  engaged,  and  they  did  not  fire  more  than 
fifteen  rounds  per  man. 

This  was  Frederick's  only  personal  experience  of  French 
troops.  He  held  them  cheap,  both  men  and  officers,  and 
in  his  military  testament  he  remarked  of  one  of  the 
Prussian  princes  that  he  ought  not  to  be  given  an  inde- 
pendent command  at  first,  for  he  had  only  fought  French- 
men hitherto.  2  Frederick  declared  that  in  the  Seven 
Years'  war  he  was  being  throttled  by  three  women — Maria 
Theresa,  Elizabeth,  and  Madame  de  Pompadour ;  but  the 
pressure  of  Russia  was  intermittent,  if  severe,  and  of 
France  he  was  soon  practically  relieved  by  England.  The 
army  under  Ferdmand  of  Brunswick,  which  was  in  British 
pay,  exceeded  90,000  men  m  the  latter  half  of  the  war,  and 
of  these  one-fourth  were  English.  Frederick  also  received 
a  British  subsidy  which  covered  about  one-third  of  his 
expenditure. 

Just  a  month  after  Rossbach,  Frederick  won  a  still 
more  brilliant  victory  over  the  Austrians  at  Leuthen. 
He  had  marched  back  in  all  haste  to  Silesia,  had  gathered 
up  the  fragments  of  the  army  which  had  been  beaten  at 
Breslau,  and  advanced  with  30,000  men  against  80,000. 

'  (Euvres,  iii.  217.  "  Friedrich,  p.  227. 


THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY     167 

He  found  that  the  Austrian  line  of  battle  extended  over 
five  miles  of  undulating  country,  and  that  woods  and 
hollows  would  hide  the  movements  of  his  own  troops. 
He  resolved  "  to  place  his  whole  army  on  the  left  flank 
of  the  Imperialists,  to  strike  his  hardest  with  his  right, 
and  to  refuse  his  left,  with  such  precautions  that  there 
should  be  no  fear  of  mistakes  like  those  which  had  been 
made  in  the  battle  of  Prague,  and  had  caused  the  loss  of 
that  of  Kolin."  1  On  this  flank  there  were  marshes 
wrongly  supposed  to  be  impassable;  the  Austrians 
believed  their  right  flank  to  be  the  one  most  exposed 
to  attack ;  and  Daun  was  hurrying  there  with  reinforce- 
ments, while  Frederick  was  wheeling  his  columns  into 
line  opposite  the  left,  at  an  angle  of  about  sixty  degrees 
with  the  prolongation  of  the  Austrian  front. 

The  attack  was  delivered  by  the  vanguard  of  ten 
battalions,  supported  by  the  first  line  which  advanced 
in  echelon  from  the  right.  The  Austrian  left  was  driven 
in  upon  the  centre,  and  the  battalions  sent  to  reinforce  it 
were  unable  to  deploy  and  were  broken  one  after  another. 
Pivoting  on  its  centre,  the  Austrian  army  swung  round, 
and  formed  a  ragged  line  facing  south  instead  of  west. 
Its  cavalry  tried  to  fall  upon  the  Prussian  left  flank, 
but  were  charged  and  dispersed  by  the  Prussian  cavalry, 
which  then  fell  on  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  Austrian 
infantry.  The  battle  lasted  little  more  than  three  hours, 
and  the  Austrians  were  so  demoralised  that,  besides 
10,000  killed  and  wounded,  they  lost  more  than  20,000 
men  as  prisoners  within  the  next  few  days.  It  was  a 
masterpiece,  as  Napoleon  has  said,  which  would  alone 
suffice  to  immortalise  Frederick ;  but  it  was  Prussian 
drill  that  made  it  possible. 

The  quality  of  the  troops  was  even  more  conspicuous 
'  CEuvres,  iii.  238. 


1 68  THE    HISTORY    OF   INFANTRY 

under  adverse  circumstances,  as  at  Hochkirch  (October  14, 
1758).  Frederick  allowed  himself  to  be  surprised  in  the 
early  morning  by  an  army  which  in  infantry  was  double 
his  strength,  and  his  right  tlank  was  driven  in.  "  Beaten 
by  8  A.M.,  having  lost  nearly  all  its  guns  and  abandoned 
its  standing  camp,  his  army  makes  the  finest  retreat  in 
the  world,  and  halts  within  a  league  of  the  battle-field ; 
there  its  attitude  is  so  imposing  that  we  throw  up  re- 
doubts and  return  to  the  defensive  four  days  after  our 
successes : "  so  writes  a  French  officer  who  was  on  Daun's 
staff.i  Yet  the  Prussian  infantry  had  lost  8000  men  out 
of  29,000. 

At  Torgau  (November  3,  1760)  a  desperate  situation 
led  Frederick  to  attack  an  army  half  as  large  again  as 
his  own,  and  so  strongly  posted  that  he  found  it  necessary 
to  divide  his  own  army  in  two,  and  make  separate  attacks 
from  north  and  south.  As  was  to  be  expected,  accidents 
baulked  his  combinations.  The  attacks  were  not  simul- 
taneous ;  the  guns  were  delayed  by  the  rough  ground,  and 
the  cavalry  came  up  late ;  the  infantry  advanced  under  a 
storm  of  fire  which  swept  away  nearly  the  whole  of  the 
first  line.  The  repeated  efforts  of  the  northern  force, 
which  was  led  by  Frederick,  met  with  only  partial  success ; 
but  the  Prussians  clung  to  the  ground  they  gained,  and 
Ziethen,  pushing  in  from  the  south  after  dark,  seized  the 
key  of  the  position.  The  victory  cost  Frederick  one-third 
of  his  army,  and  is  characterised  by  Napoleon  as  the  only 
one  in  which  he  displayed  no  talent. 

In  speaking  of  his  antagonists  and  their  methods  of 
warfare,  at  the  end  of  1758,  Frederick  said :  "  The  Russians, 
rude  and  incapable,  don't  deserve  to  be  mentioned."  - 
True  as  this  might  be  of  the  officers,  he  had  already 
found  at  Zorndorf  (August  25,  1758)  that  the  men  were 
1  Waddington,  ii.  319.  =  Friedricli,  p.  1(52. 


THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY  169 

not  to  be  despised.  His  infantry  had  given  way  before 
them  both  on  the  left  and  centre,  and  as  he  himself 
wrote,  "  everything  would  have  gone  to  the  devil  if  it 
had  not  been  for  my  brave  Seydlitz  and  the  courage  of 
my  right  wing."  '  Thanks  to  his  cavalry,  he  remained 
muster  of  the  field  after  twelve  hours'  fighting ;  but  the 
Russians  confronted  him  for  some  days,  ready  to  try 
conclusions  again,  though  they  had  lost  more  than  half 
the  men  who  took  part  in  the  battle.  It  should  be  added 
that  in  cavalry  the  Prussians  were  two  to  one,  but  in 
infantry  only  two  to  three. 

In  spite  of  this  experience,  Frederick  attacked  the 
Russians  again  next  year  at  Kunersdorf  (August  12, 
1759).  They  had  defeated  his  lieutenant,  Wedell,  three 
weeks  before  at  Paltzig  with  heavy  loss.  They  were  in  a 
strongly  intrenched  position,  and  numbered  63,000  men 
(including  18,000  Austrians  under  Loudon) ;  he  had  only 
48,000  men.  He  threw  his  whole  army  on  their  left 
flank,  carried  their  intrenchments,  and  drove  theu-  left 
wing  in  \ipon  their  right.  But  their  stubborn  resist- 
ance and  Loudon' .s  skill  saved  them  from  a  repetition  of 
Leuthen.  They  rallied  on  a  hillock  in  the  centre  of  their 
po.sition,  and  the  Prussians  tried  in  vain  to  get  possession 
of  it.  There  was  not  room  for  an  advance  in  line  or 
echelon  on  a  broad  front,  and  the  cavalry  and  artillery 
could  afford  little  support  to  the  infantry,  which  was 
already  exhausted  with  marching  and  fighting.  Yet 
Frederick  would  not  listen  to  the  advice  of  his  generals, 
to  rest  content  with  what  he  had  gained.  He  used  up  his 
last  reserves  to  no  purpose,  and  at  the  end  of  eight  hours 
some  vigorous  counter-attacks  drove  his  troops  from  the 
field  in  utter  rout.  He  wrote  that  night :  "  Out  of  an 
army  of  48,000  men  I  have  not  3000  left.  At  tht 
•  Waddingtou,  ii.  275. 


I70  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

moment  they  are  all  in  flight,  and  I  have  no  longer  any 
control  over  my  men."  ^ 

Lloyd,  the  historian  of  the  Seven  Years'  war,  in  which 
he  had  himself  taken  part  as  a  commander  of  Austrian 
light  troops,  compares  the  characteristics  of  the  armies 
engaged  in  it.  So  far  as  raw  material  is  concerned  he 
gives  the  palm  to  the  Russians.  They  are  obedient, 
patient  under  hardships,  dull  but  tenacious  of  impressions 
once  received,  "  little  disposed  to  reason  about  causes  and 
events,  and  therefore  very  proper  to  form  a  good  soldier." 
Their  reverence  for  their  prince  inspires  them  with  en- 
thusiasm, and  this  gives  them  an  advantage  over  the 
Austrians  whom  they  otherwise  resemble. 

The  Prussian  army,  he  says,  owes  its  victories  to  its 
facility  in  manoeuvring,  its  leader,  and  its  discipline : 
"  Should  this  spring  languish  but  for  an  instant  only,  the 
machine  itself,  being  composed  of  such  heterogeneous 
matter,  would  probably  fall  to  pieces." 

The  French  are  lively,  impulsive,  and  volatile ;  im- 
petuous and  formidable  in  attack,  but  if  repulsed  not 
easily  persuaded  to  try  again ;  "  and  as  their  vanity  will 
never  let  them  confess  they  are  in  the  wrong,  they  throw 
the  fault  on  their  leaders,  become  mutinous  and  desert." 

"  The  English  are  neither  so  lively  as  the  French  nor  so 
phlegmatic  as  the  Germans ;  they  resemble  more,  how- 
ever, the  former,  and  are  therefore  somewhat  lively  and 
impatient.  If  the  nature  of  the  English  constitution  per- 
mitted some  degree  more  of  discipline,  a  more  equal  distri- 
bution of  favours,  and  a  total  abolishment  of  buying  and 
selling  commissions,  I  think  they  would  surpass,  at  least 
equal,  any  troops  in  the  world."  - 

The  defects  here  glanced  at  were  dwelt  upon  by  Mau- 

■  Waddington,  iii.  171).  -  Lloyd,  ii.  pp.  xxxv.,  &c. 


THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY     171 

villon,  the  biographer  of  Ferdinand  of  Brunswick.  From 
the  purchase  system  it  follows,  he  says,  "  that  their  officers 
do  not  trouble  their  heads  about  the  service ;  and  under- 
stand of  it,  very  few  excepted,  absolutely  nothing  whatever, 
and  this  goes  from  the  ensign  up  to  the  general.  Their 
home  customs  incline  them  to  the  indulgences  of  life ; 
and,  nearly  without  exception,  they  all  expect  to  have 
ample  and  comfortable  means  of  sleep.  This  leads  them 
often  into  military  negligences,  which  would  sound  in- 
credible were  they  narrated  to  a  soldier.  To  all  this  is 
added  a  quiet  natural  arrogance  which  tempts  them  to 
despise  the  enemy  as  well  as  the  danger ;  and  as  they  very 
seldom  think  of  making  any  surprisal  themselves,  they 
generally  take  it  for  gi-anted  that  the  enemy  will  as  little."  ^ 
He  adds  that  they  look  down  on  their  allies  as  well  as 
their  enemy,  and  are  therefore  not  easy  to  co-operate  with. 

These  charges  are  to  some  extent  borne  out  by  British 
officers  themselves.  General  Kane  writes :  "  I  am  sorry 
to  say  that  I  have  not  known,  among  all  the  nations 
I  have  served  with,  any  officers  so  remiss  on  duty  as 
the  generality  of  our  own  countrymen ;  who  in  other 
respects,  not  only  equal,  but  in  a  great  measure  excel."  - 
General  Bland  (another  veteran  of  Marlborough's  cam- 
paigns) says:  "It  is  allowed  by  all  nations  that  the 
English  possess  courage  in  an  eminent  degree;  but  at 
the  same  time  they  accuse  us  of  the  want  of  patience, 
and  consequently  that  which  it  produces,  obedience."  ^ 

The  Duke  of  Cumberland  tried  to  raise  the  standard 
of  discipline  and  efficiency;  but  he  added  thereby  to  his 
own  unpopularity,  and  was  said  to  be  treating  the  soldiers 
"  rather  like  Germans  than  Englishmen."  He  had  an 
eye  for  men  of  merit ;  he  put  Wolfe  in  command  of  a 
battalion  when  he  was  only  twenty-three,  and  gave  him 
'  Carlyle,  ix.  147.  '-  Kane,  p.  139.  =  Bland,  p.  147. 


172  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

"particular  marks  of  his  esteem  and  confidence."  Wolfe, 
writing  to  a  friend  after  Braddock's  disaster,  said:  "I 
have  but  a  mean  opinion  of  the  infantry  in  general. 
I  know  their  discipline  to  be  bad,  and  their  valour 
precarious.  They  are  easily  put  into  disorder,  and  hard 
to  recover  out  of  it."  He  also  spoke  of  the  extreme 
ignorance  of  the  officers.  He  was  apt,  however,  to  express 
himself  strongly;  and  not  long  afterwards  we  find  him 
declaring  that  there  are  some  incomparable  battalions, 
"  the  like'of  which  cannot,  I'll  venture  to  say,  be  found 
in  any  army."  ^ 

His  own  regiment,  the  20th,  had  so  high  a  reputa- 
tion that  men  of  rank  who  wished  to  learn  soldiering 
sought  service  in  it.  It  was  one  of  the  regiments 
which  afterwards  justified  Wolfe's  statement  at  Minden 
(August  1,  1759),  while  he  was  wearing  himself  out  before 
Quebec.  "  I  have  seen  what  I  never  thought  to  be 
possible,"  wrote  the  French  commander,  Contades,  "a 
single  line  of  infantry  break  through  three  lines  of  cavalry 
ranked  in  order  of  battle,  and  tumble  them  to  ruin."- 
He  had  brought  his  army  out  into  the  plain  north  of 
Minden,  where  his  flanks  were  covered  by  a  river  and  a 
swamp ;  and  he  meant  to  strike  with  his  right  and  guard 
with  his  left.  Nearly  all  his  cavalry  (sixty-three  squad- 
rons out  of  eighty-five)  were  in  the  centre,  which  made 
an  elbow  in  his  line  of  battle.  While  his  right  still 
delayed,  his  centre  was  attacked  by  three  brigades  of 
infantry — two  British  and  one  Hanoverian — which  by 
some  misunderstanding  advanced  alone  from  the  right 
of  the  allied  army.  The  three  battalions  of  Waldegrave's 
brigade  (12th,  37th,  and  23rd)  led  in  line.  Kingsley's 
brigade  (20t.h,  51st,  and  25th)  and  the  Hanoverians 
formed  a  second   line,   in   echelon  to  right   and   left   of 

'   Wii-ht,  pp.  oil,  :!;!.■!.  -  Carlvio,  viii.  KiS. 


THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY  173 

the  leading  brigade.  They  had  to  cross  three-quarters 
of  a  mile  of  open  ground  under  the  tire  of  more  than 
sixty  guns.  "  But  notwithstanding  the  loss  they  sustained 
before  they  could  get  up  to  the  enemy,  notwithstanding 
the  repeated  attacks  of  all  the  enemy's  cavalry,  notwith- 
standing a  lire  of  musketry  well  kept  up  by  the  enemy's 
infantry,  notwithstanding  their  being  exposed  in  front 
and  flank,  such  was  the  unshaken  firmness  of  those 
troops  that  nothing  could  stop  them,  and  the  whole 
body  of  French  cavalry  was  totally  routed." ' 

As  soon  as  Prince  Ferdinand  saw  what  was  being 
done  by  the  British  and  Hanoverian  infantry,  he  moved 
forward  two  other  brigades  of  foot  in  support  of  them, 
and  sent  orders  to  Lord  George  Sackville  to  advance  with 
the  British  and  Hanoverian  cavalry  (thirty-two  squadrons) 
on  the  right  wing.  Sackville's  tardy  obedience  forfeited 
the  opportunity  of  making  the  victory  as  complete  as  that 
of  Rossbach.  The  French  retreated  with  a  loss  of  7000 
men.  The  loss  of  the  allies  was  only  2800,  but  half  of 
it  fell  on  the  six  British  battalions,  which  had  44  per 
cent,  of  their  strength  killed  or  wounded. 

"  It  is  always  the  case  that  the  longer  war  lasts  the 
more  the  infantry  deteriorates,  and  the  more  the  cavalry 
on  the  contrary  improves."  -  Such  was  Frederick's  experi- 
ence, and  it  took  him  seven  years  to  restore  his  infantry 
to  full  efficiency.  The  most  arduous  part  of  the  task 
was  to  reconstitute  and  train  the  corps  of  officers.  Under 
the  pressure  of  war  men  had  been  admitted  who  did 
not  belong  to  the  nobiUty.  These  people  were  now  got 
rid  of,  or  transferred  to  garrison  regiments;  for  though 
they  might  have  merit  and  talent,  the  king  distrusted 
their  sense  of  honour.     To   ensure  uniformity,   district 

•  Operalums  of  the  Allied  Army  under  Prince  Ferdinand,  p.  1(11. 
*  (Euvrcs,  V.  170. 


174  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

inspectors  were  appointed — eight  for  the  infantry,  four 
for  the  cavalry.  The  troops  were  not  only  drilled, 
but  practised  in  military  operations,  and  there  were 
mancEuvres  on  a  large  scale  both  in  spring  and  autumn. 

The  "  General  Principles,"  written  after  the  second 
Silesian  war,  needed  revision,  and  in  1771  Frederick 
issued  a  fresh  work  for  the  guidance  of  his  inspectors 
and  oiBcers.  The  title  of  it,  "  Elements  of  Castrame- 
tation  and  Tactics,"  indicates  the  change  in  his  pouit 
of  view.  The  first  fourteen  articles  (out  of  thirty-eight) 
are  on  the  art  of  encamping,  or  in  other  words  have 
reference  to  the  defensive.  "  In  the  warfare  of  the 
present  day  affairs  of  posts  and  artillery  combats  are 
everything,"  he  says.  Cavalry  must  be  kept  well  out 
of  the  way,  hidden  in  hollows  if  possible,  till  the 
opportunity  comes  for  it.  In  delivering  attacks  the 
bulk  of  the  army  should  be  kept  800  paces  from  the 
enemy,  that  being  the  utmost  range  of  case-shot.  A 
special  corps  of  attack  must  be  pushed  forward,  therefore, 
a  hammer  to  deal  the  first  blow.  It  may  be  preceded 
sometimes  by  light  troops,  which  are  not  much  to  be 
depended  on,  but  will  serve  to  draw  the  enemy's  fire 
and  cause  some  disorder  in  his  ranks. 

The  principles  of  fortification  and  siege  operations  were 
applied  by  Frederick  to  defence  and  attack  in  the  field,  and 
he  was  careful  to  make  the  fire  of  his  artillery  converge 
upon  the  point  of  attack.  He  had  come  to  rate  the  effect 
of  infantry  fire  and  the  advantage  of  rapid  loading  more 
highly  than  he  did  at  first  as  a  means  of  winning  battles. 
He  gave  several  examples  of  attacks  made  under  different 
conditions  of  ground.  Supposing  there  were  a  village  lying 
in  advance  of  the  enemy's  main  position,  he  formed  his 
corps  of  attack  in  columns,  allowing  plenty  of  room  for 
batteries  between  them.     He  provided  guns  and  howitzers 


THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY     175 

in  the  large  proportion  of  five  or  six  to  every  thousand 
men.  In  1759  he  had  introduced  a  hattery  of  light  six- 
pounders  with  mounted  detachments,  the  beginning  of 
horse- artillery.  Renewed  after  Kunersdorf,  and  again 
after  Maxen,  it  showed  its  value  at  Reichenbach 
(August  IG,  1762)  acting  in  concert  with  the  cavalry.^ 

The  increased  use  of  artillery  in  the  field  involved  an 
increase  in  the  number  of  horses  and  waggons,  which 
lengthened  out  columns  on  the  march,  or  caused  them 
to  use  several  roads  instead  of  one.  To  guard  them- 
selves against  surprise,  whether  in  movement  or  in 
camp,  armies  found  it  necessary  to  have  a  screen  of 
light  troops,  which  might  also  be  used  to  strike  at  the 
enemy's  line  of  operations  and  intercept  his  convoys.^ 
Thus  infantry  had  no  sooner  been  reduced  to  a  single 
type,  at  the  beginning  of  the  century,  than  it  began  to 
diverge  again  into  two  types.  These  differed  in  their 
function  and  charactei",  rather  than  in  their  equipment. 
Croatia  and  other  half-civilised  countries  on  the  Turkish 
frontier  provided  the  Austrians  with  excellent  light 
troops,  both  horse  and  foot,  of  which  Trenck's  Pandours 
were  a  conspicuous  example.  Frederick  found  them  a 
thorn  in  his  side,  as  Saxe  had  done  in  the  Nether- 
lands. He  consoled  himself  with  the  reflection  that 
they  kept  his  men  on  the  alert  and  inured  them  to 
war.  He  formed  some  light  battalions,  composed  chiefly 
of  deserters,  and  towards  the  end  of  his  reign  he  had 
three  regiments  of  light  infantry  and  a  Jilger  regiment 
of  two  battalions,  one  of  which  was  armed  with  rifles. 

Light  troops  were  at  first  raised  as  independent  com- 
panies, and  so  came  to  be  known  as  "  free  corps " ;  and 
the   name  fitted   their  loose   order  and   habits  so   well 

'  Frietlricb,  p.  202.  -  Mauvillon,  cbap  v. 


176  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

that  it  was  retained  after  they  were  formed  into  batta- 
lions. It  was  a  kind  of  soldiering  that  suited  the  French, 
and  under  the  encouragement  of  Saxe  light  troops  to  the 
number  of  about  5000  men  were  raised  and  attached  to 
his  army.  The  Grassin  regiment,  which  played  an  im- 
portant part  at  Fontenoy  and  afterwards,  consisted  of 
nine  companies  of  100  foot  and  two  squadrons  of  150 
horse.  Saxe  also  raised  a  regiment  of  mounted  scouts, 
recruited  in  Poland  and  other  parts  of  Eastern  Europe. 
For  the  foot  corps  smugglers  and  vagabonds  who  knew 
the  country  were  the  choicest  material. 

In  1759  light  companies  (chasseurs)  were  formed  for 
all  the  battalions  of  Broglie's  army  in  Germany.  It 
had  been  the  custom  to  employ  the  grenadiers  as  skir- 
mishers, but  they  were  not  well  suited  to  it,  being  the 
biggest  and  strongest  men  of  the  regiment.  It  was 
found  better  to  treat  them  as  a  reserve  for  emergencies 
or  as  a  picked  corps  for  assaults,  and  to  leave  skirmishing 
and  outpost  work  to  the  light  infantry  who  were  small 
and  active.^  Both  grenadiers  and  light  companies  were 
often  withdrawn  for  a  time  from  their  regiments,  and 
formed  into  special  battalions.  At  the  end  of  the  war 
the  French  light  companies  were  broken  up,  and  were 
replaced  by  legions  of  horse  and  foot  mixed,  about  400 
strong;  but  in  1776  the  light  companies  were  restored 
to  the  battalions.  A  few  years  afterwards  several  batta- 
lions of  chasseurs_^^ied  were  raised,  attached  at  first  to 
the  chasseurs  a  cheval,  but  soon  separated  from  them. 

In  the  British  army  the  evolution  of  light  troops 
took  a  course  of  its  own.  Independent  companies  of 
Highlanders  had  been  raised  in  the  early  part  of  the 
century  to  keep  the  Jacobites  in  check.  In  1739  some 
of  them  were  brought  together  to  form  the  first  Highland 
'  Rochambeau,  i.  130, 


THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY  177 

regiment,  the  Black  Watch ;  and  at  the  beginning  of  the 
Seven  Years'  war  other  regiments  of  Highlanders  were 
raised  for  service  in  America.  The  Royal  Americans 
(afterwards  the  60th  Rifles)  was  raised  at  the  same  time, 
mainly  from  foreigners  in  Pennsylvania;  and  Bouquet, 
a  Swiss  who  commanded  one  of  its  battalions,  was  one 
of  the  first  men  to  recognise  that  light  infantry  was 
needed  for  American  warfare,  and  that  hints  must  be 
taken  from  backwoodsmen  and  Red  Indians.  Lord  Howe 
shared  and  developed  these  views,  and  in  the  expedi- 
tions against  Louisburg  and  Quebec  small  corps  of  light 
infantry  drawn  from  the  line  battalions  played  a  leading 
part.  There  was  also  a  separate  light  battalion  (Gage's) 
raised  in  America,  and  another  (Morgan's)  was  raised  in 
Ireland  for  service  in  Germany.  Towards  the  end  of  the 
war  the  light  troops  in  Ferdinand's  army  rose  to  8000, 
or  10  per  cent,  of  its  strength.^  Light  companies  were 
formed  by  regiments  serving  at  home,  and  were  sent  on 
active  service.  A  few  years  afterwards  (in  1771)  the 
normal  peace  establishment  of  infantry  battalions  was 
augmented  by  a  light  company,  which  henceforth  paired 
off  with  the  gi-enadier  company.- 

Along  with  these  tendencies  in  the  direction  of  a 
looser  order  of  fighting  for  infantry  there  were  other 
tendencies  in  the  opposite  direction.  After  the  Seven 
Years'  war,  the  Prussian  manoeuvres  were  attended  by 
many  officers  from  other  countries,  eager  to  learn  the 
secret  of  the  Prussian  victories.  "  Old  Frederick  laughed 
in  his  sleeve,"  says  Napoleon,  "at  the  parades  of  Pots- 
dam, when  he  perceived  young  officers,  French,  English, 
and  Austrian,  so  infatuated  with  the  manoeuvre  of  the 
oblique  order,  which  was  fit  for  nothing  but  to  gain  a 

'  Dundas,  p.  265.  '  Davis,  iii.  Ill,  163. 

M 


1 78  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

few  adjutant-majors  a  reputation."!  But  Frederick  seems 
to  have  bad  more  faitli  in  mechanism  than  Napoleon 
had.  His  inspections  were  formidable  ordeals,  and  bis 
generals,  anxious  to  win  praise  or  escape  blame,  vied 
with  one  another  in  complicated  evolutions.  The  art 
of  drill  came  to  be  taken  for  the  art  of  war. 

Foreign  officers  were  the  more  disposed  to  lay  stress 
upon  it  because  they  saw  so  much  else  to  disapprove  of 
in  the  Prussian  army.  The  large  proportion  of  foreigners, 
the  harsh  discipline,  the  scanty  pay  and  food  of  the  men, 
their  bad  quarters  and  indifferent  equipment — all  results 
of  the  endeavour  to  maintain  an  army  out  of  proportion 
to  the  resources  of  the  country — were  in  striking  contrast 
with  the  past  achievements  of  the  troops  and  with  their 
beautiful  manoeuvring.  Other  armies,  if  they  could  only 
learn  this  art,  would  be  much  better  than  the  Prussian. 

"The  first  principle  of  the  Prussian  system  is  sub- 
ordination, and  the  first  maxim  '  not  to  reason  but  to 
obey.'  The  effects  of  these  are  attention,  alertness,  pre- 
cision, and  every  executive  quality  in  the  officers,  which, 
assisted  by  the  constant  exercise  of  the  soldiers  upon 
the  soundest  principles  of  tactics,  enable  the  troops  to 
practise  with  wonderful  ease  and  exactness  manoeuvres 
that  others  hardly  admit  in  theory."  So  wrote  an  acute 
observer,  Burgoyne^  (of  Saratoga  fame);  at  the  same 
time  he  pointed  out  that  it  was  necessity,  not  choice, 
that  had  led  the  King  of  Prussia  to  reduce  his  men  "  as 
nearly  as  possible  to  mere  machinery,"  and  that  while 
the  system  produced  excellent  sergeants  and  subalterns, 
its  effect  was  bad  on  the  higher  officers,  who  needed 
"  other  qualifications  than  those  of  mere  execution." 
The  disasters  of  Maxen  (1759)  and  Landshut  (1760) 
are  illustrations  in  point. 

>  Napoleon,  xxxii.  243,  -  Fonblanque,  pp.  62,  &c. 


THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTUIIY  179 

The  Prussian  evolutions,  as  elaborated  by  Saldern,  were 
presented  in  an  English  dress  by  Colonel  (afterwards  Sir 
David)  Dundas  in  his  "  Principles  of  Military  Movements," 
which  formed  the  basis  of  the  Field  Exercise  of  the  Infantry 
issued  by  authority  in  1792.  Up  to  this  time  there  had 
been  no  uniformity  in  battalion  movements ;  each  regi- 
ment had  its  own  method :  "  Hence  (as  Wolfe  wrote  in 
1758)  the  variety  of  steps  in  our  infantry  and  the  feeble- 
ness and  disorderly  floating  of  our  lines."  ^  The  change 
was  much  needed,  but  was  not  an  unmixed  benefit. 
Capricious  variety  was  replaced  by  servile  adherence,  and 
in  a  few  years  Moore  was  complaining  of  "  those  damned 
eighteen  manoeuvres."  -  It  was  a  principal  aim  of  Dundas 
to  correct  the  "  independent  ideas  "  of  light  infantry,  which 
had  come  increasingly  into  fashion  owing  to  the  war  of 
American  Independence.  He  held  that  their  modes  of 
fighting  "  are  certainly  not  calculated  either  to  attack  or 
repulse  a  determined  enemy,  but  only  to  annoy  a  timid 
and  irregular  one " ;  and  he  doubted  the  expediency  of 
light  companies  in  battalions.^ 

In  France,  German  fashions  had  already  begun  to  pre- 
vail before  the  middle  of  the  century.  They  were  first 
introduced  for  the  German  troops  in  French  pay,  Saxe 
setting  the  example,  and  soon  spread  to  the  French  regi- 
ments. In  the  matter  of  uniform,  says  General  Susane, 
"  folds,  facings,  pockets,  and  lining  were  reduced  to  fictions 
indicated  by  a  piping.  About  the  same  time  and  for  the 
same  reasons  we  borrowed  from  Germany  cross-belts 
which  compressed  the  chest,  but  had  the  advantage  of 
throwing  the  sword  to  the  rear  to  knock  against  the  calves, 
and  the  cartridge-box  to  quarrel  with  the  havresac ;  long 
gaiters,  which  squeezed  the  legs  and  stopped  the  circu- 
lation in  that  useful  member  of  the  foot-soldier ;  stocks, 

•  Wright,  p.  418.  *  Buubury,  p.  46.  "■  Dundas,  p.  14. 


i8o  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

which  forced  him  to  keep  his  head  up,  even  with  the  sun 
in  his  eyes,  and  their  corollary,  the  shako,  which  has  to 
be  balanced ;  curl-papers  for  the  hair  and  tight  queues. 
The  soldier  was  uncomfortable,  it  is  true,  but  he  was 
sinart."^  His  toilette  was  said  to  take  him  three  hours 
a  day.2 

This  style  of  dress,  and  the  precision  of  drill  which  went 
along  with  it,  were  uncongenial  to  the  French  soldier,  and 
were  largely  due  to  the  wish  to  make  a  good  show  at 
reviews.  But  for  accuracy  of  movement  and  for  the 
maximum  of  fire  effect  it  was  necessary  that  files  should 
touch :  and  it  was  impossible  to  reduce  them  from  3  feet 
to  1  foot  9  inches  Avithout  alteration  of  clothing  and 
equipment.  The  changes  marked  a  stage  in  the  develop- 
ment of  linear  tactics.  German  methods  of  discipline 
were  also  borrowed,  but  in  this  as  in  other  matters  there 
was  no  uniformity ;  colonels  of  regiments  were  allowed 
great  freedom. 

The  work  done  liy  Dundas  for  England  was  done  for 
France  by  Guibert,  whose  Essai  gendral  de  tadique  was 
first  published  in  1770.  He  was  then  only  twenty-seven, 
but  he  had  seen  something  of  the  Seven  Years'  war  as  a 
boy,  his  father  having  been  chief  staff-officer  to  Marshal 
Broglie,  and  at  one  time  a  prisoner  with  the  Prussians. 
An  ardent  admirer  of  Frederick,  whom  he  ranked  even 
higher  than  Giesar,  he  found  much  to  criticise  in  the 
Prussian  army.  Even  its  boasted  rapidity  of  fire  was  only 
obtained  at  the  expense  of  good  shooting,  to  which  much 
more  attention  ought  to  be  paid.  In  engagements  with 
infantry  he  preferred  file-firing  to  volleys ;  but  troops 
advancing  with  fixed  bayonets  should  not  fire  at  all. 

The  two  features  of  Frederick's  system  which  Guibert 
particularly   admired   and    recommended  were    (1)    the 
1  Susane,  i.  236.  -  Guibert,  i.  161. 


THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY     i8i 

oblique  order,  including  all  dispositions  which  enabled  an 
army  to  deliver  its  attack  at  one  or  more  points,  without 
exposing  itself  to  attack  at  other  points ;  (2)  the  close 
column  of  mana-uvre,  which  Frederick  had  latterly  adopted 
as  the  most  effective  means  of  applying  the  oblique  order. 
This  method  of  "  ployment "  and  "  deployment "  Guibert 
(like  Dundas)  regarded  as  the  great  modern  discovery, 
much  handier  and  more  expeditious  than  the  older 
method  of  breaking  into  open  column  from  line,  maintain- 
ing distance  on  the  march,  and  then  wheeling  back  into 
line.  To  give  it  full  scope  he  would  disregard  inversion, 
and  let  companies  and  battalions  form  up  in  any  order 
that  might  be  most  convenient. 

He  allowed  that  columns  should  be  used  in  certain 
cases,  not  only  for  manoeuvre,  but  for  attack,  e.g.  in  the 
attack  of  posts,  or  where  the  ground  did  not  admit  of 
advance  on  a  wide  front;  but  under  ordinary  circum- 
stances the  three-deep  line  should  be  regarded  as  the  true 
fighting  formation.  This  was  in  accordance  with  the 
existing  practice,  and  with  the  prevailing  sense  of  the 
best  French  officers.  The  regulations  issued  in  1776, 
after  three  years  of  preparation  and  experiment,  were 
based  generally  on  linear  tactics,  but  included  (as  previous 
regulations  had  done)  the  formation  of  columns  of  attack 
for  use  in  special  cases.  These  were  columns  of  platoons 
or  divisions  (one-eighth  or  one-fourth  of  a  battalion)  ac- 
cording as  they  consisted  of  one  or  two  battalions. 

There  were  many,  however,  who  still  shared  the  opinion 
of  Folard  and  of  Saxe,  that  a  deep  order  was  better  suited 
to  French  soldiers  than  a  shallow  order,  and  that  the 
column  should  be  the  normal,  not  merely  the  occasional, 
fighting  formation.  This  view  found  an  indefatigable  advo- 
cate in  Menil-Durand,  an  otKcer  of  engineers,  described 
by  Rochambeau  as  "a  great   geometrician  but    a   very 


1 82  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

mediocre  tactician."  ^  His  first  scheme,  brought  forward 
ia  1755,  was  based  on  plesions  (or  oblongs)  of  thirty-two 
ranks  and  twenty-four  files,  drawn  up  chequerwise ;  and, 
like  Folard,  he  proposed  to  arm  some  of  the  men  on  the 
front  and  flanks  with  short  pikes  or  partizans.  In  1774 
he  presented  his  system  in  a  modified  form,  dropping  his 
Greek  and  Latin  names,  and  accommodating  himself  to 
the  battalion  organisation.  This  gave  him  a  column 
of  twenty-four  ranks  and  sixteen  files.  The  battalion 
columns  were  to  be  in  pairs  side  by  side;  they  were  to 
advance  without  firing,  but  were  to  have  a  screen  of  skir- 
mishers in  front  of  them,  formed  by  their  grenadiers  and 
chasseurs.  Only  when  some  obstacle  prevented  their 
coming  to  close  quarters  with  the  enemy  should  they 
deploy  into  line  and  have  recourse  to  fire. 

Menil-Durand  found  a  powerful  patron  in  Marshal 
Broglie,  who  had  won  more  credit  in  the  Seven  Years' 
war  than  any  other  French  commander,  and  had  made 
good  use  of  columns  of  attack  at  Bergen  and  elsewhere. 
By  his  influence  a  comparative  trial  took  place  at  a  camp 
near  Bayeux,  in  1778.  The  marshal  himself  directed  the 
operations  of  the  troops  manoeuvring  on  the  new  system, 
while  Rochambeau  commanded  the  infantry  of  the  oppo- 
site force,  which  was  to  conform  to  the  Regulations  of 
1776.-  The  general  opinion  pronounced  in  favour  of 
Rochambeau,  who,  according  to  Guibert,  showed  that 
"the  modern  system  of  tactics  is  susceptible  of  every- 
thing, adapts  itself  to  everything,  employs  columns  when 
they  are  needed — and  columns  simpler  than  those  of  M. 
de  Menil-Durand — combines  them,  and  intermixes  them 
with  deployed  battalions,  supports  a  line  with  them,  &c."  * 

The  result  was  that  the  Regulations  of  1776  remained 

'  Kochambeau,  i.  226.  -  lb.,  225-232. 

■'  Guibert,  iii.  212. 


THE   EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY  1S3 

unchanged.  They  were  practically  reproduced  in  the 
Regulations  of  1791,  which  continued  in  force  through- 
out the  wars  of  the  Republic  and  Empire,'  and  which  were 
mainly  the  work  of  Guibert.  But  his  victory  over  Menil- 
Durand  was  the  victory  of  common  sense  over  exaggera- 
tion, rather  than  that  of  the  ordre  mince  over  the  oi'dre 
profonde. 

In  his  Defense  du  syf<t(Sme  de  guerre  moderne  (1779) 
Guibert  took  care  to  recognise  the  value  of  the  column 
as  a  fighting  formation  in  combination  with  luie.  Some- 
times the  attacking  battalions  should  be  alternately  in 
column  and  deployed,  sometimes  the  deployed  battalions 
should  support  the  columns,  sometimes  they  should  be 
supported  by  them ;  there  should  be  no  universal  and 
exclusive  method.  Columns  have  the  advantage  of  de- 
livering a  rapid  succession  of  strokes  at  a  particular  point. 
Their  density  gives  confidence  to  the  men  themselves,  and 
intimidates  the  enemy.  Their  narrow  front  may  enable 
them  to  find  a  line  of  approach  where  they  will  escape 
much  loss  by  the  enemy's  fire. 

"  Such  are  the  advantages  of  the  column ;  but  it  has 
also  undoubtedly  some  inconveniences.  It  is  subject  to 
undulation,  tumult,  and  disorder.  If  its  flanks  come 
under  a  brisk  fire,  if  it  does  not  surmount  the  obstacles 
m  its  path  at  the  first  efibrt,  the  men  close  up  and  press 
one  on  another,  the  ranks  become  mixed,  the  officers 
cannot  make  themselves  heard,  the  mass  sways,  scatters, 
and  cannot  be  rallied  except  a  long  way  off,  and  then 
not  as  a  column."  '^ 

Even  if  it  carries  the  point  attacked,  it  is  not  in 
much  better  case,  for  it  becomes  so  disordered  that  it 
may  be  driven  out  again,  as  happened  several  times  at 
Neerwinden  (1693). 

»  Duruy,  A.,  p.  250.  ^  Guibert,  iii.  250. 


1 84  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

As  to  the  appeal  made  to  the  national  vanity  by 
Menil-Durand,  in  giving  the  title  of  ordre  frangais  to 
his  system,  Guibert  spoke  out  with  wholesome  plainness. 
Frenchmen  are  not  the  only  people  to  whom  attack  is 
congenial:  if  they  were  the  assailants  at  Crecy  and 
Poitiers,  they  were  the  assailed  at  Blenheim  and  Minden. 
If  no  nation  has  such  capacity  for  a  first  effort  as  the 
French,  none  is  more  easily  discoui'aged  or  more  im- 
pressionable ;  none  has  lost  so  many  battles  by  want  of 
discipline,  or  lost  them  so  completely.  It  is  less  impor- 
tant to  have  an  order  which  will  favour  the  strong  points 
of  the  national  character,  than  to  have  one  which  will 
counteract  its  i 


The  Prussian  achievements  had  shown,  perhaps  more 
forcibly  than  ever  before,  how  large  a  part  discipline 
plays  in  military  success.  The  armies  of  the  French 
RepubHc  were  soon  to  remind  the  world  that  there  are 
other  factors  to  be  taken  into  account ;  and  the  war  of 
American  Independence  taught  the  same  lesson. 

It  was  regarded  as  sound  and  wholesome  doctrine, 
on  which  the  authority  of  all  governments  hinged,  that 
"  trained  troops  are  invincible  against  any  number  or  any 
position  of  undisciplined  rabble."^  So  thought  General 
Burgoyne  when  he  went  to  America;  but  he  began  to 
feel  misgivings  after  watching  the  action  at  Bunker  Hill 
(June  17,  1775).  He  wrote:  "The  defence  was  well  con- 
ceived and  obstinately  maintained ;  the  retreat  was  no 
flight :  it  was  even  covered  with  bravery  and  military 
skill,  and  proceeded  no  farther  than  to  the  next  hill, 
where  a  new  post  was  taken."  ^  Two  thousand  British 
infantry  succeeded  in  dislodging  some  4000  New  England 

1  Guibert,  iii.  211),  &c.  -  Fonblanqnc,  p.  1!)3. 

^  lb.,  pp.  142,  &c. 


THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY  185 

militia  from  intrenchments  thrown  up  in  the  night ;  but 
only  after  two  failures,  and  with  a  loss  of  half  their 
number,  killed  or  wounded.  The  militiamen  were  with- 
out bayonets,  and  their  ammunition  ran  short. 

The  impression  made  on  the  British  was  such  that 
in  the  following  March,  when  the  Americans  had  thrown 
up  batteries  on  Dorchester  heights  to  cannonade  Boston, 
Howe  thought  it  better  to  hasten  his  evacuation  of  the 
city  than  to  attempt  to  storm  the  works.  In  his  sub- 
sequent operations  he  showed  that  he  had  passed  from 
undue  confidence  to  excessive  caution.  The  command 
of  the  sea  gave  the  British  troops  a  great  advantage  for 
operations  near  the  coast,  and  in  open  country  their 
superiority  was  well-marked.  The  victories  of  Camden 
(August  IG,  1780)  and  Guilford  (March  15,  1781)  were 
won  by  Cornwallis  agamst  odds  of  two  to  one.  But  in 
wooded  country  the  case  was  different. 

In  some  "Reflections  upon  the  War  in  America" 
Burgoyne  wrote :  "  It  is  not  to  be  expected  that  the 
rebel  Americans  will  risk  a  general  combat  or  a  pitched 
battle,  or  even  stand  at  all,  except  behind  intrenchments 
:vs  at  Boston.  Accustomed  to  felling  of  timber  and  to 
grubbing  up  trees,  they  are  very  ready  at  earthworks 
and  palisading,  and  will  cover  and  intrench  themselves 
wherever  they  are  for  a  short  time  left  unmolested  with 
surprising  alacrity.  .  .  .  Composed  as  the  American  army 
is,  together  with  the  strength  of  the  country,  full  of 
woods,  swamps,  stone  walls,  and  other  inclosures  and 
hiding-places,  it  may  be  said  of  it  that  every  private  man 
will  in  action  be  his  own  general,  who  will  tui-n  every 
tree  and  bush  into  a  kind  of  temporary  fortress,  from 
whence,  when  he  hath  fired  his  shot  with  all  the  delibera- 
tion, coolness,  and  certainty  which  hidden  safety  inspires, 
he  will  skip  as  it  were  to  the  next,  and  so  on  for  a  long 


1 86  THE    HISTORY    OF    INFANTRY 

time  till  dislodged  either   by  cannon   or  by  a   resolute 
attack  of  light  infantry."  ^ 

Eighteen  months  afterwards  he  himself  fell  a  victim 
to  such  tactics,  and  was  forced  to  surrender  at  Saratoga 
(October  12,  1777).  That  disaster  brought  France  into 
the  field  as  the  ally  of  the  Americans,  and  practically 
settled  the  issue  of  the  war,  though  it  lasted  four  years 
longer. 

At  the  end .  of  that  time  the  American  troops  were 
of  very  different  quality  from  what  they  were  at  first. 
The  provincial  militia  sometimes  drove  Washington  to 
despair.  "To  lean  on  the  militia,"  he  wrote,  "is  to  lean 
on  a  broken  reed.  Being  familiar  with  the  use  of  the 
musket  they  will  fight  under  cover,  but  they  will  not 
attack  or  stand  in  the  open  field."  They  came  and 
went  according  to  their  pleasure,  or  the  exigencies  of 
their  farms:  "There  is  not  time  to  drill  the  men  before 
they  are  gone,  and  discipline  is  impossible  because  if  it 
was  enforced  they  would  go."  With  difficulty  Washing- 
ton persuaded  Congress  to  enlist  men  for  the  battahons 
of  "  the  continental  army "  with  the  obligation  to  serve 
till  the  end  of  the  war,  and  to  let  him  appoint  the 
regimental  officers,  who  were  at  first  elected  by  their 
men.  Even  then  he  found  it  necessary  to  take  the 
men  on  their  own  terms;  and  the  total  number  of 
soldiers  enlisted  durmg  the  war  (230,000)  was  nearly 
ten  times  the  average  strength  of  the  army,  so  that  it 
was  practically  renewed  annually.  The  "  continental " 
battalions,  however,  became  very  superior  to  the  militia 
in  steadiness  and  discipline,  and  some  excellent  officers, 
such  as  Nathaniel  Greene,  rose  to  high  command. 
Foreign  officers,  especially  Baron  Steuben,  a  Prussian 
veteran,  served  as  drill  instructors.^ 

'  Fonblanque,  p.  209.  "  Greene,  pp.  286-292. 


THE    EIGHTEENTH    CENTURY  187 

The  influence  of  American  warfare  in  developing 
light  mfantry  in  the  British  army  has  been  already 
mentioned.  It  also  introduced  the  practice  of  forming 
line  with  two  ranks  instead  of  three.  Many  officers 
disapproved  of  this.  General  Clinton  thought  disasters 
such  as  that  of  Tarleton  at  Cowpens  (January  17,  1781) 
were  to  be  expected  from  "our  flimsy  order  of  two 
deep  and  open  files."  ^  Dundas  says  (in  1788) :  "  The 
method  almost  universally  adopted  in  our  infantry,  and 
in  ours  only,  of  forming  two  deep,  and  at  open  files  .  .  . 
was  not  produced  by  the  experience  of  the  German 
war,  but  by  that  of  the  first  American.  The  desultory 
service  there  carried  on  by  small  bodies  of  men,  and 
the  then  deficiency  of  movement  and  want  of  flexibility 
in  our  solid  battalions,  made  us  run  into  the  other 
extreme,  and  first  introduced  it  as  proper  for  that 
country;  review  appearance  continued  it;  and  the  new 
military  modes,  brought  into  fashion  by  the  light  in- 
fantry, have  tended  to  make  it  the  prevalent  order  of 
the  service."-  He  held  that  a  two-deep  line  was  incon- 
veniently long  if  the  force  was  considerable,  that  it  was 
unfit  to  cross  bayonets  with  a  line  formed  three  deep, 
or  to  resist  the  attack  of  determined  cavalry,  and  that 
it  would  soon  be  reduced  to  single  rank  in  action.  It 
was  not  till  1824  that  the  two-deep  formation  was 
ofiicially  adopted  in  the  field  exercise  as  the  normal 
formation  for  British  infantry,  though  it  had  been 
habitually  used  in  the  Peninsula. 

'  Clinton- Cormaallis  Controversy,  i.  320. 
2  Dundas,  p.  53. 


VIII 

THE  FRENCH  REVOLUTION  (1792-1815) 

"  They  will  be  beat ;  they  want  discipline ;  they  have  no 
subordination:"  such  was  the  prediction  which  Arthur 
Young  heard  on  all  sides  when  the  French  declared  war 
against  Austria  m  April  1792.  He  was  unwilling  himself 
to  play  the  prophet,  but  "  thus  much  I  may  venture,  that 
the  expectation  of  destruction  to  France  has  many  diffi- 
culties to  encounter.  Give  all  you  please  to  power  of  field 
evolution,  depending  on  the  utmost  strictness  of  discipline 
— you  nuist  admit  that  it  bears  only  on  the  question  of 
battles.  But  guarded  as  France  is,  by  the  most  important 
fortresses  the  world  knows,  why  hazard  battles  ? .  .  .  Oil 
and  vinegar,  fire  and  water,  Prussians  and  Austrians,  are 
united  to  carry  war  among  twenty-six  millions  of  men, 
arranged  behind  one  hundred  of  the  strongest  fortresses  in 
the  world."  ^  He  came  to  the  conclusion  that  if  these 
people  cared  for  freedom,  as  they  seemed  to  do,  and  were 
but  tolerably  united,  the  attack  would  be  full  of  diffi- 
culties. Even  he  did  not  dream,  however,  that  before 
the  end  of  the  year  the  invasion  would  be  repelled,  the 
Austrians  would  be  driven  out  of  their  own  Netherlands, 
and  the  French  be  masters  of  Mayence. 

To  a  professional  eye  the  French  army  was  in  a  deplor- 
able state  at  this  time.  As  Trochu  has  said,  the  French 
are  a  warhke  rather  than  a  military  people,  and  discipline 
had  always  been  slack.     There  had  been  little  sympathy 

'  Young,  p.  35tj. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION  189 

between  officers  and  men,  drawn  as  they  were  from  widely 
different  classes;  and  the  progress  of  the  Revolution  had 
increased  their  alienation.  In  May  1791  the  National 
Assembly  authorised  the  soldiers  to  attend  meetmgs  of 
the  patriotic  clubs,  where  they  were  incited  against  their 
officers:  and  in  August  it  decided  that  half  the  vacancies 
caused  by  the  resignation  of  officers  should  be  filled  by  the 
promotion  of  under-officers.^  This  gave  a  fresh  spur  to 
intrigue  and  insubordination,  and  by  the  time  war  began 
two-thirds  of  the  officers  had  emigrated.  The  ranks  also 
were  thinned ;  for  many  men  deserted  from  the  regular 
corps  to  join  the  national  guards  or  the  volunteers,  and 
recruits  were  hardly  to  be  had.  In  June  1792  the  regular 
troops  numbered  less  than  180,000  men,  and  not  more 
than  half  of  them  were  available  for  the  field  armies. 

The  national  guards,  started  at  Paris  in  1789,  had 
spread  over  the  whole  country,  and  had  superseded  the 
provincial  militia.  They  were  enrolled  for  local  duty 
only,  but  in  1791  the  Assembly  called  upon  them  to 
furnish  101,000  volunteers  as  a  reinforcement  for  the 
armies  on  the  frontiers.  These  volunteers  formed  separate 
battalions,  and  were  allowed  to  choose  their  own  officers. 
The  generals  complained  that  they  were  apt  to  choose 
intriguers,  talkers,  and  drinkers,  rather  than  men  of 
capacity;  but  at  all  events  among  those  chosen  were 
Davout,  Jourdan,  Lecourbe,  Marceau,  Massena,  Oudinot, 
Pichegru,  and  Victor,  who  had  served  in  the  regular 
army.  Others,  such  as  Lannes,  Moreau,  St.  Cyr,  and 
Suchet,  had  had  little  if  any  military  training,  but  soon 
showed  their  fitness  for  command.  Not  only  patriotism 
and  warlike  ardour,  but  ambition  and  "  la  carriei-e  ouverte 
aux  talens,"  drew  young  men  from  the  civil  professions. 

But  whether  the  choice  was  good  or  bad,  the  system 

'  The  old  name,  bas-ojicicrs,  had  been  changed  into  tous-officicrs. 


I90  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

made  it  diftlcult  for  the  officers  to  exert  any  authority, 
especially  as  they  had  practically  no  means  of  punish- 
ment, and  the  ruling  powers  in  Paris  encouraged  insub- 
ordination. It  was  the  duty  of  the  Departments  to  clothe 
and  equip  their  volunteers,  but  the  duty  was  very  imper- 
fectly performed ;  the  men  joined  the  armies  destitute 
and  pillaged  freely. 

Rochambeau,  who  commanded  the  army  of  the  north, 
protested  against  offensive  operations  with  such  troops 
until  they  had  had  some  training  in  field  service,  and 
wished  to  assemble  them  in  intrenched  camps.  He  was 
overruled,  and  on  April  29  two  corps  were  sent  across  the 
frontier :  one  directed  on  Tournay,  the  other  on  Mons. 
They  were  to  encourage  the  Belgians  to  rise,  and  to  divert 
attention  from  the  advance  of  La  Fayette  on  Namur. 
As'soon  as  they  came  in  contact  with  the  enemy  they  fell 
into  confusion,  and  fled  back  in  panic  to  Lille  and  Valen- 
ciennes. At  Lille  they  killed  their  commander,  Dillon, 
and  they  tried  to  do  the  same  to  Bu-on  at  Valenciennes. 
The  men  who  behaved  worst  on  this  occasion  were  dragoons 
of  the  regular  army. 

Dumouriez,  at  that  time  minister  for  foreign  affairs, 
was  chiefly  responsible  for  this  abortive  offensive.  He 
was  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  army  of  the  north 
just  before  the  Austro-Prussian  army  of  invasion  crossed 
the  French  frontier  near  Longwy  (August  19).  It  was 
very  reluctantly  that  he  gave  up  his  plan  of  carrying 
liberty  into  the  Belgian  provinces,  to  go  to  meet  the 
allies  in  the  Argonne,  and  adopt  a  trivte  defensive.  His 
ability  and  resolution,  coupled  with  Brunswick's  caution, 
brought  the  invasion  to  an  end  in  the  cannonade  of  Valmy 
(September  20,  1792),  and  turned  it  into  a  disastrous  re- 
treat. The  numbers  were  about  equal.  The  quahty  of  the 
French  troops  was  not  severely  tested,  but  at  all  events 


THE  FRENCH  REVOLUTION  191 

they  faced  the  renowned  soldiers  of  Prussia  with  so  good 
a  countenance  that  the  attack  was  not  driven  home. 

In  July  the  Assembly  had  declared  the  country  in 
danger,  and  the  generals  were  allowed  to  requisition  the 
Departments  for  the  men  necessary  to  keep  up  the 
numbers  of  their  troops.  Recruits  were  much  needed, 
for  the  volunteers  were  free  to  leave  at  the  end  of  each 
campaign  if  they  had  given  two  months'  notice  to  their 
captains.^  But  the  new  recruits — volontaires  for^s  as 
they  called  themselves— had  neither  the  ardour  nor  the 
physical  fitness  of  the  volunteers  of  1791.  Substitutes 
were  allowed,  with  the  result  (as  Carnot  reported)  that 
men  who  had  sold  themselves  like  cattle  made  a  trade  of 
deserting  and  re-enlisting,  and  that  able-bodied  persons 
were  replaced  by  cripples  and  bad  characters.  If  such 
men  were  destitute,  as  they  mostly  were,  it  was  usually 
because  they  had  sold  their  arms  and  clothes.  Arms, 
indeed,  were  so  scarce  that  at  one  time  the  war  minister, 
Scrvan,  suggested  that  two  ranks  should  be  armed  with 
pikes  and  the  other  two  with  fowling-pieces.  Biron,  who 
commanded  in  Alsace,  wrote  (September  9) :  "  I  am  told 
that  you  mean  to  withdraw  from  the  army  of  the  Rhine 
nearly  all  the  troops  of  the  line,  and  to  replace  them  by 
twice  as  many  national  volunteers;  this  is  simply  to 
deprive  me  of  all  means  of  defence  while  doubling  the 
means  of  consumption."  - 

As  soon  as  Brunswick's  army  began  its  retreat  from 
Champagne,  Dumouriez  recurred  to  his  plan  of  invading 
the  Netherlands.  He  had  70,000  men,  nearly  three  times 
the  number  of  the  Austrian  troops  there,  and  he  arranged 
to  advance  simultaneously  on  Tournay,  Mens,  Charleroi, 
and  Namur.  To  those  who  advised  him  to  follow  the 
example  of  Turenne  and  Saxe,  and  have  one  siege  army 

'  Rousset,  Let  Vdontaires,  p.  27.  '  Rousset,  p.  100. 


192  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

and  one  covering  army,  he  replied :  "  We  are  not  making 
war  in  the  old  fashion ;  Belgium  is  waiting  for  me ;  I  am 
sure  of  six  provinces  out  of  ten,  and  the  inhabitants  will 
arm  at  my  approach ;  there  is  no  reason  to  be  afraid  of 
penetrating  by  four  points  at  once ;  the  more  points  the 
Austrians  occupy,  the  more  impossible  becomes  their 
defence."  ^ 

His  tactics  corresponded  to  his  strategy.  At  Jemappes 
(November  6,  1792)  the  Austrians  were  strongly  posted; 
but  they  numbered  only  13,000,  while  Dumouriez  had 
40,000.  He  had  twice  as  many  guns  as  they  had,  and 
his  guns  included  horse  artillery,  which  had  been  lately 
introduced  into  the  French  service.  He  attacked  on  both 
flanks,  as  well  as  in  front.  His  artillery,  distributed  over 
an  arc  of  ITiO",  helped  him  by  the  convergence  of  its  fire. 
Of  his  infantry  about  one-third  were  regulars,  and  as  a 
rule  one  battaHon  of  the  line  was  brigaded  with  two 
battahons  of  volunteers.  Whole  battalions  were  thrown 
forward  as  skirmishers,  supported  by  light  cavalry ;  they 
swarmed  round  the  Austrian  works,  and  drove  the 
gunners  from  their  guns  by  a  rain  of  bullets.  The 
attacking  troops  showed  some  unsteadiness,  and  lost 
heart  at  times ;  but  they  responded  to  the  appeals  made 
to  them,  and  the  battle  was  won.  It  carried  with  it  the 
conquest  of  Belgium,  encouraged  the  troops,  and  raised 
their  reputation  both  at  home  and  abroad. 

So  many  of  the  volunteers  availed  themselves  of  their 
right  to  go  home  at  the  end  of  the  campaign,  that  the 
French  army  in  the  Netherlands  was  reduced  to  half  its 
strength,  just  at  the  time  when  England  and  Holland 
were  added  to  the  enemies  with  which  it  had  to  reckon. 
Dumouriez  was  bent,  nevertheless,  on  invading  and  revo- 
lutionismg  the  Dutch  provinces,  where  he  hoped  to  find 

'  Chuquet,  Jemappes,  p.  74. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION  193 

the  supplies  which  he  was  unable  to  draw  from  France. 
But  the  advance  of  the  Austrians  from  the  lower  Rhine 
interfered  with  his  projects.  He  was  obliged  to  go  to 
meet  them,  and  a  battle  was  fought  at  Neerwinden  (March 
18,  1793).  This  time  the  numbers  were  nearly  equal. 
The  French  had  gone  through  great  hardships,  and  had 
lost  much  of  their  ardour.  They  were  short  of  officers, 
and  would  not  obey  those  they  had.  The  want  of  a 
trained  staff  was  especially  felt.  They  were  beaten,  and 
Belgium  was  lost  as  quickly  as  it  had  been  won.  Du- 
mouriez,  who  had  been  for  some  months  at  open  war  with 
the  Jacobins  in  Paris,  saved  his  head  from  the  guillotine 
by  deserting  to  the  enemy. 

In  1793  the  French  Republic  had  to  deal  with  foreign 
enemies  on  all  its  frontiers,  and  with  insurgents  in  La 
Vendee  and  the  south.  But  it  was  on  the  northern 
frontier  that  the  danger  was  greatest.  By  midsummer 
the  allies,  75,000  strong,  were  besieging  Conde  and  Valen- 
ciennes. The  French  army  numbered  only  40,000  ;  and 
its  new  commander,  Custine,  though  a  man  of  energy  and 
ambition,  found  it  necessary  to  improve  its  organisation 
and  discipline  before  attempting  operations.  In  this  work 
he  was  thwarted  by  the  war  minister,  Bouchotte,  the 
creature  of  the  Paris  Commune.  The  Pere  Duchesne 
lampoons  were  distributed  throughout  the  army,  denounc- 
ing all  aristocrats  and  Custine  in  particular.  Some  bat- 
talions tore  them  up,  declaring  that  "  Custine  was  a  brave 
man,  and  these  insults  could  only  serve  to  destroy  the 
confidence  which  the  army  had  in  its  general."  ^  The  fall 
of  Conde  (July  12),  without  any  attempt  having  been 
made  to  relieve  it,  gave  his  enemies  their  opportunity ; 
Custine  was  summoned  to  Paris  and  guillotined,  to  the 
regret  of  such  men  as  Davout  and  St.  Cyr. 

'  Rousset,  p.  217. 


194  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

Valenciennes  surrendered  on  July  28,  and  the  allies 
might  have  gone  on  to  Paris ;  or  as  their  cautious  com- 
mander, Coburg,  wished  to  do,  they  might  have  kept 
together  and  widened  the  gap  made  m  the  fortress-barrier. 
But  they  distrusted  one  another,  and  were  bent  on  pur- 
suing their  separate  interests  instead  of  the  common 
object.  Coburg  with  36,000  men  laid  siege  to  Quesnoy,  the 
Duke  of  York  (under  imperative  orders  from  England) 
marched  northward  to  besiege  Dunkirk,  and  the  Dutch 
lay  round  Menin.  While  the  allies  were  dispersing  the 
French  were  gathering.  In  February  the  Convention  had 
decreed  a  levy  of  300,000  men,  and  by  August  the  total 
strength  of  the  Republican  forces  had  risen  to  half  a 
million.  Reinforcements  from  the  armies  of  the  Rhine 
and  the  Moselle  brought  the  arm^^  of  the  north  up  to 
90,000. 

The  committee  of  public  safety  had  been  formed  in 
April  to  control  the  executive.  Carnot  joined  it  in  August, 
and  was  specially  charged  with  the  movements  of  the 
armies.  Under  his  directions  Houchard,  who  was  now 
commanding  the  army  of  the  north,  advanced  with  4"), 000 
men  in  the  beginning  of  September  to  raise  the  siege  of 
Dunkirk.  York  had  34,000  men  (of  whom  less  than  4000 
were  British) ;  20,000  were  engaged  in  the  siege,  and  the 
rest  formed  a  covering  corps,  separated  from  the  main 
body  by  a  swamp.  The  covering  corps,  mainly  Hano- 
verians, was  attacked  and  defeated  by  Houchard  at  Hond- 
schoote  (September  8),  and  the  whole  force  narrowly 
escaped  disaster.  Houchard  had  meant  to  begin  the 
attack  with  his  right ;  but  his  centre,  suffering  from 
artillery  fire,  broke  loose,  dissolved  into  skirmishers,  and 
worked  up  under  cover  to  the  enemy's  position.  Twice 
they  were  beaten  back  by  the  steady  fire  and  advance  of 
the  Germans;  but  they  swarmed  forward  again  along  the 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION  195 

whole  line,  and  after  four  hours'  fighting,  Wallmoden, 
seeing  that  his  men  and  their  ammunition  were  exhausted, 
fell  back  to  a  position  in  front  of  Furnes  which  covered 
York's  withdrawal. 

The  incompleteness  of  his  success  cost  Houchard  his 
head.  Jourdan,  who  succeeded  him,  won  the  battle  of 
Wattignies  (October  15  and  IG)  by  the  same  kind  of  fight- 
ing. Coburg  having  taken  Quosnoy  was  blockading 
Maubeuge.  He  had  nearly  "lO.OOO  men,  but  Clerfayt's 
corps  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Sambre  was  under  20,000, 
and  had  six  miles  of  broken  country  to  hold.  Jourdan 
while  engaging  this  corps  along  its  whole  front,  concen- 
trated 20,000  men  against  its  left.  "Throwing  forward 
repeatedly  whole  battalions  of  skirmishers,"  '  and  taking 
advantage  of  the  ravines,  he  enveloped  the  left  and  forced 
it  back.  Clerfayt's  centre  and  right  were  obliged  to  follow 
suit  and  to  cross  the  Sambre,  and  the  blockade  was  raised. 

The  allies  had  so  managed  matters  that  in  both  these 
battles  they  were  outnumbered  by  two  to  one,  and  the 
French,  having  the  initiative,  could  make  the  most  of 
their  loose  tactics.  It  was  not  merely  that  the  French, 
being  untrained  and  undisciplined,  fought  better  in  loose 
order  than  in  close ;  their  natural  aptitude  enabled  them 
to  fight  better  than  their  opponents  in  loose  order.  A 
Prussian  officer  wrote  of  them  in  May :  "  In  the  woods, 
where  the  soldier  breaks  rank  and  has  no  drill  movements 
to  carry  out,  but  only  to  tiro  under  cover  of  the  trees,  they 
are  not  only  equal  but  superior  to  us ;  our  men,  accus- 
tomed to  fight  shoulder  to  shoulder  in  the  open  field, 
found  it  difficult  to  adopt  that  seeming  disorder  which 
was  yet  necessary  if  they  were  not  to  be  targets  for  the 
enemy."  - 

In  the  winter  of  1793-4  the  amalgamation  of  the  regu- 
'  Duhesme,  p.  70.  '  Cliuquet,  Valenciennes,  p.  9G. 


196  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

lars  and  volunteers,  which  had  been  decreed  in  February 
1793,  began  to  be  carried  out.  The  infantry  was  formed 
into  demi-brigades  of  three  battalions,  one  from  the  line 
and  two  from  the  volunteers ;  henceforward  they  were  to 
wear  the  same  uniform,^  draw  the  same  pay,  and  all  have 
the  right  of  electing  their  officers  up  to  the  rank  of  cap- 
tain. Numerals  were  substituted  for  the  time-honoured 
names  of  regiments  —  Picardie,  Piemont,  Navarre,  &c. 
There  were  209  demi-brigades  of  the  line  and  42  of  light 
infantry ;  the  latter  formed  partly  out  of  the  regular  chas- 
seurs a  j^ied,  partly  out  of  free  corps  raised  for  service  in 
the  Alps  and  Pyrenees.  The  battalions  consisted  of  one 
grenadier  company  and  eight  fusilier  companies,  and  had 
a  strength  of  nearly  800  men. 

The  amalgamation  was  only  one  sign  among  many  of  a 
new  order  arising  out  of  chaos.  The  committee  of  public 
safety  imparted  vigour  and  unity  to  the  whole  military 
mechanism.  Men  could  be  requisitioned,  not  only  as 
soldiers  but  for  transport  service  or  manufacture. 
Horses  could  be  taken  both  for  draught  and  for  cavalry 
use.  Supplies  of  all  sorts  became  more  plentiful.  The 
officers,  especially  those  who  had  risen  from  the  ranks  of 
the  regular  army,  were  as  a  whole  superior  to  the  aristo- 
cratic officers  of  the  old  regime.  They  had  been  tested  by 
two  campaigns ;  the  nois}'  patriots  had  been  sifted  out, 
and  the  best  men  were  rising  to  high  command.  They  no 
longer  dreamed,  like  La  Fayette  and  Dumouriez,  of  playing 
a  political  part,  or  even  planning  their  own  campaigns. 
They  were  the  zealous  and  docile  servants  of  the  com- 
mittee, and  their  armies  were  reduced  or  reinforced 
according  to  the  plans  prepared  in  Paris  to  meet  the 
exigencies  of  the  war  as  a  whole. 

>  Tbe  Hue  battalions  exclianging  their  white  coats  for  the  blue  coats  of 
the  national  guard. 


THE  FRENCH   REVOLUTION  197 

The  campaign  of  1794  began  with  the  siege  of  Lan- 
drecies.  Coburg  had  160,000  men,  but  only  half  of  them 
were  available  for  the  siege  and  covering  army  ;  the  rest 
were  guarding  the  Netherlands  frontier.  The  French 
armies  of  the  north  and  the  Ardennes,  under  Pichegru, 
numbered  180,000  men,  exclusive  of  garrisons.  Pichegru 
failed  in  his  attempts  to  raise  the  siege  of  Landrecies, 
which  surrendered  on  April  30.  But  it  was  the  Repub- 
lican strategy  to  attack  the  flanks  as  well  as  the  centre ; 
and  when  Pichegru  found  the  centre  too  strong  for  him 
he  threw  his  whole  weight  into  these  flank  attaclcs.  On 
the  day  on  which  Landrecies  fell,  Moreau  and  Souham 
with  50,000  men  took  Menin  and  Courtray,  while  Carnot 
was  sending  orders  to  Jourdan  to  bring  45,000  men  from 
the  Moselle  to  reinforce  the  attack  on  the  Sambre. 

The  advance  of  the  French  into  Flanders  threatened 
the  Ime  of  communication  of  the  British  and  Dutch, 
and  the  allies  moved  northward  to  repel  it.  They  even 
hoped  to  cut  off  the  invaders :  but  their  movements 
were  so  badly  combined  that  two  columns  under  York, 
numbering  18,000  men,  had  to  deal  unsupported  with 
at  least  40,000  Frenchmen.^  York's  troops  were  on  the 
march,  near  Tourcoin  (May  IS),  when  they  were  attacked 
in  front  and  on  both  flanks,  and  were  driven  back  in 
disorder  on  Tournay  with  a  loss  of  sixty  guns.  The 
honours  of  the  day  again  fell  to  the  French  skirmishers ; 
"  as  sharp-sighted  as  ferrets,  and  as  active  as  squirrels," 
according  to  Sir  Robert  Wilson,-  they  poured  through 
the  gaps  between  the  several  bodies  and  enveloped  them. 
In  square  or  in  column  the  French  infantry  could  be 
broken  by  the  British  and  Austrian  cavalry  {e.g.  April 
24  and  26  and  May  10),  but  in  swarms  they  were  formi- 
dable and  could  sting  intolerably.     As  the  Duke  of  York's 

'  Revue  d'lluloirc,  xxix.  UG.  »  Randolph,  i.  8U. 


198  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

aide-de-camp  wrote  :  "  No  mobbed  fox  was  ever  more  put 
to  it  to  make  his  escape  than  we  were,  being  at  times 
nearly  surrounded."  ^ 

Four  days  afterwards  the  French,  encouraged  by  their 
success,  attacked  the  allies  in  their  camp  at  Toumay. 
They  were  beaten  off  with  heavy  loss,  but  only  after 
twelve  hours'  fighting.  Early  in  June  Jourdan  was  on 
the  Sambre  with  90,000  men.  After  repeated  failures 
the  French  established  themselves  on  the  left  bank  and 
gained  possession  of  Charleroi.  They  were  attacked  by 
Coburg  with  50,000  men,  and  the  battle  of  Fleurus  was 
fought  (June  26).  The  French  had  intrenched  their  posi- 
tions, which  extended  over  a  semicircle  of  twenty  miles. 
In  some  parts  they  held  their  ground,  in  others  they 
gave  way.  Marceau's  divisions — and  there  was  no  better 
leader — were  broken,  and  most  of  his  men  fled  in  panic 
across  the  river.  The  allies  might  have  won  if  they  had 
persisted,  but  Coburg  broke  off  the  battle  and  gave  orders 
for  retreat. 

A  fortnight  later  the  French  were  in  Brussels,  the 
armies  of  Pichegru  and  Jourdan  had  united,  and  the 
allies  had  fallen  back  to  Antwerp,  Louvain,  and  Namur. 
A  few  days  afterwards  they  separated  ;  the  Austrians,  who 
had  for  some  time  been  lukewarm  about  the  defence  of 
the  Netherlands,  crossed  the  Meuse  at  Liege  and  Maes- 
tricht,  while  the  English  and  Dutch  went  northward  to 
cover  Holland. 

That  a  nation  which  had  taken  its  army  to  pieces,  got 
rid  of  the  officers,  and  flooded  the  ranks  with  raw  material, 
should  beat  the  combined  forces  of  its  neighbours,  while 
it  was  itself  torn  by  civil  war,  was  an  astonishing  thing 
which  men  sought   to   explain  in  different  ways.     The 

'  Calvert,  p.  220.  Cf.  raited  Service  MayaUiie,  August  1897,  p.  517, 
"  Letters  of  a  Staff  Officer." 


THE  FRENCH  REVOLUTION  199 

Archduke  Charles,  who  had  taken  part  in  the  campaign, 
said  of  the  allies'  failure :  "  We  must  ascribe  this  wholly 
to  the  mistakes  made  by  our  generals  and  taken  ad- 
vantage of  by  our  opponents.  .  .  .  Ignorance,  indolence, 
and  egoism  are  to  blame  for  all  our  misfortunes."  * 

Another  eye-witness,  Scharnhorst,  who  was  at  that 
time  an  officer  of  Hanoverian  artillery,  Justly  argued 
that  there  were  deeper  and  more  general  causes.  Chief 
among  these  were  the  rivalries  and  divergent  aims  of  the 
allied  powers,  and  the  half-heartedness  of  their  people. 
The  powers  employed  in  this  war  less  than  one-third 
of  the  troops  which  they  maintained  on  a  peace  footing. 
As  for  the  population  and  civil  administration,  the  war 
was  carried  on  in  the  Netherlands  "  like  a  private  enter- 
prise, out  of  which  all  hoped  to  make  money,  but  for 
which  no  one  would  make  sacrifices."  France  enjoyed 
great  advantages  in  the  compactness  of  her  territory,  and 
the  strength  of  her  frontiers,  guarded  on  the  north-east 
by  a  triple  line  of  fortresses.  Owing  to  the  demolition 
of  the  Belgian  fortresses  by  Joseph  II.,  the  allies  were 
dependent  on  field  intrenchments ;  and  this  led  them 
to  adopt  a  cordon  system,  to  cover  the  country,  which 
absorbed  half  their  troops. 

As  regards  the  troops  themselves,  Scharnhorst  says 
that  the  alUes  made  the  mistake  of  holding  their  enemy 
too  cheap.  In  cavalry  the  allies  were  superior  both  in 
number  and  quality.  Their  infantry  also  was  better 
in  some  respects :  they  could  beat  oft'  cavalry  charges, 
and  if  they  failed  in  an  attack  they  could  try  again. 
These  things  the  French  could  not  do,  owing  to  their 
want  of  drill  and  discipline,  and  in  open  country  they 
were  no  match  for  the  allies,  if  the  numbers  were  at  all 
equal.  "  In  affairs  of  posts,  and  in  all  kinds  of  lighting 
'  Karl,  pp.  4-U. 


200  THE   HISTORY  OF   INFANTRY 

on  intersected  ground,  they  showed  greater  aptitude,  and 
one  may  even  say  more  courage,  than  the  allied  armies. 
The  soldier  of  the  latter,  trained  in  regular  movements 
and  taught  to  act  like  a  machine,  but  not  versed  in  the 
art  of  taking  advantage  of  the  ground  (every  ditch 
tree,  or  hillock),  and  studying  order  and  mutual  support 
when  in  loose  formation,  was  inferior  to  the  nimble  and 
quick-witted  Frenchman.  The  incessant  and  better-aimed 
fire  of  the  latter,  his  good  and  numerous  artillery,  his 
superiority  in  numbers  and  frequency  of  relief,  caused 
the  allies  to  find  that  at  the  end  of  a  hard  day's  fight- 
ing in  close  country  they  had  incurred  heavy  loss  (at 
all  events  in  wounded)  with  no  decisive  result ;  or  having 
used  up  their  ammunition  and  giving  way  to  fatigue,  they 
left  the  field  to  the  enemy.  It  is  an  established  fact  that 
the  French  skirmishers  decided  most  of  the  affiiirs  m  this 
war,  and  were  better  than  those  of  the  allied  armies."  ^ 

The  evolution  of  the  Republican  tactics  has  been  weU 
described  by  Duhesme,  who  commanded  a  battalion  of 
volimteers  in  1793  and  a  brigade  in  1794.  He  shows 
how  the  habit  of  skirmishing  spread  throughout  the 
infantry,  which  was  for  the  most  part  unfit  to  mancEuvre 
in  close  order.  By  the  end  of  1793  the  battahons  were 
practically  all  light  infantry;  they  acted  independently, 
dissolved  into  skirmishers  when  they  engaged,  and  in 
this  way  won  the  battles  of  Jemappes,  Hondschoote,  and 
Wattignies.  But  in  1794  it  was  found  that  the  Austrians 
had  taken  steps  to  meet  this  mode  of  fighting.  Coburg 
had  given  orders  that  one-third  of  a  battalion  should  be 
used  for  skirmishing,  one-third  as  supports,  and  one-third 
as  a  reserve.  When  the  French  tried  to  raise  the  siege 
of  Landrecies,  they  came  in  contact  with  outlying 
detachments  of  the  covering  army. 

'  iScharnhorst,  p.  54. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION  201 

"  These  advanced  guards,  well  handled,  only  disputed 
their  ground  long  enough  to  make  us  waste  time  and 
men.  They  brought  us  from  one  position  to  another 
till  they  reached  that  which  they  really  meant  to  defend. 
There  they  let  us  use  up  and  scatter  our  last  battalions, 
whose  ardour  generally  shattered  itself  against  their 
intrenchments.  Then  fresh  troops  issued  from  them  in 
the  most  perfect  order  ;  they,  in  their  turn,  threw  out 
skirmishers  upon  our  flanks,  and  thus  they  charged  at 
advantage  troops  dispersed  and  fatigued,  corps  in  disorder 
and  unable  to  rally  most  of  their  men."  > 

Experience  of  this  sort  taught  the  French  generals  to 
keep  their  troops  more  in  hand,  and  to  have  a  chain  of 
close  columns  behind  the  flexible  and  mobile  line  of 
skirmishers  and  their  immediate  supports.  These  were 
usually  battalion  columns  with  a  front  of  one  or  two 
platoons,  disposed  chequerwise  in  two  lines.  The  columns 
were  sometimes  deployed  when  they  came  under  fire,  or 
if  they  were  acting  on  the  defensive.  In  the  autumn  of 
1794  there  was  a  lull  in  the  operations  which  allowed 
the  troops  to  be  exercised  in  drill  and  field  duties.  The 
camps  became  more  orderly  and  regular,  but  they  were 
laid  out  on  new  principles.  "  No  more  first  line,  no  more 
second  line,  no  more  cavalry  on  the  wings :  the  arrange- 
ment of  our  armies  was  no  longer  the  same ;  it  was  broken 
up  into  divisions  of  ten  or  twelve  battalions ;  the  cavalry 
was  distributed  among  these  divisions,  four  to  six  squadrons 
to  each,  except  one-fourth  of  it  which  was  kept  together, 
and  formed  the  reserve  of  the  army."  2  A  division  had 
its  own  outposts,  furnished  by  its  light  demi-brigades ; 
and  it  often  had  a  front  of  two  or  three  leagues,  the 
troops  being  placed  on  the  higher  ground,  and  the 
intervening  hollows  being  left  unoccupied.  The  armies, 
'  Duliesiue,  p.  72.  -  lb.,  \\.  Tli. 


202  THE   HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

therefore,  took  up  a  great  deal  of  room,  three  or  four 
times  as  much  as  in  former  days,  with  advanced  guards 
thrown  far  to  the  front.  It  was  an  accepted  principle 
that  to  outflank  the  enemy  was  to  beat  him,  and  that 
an  army  could  not  extend  itself  too  much.^  In  advanc- 
ing, the  divisions  moved  by  parallel  roads  and  acted 
more  or  less  independently.  Great  scope  was  given  to 
divisional  commanders  to  show  their  capacity  to  handle 
the  three  arms  in  combination. 

Besides  the  tactics  and  organisation  of  the  Republican 
armies  there  are  two  other  points  to  be  noticed :  their 
moral  and  their  mobility.  The  standard  of  discipline  in 
the  narrower  sense — instinctive  obedience — was  still  far 
from  high,  and  remained  so  throughout  the  wars  of  the 
Empire.  As  Napoleon  wrote  to  his  brother  Joseph 
(June  22,  1806):  "The  Frenchman  has  never  been 
obedient,  and  is  still  less  so  since  the  war  and  the  Revolu- 
tion have  excited  him."  But  experience  had  taught  all 
ranks  the  need  of  subordination,  and  as  the  unfit  had  been 
weeded  out  there  had  grown  up  that  mutual  confidence 
between  officers  and  men  which  secures  the  main  purpose 
of  discipline,  common  action  for  an  end.  Their  Re- 
publican ardour  supplied  them  with  that  enthusiasm 
which,  as  Lloyd  pointed  out  (p.  170),  is  an  essential  m- 
gredient  in  the  best  soldiers;  and  their  alertness  of  mind 
and  body  gave  them  the  individual  initiative  and  enter- 
prise which  their  tactics  demanded.  If  they  were  deficient 
in  the  discipline  which  consists  in  doing  what  one  is 
told,  they  excelled  in  that  higher  kind  of  discipline  which 
makes  a  man  anticipate  orders,  and  do  what  his  superior 
would  wish  him  to  do.  The  hope  of  honours  and  rewards 
was  more  than  an  equivalent  for  the  fear  of  punishment 
on  which  Frederick  had  relied.     The  election  of  officers  by 

1  Foy,  i.  10(5. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION  203 

their  men  had  been  dropped,  and  strict  rules  were  laid 
down  for  promotion. 

Before  the  Revolution  the  feeding  of  the  troops  was  left 
to  the  commissariat,  who  obtained  their  supplies  usually 
from  magazines  or  by  local  purchase.  They  magnified 
their  olHce,  and  claimed  that  the  general  should  not  only 
let  his  chief  supply  officer  know  beforehand  of  his  in- 
tended movements,  but  should  take  him  into  counsel. 
The  very  large  numbers  of  men  in  the  Republican  armies, 
and  the  want  of  money,  compelled  a  change  of  system. 
The  troops  lived  on  the  country  they  occupied,  either  by 
requisitions  or  by  pillage.  It  became  the  business  of  the 
commanders  of  divisions  to  see  to  the  subsistence  of  their 
men,  and  the  commissaries  sank  into  subordinate  agents. 
The  collection  of  supplies  was  one  reason  for  the  wide 
extension  of  the  armies,  as  it  became  increasingly  difficult 
when  they  were  concentrated  and  stationary.  In  rich  and 
populous  countries,  such  as  the  Netherlands  and  the 
Rhineland,  the  troops  could  be  fed  well  enough  by  requi- 
sitions; but  they  failed  when  the  country  was  poor  or 
when  the  troops  were  in  rapid  movement.  There  was 
nothing  for  it  then  but  for  the  men  to  help  themselves ; 
pillage  was  winked  at  or  even  enjoined,  and  the  habit  of 
marauding  became  confirmed.  "  Our  mode  of  feeding  our 
armies  is  odious,"  writes  an  oflScer  in  1813;  "it  is  sub- 
versive of  all  subordination  and  of  every  principle  of 
generosity  and  civilisation." ' 

It  was  the  result  of  necessity  rather  than  of  choice,  and 
it  had  at  all  events  the  advantage  that  it  enabled  the 
French  to  cut  down  their  transport.  This  was  reduced  in 
other  ways  also.  Tents  were  not  carried ;  subalterns  and 
captains  of  infantry  were  not  allowed  horses,  but  shared 
the  burdens  of  their  men.  The  French  infantry  had  only 
'  Fantin  des  Odoards,  p.  373. 


THE  HISTORY  OF   INFANTRY 


one-tenth  of  the  number  of  baggage  animals  that  were 
attached  to  the  Prussian  infantry.  The  mobihty  which 
this  diminution  of  trains  gave  them  was  increased  by 
the  marching  powers  of  the  French  soldiers,  in  respect 
both  of  endurance  and  speed.  On  the  battle-field  they 
broke  loose  from  the  regulation  pace  (seventy-six  steps  a 
minute)  and  manoeuvred  in  quick  time  or  even  at  the 
double. 

The  mobility  of  the  Republican  troops  was  serviceable 
to  them  in  the  Netherlands  and  on  the  Rhine,  but  it  was 
in  Bonaparte's  Italian  campaigns  that  its  full  value  was 
brought  out.  For  instance,  Massena's  division,  after  fight- 
ing at  St.  Michel,  east  of  Verona,  marched  in  the  night 
sixteen  miles  to  Rivoli,  helped  to  win  the  battle  there 
next  day  (January  14,  1797),  and  on  the  loth  marched 
twenty-five  miles  towards  Mantua.  The  brigades,  formed 
in  deep  columns,  "  struck  the  enemy's  front  like  a 
battering-ram,  while  the  light  infantry  skirmishers 
gained  the  flanks,  crowned  the  heights,  carried  alarm 
and  confusion  into  the  enemy's  rear,  and  hindered  or 
even  cut  off  his  retreat." '  Napoleon  afterwards  said 
that  in  his  early  campaigns,  if  he  was  in  a  difficulty  about 
feeding  his  men,  he  had  only  to  throw  himself  on  the 
rear  of  his  enemy  to  find  plenty.^  The  masses  of  prisoners 
taken  by  the  army  of  Italy  astonished  the  armies  north 
of  the  Alps,  who  were  accustomed  to  regard  the  capture 
of  5000  men  as  a  great  achievement. 

Marmont  says  that  Napoleon,  unsurpassed  as  a  strate- 
gist, was  deficient  in  the  art  of  handling  troops  on 
the  battle-field,  having  had  no  practical  experience  in 
command  of  a  brigade  or  division.^  The  man  who  was 
beaten  at  Salamanca  was  hardly  entitled  to  pass  judg- 
ment on  the  man  who  won  Austerlitz,  but  at  all  events 

I  Duhesme,  p.  95.  -  Jomini,  i.  334.  ■'  Marmont,  p.  26. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION  205 

Napoleon  seems  to  have  concerned  himself  much  less 
than  Frederick  did  with  details  of  "  sergeantry."  The 
drill-book  of  1791  remained  in  force  throughout  his 
roign,  except  for  some  minor  modifications,  but  corps 
commanders  were  allowed  much  freedom  in  the  use 
of  it.i 

The  conscription  law  passed  in  1798  had  provided 
permanent  machinery  for  maintaining  the  French  armies 
at  the  required  strength.  It  yielded  80,000  conscripts  a 
year,  if  necessary,  and  the  total  number  of  officers  and 
men  when  Napoleon  became  emperor  was  over  400,000. 
The  "grand  army"  which  he  formed  for  the  invasion 
of  England,  and  eventually  led  against  Austria  in  1805, 
was  not  far  short  of  200,0u0  men.  For  the  better  control 
of  such  large  numbers,  Napoleon  grouped  the  divisions 
into  army  corps,  and  formed  the  heavy  cavalry  into  a 
separate  corps.  This  practically  confined  the  generals 
of  division  to  the  command  of  a  single  arm,  and  gave 
them  less  scope  than  they  had  had  under  the  Republic. 
The  demi-brigades  became  regiments  again  in  October 
180?),  but  kept  their  numbers. 

By  the  conscription  law  all  Frenchmen  became  liable 
to  service  for  four  years  on  reaching  the  age  of  twenty, 
and  were  to  be  called  up  as  they  were  needed ;  but 
Napoleon  allowed  of  substitutes  in  order  that  he  might 
keep  a  good  proportion  of  old  soldiers.  Companies  of 
"voltigeurs"  were  added  to  all  battalions  in  1805  to  be 
used  especially  as  skirmishers,  not  with  the  object  of 
creating  a  special  class  of  infantry,  but  to  turn  to  account 
the  conscripts  who  were  below  the  standard  height.  As 
soon  as  he  was  appointed  to  command  in  Italy,  Napoleon 

'  See  for  instance  the  military  studies  prepared  by  Ney  in  1804  for  the 
guidance  of  his  troops  in  the  camp  at  Montreuil,  printed  at  the  end  of 
his  Memoirs. 


2o6  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

revived  the  practice  of  detaching  the  grenadier  companies 
from  their  battalions.  In  1805  he  formed  a  division  of 
grenadiers  under  Oudinot  as  a  reserve  for  the  army,  and 
he  afterwards  detached  the  voltigeurs  also,  and  coupled 
them  with  the  grenadiers.  He  had  a  strong  leaning 
towards  picked  corps,  though  he  was  alive  to  the  injurious 
eliiect  on  the  army  at  large  if  much  of  its  cream  was  taken. 
The  Guard  when  first  formed,  at  the  end  of  1799,  was 
limited  to  about  2000  men.  By  the  end  of  1813  its 
infantry  had  been  gradually  increased  to  eight  divisions, 
amounting  to  72,000  men.  Its  value,  not  only  as  a 
reserve  on  the  field  of  battle,  but  as  a  training-school  for 
under-officers,  was  held  to  justify  the  increase;'  but  its 
growth  was  at  once  cause  and  consequence  of  the  deterio- 
ration of  the  troops  as  a  whole.  It  drew  its  recruits  partly 
from  other  corps,  partly  from  the  levies  of  conscripts. 

The  dress  of  the  infantry  was  altered  and  made  looser 
to  suit  its  mode  of  fighting.  A  shako  was  substituted 
for  the  three-cornered  hat,  and  the  gaiters  were  shortened. 
The  facings  of  the  coat,  instead  of  being  mere  oi-nament, 
were  made  to  afford  a  double  covering  to  the  chest,  and 
the  men  were  provided  with  overcoats,  a  necessary  pro- 
vision for  men  who  habitually  bivouacked,  and  had  often 
to  face  winter  campaigns.  The  muskets  were  of  an  old 
pattern  (1777),  effective  up  to  200  yards  and  with  an 
extreme  range  of  about  500  yards.  The  calibre  was  two- 
thirds  of  an  inch,  and  the  weight  (with  the  bayonet) 
11  lbs.  This  was  rather  less  than  the  weight  of  the 
English  muskets,  which  were  five  inches  shorter,  but  had 
a  calibre  of  three-quarters  of  an  inch.  The  rate  of  fire 
for  a  continuance  was  about  two  shots  a  minute,  but 
misfires  were  frequent.  Each  man  carried  sixty  rounds 
of  ammunition.^ 

•  Correspondance,  November  16,  1813.  -  Balagny,  i.  23, 


THE  FRENCH   REVOLUTION  207 

Napoleon  held  that  "  the  fire-arm  is  everything,  the  rest 
nothing  "  ;  the  very  opposite  of  Souvorov's  saying  about  the 
bullet  and  the  bayonet.  He  was  not  incluied,  therefore, 
to  trust  wholly  to  columns  and  skirmisher  swarms  against 
troops  in  line.  Nor  did  he  admire  the  Republican  system 
of  extending  to  envelop  the  enemy.  Jourdan's  defeat  at 
Stockach  (March  23,  1799)  was  due  to  this :  "  His  divi- 
sions were  too  far  apart,  and  hi.s  field  of  battle  was  three 
times  what  it  should  have  been."  ^  The  Austrians  had 
made  the  same  mistake  at  Rivoli.  To  avoid  disaster 
and  to  secure  decisive  results,  Napoleon  liked  to  have 
his  troops  under  his  own  eye  and  hand.  "  The  army 
should  be  kept  united,"  he  said ;  "  the  largest  possible 
force  should  be  concentrated  on  the  field  of  battle,  and 
every  opportunity  should  be  taken  advantage  of,  for 
fortune  is  a  woman." - 

At  the  passage  of  the  Tagliamento  (March  16,  1797)  the 
leading  demi-brigades  had  their  second  battalions  de- 
ployed with  the  first  and  third  battalions  in  close  column 
on  the  flanks  of  the  second,  by  Napoleon's  order.^  At 
Marengo  Desaix's  demi-brigades  had  two  battalions 
deployed  and  the  third  in  column  200  paces  in  rear.* 
In  November  1805,  when  he  was  about  to  meet  the 
Russians  and  to  settle  (as  he  said)  whether  the  French 
infantry  was  the  second  or  the  first  in  Europe,  Napoleon 
issued  instructions  for  the  formation  of  the  brigades.  If 
circumstances  allowed,  the  first  regiment  should  have 
its  two  battalions  deployed;  the  two  battalions  of  the 
second  regiment  should  be  in  close  column  of  divisions, 
to  the  right  rear  and  left  rear  respectively  of  the  line 

'  Napoleon  I.,  xxx.  2(>3.  '  lb,,  xxxi.  U.S. 

'  Correspondance,  March  17,  1797. 

♦  So  the  brigade  reports  indicate  (Cugnao,  L'armAe  de  reserve,  ii.  397). 
A  different  formation  is  shown  in  the  picture  of  the  battle  which  serves  as 
frontispiece  to  Home's  Pricis  of  Modern  Tactics. 


208  THE   HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

so  formed.  By  this  means  the  enemy  would  be  met  by 
the  tire  of  the  line,  and  the  columns  would  be  in  readi- 
ness to  engage  his  columns.  If  the  division  had  a  fifth 
regiment,  it  should  be  held  in  reserve  100  paces  to  the 
rear.  There  should  be  a  squadron  or  a  troop  of  cavalry 
behind  each  brigade,  and  the  guns  should  be  placed 
between  the  deployed  battalions  and  on  their  flanks.^ 

These  directions  were  not  closely  followed  at  the  battle 
of  Austerlitz  (December  2,  1805).  For  instance,  in  St. 
Hilaire's  division  of  Soult's  corps  the  fifth  regiment,  in- 
stead of  being  in  reserve,  led  the  advance,  throwing  out 
skirmishers.  The  other  four  regiments  were  side  by  side 
in  column  of  divisions,  each  having  one  battalion  behind 
the  other.  At  Pratzen  they  came  upon  the  head  of  a 
Russo- Austrian  column  (Kollowrath's),  and  while  engaged 
with  it  they  were  attacked  on  their  right  flank  by  part 
of  another  column.  The  leading  battalions  deployed  on 
a  crooked  front,  and  the  rest  were  brought  up  to  fill  gaps 
in  the  first  line,  so  that  at  length  nearly  the  whole  division 
was  fighting  in  line.- 

The  experience  ot  1805  caused  the  Austrians  to  issue 
new  drill  regulations  in  which  the  formation  and  de- 
ployment of  columns  of  divisions  were  included,  and 
fighting  in  loose  order  was  for  the  first  time  recognised. 
Prussia  did  not  at  once  follow  this  example.  Her  troops 
had  not  come  into  collision  with  the  French  since  the 
early  years  of  the  Revolution,  and  the  repulse  of  Hoche 
at  Kaiserslautern  (November  30,  1793)  had  confirmed 
their  belief  in  their  own  superiority.  It  was  allowed  that 
Napoleon's  soldiers  had  some  good  qualities,  but  after 
all  they  were  "  the  men  of  Rossbach  "  ;  defeat  would  mean 
rout  with  them.     However  it  might  be  in  close  and  hilly 

'  Correspondanoe,  November  26,  1805. 

'  See  Sevue  d'Histoire,  June  and  August  1907,  and  plans  attached. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION  209 

country,  they  were  no  match  for  Prussians  in  the  open 
field.  Schamhorst,  who  had  recognised  their  merits  as 
skirmishers  (see  p.  200),  thought  that  the  Prussians  had 
the  advantage  not  only  in  discipline,  but  in  the  quality 
of  their  officers — their  skill,  bravery,  and  high  sense  of 
duty. 

At  the  same  time  he  and  other  men  of  capacity  were 
not  blind  to  the  need  of  reforms  in  the  Prussian  army. 
Frederick  William  III.,  on  his  accession  (in  1797),  charged 
a  mihtary  commission  to  work  out  a  scheme.  He  wished 
to  have  a  larger  proportion  of  native  recruits,  to  raise 
the  strength  of  the  battalions,  to  improve  the  instruc- 
tion of  the  younger  officers  and  the  food  of  the  men. 
He  declared  that  for  some  years  past  there  had  been  a 
great  falling  off  in  zeal  and  emulation  among  the  officers 
generally ;  and  if  this  were  not  corrected  "  our  fine  army, 
which  served  as  a  pattern  for  all  Europe,  will  break  down, 
and  will  retain  only  the  memory  of  its  brilliant  past."  ^ 
But  he  had  not  the  vigour  to  carry  through  the  changes 
which  he  saw  to  be  necessary  in  the  face  of  strong  opposi- 
tion. Even  his  efforts  to  cut  down  the  excessive  trans- 
port of  the  army  proved  fruitless. 

The  number  of  men  that  Prussia  could  put  into  the 
field,  under  200,000,  was  plainly  inadequate  to  a  single- 
handed  contest  with  France :  and  many  proposals  were 
made  for  the  establishment  of  a  militia,  or  the  adoption 
of  universal  service.  The  Prussian  system  of  giving  fur- 
loughs to  native  recruits  as  soon  as  they  were  trained 
lent  itself  to  these  plans,  which  foreshadowed  the  sub- 
sequent reforms  of  Scharnhorst.  But  most  of  the  older 
officers  shook  their  heads  at  such  schemes.  It  was  by 
precision  of  drill  that  Frederick's  army  had  won  its 
victories   against  great  odds.     This  precision  had  been 

'  Goltz,  p.  172. 


2IO  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

maintained,  and  even  carried  to  a  higher  pitch ;  and 
"  as  compared  with  battalions  which  mancEuvred  with- 
out a  fault,  the  idea  of  a  levy  in  mass  could  only  seem 
a  caricature  of  soldiering."  ^ 

Civil  objections  reinforced  military,  and  had  come  to 
carry  more  weight.  Powerful  class  interests  opposed 
the  withdrawal  of  the  existing  exemptions  from  mili- 
tary service,  and  the  imposition  of  the  higher  taxation 
which  any  substantial  increase  in  the  armed  forces  of 
the  countiy  would  involve.  There  was  also  a  fear  that 
such  an  increase  would  be  regarded  by  Napoleon  as 
a  symptom  of  hostility  and  would  hasten  a  collision. 
The  consequence  was  that  little  was  done  beyond  the 
addition  of  a  fifth  company  to  the  service  battahons 
of  the  infantry,  bringing  their  strength  up  to  nearly 
800  men. 

The  three  light  infantry  regiments  formed  by  Frede- 
rick the  Great  had  been  expanded  by  his  successor 
into  twenty-four  battalions  of  "fusiliers,"  and  the  Jager 
corps  had  been  increased  to  three  battalions.  Ten  men 
per  company  of  the  line  battalions  and  twenty  per  com- 
pany of  the  fusilier  battalions  were  armed  with  rifled 
carbines  and  practised  in  shooting  at  a  target  up  to 
300  paces.  This  gave  a  total  of  about  23,000  men  (or 
more  than  one  in  six)  who  were  trained  to  act  as  light 
infantry.  Many  officers  held  this  proportion  to  be  in- 
sufficient, and  wished  the  battalions  to  be  formed  two 
deep  in  line,  the  third  rank  being  used  for  skirmishing. 
Some  of  them,  e.g.  Gneisenau,  had  taken  part  in  the 
war  of  American  independence,  and  had  learnt  the 
value  of  skirmishing  there;  others  were  impressed  by 
the  victories  of  the  French  Republicans.  On  the  other 
side  it  was  urged  that  fighting  in  loose  order  lent  itself 
>  Goltz,  p.  156. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION  211 

to  skulking  and  desertion,  unfitted  men  for  fighting  in 
line,  and  checked  the  use  of  the  bayonet;  it  had  been 
adopted  by  the  French  only  from  force  of  circumstances, 
and  they  were  now  reverting  to  the  older  formations. 
By  1806  the  reaction  had  gone  so  far  in  Prussia  that 
even  the  fusilier  battalions  used  only  a  fraction  of  their 
men  as  skirmishers. 

Many  hard  things  were  said  of  the  Prussian  army 
after  its  defeat ;  but  it  seems  to  have  been  painstaking, 
zealous,  well  drilled  and  disciplined.  The  muskets,  says 
Clausewitz,  were  in  a  high  state  of  polish,  but  they  were 
the  worst  in  Europe,  and  the  artillery  was  inferior  to 
the  French.  The  chiefs  were  old  men  formed  m  the 
school  of  Frederick,  where  men  learned  to  obey  rather 
than  to  command.  They  followed  the  letter  instead  of 
the  spirit  of  Frederick,  who  was  ever  on  the  watch  to 
adapt  himself  to  new  conditions.  There  were  cliques 
and  jealousies  among  them,  and  the  king's  presence 
with  the  army  made  Brunswick  only  a  nominal  com- 
mander-in-chief. In  Jomini's  words,  it  was  "  a  fine 
army,  well  trained  and  well  disciplined,  but  without 
able  leaders  and  without  national  reserves."  ' 

"  It  seems  that  what  is  most  to  be  feared  among  the 
Prussians  is  their  cavalry ;  but  with  the  infantry  you  have, 
if  you  always  take  care  to  be  able  to  form  square,  you 
have  little  to  fear  : "  so  wrote  Napoleon  to  Soult  (October 
.'>,  1806).  The  attair  at  Saalfeld  a  few  days  afterwards 
showed  that  the  Prussian  cavalry  was  not  a  match  for  the 
French;  and  the  mistake  was  made  of  distributing  it 
among  the  divisions,  so  that  it  was  disabled  from  playing 
any  such  part  as  it  had  done  under  Seydlitz. 

The  defeat  of  the  Prussian  troops  at  Jena  (October  14) 
was  hardly  a  reproach  to  them.     They  were  outnumbered 

'  Jomini,  i.  lOti. 


212  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

ultimately  by  two  to  one.  Hohenlohe  was  hampered  by 
his  instructions,  was  ill  informed,  and  allowed  his  divisions 
to  be  engaged  and  beaten  one  after  another.  At  the  crisis 
of  the  battle,  when  he  tried  to  recover  Vierzehnheiligen- — 
instead  of  following  Frederick's  advice,  to  use  columns  in 
such  a  case  (see  p.  174) — he  let  eighteen  battalions  remain 
halted  in  line  for  two  hours,  carrying  on  an  ineffectual 
fire-fight  with  the  French  in  the  village.  His  aide-de- 
camp says :  "  The  enemy's  skirmishers  took  advantage 
of  all  the  inequalities  of  the  ground,  lay  down  behind  them 
and  fired  into  our  ranks.  Even  their  batteries  were 
screened  by  the  crests,  or  sunk  in  the  ground,  so  that  only 
the  muzzles  of  the  guns  could  be  seen.  The  skirmishers 
fell  back  under  protection  of  these  batteries,  or  covered 
them  when  they  changed  position.  We  lost  a  lot  of  men 
without  seeing  an  enemy."  ^ 

But  the  battle  of  Auerstedt,  fought  on  the  same  day, 
was  a  more  conclusive  proof  of  the  superiority  of  the 
French  soldiers,  apart  from  the  personality  of  the  emperor, 
which  Wellington  reckoned  as  equivalent  to  40,000  men. 
The  main  Prussian  army  under  Brunswick,  accompanied 
by  the  king,  was  retreating  towards  the  north-east  when 
it  met  the  corps  of  Davout,  which  was  marching  in  the 
opposite  direction  to  take  the  Prussians  in  rear,  on  the 
assumption  that  they  were  still  near  Jena.  There  were 
50,000  men  under  Brunswick  of  whom  9000  were  cavalry. 
Davout  had  only  27,000  in  all,  and  only  1400  cavalry. 
In  guns  (including  battalion  guns)  he  was  outnumbered 
by  five  to  one. 

It  was  in  the  mist  of  the  early  morning  that  the  cavalry 
of  the  advanced  guard  under  Blucher  encountered  the 
leading  French  division  (Gudin)  at  Hassenhausen.  Blucher 
charged  repeatedly  but  was  beaten  off.     At  9  a.m.  Friant's 

'  Scvue  d'Bisloire,  November  1906,  p.  474. 


THE  FRENCH   REVOLUTION  213 

division  came  up  on  the  right  of  Gudin,  and  at  10.30 
Morand's  came  up  on  the  left.  The  French,  who  by  that 
time  were  hard  pressed  by  two  Prussian  divisions,  now 
began  to  gain  ground;  and  the  arrival  of  a  third  Prus- 
sian division  did  not  arrest  their  progress.  Brunswick 
was  mortally  wounded  early  in  the  day,  and  at  2.30  the 
king  gave  orders  for  retreat,  though  two  of  his  five 
divisions  had  as  yet  taken  hardly  any  part  in  the  battle. 
The  retreat  soon  became  a  rout,  and  the  Prussians  were  so 
demoralised  that  3000  prisoners  and  115  guns  were  taken 
by  the  small  force  of  light  cavalry  at  Davout's  disposal. 

The  result  was  so  astonishing  that  both  Frederick  William 
and  Napoleon  were  at  first  incredulous  as  to  the  relative 
strength  of  the  combatants.  It  was  due  partly  to  the 
tardiness  of  the  Prussians,  the  want  of  mutual  support  be- 
tween the  three  arms,  and  the  neglect  to  make  use  of  their 
reserves.  Their  generals  were  nearly  twice  the  age  of  the 
French  leaders:  Brunswick  was  seventy-one,  Mollendorf 
eighty-two,  Kalkreuth  sixty-nine,  while  the  average  age  of 
Davout  and  his  lieutenants  was  under  forty.  But  it  was 
due  also  to  the  admirable  quality  of  the  French  officers 
and  men,  their  trust  in  one  another  and  ready  co-operation, 
the  tenacity  with  which  they  held  their  ground,  and  the 
boldness  with  which  they  took  the  ott'ensive  with  no 
reserves  behind  them.  The  battle  cost  them  more  than 
25  per  cent,  of  their  strength. 

As  Rossbach  set  the  French  to  learn  Prussian  tactics, 
so  Jena  made  the  Prussians  turn  to  French  formations. 
The  old  belief  that  "  in  war  everything  depended  on 
advance  in  echelon  and  vigorous  attack  by  battalions" 
was  shaken.  The  problem  of  satisfactorily  combining 
linear  tactics  with  the  free  use  of  skirmishers  was  dropped, 
and  along  with  it  went  the  control  of  musketry  fire,  on 
which  so  nuich  stress  had  been  laid.     The  column  as  a 


214  THE   HISTORY   OF  INFANTRY 

fighting  formation  was  introduced  into  the  Prussian  regula- 
tions in  1812,  and  was  used  in  the  war  of  liberation.^ 


One  should  change  one's  tactics  every  ten  years,  Napo- 
leon said :  and  by  the  time  the  Austrians  and  Prussians 
had  adopted  the  French  mode  of  fighting,  the  French 
were  beginning  to  alter  it,  making  their  columns  more 
massive  but  less  handy.  There  were  several  reasons  for 
the  change.  Napoleon's  policy,  especially  in  Spain,  made 
ever  increasing  demands  for  troops,  and  in  order  to  provide 
officers  for  the  new  levies,  the  infantry  regiments  were 
reorganised,  the  number  of  battalions  being  increased  to 
five  (including  a  depot  battalion)  and  the  number  of  com- 
panies in  each  of  the  four  war  battalions  being  reduced  to 
six.  The  companies  were  made  larger  than  before,  having 
a  strength  of  140  officers  and  men ;  but  when  the  grena- 
diers and  voltigeurs  were  detached,  as  was  usually  the 
case,  the  battalion  column  foi-med  a  small  unit  of  little 
more  than  500  men.^ 

Such  columns  were  rather  feeble  for  attack,  especially 
if  the  men  were  young  and  the  officers  few.  It  was  by 
moral  effect,  rather  than  by  actual  use  of  fire  or  steel, 
that  columns  did  their  work  ;  and  the  moral  eftect  might 
be  expected  to  increase  with  the  size  of  the  columns 
within  the  limits  of  mobility.  The  tendencies  of  Im- 
perialism were  against  the  independence  and  initiative 
which  were  characteristic  of  the  battalion  columns  in  the 
Republican  days,  and  there  was  not  room  for  them  on 
the  Napoleonic  battle-field.  At  Eylau  (February  8,  1807) 
Augereau's  corps  occupied  a  space  of  less  than  a  mile. 
When  he  was  ordered  to  attack,  his  two  divisions  had  to 
advance  in  two  columns,  and  then  deploy  their  leading 
brigades  while  the  rear  brigades  formed  squares.     During 

1  Goltz,  p.  371.  ^  Correspondance,  February  18,  1808. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION  215 

this  operation  they  were  under  a  storm  of  fire  from  the 
enemy's  guns  ;  the  Russian  infantry  advanced  to  meet 
them,  the  cavalry  charged  them,  and  the  corps  fell  back 
in  disorder,  having  lost  5000  men  out  of  12,000.' 

In  1809  the  French  had  again  to  deal  with  the  Austrians, 
who  were  now  fighting  in  battalion  columns,  and  were 
under  the  able  leadership  of  the  Archduke  Charles.  In 
the  two  chief  battles  of  the  campaign,  Essling  and  Wagram, 
as  at  Austerlitz,  Napoleon  struck  at  the  enemy's  centre. 
At  Essling  (May  22)  only  part  of  the  French  army  was  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Danube,  and  it  was  necessary  to  gain 
ground  to  make  room  for  the  remainder.  Lannes  was 
ordered  to  advance  between  Aspern  and  Essling,  a  space 
of  about  a  mile.  He  formed  his  three  divisions  in  columns 
of  regiments,  and  advanced  in  echelon  from  the  right. 
When  enough  ground  had  been  gained  they  were  to  deploy 
on  an  oblique  line,  refusing  the  left.  The  Austrians  were 
falling  back,  the  deployment  had  begun,  and  everything 
seemed  to  promise  well,  when  news  came  that  the  bridges 
over  the  main  arm  of  the  Danube  had  been  swept  away, 
and  Napoleon  was  obliged  to  withdraw  his  troops  into  the 
island  of  Lobau. 

At  Wagram  (July  6)  he  himself  superintended  the  for- 
mation of  Macdonald's  corps,  which  was  to  break  through 
the  Austrian  centre,  and  he  adopted  the  Austerlitz  forma- 
tion on  a  larger  scale.  Eight  battalions  were  deployed, 
forming  two  lines  of  four  battalions  each,  the  second  Ime 
was  closed  upon  the  first,  and  the  remaining  thirteen 
battalions  were  formed  in  close  column  on  the  two  wings.* 

'  Extracts  from  Augereau's  report  are  given  in  Marion's  Memoir  of 
Senarmont.  He  says  nothing  of  the  snowstorm  on  which  Napoleon  laid 
stress,  as  accounting  for  the  disaster. 

'  Such  is  Macdonald's  version  (HecoUections.  p.  llJli).  Lamarque  says 
that  his  division  was  in  column  of  deployed  battalions  one  behind  the 
other,  but  perhaps  he  refers  to  the  wing  columns. 


2i6  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

The  whole  made  three  sides  of  a  square  (like  the  English 
at  Fontenoy)  numbering  about  10,000  men,  and  the  rear 
was  closed  by  cavalry.  The  corps  succeeded  in  its  mission, 
but  not  without  support,  and  it  met  with  very  heavy  loss 
(at  least  three  men  out  of  four).  Meanwhile  on  the  ex- 
treme right  Davout's  divisions  were  fighting  in  battalion 
columns  as  in  the  old  days,  and  driving  the  enemy  before 
them. 

"  In  the  late  wars  there  have  been  many  instances,"  says 
Jomini,!  "  in  which  Russian,  French,  or  Prussian  columns 
have  carried  positions  with  supported  arms,  without  firing 
a  shot ;  it  is  the  triumph  of  momentum  and  of  the  moral 
elfect  which  it  produces ;  but  against  the  murderous  fire 
and  the  sang  froid  of  the  English  infantry,  columns  did 
not  have  the  same  success."  The  campaigns  of  '93  and  '94, 
in  which  the  English  shared  in  the  discomfiture  of  the 
allies,  had  taught  the  French  to  hold  them  cheap.  So 
also  in  Holland  in  1799  they  were  no  match  for  the 
Republican  troops  when  fighting  in  loose  order  among 
the  sandhills.2  In  Egypt  and  at  Maida  they  had  shown 
their  quality,  but  the  disparagement  of  them  remained 
practically  undisturbed  until  the  war  in  the  Peninsula. 
A  French  officer  noted  in  his  diary  after  the  battle  of 
Corunna  that  the  English  had  behaved  well,  and  were  not 
degenerate,  as  they  were  often  said  to  be.^ 

In  after  years  Marshal  Bugeaud  used  to  say,  "The 
British  infantry  is  the  most  formidable  in  Europe ;  luckily 
there  is  not  much  of  it ; "  and  he  gave  a  vivid  picture 
of  the  normal  course  of  the  battles  between  French  and 
English,  though  he  seems  to  have  had  little  experience 
of  them  himself.*     Foy,  who  had  ample  experience,  says 

1  Jomini,  ii.  231.  ^  Bunbury,  p.  26, 

'  Fautin  des  Odoards,  p.  203.  •  Trochu,  p.  239. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION  217 

that  the  English  possess  the  most  vakiable  of  all  quali- 
ties on  the  field  of  battle,  self-possession  in  anger.  The 
infantry  is  the  best  part  of  their  army.  Not  so  supple 
and  swift  as  the  French,  they  are  more  silent,  cooler, 
more  obedient ;  hence  their  fire  is  better  aimed  and  more 
destructive.  They  have  not  the  patience  of  the  Russians 
under  a  cannonade,  but  they  keep  their  formations  better. 
When  attacked  they  begin  with  volleys  of  battalions, 
followed  by  well-sustained  file  fire.  In  advancing  they 
fire  without  breakmg  rank.  Deployed  in  line,  they  do 
not  hesitate  to  attack  columns  with  the  bayonet.  But 
the  leader  who  wishes  to  use  this  infantry  without  com- 
promising it,  must  move  it  seldom  and  with  caution, 
and  must  reckon  more  on  its  fire  than  on  its  mananivrcs.' 

Marbot  attributes  the  excellence  of  the  British  musketry 
to  the  large  amount  of  target  practice  and  to  the  forma- 
tion in  two  ranks.  So  far  as  ordinary  regiments  of  the 
line  were  concerned,  there  was  no  target  practice.  The 
absence  of  a  third  rank  had  no  doubt  some  effisct,  allow- 
ing better  aim ;  but  the  deadliness  of  British  volleys  had 
been  recognised  at  Dettingen  and  Fontenoy,  when  there 
were  three  ranks.  The  regulations  still  regarded  three 
ranks  as  the  normal  formation,  but  one  of  the  first 
orders  issued  by  Sir  Arthur  Wellesley  when  he  landed 
in  Portugal  was,  "  The  order  of  battle  of  the  army  is  to 
be  two  deep"  (August  3,  1808).  If  something  more  solid 
was  needed,  to  resist  cavalry  for  instance,  the  men  were 
formed  four  deep. 

The  first  important  action  fought  in  the  Peninsula 
struck  the  keynote.  At  Vimiero  (August  21,  1808)  the 
leading  French  brigade,  formed  in  one  close  column,  and 
preceded  by  skirmishers,  mounted  a  hill  on  which  the 
."(Oth  regiment  was  drawn  up  in  line.     The  colonel  (after- 

'  Foy,  i.  207,  283. 


2i8  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

wards  Sir  G.  T.  Walker)  wheeled  his  right  wing  into 
echelon  of  companies  about  four  paces  to  the  left,  to 
bring  it  to  bear  on  the  flank  of  the  column.^  Then  he 
ordered  a  volley  and  a  charge.  The  column  was  broken 
and  driven  down  the  hill. 

At  Busaco  (September  29,  1810)  Nay's  columns  were 
similarly  repulsed  by  the  Light  Division.  Those  of 
Regnier,  three  columns  of  regiments,  succeeded  in  estab- 
lishing themselves  for  a  time  on  the  I'idge  which  formed 
the  British  position ;  but  they  were  attacked  from  both 
sides,  and  being  unsupported  they  were  at  length  driven 
down  the  mountain  side. 

The  battle  of  Albuera  (May  16,  1811)  is,  however,  a 
more  striking  example  of  the  success  of  line  against 
column,  because  it  was  fought  at  great  disadvantage, 
and  was  purely  a  soldier's  victory.  Soult  was  marching 
with  23,000  men  to  relieve  Badajoz ;  Beresford  was  bar- 
ring his  way  with  30,000  men,  of  whom  only  one-fourth 
were  British.  Skill  and  mobility  enabled  Soult  to  place 
the  bulk  of  his  troops  on  the  right  flank  of  the  allies, 
threatening  to  roll  up  their  line.  A  new  front  had  to  be 
formed  hastily;  there  was  some  disorder  and  symptoms 
of  retreat,  which  led  Soult  to  push  on  with  the  fifth 
corps  in  its  original  close  formation.  It  seems  to  have 
been  in  three  contiguous  columns  of  deployed  battalions,^ 
one  division  being  behind  the  other,  and  the  whole 
numbering  about  10,000  men.  On  its  left  there  was  a 
force  of  3500  cavalry,  and  there  was  a  strong  brigade 
of  infantry  as  a  reserve  in  rear. 

Beresford  had  ordered  up  Stewart's  division  from  the 

1  Fyler,  p.  105. 

^  The  fact  that  during  the  action  "  un  passage  de  lignes"  was  ordered, 
though  it  could  not  be  carried  out,  shows  that  the  battalions  were  de- 
ployed (  Victoires.,  Conquctes,  dr.,  xx.  241,  &c.). 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION  219 

original  centre,  to  support  the  Spaniards  on  the  right. 
By  the  time  it  arrived  the  Spaniards  were  giving  way. 
Colborne,  who  commanded  the  leading  brigade,  wrote 
two  days  afterwards:  "We  were  brought  up  under 
very  disadvantageous  circumstances,  and  obliged  to 
deploy  under  the  enemy's  fire.  The  regiments  were 
ordered  to  charge  before  the  deployment  was  complete, 
and  without  support :  in  the  act  of  charging  two  very 
heavy  columns,  a  regiment  of  Polish  cavalry  passed  by 
our  right,  which  was  unprotected,  and  having  gained 
our  rear,  the  three  right-hand  regiments  were  almost 
destroyed."  ^  The  fourth  regiment,  which  was  left  behind, 
held  the  ground  until  Hoghton's  brigade  came  up  in 
line  and  relieved  it.  The  three  battalions  of  that 
brigade  sustained  the  fight  for  some  hours,  holding  the 
fifth  corps  in  check ;  but  the  fire  was  so  heavy  that  one 
of  them  (the  57th)  lost  throe-fourths  of  its  men,  earning 
the  name  of  "  the  Diehards." 

Two  brigades  of  Cole's  division — one  British  and  one 
Portuguese — had  joined  the  army  just  as  the  battle  began, 
and  had  been  placed  by  Beresford  about  half  a  mile  to  the 
right  rear  of  the  new  front,  to  cover  his  line  of  retreat, 
with  strict  injunctions  to  remain  there.  But  the  situa- 
tion had  become  so  grave  that  while  Beresford  was  fetch- 
ing Portuguese  reinforcements,  Cole  allowed  himself  to  be 
persuaded  to  attack  the  French  columns  in  flank.  In  doing 
this  he  ran  risk  of  being  attacked  on  his  own  right  flank 
by  the  enemy's  cavalry,  which  was  very  superior  to  that 
of  the  allies.  He  advanced,  therefore,  in  echelon  from 
the  left,  two  battalions  of  the  British  (fusilier)  brigade 
being  deployed,  and  the  third  in  quarter  distance  column, 
forming  square  at  every  halt,  to  cover  the  right  of  the 
brigade.     The  Portuguese  echelons  followed,  and  a  volley 

'  Moorc-ymith,  p.  160. 


220  THE   HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

from  them  drove  off  the  Polish  lancers  when  they  tried 
to  fall  upon  the  fusiliers.' 

While  Cole  was  advancing,  Abercrombie's  brigade  of 
Stewart's  division  deployed  to  the  left  of  Hoghton's 
brigade,  and  the  French  columns  found  themselves  simul- 
taneously assailed  on_both  flanks.  The  scene  that  followed 
has  been  described  once  for  all  by  Napier.  The  French, 
enveloped  and  unable  to  extend  their  front,  or  to  make 
effective  reply  to  the  convergent  fire  to  which  they  were 
exposed,  became  discouraged.  There  was  "  un  mouvement 
tres  pronon^e  de  fluctuation " ;  ^  the  leading  regiment, 
having  lost  600  men,  gave  way,  and  the  others  followed 
in  succession.  The  fifth  corps  became  a  confused  mass 
of  fugitives  which  could  not  be  rallied  till  it  reached  the 
ground  from  which  it  had  started  in  the  morning.  The 
total  French  loss  in  the  battle  seems  to  have  been  7000.^ 
That  of  the  allies  was  about  the  same,  and  half  of  it  fell 
on  the  British  infantry,  being  a  loss  of  two  men  out  of 
three. 

A  few  weeks  before  Albuera,  an  action  was  fought  at 
Sabugal  (April  3)  between  the  Light  Division,  3000  strong, 
and  Regnier's  corps  of  11,000  men.  In  this  action,  which 
Wellington  described  as  "  one  of  the  most  glorious  that 
British  troops  were  ever  engaged  in,"  they  were  the  assail- 
ants, and  bad  weather  delayed  the  two  other  divisions 
which  were  to  have  co-operated  with  the  Light  Division. 
In  a  private  letter  Wellington  said :  "  We  have  given  the 
French  a  handsome  dressing,  a.nd  I  think  they  will  not 
say  again  that  we  are  not  a  manoeuvring  army.  We  may 
not  manoeuvre  so  beautifully  as  they  do,  but  I  don't  desire 
better  sport  than  to  meet  one  of  their  columns  en  masse 
with  our  lines." 

1  Journal  of  the  R.  U.S.  InsUlution,  xxxix.  903,  >S:c. 

-  Lapene,  p.  162.  "  Napier,  vi.  313. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION  221 

The  question  presents  itself,  how  was  it  that  the  French 
skirmishers  had  no  such  eiiect  on  the  British  lines  as  they 
had  on  the  Prussians  at  Jena.  For  one  thing,  Wellington 
placed  his  battalions,  if  he  could,  where  the  ground  gave 
them  some  cover,  behind  the  crest  of  a  ridge,  for  instance, 
or  made  them  lie  down,  instead  of  letting  them  be  a  target 
for  artillery  and  musketry.  But  in  any  case  the  British 
skirmishers  were  more  of  a  match  for  the  French  than  the 
Prussians  had  been.  The  tradition  of  hght  infantry  fight- 
ing, formed  in  America,  had  never  quite  died  out.  In 
1798  Lord  Cornwallis  wrote  to  Arthur  Wellesley,  with  re- 
ference to  the  threatened  invivsion  of  England :  "  The 
system  of  David  Dundas  and  the  total  want  of  light 
infantry  sit  heavy  on  my  mind."  ^  But  apart  from  light 
companies,  a  regiment  of  light  infantry  had  been  raised  in 
1794  (the  90th  Perthshire  Volunteers,  noAV  the  second 
battalion  of  the  Scottish  Rifles).  In  1800  a  corps  of  rifle- 
men was  formed,  which  became  the  95th  and  then  the 
Rifle  Brigade.  William  Stewart,  who  commanded  one  of 
the  divisions  at  Albuera,  was  its  lieutenant-colonel ;  and 
he  borrowed  his  system  of  training  from  German  sources, 
having  served  with  the  Austrians  in  the  campaign  of  1799 
and  watched  the  Tyrolese  Jiigers.  His  system  was  in  its 
turn  the  foundation  of  the  Shorncliflt'  drill,  by  which  Sir 
John  Moore  formed  the  regiments  of  the  Light  Division. 
In  the  Peninsula  those  regiments  (43rd,  52nd,  and  95th) 
were  brought  by  Craufurd  "  to  a  state  of  discipline  and 
knowledge  of  the  duties  of  light  infantry  which  never  was 
equalled  by  any  division  in  the  British  army,  or  surpassed 
by  any  division  of  the  French  army."  ^  There  were  also 
good  foreign  corps  of  light  troops  serving  under  Welling- 
ton, such  as  the  Portuguese  Ca9adorcs,  the  fifth  battalion 

•   C'ortiwa/lis  Correspondence,  ii.  IVM. 
'  Sir  George  Napier,  p.  224. 


222  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

of  the  60th  (formed  as  a  rifle  battalion  in  1797),  and  two 
battalions  of  the  King's  German  Legion. 

The  divisions  of  the  Russian  army  consisted  of  three 
brigades,  one  of  which  was  a  Jager  brigade :  but  it  did 
not  diifer  essentially  from  the  others.  The  Russians  did 
not  take  readily  to  light  mfantry  work ;  they  fought  best 
in  line  or  column.  There  were  six  battalions  in  a  brigade, 
and  four  companies  of  250  men  in  a  battalion.  They 
made  use  of  battalion  columns,  having  a  front  of  one 
company  and  a  strength  of  1000  men,  for  the  grenadiers 
were  not  detached.^  The  battle  of  Borodino  (September  7) 
was  the  only  pitched  battle  of  the  campaign  of  1812.  The 
French  owed  their  victory,  so  far  as  it  deserves  the  name, 
mainly  to  their  cavalry  and  artillery.  Napoleon  rejected 
Davout's  proposal  that  he  should  turn  the  Russian  left, 
lest  the  enemy  should  retire  without  fighting,  and  de- 
liberately took  the  bull  by  the  horns.  He  had  125,000 
men  massed  in  a  space  of  less  than  three  miles,  but  he 
found  once  more  how  difficult  it  was  to  dislodge  Russians 
by  a  front  attack,  especially  when  they  had  the  help  of 
intrenchments.  The  final  attack  on  the  grand  redoubt 
was  made  by  a  brigade  which  had  in  first  line  two  bat- 
talions deployed  flanked  by  two  in  column,  and  in  second 
line  four  battalions  deployed ;  but  the  redoubt  was  actually 
carried  by  cuirassiers,  who  made  their  way  into  it  by  its 
open  gorge. 

In  the  war  of  liberation  (1813-14)  both  sides  fought 
in  the  French  fashion,  but  the  French  armies  consisted 
largely  of  boys  called  up  before  their  time.  It  was  only 
the  genius  of  Napoleon,  and  the  experience  and  capacity 
of  the  officers  of  all  ranks,  that  enabled  them  to  make 
head  against  the  allies,  who  had  the  advantage  in  quality, 

'   Riistow,  ii.  331. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION  223 

and  latterly  in  numbers  also.  There  was  no  want  of  dash 
in  the  young  conscripts,  but  they  lacked  strength  and 
were  demoralised  by  defeat.  "Every  Frenchman  is  a 
soldier  in  six  weeks,  an  advantage  appertaining  to  no 
other  state,"  wrote  Sir  Robert  Wilson  after  the  battle  of 
Leipzig ;  1  but  quickness  could  not  make  up  for  immaturity, 
and  the  wastage  was  great.  "It  is  the  massacre  of  the 
Innocents  over  again,"  said  Drouot,  as  he  saw  the  con- 
scripts falling  at  the  battle  of  Laon.2 

It  was  a  very  different  army  that  Napoleon  led  against 
Blucher  and  Wellington  in  1815.  The  men  were  seasoned 
.soldiers,  devoted  to  their  emperor  and  eager  to  fight; 
but  the  brigades  and  some  of  the  regiments  were  newly 
formed,  officers  and  men  did  not  know  one  another,  and 
mimy  of  the  generals  were  suspected  of  disloyalty.  The 
material  was  excellent,  but  it  was  loosely  held  together.' 
The  Prussians  had  the  advantage  in  this  respect ;  the 
officers  were  experienced  and  trusted  by  their  men.  Most 
of  the  men  had  served  in  the  war  of  liberation,  and  they 
were  animated  by  love  of  country  and  hatred  of  the 
enemy.  The  reforms  introduced  by  Scharnhorst  had 
taken  effect  by  this  time.  The  obligation  to  serve  was 
universal,  but  it  was  settled  by  lot  which  men  should 
join  the  colours.  After  three  years  they  passed  to  the 
reserve,  and  two  years  later  to  the  landwehr,  which  had 
its  own  regiments  distinct  from  the  standing  army.  There 
was  a  first  and  a  second  call  of  landwehr,  and  the  men 
spent  seven  years  in  each.  One-third  of  Blucher's  infantry 
wius  landwehr.  At  Ligny  (June  16)  the  forces  engaged 
were  nearly  equal,  but  the  French  were  weaker  in  infantry, 
stronger  in  cavalry  and  guns.  Wellington  thought  the 
Prussians  were  badly  drawn  up,  and  predicted  that  they 
would  be  "  damnably  mauled."     They  were  dotted  about 

'  Wilson,  ii.  185.  «  Segur,  p.  347.  ^  Charras,  p.  61. 


224  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

on  ground  falling  to  the  front,  making  good  targets  for 
artillery,  and  they  had  undertaken  to  defend  two  villages 
(Ligny  and  St.  Amand)  which  lay  too  far  in  advance  of 
their  position.  The  battle  was  mainly  a  fight  of  battalion 
columns  for  the  possession  of  these  two  villages.  At  the 
end  of  five  hours  the  Prussians  were  beaten,  but  they 
retreated  in  the  night  unpursued,  and  were  able  to  pro- 
mise Wellington  that  they  would  come  to  his  assistance 
two  days  afterwards. 

The  army  with  which  Wellington,  relying  on  Prussian 
aid,  made  his  stand  at  Waterloo  (June  18),  numbered 
nearly  68,000  men.  But  out  of  50,000  infantry  less  than 
15,000  were  British;  4500  belonged  to  the  Kmg's  German 
Legion ;  the  rest  were  Dutch-Belgians  of  doubtful  staunch- 
ness, or  newly  raised  Germans.  In  point  of  numbers. 
Napoleon's  army  was  equal  to  Wellington's  in  infantry, 
superior  by  one- fourth  in  cavalry,  and  had  five  guns 
to  three. 

Reille,  who  had  seen  much  service  in  Spain,  was  ques- 
tioned by  the  emperor  about  the  English  army,  and 
said  that  "in  a  good  position,  such  as  Wellington  was 
accustomed  to  choose,  he  considered  it  invincible  by  a 
front  attack,  because  of  the  calm  tenacity  and  good 
shooting  of  its  infantry.  Before  one  could  attack  it  with 
the  bayonet  one  might  expect  to  lose  half  one's  men ; 
but  it  was  less  supple,  less  ready  in  manoeuvring  than 
our  own."  He  advised  Napoleon,  therefore,  to  manasuvre, 
but  was  met  by  an  exclamation  of  incredulity.^  At  St. 
Helena  Napoleon  praised  Turenne  for  always  observing 
two  maxims:  "(1)  Do  not  make  front  attacks  on  positions 
which  you  can  gain  by  turning  them.  (2)  Do  not  do 
what  the  enemy  wants  you  to  do,  and  avoid  it  just 
because  he  wants  it.     Shun  the  battle-field  which  he  has 

'  Segur,  Mdlanges,  p.  273. 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION  225 

reconnoitred  and  studied,  much  more  that  which  he 
has  fortified  and  where  he  is  intrenched."  ' 

But  at  Waterloo  he  disregarded  these  maxims.  It  was 
Welhngton's  hope  that  he  would  be  attacked  in  front, 
and  he  would  allow  of  no  intrenchments  lost  they  should 
discourage  a  front  attack.  His  fear  was  that  Napoleon 
would  turn  his  right,  and  move  on  Brussels  by  the  Hal 
road,  as  the  French  had  done  in  1794,  after  Fleurus. 
To  guard  against  this  contingency,  he  left  nearly  15,000 
men  at  Hal,  though  he  could  ill  spare  them. 

Wellington  had  chosen  his  ground,  as  usual,  so  that 
his  troops  should  have  cover.  The  position  was  two 
miles  long,  and  was  divided  in  half  by  the  Charleroi- 
Brussels  road,  which  ran  at  right  angles  to  it.  Napoleon 
saw  that  the  right  (or  western)  half  was  held  in  more 
strength  than  the  left,  and  he  decided  to  make  his  main 
eSbrt  against  the  left.  If  he  succeeded,  the  troops  on 
the  right  would  be  cut  off  from  the  Brussels  road  and 
from  the  Prussians.  He  reckoned  that  the  chances  were 
nine  to  one  in  his  favour,  as  the  English  were  the  only 
good  troops  in  the  allied  army.= 

The  attack  was  made  about  1.30  p.m.  by  the  four 
divisions  of  D'Erlon's  corps,  numbering  nearly  17,000 
men.  It  had  been  prepared  by  the  fire  of  eighty  guns 
placed  on  a  spur  GOO  yards  from  the  position.  The 
divisions  advanced  in  columns  of  deployed  battalions 
with  intervals  of  400  paces  between  them.  One  brigade 
of  Alix's  division  (formed  in  column  of  attack)  moved 
upon  La  Haye  Sainte  by  the  Brussels  road ;  the  other 
brigade  (four  battalions)  was  on  its  right.  To  the  right 
of  Alix's  division  came  Donzelot's  (nine  battalions),  then 
Marcognet's  (eight  battalions)  and  Durutte's  (eight  batta- 
lions).   West  of  the  Brussels  road,  a  division  of  Rcille's 

■  Napoleon  I.,  xxxii.  1:^3.  "  76.,  xxxi.  187. 


226  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

corps  moved  forward  in  support,  with  a  division  of 
cuirassiers. 

The  part  of  the  position  against  which  this  attack  was 
directed  was  held  by  two  brigades  of  Picton's  division 
(3000  men)  and  two  Hanoverian  brigades  (5000  men). 
In  front  of  them  was  Perponcher's  Dutch-Belgian  division 
(4300  men),  Bylandt's  brigade  being  on  the  forward  slope, 
and  Saxe-Weimar's  holding  hamlets  on  the  left.  The 
French  columns  advanced  in  echelon  from  the  left,  and 
Bylandt's  brigade  gave  way  before  them.  The  skir- 
mishers of  Picton's  division  were  driven  in,  and  the  gun 
detachments  of  the  twenty  pieces  which  were  on  the 
crest  of  the  ridge  had  to  leave  their  guns.  The  right 
brigade  of  Alix's  division  had  nearly  reached  the  Wavre 
road,  which  ran  along  the  crest,  when  it  was  met  by 
a  volley  and  a  charge  from  Kempt's  brigade,  and  was 
thrown  into  confusion.  Donzelot's  column  crossed  the 
road,  and  part  of  Pack's  brigade  fell  back  in  disorder; 
but  the  Union  brigade  of  dragoons  (1000  sabres.  Royals, 
Inniskillings,  and  Scots  Greys),  passing  through  the  inter- 
vals of  the  British  line,  fell  upon  the  French  infantry, 
which  broke  and  fled  down  the  slope  and  across  the 
valley.  The  right  column  (Durutte)  was  less  severely 
engaged,  but  fell  back  when  the  others  were  routed. 
The  loss  of  the  corps,  including  prisoners,  is  reckoned 
at  5000  men. 

The  unexpected  charge  of  the  British  cavalry,  which 
gave  the  French  no  time  to  form  square,  was  the  main 
cause  of  their  defeat ;  but  they  had  suffered  much  in 
their  slow  approach  over  sodden  ground  covered  with 
standing  crops.  De  Lacy  Evans  says :  "  The  enemy's 
column  [Donzelot's]  near  which  I  was,  on  arriving  at  the 
crest  of  the  position  seemed  very  helpless,  had  very  little 
fire  to  give  from   its  front  or  flanks,  was   incapable  of 


THE   FRENCH   REVOLUTION  227 

deploying,  must  have  lost  many  of  its  officers  in  coming 
up,  was  tired  into,  close,  with  impunity,  by  stragglers  of 
our  infantry  who  remained  behind." ' 

The  attack  of  D'Erlon's  corps  was  to  have  been 
supported  by  Lobau's  corps,  but  it  had  already  become 
necessary  to  send  the  latter  eastward  to  hold  the 
approaching  Prussians  in  check.  Before  the  end  of  the 
(lay  nearly  half  of  the  Imperial  Guard  was  sent  to  help 
Lobau,  so  that  the  troops  available  against  Wellington 
were  reduced  by  one-fourth. 

Nevertheless,  and  though  the  grand  attack  had  failed, 
the  strain  on  the  British  became  very  severe  as  the 
day  wore  on.  "  It  has  been  a  damned  nice  thing — the 
nearest  run  thing  you  ever  saw  in  your  life : "  so 
Wellington  told  Creevey  next  day.  The  capture  of 
La  Haye  Sainte  (towards  6  p.m.)  enabled  the  French 
skirmishers  to  establish  themselves  within  sixty  yards 
of  the  centre  of  the  position,  and  to  bring  up  guns ; 
while  the  incessant  charges  of  the  French  cavalry  kept 
the  allied  infantry  in  squares.  The  27th  regiment  had 
more  than  two-thirds  of  its  men  shot  down ;  the  30th 
and  73rd,  formed  in  one  square,  lost  40  per  cent. 
Kielmansegge's  Hanoverian  brigade  suffered  so  much 
that  it  gave  way,  leaving  a  gap  in  the  position ;  and 
some  Nassau  troops,  brought  up  to  fill  the  gap,  also 
gave  way,  and  fired  at  Wellington  when  he  tried  to 
rally  them.  But  the  head  of  a  second  Prussian  corps 
(Ziethen)  was  by  this  time  within  two  miles  of  the 
allied  left,  and  soon  allowed  the  Duke  to  draw  some 
of  his  troops  from  that  part  of  the  position. 

About  7.30  P.M.  Napoleon  sent  forward  the  Guard 
to  decide  the  battle,  as  it  had  decided  that  of  Ligny 
at  the  same  hour  two  days  before.  But  of  the  twenty- 
'  Waterloo  Letters,  p.  (51. 


228  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

four  battalions,  ten  were  engaged  with  the  Prussians, 
seven  were  kept  back  as  reserves,  and  only  seven  took 
part  in  the  attack.  These  were  all  of  the  Middle 
Guard,  and  with  one  battalion  left  behind  they  made 
up  its  four  regiments.  The  average  strength  of  the 
battalions  was  500  men.  They  were  at  first  formed 
in  squares,  the  weaker  battalions  being  coupled,  so  that 
there  were  two  squares  of  grenadiers  on  the  right  and 
three  of  chasseurs  on  the  left.^  They  advanced  in 
echelon  from  the  right,  and  the  five  squares  seem  to 
have  become  two  columns,  one  of  grenadiers  leading, 
and  one  of  chasseurs  following  to  its  left  rear.  They 
were  directed,  not  against  the  weakened  centre  of  the 
position,  but  towards  the  right,  where  Maitland's  brigade 
of  Guards  (1500  men)  was  posted,  with  Adam's  brigade 
(2500  men)  on  its  right.^ 

The  two  brigades  were  formed  four  deep  to  meet  the 
attack,  as  the  Duke  expected  that  cavalry  would  take 
part  in  it;  and  the  men  were  lying  down  behind  the 
crest  of  the  ridge.  When  the  column  of  grenadiers 
had  come  within  fifty  paces,  the  Guards  rose,  fired  a 
volley,  and  charged ;  the  column,  "  crippled  and  broken, 
retreated  with  the  utmost  rapidity,"  ^  says  General 
Maitland,  and  the  Guards,  after  pursuing  it  down  the 
slope,  returned  to  their  position.  The  second  column 
(chasseurs)  soon  approached  the  right  of  Maitland's 
brigade ;  but  Colborne,  colonel  of  the  52nd  (of  Adam's 
brigade),  wheeled  his  regiment  70°  to  the  left,  so  that 
its  front  was  nearly  parallel  to  the  flank  of  the  column, 
and  advanced  upon  it  in  two  lines,  thi-owing  out  one 
company  as   skirmishers.      The   column   halted,  and   its 

»  Houssaye,  pp.  389,  &c. 

=  Vniled  Service  Magazine,  April  1900,  pp.  SS-fi;",  '■  Tlie  La.st  French 
Charge  at  Waterloo." 

'  Waterloo  Letters,  p.  245. 


THE  FRENCH   REVOLUTION  229 

Hank  sections  wheeled  up  to  form  a  line  facing  the 
52nd;  but  when  that  regiment  charged,  it  broke  "into 
the  wildest  confusion,"  and  fled  to  the  low  ground  south 
of  La  Haye  Sainte.i 

The  troops  of  D'Erlon's  corps  had  renewed  their 
pressure  on  the  allied  centre  and  left  when  the  Imperial 
Guard  advanced,  but  they  fell  back  when  they  saw  it 
was  beaten,  and  soon  the  whole  French  army  was  in 
(light. 

"  Never  did  I  see  such  a  pounding  match.  Both  were 
what  the  boxers  call  '  gluttons.'  Napoleon  did  not 
manoeuvre  at  all.  He  just  moved  forward  in  the  old 
style,  in  columns,  and  was  driven  off  in  the  old  style. 
The  only  diflercnce  was,  that  he  mixed  cavalry  with 
his  infantry,  and  supported  both  with  an  enormous 
quantity  of  artillery.  I  had  the  infantry  for  some  time 
in  squares,  and  we  had  the  French  cavalry  walking 
about  us  as  if  they  had  been  our  own.  I  never  saw 
the  British  infantry  behave  so  well."  - 

Such  was  Wellington's  account  of  the  battle  to 
Beresford  a  fortnight  afterwards. 

'  Waterloo  Letters,  p.  2'Ja.  -  Gurwood,  p.  872. 


IX 

THE  NINETEENTH    CENTURY:  I.  (1816-1866) 

Bitter  experience  set  the  continental  powers  to  the  work 
of  amending  their  military  institutions  during  and  after 
the  Napoleonic  wars.  England  had  fared  better,  and  had 
reason  to  be  proud  of  the  part  which  her  soldiers,  as  well 
as  her  sailors,  had  played.  There  was  strong  popular 
pressure  for  retrench'nent,  but  none  for  reform  in  army 
matters.  The  limited  Enlistment  Act,  passed  in  1806, 
had  not  fulfilled  Windham's  anticipations,  and  in  1829  it 
was  dropped,  to  be  revived  in  a  different  form  twenty  years 
later.  Recruits  were  tempted  by  bounties  to  engage  for 
life,  and  flogging  was  freely  used  to  check  desertion  and 
maintain  discipline.  The  well-earned  weight  of  Welling- 
ton was  on  the  side  of  conservatism.  He  regarded  it  as 
inevitable  that  the  British  soldier  should  be  drawn  from 
the  dregs  of  the  population,  and  should  be  subjected  to  a 
more  severe  system  than  was  needed  for  soldiers  drawn 
from  all  classes  under  conscription.  There  was  a  differ- 
ence, too,  in  the  officers  :  "  The  duty  of  a  subaltern  officer, 
as  done  in  a  foreign  army,  is  not  done  at  all  in  the  cavalry 
or  the  British  infantry  of  the  line.  It  is  done  in  the 
Guards  by  the  sergeants."  ^ 

The  militia,  as  remodelled  by  the  elder  Pitt  in  1757, 
was  raised  by  ballot,  hut  substitutes  were  allowed.  In  the 
great  war  the  militia  was  embodied,  and  the  price  of  sub- 
stitutes rose  high  (to  £60  or  more).    This  interfered  with 

'  Gurwood,  p.  920. 


THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY  231 

recnuting  for  the  regular  army,  which  was  allowed,  there- 
fore, to  obtain  men  from  the  militia.  About  4U  per  cent, 
of  its  recruits  were  drawn  from  this  source,'  and  they  were 
men  already  trained  ;  so  that  the  militia  became  a  feeder 
to  the  array,  as  well  as  a  reserve.  In  1808  a  "local 
militia  "  was  created,  to  be  i-aised  by  ballot  without  sub- 
stitutes, but  its  ranks  were  mainly  filled  by  means  of  a 
small  bounty.  At  the  end  of  1813  this  force  numbered 
nearly  300,000  men,  the  volunteers  and  yeomanry  65,000, 
the  general  militia  83,000,  and  the  regulars  237,000, 
making  a  total  of  685,000  men  found  by  a  population  of 
less  than  twenty  millions.  After  the  peace  of  1815  the 
Ballot  Act  was  suspended,  the  volunteers  disappeared,  the 
militia  and  yeomanry  became  mere  cadres,  and  the  army 
was  reduced  to  about  100,000  men.  It  was  an  aggregate 
of  regiments,  without  higher  organisation,  without  trans- 
port, and  with  few  opportunities  of  training  outside  the 
barrack  square. 

The  linear  tactics  had  served  the  British  so  well  that 
they  remained  substantially  unchanged.  The  formation 
in  two  ranks,  which  had  long  been  customary,  received 
official  recognition  in  1824  ;  and  the  drill-book  of  that 
year  also  took  account,  for  the  first  time,  of  the  training 
of  light  infantry.  Otherwise  there  was  little  alteration 
in  the  system  of  infantry  movements  which  Dundas  had 
borrowed  from  the  Prussians ;  and  even  fifty  years  later 
it  could  be  said  that  "  the  fighting  tactics  of  Frederick 
the  Great,  improved  by  the  Duke  of  Wellington  to  suit 
the  arms  of  his  day,  are  still  alone  to  be  found  in  our 
Field  Exercise  Book."- 

It  was  much  the  same  with  the  French  regulations  : 
those  of  1831  followed  the  general  arrangement  and  the 
spirit  of  Guibert's  compilation  of  1791,  and  the  regulations 
'  Goodenough,  p.  23.  "  Wolseley,  p.  273. 


232  THE   HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

of  1862  were  on  the  same  lines  as  those  of  1831.'  The 
drill-book  of  1791  lent  itself,  as  already  pointed  out  (p. 
183),  either  to  column  or  linear  tactics.  Some  military 
writers  {e.g.  Rogniat),  influenced  by  the  British  victories, 
advocated  the  habitual  use  of  line  rather  than  column, 
whether  for  attack  or  defence.  Bugeaud  was  inclined  to 
favour  it,  because  it  alone  "  allows  infantry  to  make  use  of 
its  fire,  which  is  its  main  strength."  -  Morand,  one  of  the 
most  distinguished  of  the  divisional  generals  of  the  Empire, 
maintained  that  no  formation  suited  the  various  contin- 
gencies of  the  battle-field  so  well  as  the  battalion  column, 
formed  on  the  centre  by  divisions  (or  double  companies) 
at  platoon  distance.  The  columns  should  be  in  one  or  two 
lines,  with  deploying  intervals  between  them,  with  their 
light  companies  skirmishing  in  front,  and  their  grenadiers 
as  a  reserve  in  rear.^  Jomini  also  held  that  battalion 
columns  formed  the  best  order  of  attack.  All  agreed  in 
blaming  the  massive  columns  which  had  been  made  use 
of  in  the  later  years  of  the  Empire :  "  Such  masses  are 
exposed  to  the  ravages  of  artillery,  and  involve  a  loss  of 
mobility  and  momentum  without  any  gain  of  strength."  * 
The  formation  of  infantry  in  two  ranks,  instead  of  three, 
was  much  discussed.  Jomini  thought  it  would  be  of 
advantage  as  diminishing  the  depth  of  columns ;  but 
"what  European  army  (except  the  English)  could  be 
trusted  in  line  only  two  deep."  ^  The  Archduke  Charles 
had  come  to  the  conclusion,  after  trial  with  Austrian 
troops,  that  a  third  rank  was  necessary  for  a  bayonet 
charge  or  to  resist  cavalry,  and  desirable  for  a  steady 
advance  and  for  musketry  fighting.*'  Four  days  before 
the  battle  of  Leipzig  Napoleon  had  issued  orders  that  all 


Trochu,  p.  210. 

-  Tbiry,  p.  10. 

Morand,  pp.  137,  &c. 

*  Jomini,  ii.  228. 

Jomini,  ii.  226. 

'  Karl,  pp.  4,  &c 

THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY  233 

the  infiintry  should  be  t'ormed  two  deep.  This  was  partly  m 
order  that  the  battalions  might  seem  to  the  enemy  to  be 
half  as  strong  again  as  they  were,  but  also  because  he  was 
satisfied  that  the  fire  of  the  third  rank  and  the  bayonet  of 
the  third  rank  were  of  no  value.'  Indeed  they  were  worse 
than  useless,  for  they  caused  so  many  injuries  among  the 
young  conscripts  that  Napoleon  at  first  believed  they  were 
mutilating  themselves  on  purpose.  As  St.  Cyr  says,  what- 
ever may  be  laid  down  as  to  the  first  rank  kneeling  when 
the  three  ranks  have  to  fire,  or  the  third  rank  only  loading 
for  the  second,  all  ranks  will  fire,  with  or  without  orders, 
when  they  hear  the  bullets  whistle  past  their  ears.-  Mar- 
mont  declared  that  there  was  nothing  to  justify  a  third 
rank ;  nevertheless  it  was  retained  as  an  optional  formation 
in  the  French  service  till  1859,  and  even  then  old  soldiers 
shook  their  heads  at  its  abandonment  on  the  eve  of  a  war. 
In  the  Prussian  service  also  the  third  rank  was  retained, 
but  it  was  to  be  used  in  the  field  for  skirmishing ;  so  that 
the  battaUon  was  practically  two  deep  in  line,  or  eight 
deep  in  column,  formed  on  the  two  centre  subdivisions.' 
The  strength  of  the  battalion  was  1000  men,  on  a  war 
footing ;  but,  mainly  for  the  sake  of  economy,  it  consisted 
of  four  companies  only.  After  the  peace  of  1815  there 
was  a  reaction  towards  the  rigid  close-order  drill  of  the 
old  school,  as  the  best  training  for  short-service  soldiers. 
The  king,  Frederick  William  III.,  inclined  that  way,  as 
did  his  second  son,  afterwards  William  I.  The  drill-book 
of  1812,  inspired  by  Scharnhorst,  was  supplemented  by  a 
series  of  orders  which  restrained  the  freedom  it  had  given 
to  commanders.''  The  inspections  of  the  troops  took  place 
on  the  drill-ground,  and  were  concerned  with  movements 
in  close  order. 

'  Corrciipondance,  October  13,  1813.     =  Gouvion  St.  Cyr.,  vol.  i.  p.  xliv. 
'  Riistow,  ii.  322.  «  Blunic,  p.  90. 


234  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

After  the  accession  of  Frederick  William  IV.  the  advo- 
cates of  progress  met  with  more  attention.  A  new  drill- 
book,  issued  in  1847,  gave  full  recognition  to  the  company 
column  as  a  handy  alternative  to  the  battalion  column. 
The  company  column  was  six  deep  or  twelve  deep.  To 
meet  the  varying  requirements  of  the  skirmisher-fight  it 
was  found  better  to  use  whole  companies  as  units  than  to 
depend  on  the  third-rank  men.  The  two  flank  companies 
were  sent  forward  to  form  the  skirmish  line  and  its  sup- 
ports, the  two  centre  companies  (or  at  least  one  of  them) 
being  kept  in  column  as  a  reserve.  This  led  to  more 
independent  action  on  the  part  of  the  captains  of  com- 
panies, who  passed  to  some  extent  out  of  the  control  of 
the  battalion  commandsr.^ 

The  methodising  of  skirmishing,  the  full  development 
and  maintenance  of  musketry  fire  as  a  preparation  for  the 
decisive  shock  by  columns,  and  in  combination  with  the 
action  of  artillery  and  cavalry,  had  become  the  chief 
military  problem ;  and  its  importance  grew  with  every 
improvement  in  fire-arms.  After  prolonged  trials,  flints 
were  superseded  by  percussion  caps,  which  reduced  mis- 
fires to  insignificance,  lessened  recoil  and  improved  the 
shooting,  both  in  accuracy  and  rapidity.  A  percussion 
musket  was  adopted  for  the  British  infantry  in  1842. 
Even  with  this  improved  weapon  it  was  found  that  half 
the  shots  missed  a  six-foot  target  at  200  yards. 

It  had  long  been  known — at  all  events  from  the  middle 
of  the  sixteenth  century — that  better  shooting  was  ob- 
tained from  rifled  barrels.  But  they  were  expensive,  and 
the  gain  in  accuracy  was  counterbalanced  by  difficulty 
and  delay  in  loading,  as  the  spherical  bullet  had  to  be 
forced  down  (sometimes  with  a  mallet)  to  take  the 
grooves.  They  were  used  at  first  for  target  shootmg  and 
>  Rustow,  ii.  334. 


THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY  235 

sport.  In  the  latter  part  of  the  seventeenth  century  some 
of  the  German  princes  employed  mountaineers  as  sharp- 
shooters, who  brought  their  rifles  with  them.  Louis  XIV. 
followed  the  example,  and  in  107!)  he  ordered  that  two 
men  in  every  company  of  horse  should  be  armed  with 
rifled  carbines.  As  in  the  case  of  the  grenadiers,  these 
carbineers  were  soon  gathered  into  separate  companies, 
and  the  companies  brought  together  into  brigades,  form- 
ing one  of  the  most  distinguished  corps  of  the  French 
army.  Rifled  arms  were  also  supplied  for  two  men  in 
every  company  of  foot.  The  bullets  were  made  of  two 
sizes,  the  smaller  to  be  used  when  speed  in  loading  was 
more  important  than  accuracy. 

The  corps  of  J<\gers  and  chasseurs  raised  in  the  latter 
part  of  the  eighteenth  century  were  armed  with  rifles, 
wholly  or  partially.  The  British  corps  formed  in  1800 
(which  ultimately  became  the  Rifle  Brigade)  had  the 
Baker  rifle,  2  feet  6  inches  in  length  of  barrel,  and  with 
bullets  20  to  the  pound.  A  marksman  was  expected  to 
hit  a  target  4  feet  in  diameter  twice  out  of  three  times  at 
200  yards,  but  the  rate  of  firing  was  only  one  round  per 
minute.  The  need  of  special  ammunition  for  riflemen 
was  a  drawback :  it  was  the  cause  of  the  loss  of  La  Haye 
Samte  at  Waterloo.  The  Jagers  of  the  King's  German 
Legion  who  formed  the  garrison  expended  all  their 
cartridges,  and  the  reserve  supply  could  not  be  found.' 

Napoleon  laid  stress  on  uniformity  of  armament,  and 
rifled  carbines  were  provided  only  for  the  officers  and 
under-officers  of  the  voltigeurs,  not  for  the  men.^  France 
alone  had  no  corps  of  riflemen,  until  improvements 
mainly  due  to  French  officers  gave  rifles  a  new  value. 
Spherical  bullets  were  replaced  by  elongated  bullets 
hollowed  at  the  base,  which  were  expanded  to  take  the 

'  Omptctla,  p.  :!(I9.  -  Corrcspondance,  March  1.3,  IS04. 


236  THE   HISTORY   OF  INFANTRY 

rifling  by  the  explosion  of  the  powder  charge.  This  not 
only  got  rid  of  the  difficulty  of  loading,  but  gave  increased 
range  and  accuracy  and  allowed  the  calibre  to  be  reduced. 
The  change,  worked  out  during  the  second  quarter  of 
the  nineteenth  century,  produced  a  weapon  so  superior 
to  the  smooth-bore  musket  that  it  was  bound  to  super- 
sede it. 

The  Minie  rifle  was  introduced  into  the  British  service 
in  1851  for  the  infantry  generally;  it  was  replaced  by 
the  Enfield  pattern  four  years  afterwards.  In  Austria 
and  Russia  the  course  adopted  at  first  was  to  arm  a 
certain  number  of  men  in  each  company  with  rifles. 
The  French  had  formed,  in  1838-40,  a  special  corps  of 
chasseurs  a  pied,  trained  to  manoeuvre  at  five  miles  an 
hour  (pas  gymnastique).  These  troops  were  intended 
for  service  in  Algeria.  They  were  armed  with  rifles 
{carabines  a  tige)  and  sword  bayonets.  The  number  of 
battalions,  ten  in  1840,  rose  to  twenty  in  1853,  and  they 
became  the  light  infantry  of  the  French  army.  There 
was  another  special  corps,  the  Zouaves,  which  was  raised 
for  Algerian  warfare.  Named  after  a  tribe  of  Kabyles 
the  (Zouaoua),  it  was  meant  to  consist  mainly  of  natives, 
and  the  uniform  was  a  modified  Eastern  dress.  But  many 
of  the  natives  deserted  at  Abd-el-Kader's  call  in  1839,  and 
the  African  element  was  reduced  to  one  company  in  each 
battalion.  Trained  by  Lamoriciere  to  work  and  to  fight, 
like  the  Roman  legionary,  and  constantly  in  the  field 
against  a  mobile  enemy,  the  Zouaves  became  a  model 
of  efliciency,  a  picked  corps  to  which  officers  and  men 
sought  admission.  In  1852  they  were  raised  to  three 
regiments  of  three  battalions  each,  and  soon  afterwards 
they  were  armed  with  rifles.^  The  French  infantry 
generally  were  not  so  armed  till  1857. 
'  [Aumale],  pp.  1 1-89. 


THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY  237 

A  breech-loading  rifled  musket  (the  needle  gun)  had 
been  invented  by  Dreyse,  and  was  adopted  by  the 
Prussian  Government  in  1841.  A  stock  of  these  arms 
was  gradually  accumulated  in  the  arsenal  at  Berlin,  to 
be  issued  to  the  troops  in  case  of  war,  and  take  an  enemy 
unawares.  The  disturbances  of  1848  put  an  end  to  all 
secrecy  about  this  weapon,  and  the  whole  of  the  Prussian 
infantry  was  gradually  provided  with  it  between  1853  and 
1858.'  Seven  shots  a  minute  could  be  fired  with  it ;  but 
there  was  much  doubt  abroad  as  to  its  suitability  for 
general  use  in  the  field.  As  regards  the  effective  range 
and  accuracy  of  musketry  fire,  they  may  be  said  to  have 
been  increased  fourfold  by  the  adoption  of  rifles  with 
elongated  bullets.  But  men  must  be  good  shots  to  turn 
the  new  arms  to  full  account,  and  much  more  attention 
began  to  be  paid  to  instruction  in  musketry.  So  little 
had  been  done  in  former  days  that  we  find  Berthier 
giving  orders,  on  the  eve  of  passing  the  St.  Bernard  in 
1800,  that  all  the  conscripts  should  fire  a  few  shots, 
"  that  they  may  know  which  eye  to  aim  with  and  how 
to  load  their  muskets."-  Napoleon  In  1811  approved  ot 
target  practice  for  the  recruits,  but  desired  that  inferior 
powder  should  be  used  for  it.^ 

After  nearly  forty  years  of  peace  between  the  great 
powers,  came  the  Crimean  war,  and  for  the  first  time 
British  troops  encountered  Russians.  Each  adhered  to 
their  old  tactics,  and  it  was  once  more  line  against 
column.  At  the  battle  of  the  Alma  (September  20,  1854) 
two-thirds  of  the  Russian  army  held  that  part  of  the 
position  against  which  the  British  attack  was  directed,  so 
that  the  numbers  there  were  equal — 24,000  on  each  side. 

'  Rustow,  ii.  .37r>.  -  nerr^cagaix,  i.  399. 

■'  Corre.sjxjndance,  October  :J0,  1811. 


238  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

The  Russians  had  the  advantage  in  guns  and  cavah-y. 
On  arriving  within  a  mile  of  the  Russian  batteries,  four 
divisions  of  British  infantry  deployed  into  two  hnes,  with 
one  battalion  of  riflemen  thrown  forward  as  skirmishers. 
The  troops  then  advanced  under  a  heavy  fire  of  artillery. 
They  had  to  pass  through  vineyards,  and  to  cross  a  stream 
with  high  banks ;  and  on  the  right  a  village  which  had 
been  set  on  fire  stood  in  their  way.  Consequently  the 
attack  was  begun,  not  in  orderly  lines,  "  but  with  such 
attempts  at  lines  as  the  men  themselves,  instinctively 
seeking  their  own  companies,  succeeded  in  making,  that 
is  to  say,  a  line  chiefly  of  groups  and  masses." '  Some 
battalions  had  to  reform  column,  and  two  on  the  left 
formed  square  to  resist  cavalry. 

Codrington's  brigade  of  the  Light  Division,  with  the 
two  battalions  to  right  and  left  of  it,  advanced  upon 
the  main  battery  and  carried  it,  the  guns  being  with- 
drawn from  it  on  their  approach.  But  a  heavy  Russian 
column  of  four  battalions,  supported  by  others,  forced 
them  to  fall  back  to  the  stream,  having  lost  25  per  cent, 
of  their  men.  There  they  were  relieved  by  the  brigade 
of  Guards,  which  advanced  in  better  order,  drove  back 
the  Russians,  and  reoccupied  the  battery.  The  French 
had  crossed  the  Alma  lower  down,  and  had  cHmbed  the 
heights,  meeting  with  comparatively  little  resistance. 
They  now  threatened  the  left  flank  of  the  Russians, 
who  after  three  hours'  fighting  retreated  on  Sebastopol. 
Their  loss  had  been  very  heavy,  double  the  loss  of  the 
allies. 

Nearly  all  the  British  infantry  were  armed  with  rifles, 
but  only  a  small  proportion  of  the  Russians.  Moltke, 
commentmg  on  the  battle  ten  years  afterwards,  attri- 
buted their  defeat  partly  to  this  difference  of  armament, 

'  Hamley,  p.  5G. 


THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY  239 

partly  to  their  neglect  of  intrenchnients  and  reliance  on 
bayonet  attacks  by  massive  columns.  At  the  same  time 
he  pointed  out  that  the  British  line  had  become  "an 
irregular  chain  of  skirmishers,  in  which  the  men,  not 
only  of  different  companies,  but  even  of  different  regi- 
ments, got  so  mixed  up  together  that  it  became  no  longer 
possible  to  fire  volleys,  or  to  make  any  regular  move- 
ments."' His  conclusion  was  that  small  columns  are 
best  for  attack,  line  for  receiving  attack,  and  that  the 
Prussian  system  of  company  columns  meets  all  con- 
tingencies. 

At  the  battle  of  Inkerman  (November  5)  the  parts  were 
reversed  :  the  Russians  were  the  assailants.  Under  cover 
of  the  morning  mist,  15,000  men  suddenly  attacked  the 
Inkerman  plateau,  which  formed  the  right  of  the  British 
positions.  They  were  supported  by  a  powerful  artillery, 
and  were  confronted  by  only  3600  men ;  yet  they  were 
driven  back  so  shattered  and  disorganised  that  they  could 
not  be  brought  forward  again.  By  the  Czar's  order  the 
leading  troops  had  been  formed  in  company  columns; 
but  owing  to  the  cramped  space  and  broken  ground  they 
soon  gathered  into  dense  crowds  on  which  the  British 
tire  told  very  severely.  The  rifle  was  of  even  more 
service  here  than  at  the  Alma ;  the  Russian  gunners 
were  shot  down  at  a  range  of  half  a  mile.  The  British 
line  again  resolved  itself  into  a  chain  of  knots  and  groups 
of  men  fighting  independently. 

Renewed  attacks  were  made  by  fresh  regiments,  for 
36,000  men  had  been  directed  against  the  plateau  ;  and 
these  attacks  were  pushed  with  more  vigour,  and  met 
with  some  success.  "  What  a  slaughter  yard  ! "  said 
General  Bosquet,  as  he  rode  past  the  Sandbag  battery, 
which  was  taken  and  retaken   several   times.     But   the 

'  MoUke,  pp.  (il,  .332. 


240  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

numbers  of  the  allies  rose  to  12,000,  of  whom  more  than 
half  were  French ;  their  artillery  became  predominant ; 
and  by  midday  the  Russian  general  recognised  that  his 
attempt  had  failed.  It  had  cost  him  over  10,000  men, 
more  than  three  times  the  loss  of  the  allies.  Making 
all  allowances  for  the  difficulties  attending  it,  it  ought 
to  have  succeeded.  Fifty'  years  afterwards  an  eye- 
witness wrote  of  the  Russian  assault  on  the  Motien-ling 
(July  17,  1904) :  "  It  is  passing  strange  that  soldiers  so 
steady  and  formidable  in  retreat  should  be  so  slow  and 
so  sticky  in  the  attack.  They  exposed  themselves  for 
a  time  with  admirable  coolness  to  heavy  losses  in  in- 
ferior positions.  Then,  with  equal  indifference  to  danger, 
they  withdrew  to  their  camp."  ^ 

Towards  the  end  of  the  siege  the  Russians  made  an- 
other attack  in  force  upon  the  intrenched  positions  on  the 
Tchernaya,  held  by  18,000  French  and  9000  Sardinians 
(August  16,  1855).  The  Russians  brought  up  48,000 
infantry,  10,000  cavalry,  and  more  than  300  guns.  They 
twice  forced  the  Traktir  bridge  over  the  river,  and  pressed 
up  the  slope  of  the  French  position  ;  but  were  driven  back 
again  by  the  charge  of  the  French  infantry,  and  at  length 
retreated,  having  lost  8000  men.  They  showed  astonish- 
ing fortitude  and  tenacity  in  defence  of  their  own  works, 
but  in  the  field  they  certainly  fell  short  of  their  old 
achievements  in  the  wars  of  Frederick  and  Napoleon. 
Their  strength  had  always  lain  in  shock  tactics,  and  the 
increased  effect  of  fire-arms  would  in  any  case  have  told 
against  them,  even  if  they  had  been  as  well  armed  as  their 
opponents. 

If  the  French  happened  to  play  a  secondary  part  at  the 
beginning  of  this  war,  they  made  up  for  it  afterwards ; 
and  by  storming  the  Malakhow  they  took  Sebastopol.  An 
'  Hamilton,  ii.  27y. 


THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY  241 

Italian  officer  who  was  present  at  the  siege  praised  the 
extraordinary  solidity  of  the  English,  but  found  them 
otherwise  inferior  to  the  French  in  the  art  of  war :  less 
skilful  in  manoeuvring,  less  vigilant  against  surprise,  and 
less  fit  to  look  after  themselves  in  respect  of  shelter  and 
subsistence.' 

The  war  of  Italian  liberation  in  1859  gave  better  oppor- 
tunities of  judging  of  the  army  of  the  Second  Empire.  It 
contributed  two-thirds  of  the  Franco-Sardinian  forces, 
which,  like  the  Austrians  opposed  to  them,  numbered 
about  200,000  men.  The  French  regiments  of  the  line 
were  still  only  partially  armed  with  rifles,  and  the  Lorenz 
rifle  with  which  the  Austrians  were  armed  was  better  than 
the  French  weapons.  On  the  other  hand,  the  French  had 
some  rifled  guns,  which  now  appeared  for  the  first  time  on 
the  battle-field  and  doubled  the  effective  range  of  artillery. 

Under  the  law  of  1S32  only  about  one  in  four  of  the 
young  men  who  reached  the  military  age  was  called  up  to 
serve  in  the  French  army,  and  the  term  of  service  was 
seven  years.  Substitutes  were  allowed,  and  in  1855  the 
State  undertook  to  provide  them,  exonerating  conscripts 
for  a  fixed  payment.  The  result  was  that  one-third  of  the 
men  in  the  ranks  had  more  than  seven  years'  service, 
having  been  tempted  to  re-engage  by  bounties  and  pen- 
sions. This  system  suited  Napoleon  III.  on  political 
grounds,  and  was  in  harmony  with  the  views  of  his  uncle, 
who  said  that  soldiers  should  be  encouraged  by  all  means 
to  remain  with  the  colours.^  In  the  Austrian  army  the 
term  of  service  was  eight  years,  but  men  were  kept  only 
two  or  three  years  with  the  colours ;  "  and  the  young 
Austrians  were  no  match  for  the  unyielding  tenacity 
which  distinguished  the  French  regiments,  stiffened  by 

'  Govone,  p.  85.  -  Napoleon  I.,  .x.xxi.  ,304. 

Q 


242  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

long  years  of  service,  and  by  previous  experience  of  war."  ^ 
Two-thirds  of  the  French  subalterns  and  captains  had 
risen  from  the  ranks,  but  only  a  small  proportion  of  the 
staff  or  commanding  otBcers.  The  Austrians  and  French 
were  organised  in  army  corps  ;  the  Sardinians  in  strong 
divisions  which  included  two  battalions  of  sharpshooters 
(bersaglieri).  The  Austrians  had  reserve  divisions  of 
cavalry  outside  the  corps  organisation. 

At  Montebello  (May  20),  the  first  action  of  the  war,  a 
reconnaissance  in  force  made  by  five  Austrian  brigades 
was  brought  to  a  check  by  a  single  French  division,  which 
inflicted  on  them  a  loss  double  its  own.  "  The  French 
distinguished  themselves  by  tactical  skill,  good  use  of  the 
ground,  and  above  all  by  a  vigorous  offensive."  ^  The 
Austrian  commander  was  led  to  report  that  he  had  been 
engaged  with  at  least  40,000  of  the  enemy.  This  informa- 
tion, which  was  quite  misleading,  was  regarded  by  Gyulai, 
the  commander-in-chief,  as  a  mo.st  valuable  result  of  the 
reconnaissance,  justifying  his  own  dispositions. 

At  Magenta  (June  4)  the  French  infantry  again  showed 
itself  very  superior  in  energy  and  perseverance,  in  sagacity 
and  initiative.^  The  frontal  attack  on  the  canal  which 
formed  the  Austrian  line  of  defence  was  made  some  hours 
before  Macmahon  was  ready  to  support  it  by  his  flank 
attack  from  Turbigo.  The  bridges  were  stormed  by  the 
grenadiers  and  Zouaves  of  the  Imperial  Guard,  and  were 
held  against  three  times  their  own  numbers  until  other 
corps  came  up.  As  in  the  days  of  the  Revolution,  the 
French  attacked  in  battalion  columns  of  double  com- 
panies covered  by  skirmishers  :  whole  battalions  sometime.s 
fed  the  skirmisher-line ;  and  its  fire  told  very  severely  on 
the  Austrian  columns. 

The  same  qualities  were  shown  at  Solferino  (June  24). 
1  [Moltke],  p.  185.  '  -  lb.,  p.  50.  ^  lb.,  p.  96. 


THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY  243 

As  Chesney  says :  "  The  capture  of  ihe  hill  of  Solferino 
was  the  fruit  of  long  light  infantry  training,  improved  by 
experience  in  rough  Algerian  skirmish,  and  stimulated  to 
the  utmost  quickness  consistent  with  order  by  the  example 
of  the  dashing  Zouave — the  pattern  of  such  soldiers — and 
by  the  natural  intelligence  of  the  French  recruit."  >  But 
a  more  remarkable  feature  of  this  battle  was  the  prolonged 
and  successful  stand  made  in  the  plain  of  Medole,  mainly 
by  Niel's  corps,  against  the  three  corps  which  constituted 
the  first  Austrian  army.  The  French,  though  superior  in 
cavalry  and  artillery,  had  only  30,000  infantry  here  to 
oppose  to  .50.000;  and  the  men  were  for  the  most  part 
armed  with  smooth-bore  muskets.  According  to  Niel,  "  so 
long  as  it  was  a  musketry  fight  I  lost  ground,  owing  to  the 
enemy's  advantage  in  number.  Then  I  formed  a  column 
of  attack  with  one  of  the  battalions  of  my  reserve,  and  we 
won  back  with  the  bayonet  more  than  we  had  lost  with 
the  fusilade."  ^  Three  successive  efforts  on  the  part  of  the 
Austrians  failed ;  and  the  French  had  begun  to  take  the 
otlensive  in  this  part  of  the  field,  when  a  violent  thunder- 
storm put  an  end  to  the  battle.  The  loss  of  Niel's  corps 
was  over  20  per  cent. 

A  general  order  issued  by  the  French  emperor  shortly 
afterwards  directed  that,  when  fighting  on  the  defensive, 
"  the  lines  of  infantry  will  be  disposed,  when  the  ground 
permits,  alternately  in  battalions  deployed  and  in  bat- 
talions in  double  colunm  ;  useless  fire  of  skirmishers  will 
be  avoided ;  and  while  the  deployed  battalions  engage  in 
file-firing,  the  others  will  beat  the  charge  and  attack  the 
enemy  with  the  bayonet."  ^ 

The  French  troops  had,  as  of  old,  the  defects  of  their 
qualities.      Napoleon   III.  had   thought  it  necessary  to 

'  Edinburgh  Review,  January  IHHii.  2  Duquet,  p.  28S. 

'   Hamley,  Operations  of  War.  p.  323. 


244  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

caution  them  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign :  "  In 
battle  remain  in  close  order,  and  do  not  leave  your  ranks 
to  rush  forward.  Be  on  your  guard  against  too  much 
dash ;  that  is  the  only  thing  I  am  afraid  of."  ^  Those 
impetuous  rushes,  well  described  as  a  fmte  en  avant, 
under  provocation  of  the  enemy's  fire,  were  frequent 
incidents  according  to  Trochu,  who  was  one  of  the  best 
divisional  commanders.  He  attributed  them  largely  to 
Algerian  warfare,  which  had  developed  individualism  to 
excess ;  for  though  the  French  temperament  was  always 
vehement,  it  had  shown  itself  capable  of  self-control  in  the 
great  wars.-  He  complained  also  of  the  enervating  effect 
of  picked  corps,  such  as  the  Imperial  Guard  (revived  in 
1854)  and  the  chasieiors  a  pied,  which  made  the  mass 
of  the  army  a  mere  residuum.  At  the  same  time  he 
recommended  that  each  battalion  should  have  its  com- 
pany of  sharpshooters,  as  he  was  convinced  that  the 
ordinary  soldier  never  aims  in  action. 

But  Trochu  Avas  an  exception.  The  war  of  1859  left 
the  French  army  as  a  whole  well  pleased  with  itself,  and 
with  a  good  opinion  of  its  opponent.  It  was  the  received 
belief  that  Austria  came  next  to  France  as  a  militar}' 
power,  and  that  the  Prussian  army  was  little  better  than 
a  militia,  looking  well  on  paper  but  unfit  for  war. 

Before  this  belief  was  put  to  the  proof  there  was  a  war 
on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic  which  in  scale  and 
character  was  unprecedented.  It  is  reckoned  that  the 
number  of  men  taking  part  in  it  at  one  time  reached  a 
million  and  a  half,  and  that  the  total  loss  of  life  was  half 
a  million.  Never  was  so  much  inventiveness  and  resource 
brought  to  bear  on  a  war,  or  such  lavish  expenditure. 
"  No  European  general  has  yet  been  called  upon  to  carry 
'  [Olberg],  p.  24.  ^  Trochu,  p.  204. 


THE  NINETEENTH   CENTURY  245 

on  a  campaign  in  a  wilderness  of  primeval  forest,  covering 
an  area  twice  as  large  as  the  German  empire,  and  as  thinly 
populated  as  Russia.  Nor  has  any  government  been 
obliged  to  organise  enormous  armies  for  the  invasion  of 
such  a  territory  from  a  multitude  of  untrained  and  in- 
experienced civilians,  with  the  help  of  a  handful  of  regular 
officers,  and  to  manufacture,  to  collect  and  issue,  the  whole 
of  the  miitericl  needed  for  their  use."  ' 

The  regular  troops  of  the  United  States  numbered 
17,000  officers  and  men  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 
They  were  not  all  immediately  available,  being  scattered 
in  small  detachments  on  the  western  frontier,  to  guard 
it  against  Indians ;  but  they  did  something  to  stiffen  the 
earlier  armies  of  the  North.  Of  the  officers,  about  one- 
third  resigned,  and  entered  the  service  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy;  the  rest,  so  far  as  they  could  bo  spared 
from  their  regiments,  were  used  for  staff  and  technical 
duties  and  for  the  higher  commands.  There  were  also 
many  retired  officers,  who  had  received  a  military  edu- 
cation at  West  Point,  and  had  perhaps  served  in  the 
Mexican  war.  But  the  great  bulk  of  the  troops  on  both 
sides  were  quite  untrained  when  they  took  the  field, 
officers  as  well  as  men.  They  were  "  volunteers,"  and  the 
officers  were  at  first  elected  by  their  men. 

Individually  the  Southerners  wei-e  better  material  for 
soldiers,  except  in  the  west.  They  were  country-bred, 
good  shots  and  good  horsemen ;  while  the  northern 
armies  were  recruited  from  townsmen,  and  had  a  large 
foreign  element,  10  per  cent.  Germans,  and  10  per  cent. 
Irish.  The  Southern  States  were  more  whole-hearted 
and  more  ready  to  make  sacrifices  for  their  cause.  They 
had  only  eight  millions  of  whites  as  against  nineteen 
millions,  and  they  soon  adopted  conscription,  which  was 

'  Henderson,  p.  234. 


246  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

gradually  extended  up  to  men  of  fifty  years  of  age. 
This  enabled  them  to  make  good  losses  in  their  regiments 
by  drafts,  and  give  them  tried  leaders :  while  in  the 
North,  for  political  reasons,  new  regiments  were  raised 
under  untried  men. 

In  equipment  the  South  was  at  great  disadvantage. 
Its  artillery  was  inferior,  and  the  stock  of  rifles  had  to  be 
supplemented  by  flint-lock  muskets  and  fowling-pieces. 
The  southern  soldiers  sought  to  make  good  their  de- 
ficiencies by  captures  from  the  enemy.  The  battle-field 
was  their  harvest ;  but  their  eagerness  for  spoil  hindered 
them  from  making  the  most  of  their  successes.  Boots 
constantly  failed  them,  and  this  had  much  to  do  with 
the  prevalence  of  straggling,  which  sometimes  reduced 
their  available  numbers  by  one-third.  Under  such  con- 
ditions the  Confederate  soldier  was  much  like  the  French 
Republicans  who  overran  Western  Europe.  General  D.  H. 
Hill  has  described  him :  "  Self-reliant  always,  obedient 
when  he  chose  to  be,  impatient  of  drill  and  discipline, 
he  was  unsurpassed  as  a  scout  or  on  the  skirmish  line. 
Of  the  .shoulder-to-shoulder  courage,  bred  of  drill  and 
discipline,  he  knew  nothing  and  cared  less.  Hence,  on 
the  battle-field,  he  was  more  of  a  free  lance  than  a 
machine.  Whoever  saw  a  Confederate  line  advancing 
that  was  not  crooked  as  a  ram's  horn  ?  Each  ragged 
rebel  yelling  on  his  own  hook  and  aligning  on  himself."  ' 

There  was  much  the  same  independence  among  the 
soldiers  of  the  North.  The  officers  were  apt  to  neglect 
orders  which  they  disapproved,  and  to  indulge  freely 
in  criticism  of  their  superiors.  Political  influence  was 
paramount  for  some  years.  But  towards  the  end  of  the 
war  the  teaching  of  experience  and  the  abundance  of 
supplies  made  it  possible  to  weed  out  the  ineflicient, 
'  Henderson,  Jackson,  ii.  4-lU. 


THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY  247 

and  to  raise  the  standard  of  discipline.  Lincoln,  who 
had  thwarted  M'Clellan,  gave  Grant  his  lull  support. 

Of  the  British  soldiers  at  Waterloo  Wellington  said : 
"  Many  of  my  troops  were  new,  but  the  new  tight  well, 
though  they  manoeuvre  ill;  better  perhaps  than  many 
who  have  fought  and  bled."i  His  defensive  tactics  re- 
lieved them  from  manoeuvring.  In  the  American  Civil 
war,  the  loose  organisation,  the  inexperienced  .staft',  and 
the  thickly  wooded  country  were  additional  reasons  for 
fighting  on  the  defensive.  In  the  first  battle  of  the  war 
(Bull  Run,  July  21,  1861)  the  Federal  regiments  which 
attacked  proved  incapable  of  movement  under  fire. 
They  showed  no  want  of  courage,  but  they  broke  into 
fragments,  and  their  firing  was  wild.  They  gave  way 
before  Jackson's  counterstroke ;  but  "  the  same  want  of 
discipline  that  had  driven  them  in  rout  to  Washington 
had  dissolved  the  victorious  Confederates  into  a  tumul- 
tuous mob."- 

Even  when  the  troops  on  both  sides  had  gained  ex- 
perience, the  defence  retained  its  advantage.  Cover  was 
generally  to  be  had,  in  the  form  of  log  breastworks  or 
intrenchmcnts,  and  frontal  attacks  were  always  bloody 
and  often  fruitless.  At  the  second  battle  of  Manassas 
(August  29  and  30,  1862)  the  Confederates  repulsed 
repeated  assaults  with  heavy  loss;  but  when  they  took 
the  offensive  they  were  soon  brought  to  a  check.  Even 
at  Chancellorsville  (May  5,  1863)  the  Federals  contrived 
to  rally  and  show  front  against  the  unlooked-for  and 
overpowering  flank  attack  of  Jackson's  corps.  Jackson 
himself  said  :  "  My  men  sometimes  fail  to  drive  the 
enemy  from  his  position,  but  to  hold  one,  never ! "  ^ 
Again  and  again  the  Federals  found   tiiat  odds  of  two 

'  S.  Rogers'  Recollections,  p.  209. 

•-•  Henderson,  Jackson,  i.  198.  "  Ih.,  ii.  419. 


248  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

to  one  would  not  enable  them  to  storm  Confederate 
positions.  Grant  liked  to  say  that  he  never  manoeuvred, 
and  to  trust  to  continuous  hammering ;  but  at  Cold 
Harbour  (June  3,  1864)  his  "  thinking  bayonets  "  refused 
to  respond  to  his  order  for  a  fresh  assault  when  13,000 
of  them  had  already  fallen  that  morning. 

In  the  attack  on  Lee's  intrenchments  round  Spottsyl- 
vania  Court-house  (May  12,  1864)  20,000  men  were 
directed  on  a  salient  angle,  and  were  formed  in  line 
of  battalion  columns  in  mass.  The  Confederate  com- 
mander at  that  point  says:  "This  column  came  up  in 
large  numbers,  but  in  great  disorder,  with  a  narrow 
front,  but  extending  to  the  rear  as  far  as  I  could  see."  ^ 
It  forced  its  way  over  abattis  and  intrenchment  under 
a  heavy  fire,  and  captured  4000  men  ;  but  it  was  brought 
up  by  an  inner  line,  and  was  driven  back  by  a  counter- 
stroke.     This  attack  was  made  at  4.30  a.m. 

Usually  the  battalions  were  deployed,  and  attacks 
were  made  in  Une,  covered  by  skirmishers.  The  men 
opened  out  as  they  advanced,  so  that  they  practically 
came  on  in  successive  waves  of  skirmishers,  and  gained 
ground  by  successive  rushes.  Bayonets  were  so  little 
used  that  many  men  threw  them  away.  The  actions 
were  decided  by  fire,  but  there  was  little  fire-discipline, 
and  ammunition  generally  ran  short.  Towards  the  end 
of  the  war  the  Confederates  formed  corps  of  sharp- 
shooters for  outpost  work.  They  were  first-rate  marks- 
men, and  their  rifles  were  often  fitted  with  telescopic 
sights.  They  were  subdivided  into  groups  of  fours,  which 
messed  and  slept  together  and  were  never  separated  in 
action.- 

The  infantry  tactics  took  small  account  of  cavalry. 
It  was  at  first  weak  in  numbers  and  not  highly  trained, 
'  Henderson,  p.  336.  ^  Henderson,  Jackson,  ii.  585. 


THE  NINETEENTH   CENTURY  249 

and  the  wooded  country  was  ill-suited  to  it.  Mounted 
men  were  valuable  for  outpost  duties,  and  for  raids  on 
the  enemy's  communications,  and  their  numbers  became 
large ;  but  they  were  mounted  rifles  rather  than  cavalry. 
Even  when  they  encountered  one  another  they  fought 
with  revolvers  and  carbines,  not  with  sabres,  and  they 
usually  fought  on  foot.  "  It  was  very  easy,"  says  a  Con- 
federate horseman,  "to  charge  down  a  road  in  column 
of  fours,  but  very  hard  to  charge  across  country  in 
extended  line  and  keep  any  sort  of  formation.  Then 
we  never  used  sabres,  and  long  guns  were  not  exactly 
the  weapons  for  cavalry  evolutions.  We  found  the 
method  of  fighting  on  foot  more  effective;  we  could 
manffiuvre  with  more  certainty,  and  sustain  less,  and 
inflict  more,  loss." ' 

It  was  the  Confederate  leaders — Morgan,  Forrest,  and 
Stuart — who  first  showed  how  much  could  be  done  with 
independent  divisions  of  horse,  but  the  Federals  followed 
the  example.  At  length,  in  the  spring  of  1865,  Sheridan 
played  the  principal  part  in  bringing  about  Lee's  surrender. 
At  the  head  of  a  mounted  corps  of  10,000  men,  armed 
with  breech-loading  and  repeating  carbines,  he  turned 
the  right  of  the  Confederate  positions  at  Petersburg, 
and  obliged  Lee  to  retreat  westward  to  save  his  com- 
nmnications.  Moving  parallel  to  him,  Sheridan  cut  in 
between  the  Confederate  corps  and  forced  Ewell  to 
surrender.  Finally  he  headed  the  retreating  army  at 
Appomattox  Court-house  (April  8),  and  barred  its  road 
till  the  Federal  infantry  came  up.- 

The  American  Civil  war  showed  plainly  what  changes 

were  bound  to  follow  on  the  adoption  of  arms  of  precision : 

looser  fighting  formations,  advance  by  rushes,  dismounted 

action    of    cavalry,    increased    use    of    the    spade,    and 

'  Denison,  p.  444.  *  Sheridan,  ii.  148-204. 


2SO  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

diminished  use  of  sword  and  bayonet.  But  its  imme- 
diate influence  on  tactics  was  not  nearly  so  great  as  it 
was  on  naval  warfare  and  siege  operations.  The  American 
battles  were  described  in  Germany  as  conflicts  between 
armed  mobs,  from  which  there  Avas  nothing  to  learn,  and 
their  lessons  had  to  be  repeated  on  European  battle-fields. 
Moltke,  however,  recognised  that  the  fire  of  stationary 
troops  was  so  much  more  effective  than  that  of  troops 
advancing,  that  it  would  be  well  to  combine  as  far  as 
possible  a  tactical  defensive  with  a  strategical  offensive.' 

Bi-eech- loaders  had  been  largely  used  by  the  cavalry  in 
the  American  war,  but  not  by  the  infantry.  Lee,  indeed, 
was  unwilling  to  see  his  men  armed  with  them,  because 
the  ammunition  would  be  more  quickly  expended  and 
less  readily  supplied.  Cartridges  containing  their  own 
means  of  ignition  could  not  be  improvised;  and  it  was 
also  thought  that  serious  injuries  might  be  caused  by 
their  accidental  explosion.  The  war  of  1864  between 
Germany  and  Denmark  showed  that  the  drawbacks  had 
been  exaggerated,  and  were  outweighed  by  the  advantage 
of  more  rapid  fire.  The  needle-gun  justified  the  hopes 
built  on  it ;  and  Prussia  found  herself  once  more,  as  in  the 
middle  of  the  eighteenth  century,  in  the  enjoyment  of  a 
temporary  superiority  of  fire  over  all  other  powers.  They 
prepared  to  follow  her  example,  but  it  was  a  work  of  time ; 
and  to  reap  the  benefit  of  the  difference  in  weapons,  the 
Prussian  Government  hastened  on  the  inevitable  struggle 
with  Austria  for  the  leadership  of  Germany. 

In  1850  Prussia  had  had  to  forego  that  leadership,  and 
to  submit  to  the  humiliation  of  Olmiitz,  because  her  army 
when  mobilised  was  found  unfit  for  war.  The  landwehr, 
according  to  the   scheme  initiated  by  Scharnhorst,  was 

'  MUitair  WochoMatt,  July  8,  18G5. 


THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY  251 

meant  to  consist  of  trained  soldiers,  men  who  had  served 
three  years  with  the  colours  and  two  years  in  the  reserve. 
But  in  the  long  spell  of  peace  after  Waterloo  financial 
considerations  had  been  paramount,  and  the  peace 
footing  of  battalions  of  the  standing  army  was  so  low 
that  only  half  the  conscripts  of  each  year  could  find  a 
place  in  the  ranks.  The  rest  passed  direct  to  the 
landwehr,  where  they  had  hardly  any  training.  In  1837 
the  service  with  the  colours  had  been  reduced  to  two 
years,  to  allow  more  men  to  share  in  it,  but  this  lowered 
the  quality  of  the  line  battahons  as  much  as  it  improved 
the  landwehr.  The  latter  was  especially  defective  in  the 
matter  of  cavalry  and  train.  The  officers  who  had  only 
.served  in  the  army  as  "  one  year  volunteers "  were  not 
qualified  to  make  up  for  the  shortcomings  of  their  men. 
Many  of  them,  officers  and  men,  were  married,  and  were 
unwilling  to  be  called  from  civil  life  to  fight  in  execution 
of  a  policy  of  which,  perhaps,  as  citizens  they  disapproved. 
The  mobilisation  of  the  Prus.sian  army  in  1859  furnished 
fresh  evidence  of  the  defects  of  its  organisation,  and 
William  I.,  who  had  always  taken  the  deepest  interest  in 
its  efficiency,  resolved  to  make  it  as  far  as  possible  inde- 
pendent of  the  landwehr.  The  number  of  conscripts  to 
be  called  up  yearly  was  raised  from  40,000  to  63,000  (a 
change  warranted  by  the  growth  of  the  population),  and 
the  term  of  service  was  made  three  years  with  the  colours, 
and  four  years  (instead  of  two)  in  the  reserve.  These 
changes  doubled  the  strength  of  the  army,  including  the 
reserve,  and  made  it  unlikely  that  the  landwehr  would  be 
called  upon  for  anything  beyond  garrison  duty  in  time  of 
war.*  The  term  of  landwehr  service  was  reduced  by  five 
years. 

'  The    landwehr   were    actually    engaged    in    ISGC    only    against   the 
Hanoverians  at  Langensalza  (Blume,  p.  217). 


253  THE  HISTORY  Of  INFANTRY 

In  spite  of  the  parliamentary  deadlock  caused  by  the 
refusal  of  the  Lower  House  to  vote  the  necessary  supplies, 
the  scheme  was  carried  through.  The  enlargement  of  the 
army  quickened  the  promotion  of  officers,  which  had  been 
very  slow,  and  the  unfit  were  weeded  out ;  so  that  a  new 
spirit  pervaded  the  whole  body.  When  Bismarck  brought 
matters  to  an  issue  with  Austria  in  18G6,  the  changes  had 
had  time  to  produce  nearly  their  full  effect.  The  minor 
states  of  Germany  declared  against  Prussia,  but  they  were 
balanced  by  Italy,  which  was  on  her  side.  The  Austrian 
empire  had  more  than  twice  the  area  and  revenue,  and 
nearly  twice  the  population,  of  Prussia ;  yet  the  Prussian 
armies  were  numerically  stronger  than  the  Austrians  in 
Bohemia,  even  with  the  Saxon  contingent  thrown  in. 

In  1859  the  Austrian  infantry  had  been  better  armed 
than  the  French.  Napoleon  III.  had  told  his  troops : 
"  Arms  of  precision  are  only  dangerous  at  a  distance. 
They  will  not  prevent  the  bayonet's  being,  as  in  former 
days,  the  terrible  weapon  of  the  French  infantry."  i  The 
French  had  made  it  their  aim  accordingly  to  come  to 
close  quarters,  and  they  had  been  victorious.  The 
Austrians  now  determined  to  adopt  similar  shock  tac- 
tics against  the  needle-gun,  overlooking  the  fact  that  its 
advantage  lay,  not  in  range  and  accuracy,  but  in  rapidity 
of  fire  at  short  ranges.  The  Prussians  had  been  told  to 
reserve  their  fire  till  the  enemy  came  within  a  quarter  of 
a  mile,  to  have  a  comparatively  thin  firing-line,  since  one 
man  was  a  match  for  three  of  the  enemy  armed  with 
muzzle-loaders,  and  to  keep  small  columns  near  at  hand 
in  readiness  for  counterstrokes.  They  were  also  told  to 
throw  out  few  skirmishers,  but  this  injunction  soon 
came  to  be  disregarded,  as  it  was  found  that  the  breech- 
loader could  be  best   used   in   loose   order.     Companies 

'  LOlberg],  p.  195. 


THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY  253 

dissolved  themselves  into  skirniishcr  swarms,  one  after 
another. 

The  difference  of  arms  and  tactics  caused  a  striking 
disparity  of  losses  in  every  engagement.  At  Nachod 
(June  27)  the  advanced  guard  of  the  "ith  Prussian  corps 
{G},  battalions)  held  its  ground  for  two  hours  against  three 
Austrian  brigades  (L'l  battalions),  giving  time  for  the 
main  body  of  the  corps  to  debouch  from  a  defile.  The 
Austrians  fell  back  defeated,  having  lost  five  times  as 
many  men  as  the  Prussians.  At  Trautenau,  on  the  same 
day,  they  were  more  successful :  the  10th  Austrian  corps 
(Gablenz)  drove  the  first  Prussian  corps  back  into  the 
mountains.  Yet  here  the  loss  of  the  victors  was  nearly 
four  times  as  great  as  that  of  the  troops  they  de- 
feated. 

In  the  course  of  this  action  seven  Pru.ssian  companies 
on  a  low  ridge,  with  a  front  of  half  a  mile,  were  attacked 
by  seven  Austrian  battalions.  The  Austrians  were  formed 
in  double-company  columns  (three  to  each  battahon)  and 
in  two  lines.  The  attack  was  made  in  echelon  from  the 
right,  and  was  supported  by  two  batteries,  which  soon 
silenced  the  Prussian  guns  opposed  to  them.  Covered 
by  a  thick  belt  of  skirmishers,  the  columns  of  the  first 
line  advanced  to  within  150  paces  of  the  position,  meaning 
to  carry  it  with  the  bayonet.  "  The  Prussian  companies 
of  the  first  line  were  almost  entirely  extended,  and  the 
small  volleys  of  the  supports  soon  turned  into  an  anni- 
hilating quick  fire  like  that  of  the  skirmishers."  '■  One 
of  the  two  companies  in  reserve  came  up  into  the  fire- 
line  and  delivered  two  volleys,  and  then  several  com- 
panies charged.  The  Austrians  fell  back,  incurring  fresh 
losses,  "  for  it  is  against  retreating  troops  that  the  breech- 
loader is  most  deadly."  ^     Two  nut  of  the  four  battalions 

'   KutiDC,  pp.  71.  &c.  -  Ik,  p.  97. 


2  54  THE   HISTORY  OF   INFANTRY 

engaged  lost  nearly  [  half  their  men.  A  second  advance, 
combined  with  a  turning  movement,  caused  the  Prussians 
to  withdraw. 

The  battle  of  Koniggratz  (July  3),  where,  for  the  first 
time  on  a  European  battle-field,  more  than  200,000  men 
were  engaged  on  each  side,  was  fought  by  the  Austrians 
under  the  discouragement  of  the  earlier  encounters,  and 
told  the  same  tale.  Benedek  fought  on  the  defensive  in 
a  prepared  position,  though  at  first  he  had  odds  of  five 
to  three  in  his  favour.  The  battle  had  lasted  four  hours 
when  the  Crown  Prince's  army  came  up,  and  the  corps 
told  off  to  meet  it  were  already  shaken.  The  Prussian 
Guards  gained  possession  of  Chlum,  the  key  of  the 
Austrian  position,  without  much  difficulty ;  and  the  two 
reserve  corps  sent  by  Benedek  to  recover  it  were  repulsed 
with  heavy  loss.  The  battle  cost  the  Prussians  9000  men ; 
it  cost  the  Austrians  4", 000,  of  whom  more  than  18,000 
were  killed  or  wounded. 

The  Austrians  were  so  heavily  handicapped  in  this 
war  by  the  difference  of  weapons  that  it  is  hardly  neces- 
sary to  look  further  for  an  explanation  of  the  result.  It 
was  in  infantry  fighting  that  they  failed  ;  in  cavalry  and 
artillery  they  more  than  held  their  own.  But  Colonel 
Stoffel,  the  clear-sighted  French  attache  at  Berlin,  found 
other  causes  than  the  breech-loader  for  the  Prussian  suc- 
cess. The  education  and  sense  of  duty  of  the  people,  and 
consequently  of  the  soldiers  drawn  from  it;  the  high 
tone  and  thorough  instruction  of  the  whole  body  of 
officers ;  the  unique  efficiency  of  the  general  staff  with 
Moltke  at  its  head  ;  these  advantages  would  have  brought 
about  the  defeat  of  the  Austrians  even  if  they  had  had 
breech-loaders.  The  value  of  the  latter  lay  chiefly  in 
quick  loading.  Austrian  officers  said,  "  Our  soldiers  are 
demoralised,  not  by  the   rapidity  of  your  fire  .  .  .  but 


THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY  255 

bcciuiso  yon  arc  always  ready  to  fire."  '  'I'ho  lotal  ex- 
penditure of  infantry  ammunition  in  the  war  was  only 
two  million  rounds,  or  about  seven  rounds  per  man,  on 
the  Prussian  side. 

Under  the  fire  of  rifled  guns  it  was  impossible  to  operate 
with  large  bodies  of  men  without  incurring  heavy  losses. 
Small  columns,  of  one  or  two  companies,  were  used  on 
both  sides  ;  though  the  multiphcation  of  units  was  in- 
convenient and  made  control  difhcult.  Consequently  the 
actual  conduct  of  the  light  fell  to  the  captains  of  com- 
panies, and  one  of  the  ablest  of  them  (Captain  May) 
attributed  the  Prussian  success  largely  to  this  fact.  They 
were  old  enough  to  know  their  work  thoroughly,  and  not 
so  old  as  to  have  lost  their  spring.  Ten  years  later  the 
bold  active  spirit  was  apt  to  be  quenched  by  the  routine 
of  service,  children,  and  rheumatism.  They  had  a  per- 
sonal hold,  too,  of  their  men,  with  whom  attachment 
to  their  officers,  when  there  was  good  ground  for  it, 
was  a  stronger  motive  than  ambition  or  patriotism ;  for 
"  the  desire  heartily  to  admire  some  one "  is  a  marked 
characteristic  of  the  North  German  soldier.^ 

'  Stoffel,  p.  \i<\.  =  [May],  pp.  13-lG. 


X 

THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY:  II.  (1867-1900) 

Napoleon  III.  meant  to  fish  in  the  troubled  waters  of 
Germany,  and  to  secure  some  extension  of  the  French 
frontier  towards  the  Rhine.  He  was  foiled  by  Bismarck, 
with  the  help  of  Roon  and  Moltke,  and  he  only  succeeded 
in  delaying  the  unification  of  Germany.  Discontent  at 
his  failure  shook  his  throne,  and  drove  him  against  his 
will  towards  a  war  with  Prussia.  Both  sides  actively 
prepared  for  what  was  seen  to  be  inevitable.  The  result 
of  the  war  of  1866  was  to  increase  the  population  of 
Prussia  to  twenty-four  millions,  to  which  nearly  six 
millions  might  be  added  for  the  smaller  states  of  the 
North  German  confederation,  formed  under  her  leader- 
ship. The  Prussian  military  system  was  extended  over 
the  whole  area  of  the  confederation,  but  with  reduction  of 
the  term  of  landwehr  service  to  five  years  ;i  and  it  was 
settled  that  the  effective  strength  of  the  federal  army 
should  be  1  per  cent,  of  the  population  on  a  peace  footing, 
and  3  per  cent,  on  a  war  footing.  This  would  yield  in 
course  of  time  nearly  a  million  of  trained  soldiers  under 
thirty-three  years  of  age. 

The  cavalry  was  increased,  and  the  criticisms  of  Moltke 
on  the  overcaution  with  which  it  had  been  handled  in 
1866  2  lja(j  a  marked  effect  on  its  subsequent  use  both 
in  reconnaissance  and  on  the  battle-field.     The  artillery 

»  Blume,  p.  254.  -  R.U.S.I.  Journal,  1.  22U. 


THE   NINETP:ENTH   century  257 

had  also  failed  to  support  the  infantry  as  it  should  have 
done :  and  arrangements  were  made  to  correct  this  in 
future,  and  to  bring  as  many  batteries  as  possible  into 
play  from  the  outset,  instead  of  holding  some  of  them 
in  reserve.  The  smooth-bore  guns  were  got  rid  of  alto- 
gether, and  the  steel  breech-loaders  substituted  for  them 
were  superior  to  the  bronze  muzzle-loaders  of  the  French 
artillery  both  in  range  and  accuracy.  The  French 
mitrailleuses,  from  which  much  was  expected,  proved 
of  less  value  than  field  guns.  On  the  other  hand  the 
needle-gun  had  only  half  the  effective  range  of  the 
French  chassepot,  and  its  rate  of  fire  was  less  by  one- 
third.  The  number  of  rounds  carried  by  the  Prussian 
soldier  was  raised  from  60  to  80 ;  the  French,  whose  rifle 
was  of  smaller  bore  (-51  inch),  carried  90  rounds. 

Stotfel  kept  the  French  Government  well  informed  of 
all  that  was  being  done  to  improve  the  Prussian  army, 
in  the  light  of  the  experience  lately  gained,  and  he 
warned  it  that  Prussia  would  prove  a  far  more  formi- 
dable antagonist  than  Austria.  At  the  same  time  Trochu 
was  trying  to  open  the  eyes  of  his  fellow-countrymen  to 
the  defects  of  the  French  military  system.'  Napoleon  III. 
was  not  blind  to  these  defects,  especially  to  the  want  of 
reserves,  and  wished  to  follow  the  Prussian  example  of 
three  years'  colour  service.  But  his  generals  were  against 
changes  which  would  sacrifice  quality  to  quantity,  and 
his  ministers  insisted  that  the  burden  of  military  ser- 
vice must  not  be  more  widely  extended  nor  the  cost 
increased. 

The  new  military  law  passed  at  the  beginning  of  1868 
was  a  compromise.  The  term  of  service  with  the  colours 
was  reduced  from  seven  years  to  five,  to  be  followed  by 
four  years  in  the  reserve.    Exoneration  by  payment  was 

•  L'armiefranniisc  enimi. 

K 


258  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

abandoned,  but  substitutes  were  allowed.  Conscripts  who 
were  not  called  up  for  service  (either  as  exempt,  or  as 
having  drawn  lucky  numbers)  were  to  be  attached  for 
five  years  to  the  garde  nationale  mobile.  This  new 
auxiliary  force  was  meant  to  relieve  the  army  of  garrison 
duty,  but  it  was  in  no  way  comparable  to  the  landwehr. 
It  would  be  practically,  untrained,  and  no  money  was 
voted  for  it.  The  law  met  with  strong  opposition  in  the 
Chamber,  and  was  described  by  Jules  Favre  as  an  attempt 
to  turn  France  into  a  barrack  instead  of  a  workshop. 
It  was  reckoned  that  army  and  reserve  together  would 
amount  to  800,000  men,  and  the  garde  mobile  would 
add  400,000.1 

Marshal  Niel,  the  author  of  the  new  law,  died  in  1869, 
and  it  had  not  had  much  effect  when  war  was  declared 
(July  15,  1870).  The  emperor  had  been  led  to  expect 
that,  however  inferior  in  total  numbers,  he  would  have 
the  advantage  at  the  outset,  and  could  take  the  initiative ; 
but  the  machinery  of  mobilisation  worked  so  badly  that 
at  the  end  of  three  weeks  there  were  only  220,000  French 
soldiers  assembled  on  the  eastern  frontier.-  By  that  time 
three  German  armies  had  begun  to  cross  it,  and  had 
beaten  the  French  at  Worth  and  Spicheren  (August  6). 
They  included  the  forces  of  the  South  German  States,  and 
numbered  nearly  half  a  million.  Behind  them  were  such 
ample  reserves  that  in  the  course  of  the  next  six  months 
more  than  600,000  men  were  able  to  follow  them  into 
France.  Bad  generalship  aggravated  a  situation  which 
was  nearly  hopeless  from  the  first,  and  led  to  unexampled 
disasters.  More  than  :J00,000  French  soldiers  had  become 
prisoners  of  war  within  three  months;  the  Imperial  army 
had  practically  disappeared. 

But  the  question  that  concerns  us  here  is,  how  did  the 
1  OUivier,  x.  328.  #     ^  La  Chapelle,  p.  202, 


THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY  259 

German  infantry  compare  with  the  French  infantry ;  and 
the  evidence  hardly  bears  out  Prince  Hohonlohe's  asser- 
tion that  the  German  is  the  most  perfect  infantry  that 
has  yet  been  seen,  or  that  can  be  imagined.^  The  officers 
were  admirable  in  all  respects ;  the  men  compared  favour- 
ably with  the  French  as  regards  order,  discipline,  and 
patient  endurance.  But  short-service  soldiers  are  more 
dependent  than  others  on  their  officers,  and  (in  Hoenig's 
words)  when  the  Germans  lost  their  officers  they  lost  their 
heads.  "  Our  national  strength,"  says  Meckel,  "  does  not 
lie  in  dispersion,  where  each  man  fights  for  himself.  .  .  . 
Though  our  soldier  is  accustomed  in  peace  to  careful 
drill,  strict  discipline,  and  unconditional  obedience,  in 
battle  he  is  confused  by  disorder,  and  by  the  withdrawal 
of  his  accustomed  leaders.  ...  It  is  not  so  with  soldiers 
of  the  Latin  races.  Among  them,  the  individual  has  more 
self-consciousness,  and  a  greater  tendency  to  act  for  him- 
.self.  He  does  not  regard  his  officer  as  a  demi-god  :  he 
likes  to  feel  himself  untrammelled  and  without  a  master."  ^ 
In  all  armies  there  are  skulkers,  but  the  German  conscript 
seems  to  have  been  more  than  usually  prone  to  seek  safety 
in  action  by  dropping  into  a  ditch  or  furrow,  or  sneaking 
oft"  to  the  rear. 

As  the  Frent-h  had  the  better  rifle,  they  had  been  told 
to  make  the  most  of  it;  to  dig  shelter  trenches,  await  the 
enemy,  and  crush  him  by  fire  before  attacking.  This 
made  it  necessary  for  the  Germans  to  depart  from  the 
defensive  tactics  which  Mollke  had  recommended  (p.  250), 
to  push  in  to  the  shorter  ranges  which  suited  their 
weapon,  and  to  utilise  their  superior  numbers  by  operat- 
ing on  the  enemy's  flanks  while  holding  him  in  front. 
But  Moltke  had  not  changed  his  opinion.      In  the  in- 

>  Letters  on  Infantry,  p.  1. 

2  A  Summer-night's  Dream  {i'.H.  Mayazinc,  June  1890). 


26o  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

structions  issued  in  18G9  to  commanding  officers  he  said: 
"  There  can  be  no  question  tliat  the  man  who  stands  still 
and  fires  has  the  advantage  of  the  man  who  fires  as  he 
moves  forward  ;  that  the  ground  is  a  help  to  the  former, 
an  obstacle  to  the  latter ;  and  that  if  excited  elan  is  met 
by  steady  tenacity,  fire-effect,  which  has  gained  so  much 
in  our  days,  will  decide  the  issue.  If  we  are  able  to  take 
up  a  position  which  the  enemy  is  likely  to  attack,  whether 
for  military  or  political  reasons  or  from  mere  national 
vanity,  it  seems  thoroughly  advisable  to  avail  ourselves 
of  the  advantages  of  the  defensive  before  we  assume  the 
oiTensive." 

Worth  was  an  example  of  the  new  French  tactics.  The 
battle  lasted  ten  hours  and  the  result  was  for  some  time 
doubtful,  but  fresh  troops  came  up  in  the  course  of  the 
day  which  ultimately  gave  the  Germans  a  superiority  of 
nearly  three  to  one  in  infantry  and  more  than  three 
to  one  in  artillery.  They  were  able  to  turn  both  flanks 
of  the  French  position  while  pressing  it  in  front, 
and  Macmahon  was  at  length  driven  from  the  field 
with  a  loss  of  nearly  half  his  army.  The  defence  was 
passive  as  a  whole,  but  there  were  some  brilliant  local 
counterstrokes.  In  the  attack  on  Elsasshausen,  for 
instance,  the  historian  of  the  Prussian  50th  Regiment 
records  that  "the  fire  became  heavier,  and  a  regiment 
of  Turcos  (Algerians),  firing  and  yelling,  came  bounding 
through  the  smoke.  This  was  too  much  for  even  Prussian 
grenadiers,  and  away  they  all  went,  followed  up  by  the 
Turcos,  towards  a  small  knoll  which  stands  100  yards  or 
so  north  of  the  Niederwald.  In  vain  the  ofiBcers  tried  to 
halt  the  men.  Fortunately,  at  this  moment,  a  battery  of 
artillery  deployed  upon  the  knoll,  and  a  company  in  good 
order  took  post  alongside.  The  flying  troops  were  halted, 
and   a   murderous    fire  was   poured    into   the   pursuing 


THE  NINETEENTH   CENTURY  261 

Turcos,  who  were  within  60  yards  of  the  guns.  Their 
chiirge  was  checked,  and  as  they  fled  back  the  Prussians 
resumed  their  advance  on  ELsasshausen."  ' 

Much  of  the  fighting  took  place  in  the  woods  on  each 
flank,  where  the  French,  especially  the  Zouaves,  showed 
themselves,  man  for  man,  more  than  a  match  for  the 
Germans.  In  the  centre,  the  French  fighting  line  was 
placed,  not  on  the  crest  of  the  high  ground,  but  on  the 
forward  slope,  in  order  to  have  a  better  field  of  fire  over 
the  Sauer  valley.  Consequently  it  was  exposed,  and  its 
supports  also,  to  the  crushing  tire  of  the  German  guns. 
It  was  their  assistance  which  enabled  the  German  infantry 
to  gain  ground,  and  come  within  ranges  suited  to  their 
weapon.  The  advance  was  commonly  made  in  three 
lines.  "The  first  line,  composed  of  about  two-thirds  of 
the  attacking  force,  moved  forward  in  line  of  company 
columns  at  deploying  interval.  When  the  enemy's  fire 
began  to  be  felt,  one-third  (seventy  rifles)  of  each  company 
was  extended,  while  the  remainder  of  the  company,  ad- 
vancing in  column  of  sections,  formed  the  support  and 
reserve.  The  second  line  was  almost  always  stronger 
than  the  third  line,  and  advanced  either  in  line  of 
company  columns,  or  in  line  of  half  battalion  columns, 
at  deploying  intervals ;  but  these  columns  nearly  always 
deployed  and  extended  when  they  came  under  heavy 
fire.  In  some  cases  there  was  no  third  line.  ...  It  was 
iiot  till  after  a  long  and  constantly  fluctuating  struggle, 
swinging  backwards  and  forwards,  and  swallowing  up  the 
supports,  the  reserves,  and  in  many  cases,  even  the  second 
and  third  lines,  that  the  Gorman  companies  were  able 
to  establish  themselves  within  400  to  ."lOO  yards  of  the 
enemy's  front.  This  was  the  time  when  counter-attacks 
were  frequent,  the  attacking  line  being  over  and   over 

'   lUiideison,  Wonl.,  p.  7.'.. 


262  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

again  driven  back  with  heavy  losses,  both  in  men  and 
in  moral;  and  as  a  very  general  rule  it  was  not  until 
the  artillery  came  up  in  support  to  within  1200  to  900 
yards  of  the  defence  that  the  fire  -  position  could  be 
considered  as  definitely  occupied."  ^ 

Even  then  it  was  usually  necessary  to  attack  the  flanks 
as  well  as  the  front  in  order  to  subdue  the  fire  of  the 
defence  suflaciently  to  admit  of  approach  to  closer  quarters. 
When  this  seemed  to  be  secured,  groups  from  the  firing 
line  advanced  and  were  joined  by  others,  until  at  length 
the  whole  body  rushed  forward  to  the  assault.  If  the 
time  was  ripe  the  defenders  did  not  wait  to  cross  bayonets, 
but  there  were  many  instances  of  prematui-e  assault. 

Not  only  in  the  wood  fighting,  but  in  the  more  open 
country,  units  were  broken  up  and  intermingled  in  the 
course  of  the  advance ;  the  conduct  of  the  fight  fell  to  the 
company  leaders,  who  were  in  some  cases  sergeants,  in 
others  colonels  or  generals.  It  was  a  mass  of  disordered 
battalions  belonging  to  two  different  army  corps  that  gave 
way  before  the  charge  of  the  Turcos.  This  confusion  and 
absence  of  control  were  unavoidable  under  the  new  condi- 
tions imposed  by  the  breech-loader,  but  they  were  very 
distasteful  to  many  of  the  older  officers,  including  King 
William.  He  had  refused  to  sanction  a  revision  of  the 
drill-book  (which  dated  from  1847)  by  the  light  of  the 
experience  gained  iii  18GG,  and  clung  to  mancBUvres  in 
battalion  column  as  a  necessary  corrective  of  the  tendency 
to  loose  order.2  In  the  battle  of  Gravelotte  (August  18) 
the  Prussian  Guards  paid  the  penalty  of  this  conservatism. 

Canrobert's  corps,  which  was  on  the  right  of  the  French 

array,  held  the  village  of  St.  Privat,  and  extended  a  mile 

to  the  north  of  it.     It  was  a  solidly  built  village,  with 

walls  and  hedges   on   its   outskirts,  afibrding   successive 

'  Henclersuii,  pp.  51-53.  -  Blume,  p.  225. 


THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY  263 

lines  of  tire.  Towards  evening  three  brigades  of  the  Prus- 
sian Guards  were  ordered  to  attack  St.  Privat,  without 
waiting  for  the  turning  movement  which  the  Saxons  were 
carrying  out  to  the  north  of  them,  or  for  artillery  prepara- 
tion. They  had  to  cross  more  than  a  mile  of  gently  rising 
ground  which  aftbrded  hardly  any  cover.  Reckoning 
themselves  to  be  beyond  the  effective  range  of  infantry 
tire,  they  began  their  advance  mainly  in  columns  of  half 
battalions,  with  some  company  columns  in  front  which 
threw  out  skirmishers.  The  long  range  fire  of  the 
French  skirmish  line,  600  yards  west  of  the  village, 
inflicted  serious  losses  on  them  from  the  first,  and  these 
increased  as  they  drew  nearer.  The  columns  soon  lost 
their  cohesion,  but  struggled  bravely  onward  in  swarms, 
until  they  reached  the  French  skirmish  line,  and  were 
able  to  use  their  own  rifles  with  effect  against  the  troops 
in  the  village.  Beyond  this  they  could  make  no  progress 
until  the  Saxons  were  ready  to  join  them  in  a  combined 
assault  from  north  and  west,  for  which  the  fire  of  twenty- 
four  batteries  had  meanwhile  paved  the  way. 

The  final  assault  did  not  cost  many  men,  for  the  French 
were  falling  back ;  but  the  Guards  lost  30  per  cent,  of  their 
strength  altogether,  and  one  battalion  lost  55  per  cent.i 
More  than  half  the  ofiicers  were  killed  or  wounded,  and  in 
the  case  of  the  mounted  ofiicers  the  proportion  was  much 
higher.  Some  idea  of  the  storm  of  fire  to  which  they 
were  exposed  is  given  by  the  fact  that  Canrobert's  infantry 
expended  in  two  days'  fighting  (August  IG  and  1 8)  nearly 
two  miUion  cartridges,  which  was  the  total  expenditure  of 
the  Prussians  in  the  war  of  1860. 

While  the  Guards  were  attacking  St.  Privat  two  other 
corps  attacked  the  left  of  the  French  army,  which  was  on 
high  ground  separated  from  Gravelotte  by  the  wooded 

1  Balck,  p.  28. 


264  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

ravine  of  the  Mance.  This  ravine,  of  which  the  Germans 
had  ah'eady  gained  possession,  gave  them  cover  to  within 
half  a  mile  of  the  French  fighting  line;  and  there  had 
been  no  reply  to  the  preliminary  cannonade  by  the  German 
batteries  near  Gravelotte.  The  conditions  seemed  favour- 
able; but  when  the  infantry  issued  from  the  woods  and 
came  within  short  range,  "  they  suddenly  found  that  the 
French  artillery  and  mitrailleuses  had  by  no  means  been 
silenced — about  two  hundred  pieces  opening  on  them 
with  fearful  effect,  while  at  the  same  time  the  whole  crest 
blazed  with  a  deadly  fire  from  the  chas«e2K>t  rifles.  Re- 
sistance like  this  was  so  unexpected  by  the  Germans  that 
it  dismayed  them;  and  first  wavering  a  moment,  then 
becoming  panic-stricken,  they  broke  and  fled,  infantry, 
cavalry,  and  artillery  coming  down  the  slope  without  any 
pretence  of  formation,  the  French  hotly  following  and 
pouring  in  a  heavy  and  constant  fire  as  the  fugitives  fled 
back  across  the  ravine  towards  Gravelotte." ' 

"  It  would  have  been  better,"  says  Moltke  drily,  "  if  the 
chief  of  the  general  staff,  who  was  on  the  spot,  had  not 
allowed  this  advance  so  late  in  the  day."  -  All  that  he  had 
written  about  the  difEculty  of  attacking  troops  well  armed 
and  well  posted  must  have  come  vividly  home  to  him. 
But  the  time  had  come  when  he  was  at  length  able  to 
combine  offensive  strategy  with  defensive  tactics,  and 
when  the  Germans  were  to  get  the  benefit  of  the  breech- 
loader's efficacy  to  check  an  advancing  enemy.  The  world 
was  surprised  to  see  a  French  army  of  150,000  men  shut 
up  in  Mctz,  and  starved  into  surrender,  by  a  German  army 
which  was  not  much  larger  and  was  spread  over  a  circuit 
of  nearly  thirty  miles.  But  this  investment  line,  long  and 
thinly  manned  as  it  was,  had  no  Hanks  to  be  turned  ;  its 
strength  was  quickly  increased  by  field  intrenchi 
'  Sheridau,  ii.  375.  -  Kiieg  von  1870-71,  p.  ! 


THE  NINETEENTH   CENTURY  265 

the  French  troops  could  not  be  massed  to  attack  any 
one  section  of  it  without  warning,  and  the  forces  at  the 
threatened  point  could  hold  their  own  long  enough  to 
allow  reinforcements  to  come  up.  It  was  not  an  iron 
ring  but  an  elastic  band,  which  yielded  to  some  extent  to 
the  assailant's  efforts,  but  clung  round  his  flanks.  It  was 
not  severely  tested,  for  Bazaine's  attempts  to  break  out 
were  little  more  than  formal. 

The  battle  of  Sedan  (September  1)  was  practically  a 
case  of  the  same  kind.  The  Germans  enveloped  the 
French  army  so  completely  that  they  had  no  need  to 
drive  their  attack  home.  Their  task  was  in  the  main  to 
resist  the  efforts  of  the  French  to  escape  from  a  hopeless 
position,  and  to  keep  them  exposed  to  a  crushing  artillery 
fire.  The  gallant  charges  of  GalliSet's  cavalry  had  no 
result  except  their  own  destruction.  They  confirmed  what 
Moltke  had  written  in  186!)  :  "  Infantry  in  good  order 
need  fear  no  cavalry  attack,  so  long  as  it  keeps  cool.  That 
is  far  more  important  than  its  formation,  which  only 
matters  so  far  as  it  heightens  its  sense  of  security."  * 
Already  in  1866  the  Prussian  infantry  had  been  told  not 
to  form  square  to  resist  cavalry.'- 

Bredow's  brigade  showed  at  Vionville  (August  16)  how 
much  might  be  done  by  the  well-timed  charge  of  six 
squadrons.  It  not  only  served  its  purpose — to  gain  breath- 
ing space  for  Alvensleben's  infantry — but  it  put  ten 
French  batteries  out  of  action  for  the  rest  of  the  day. 
The  batteries,  however,  were  exposed  on  a  ridge  with  only 
three  companies  of  chasseurs  as  a  guard  for  them.  The 
ground  allowed  Bredow  to  approach  under  cover,  and  to 
charge  through  the  line  of  guns  when  some  batteries  were 
in  the  act  of  relieving  others.  There  was  a  regiment  of 
infantry  (three  battalions)  on  the  reverse  slope  behind  the 

'  Moltke,  p.  200.  2  lloheiilulie,  p.  2oU. 


266  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

batteries  ;  but  it  was  already  shaken,  and  the  flying  guns 
and  limbers  broke  through  it,  opening  the  way  for  the 
German  lancers  and  cuirassiers.^ 

In  the  People's  war  which  followed  on  the  collapse  of 
the  Empire  and  the  Imperial  army,  Gambetta  did  all  that 
one  man  could  to  repeat  the  achievements  of  1794,  but  he 
was  not  able  to  organise  victory  like  Carnot.  He  had  to 
do  with  a  single  power  and  a  set  purpose,  instead  of  a 
half-hearted  coalition.  It  was  not  a  fight  between  a  nation 
and  an  army,  but  a  fight  between  two  armed  nations,  one 
trained,  the  other  untrained.  The  Government  of  National 
Defence  had  half  a  million  of  men  at  its  disposal  in  Sep- 
tember,^ but  not  much  more  than  half  of  them  could  be 
called  soldiers.  Towards  the  end  of  the  year  the  total 
rose  to  a  million,  but  as  Moltke  wrote  to  his  brother 
November  23),  "  an  armed  crowd  is  very  far  from  being 
an  army,  and  it  is  brutal  to  lead  such  men  into  battle."  In 
his  anxiety  to  save  Paris,  Gambetta  could  not  wait  to  orga- 
nise or  discipline  his  improvised  corps ;  he  hurried  them 
forward  imperfectly  equipped  on  disconnected  enterprises. 

At  Bapaume  (January  3,  1871)  40,000  French  found 
themselves  unable  to  dislodge  15,000  Germans,  and  at  St. 
Quentin  (January  19)  they  were  themselves  driven  from 
their  positions  by  33,000  Germans.  At  Beaune  la  Rolande 
(November  28)  11,000  Germans  held  their  ground  for 
several  hours  against  60,000  French,  and  at  Loigny-Pouppry 
(December  1,  2)  less  than  40,000  Germans  repulsed  and 
completely  defeated  100,000  French.  When  Bourbaki 
marched  to  the  relief  of  Belfort  with  more  than  100,000 
men,  Werder,  who  had  only  42,000  (of  which  half  were 
landwehr),  telegraphed  for  instructions  whether  he  should 
raise  the  siege.     It  trammelled  his  movements,  obliged 

»  SevuecfBistoircxiii.  170-190. 
2  lb.,  xxvi.  341-346. 


THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY  267 

him  to  extend  his  force  too  much,  and  exposed  him  to 
attack  in  rear,  so  that  defeat  would  mean  disaster.  The 
answer  came  promptly  from  headquarters  that  he  was  not 
to  raise  the  siege,  and  the  three  days'  fighting  on  the 
Lisaine  (January  15-17)  justified  the  decision. 

The  broad  result  of  the  lessons  of  1870  is  stated  as 
follows  by  a  German  infantry  officer:  "No  volleys  in 
battle ;  no,  or  at  least  very  few,  attacks  by  troops  in  close 
order ;  great  deployments  of  skirmishers  on  both  sides ; 
long-continued  gradually  advancing  musketry  fights,  often 
rolling  backwards  and  forwards;  at  last,  the  flank  of  one 
party  turned,  or  else  one  side  exhausted ;  the  other  side 
pressing  on  in  consequence,  or  a  rush  of  dense  clouds  of 
skirmishers  who  endeavour  at  any  price  to  dislodge  their 
opponents,  not  forgetful  that  in  case  of  failure  and  retreat 
they  are  dead  men.  On  both  sides  great  dispersion,  inter- 
mingling of  troops,  particularly  in  broken  ground ;  hence 
the  leader's  control  diminished." ' 

William  I.  and  his  advisers  were  unwiUing  to  accept  this 
loss  of  control.  They  tried  to  combine  the  older  method 
with  the  new,  and  continued  to  look  to  the  coming  up  of 
the  second  line  in  solid  formation  to  decide  the  action. 
The  revised  drill-book,  issued  in  1873,  showed  no  sub- 
stantial change  in  this  respect.  The  French  Regulations 
for  manceuvrcs,  issued  m  1875,  took  fuller  account  of 
recent  experience.  They  recognised  that  bodies  of  troops 
must  be  broken  up  into  small  units  and  extended  when 
they  came  within  the  zone  of  effective  fire ;  that  fire  must 
be  the  chief  means  of  action ;  and  that  the  skirmish  fight, 
instead  of  being  merely  preparatory,  must  be  carried 
through  to  the  end.  The  fighting  lino  would  advance 
by  rushes  up  to  the  critical  stage,  being  fed  from  the  rear 
as  it  moved  forward ;  after  sufficient  preparation,  it  would 

1  Boguslawski,  p.  S8. 


268  THE  HISTORY   OF  INFANTRY 

be  joined  by  the  reserves,  and  would  try  to  storm  the 
position.  Both  in  France  and  Germany  the  balance  of 
opinion  was  strongly  in  favour  of  offensive  tactics. 

The  Russo-Turkish  war  of  1877  gave  fresh  means  of 
judging  of  the  effect  of  rifled  breech-loaders.  The  Turks 
were  inferior  in  numbers  and  organisation,  but  they  had  a 
better  rifle  than  that  with  which  the  greater  part  of  the 
Russian  iafantry  was  armed,  and  they  had  also  a  bettor 
fleld  gun.  As  they  fought  mostly  on  the  defensive,  they 
derived  the  full  advantage  from  their  weapons.  Of  many 
examples  the  best  are  to  be  found  in  the  fighting  round 
Plevna. 

A  force  of  9000  Russians  was  sent  to  occupy  Plevna,  an 
open  town  which  was  the  meetmg  point  of  many  roads, 
and  was  within  50  miles  of  the  Russian  bridge  over  the 
Danube.  On  arriving  there  (July  19)  it  found  15,000 
Turks  in  possession,  for  Osman  Pasha  had  arrived  from 
Widdin  a  few  hours  before.  The  Russians  attacked  next 
day,  but  were  repulsed  with  a  loss  of  one-third  of  their 
men.  Ten  days  afterwards  (July  30)  the  attack  was 
renewed  by  32,000  men.  By  that  time  Osman  had  20,000, 
and  he  had  made  redoubts  and  intrenchments  on  the  hills 
surrounding  the  town.  After  some  very  severe  fighting 
the  Russians  were  again  repulsed,  with  a  loss  of  7000 
men. 

The  Russian  pride  and  prestige  were  deeply  touched  by 
these  failures,  and  it  was  felt  that  no  effort  must  be  spared 
to  wipe  them  out.  The  Roumanians  were  called  upon  to 
help,  and  they  contributed  one-third  of  the  100,000  men 
who  were  brought  together  for  the  purpose  in  the  early 
part  of  September.  But  the  positions  were  now  much 
stronger,  for  the  Turks  were  indefatigable  in  adding  to 
their  works.  "  An  infectious  desire,  which  never  relaxed 
till  Plevna  fell,  seized  the  soldiers  to  dig:  themselves  in 


THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY  269 

like  moles." '  The  trenches  were  so  made  as  to  aftbrd 
successive  tiers  of  fire,  and  500  cartridges  were  provided 
for  each  man.  The  orders  were :  "  As  soon  as  you  know 
or  suppose  the  enemy  to  be  within  range  of  your  rifles, 
cover  the  space  presumably  occupied  by  him,  or  presum- 
ably to  be  traversed  by  him,  with  quick  fire,  independent 
of  distance,  duration,  ditiiculty  of  aim,  probability  of 
hitting,  and  consumption  of  cartridges."  -  The  positions 
formed  a  horse-shoe,  IG  miles  in  circuit,  and  open  towards 
the  west.  Convoys  and  reinforcements  had  come  in,  bring- 
ing up  the  Turkish  numbers  to  30,000.  They  had  only  70 
guns,  while  the  Russians  had  440,  including  24  siege  pieces. 
The  assault  was  to  be  made  on  three  sides,  like  the 
previous  one.  The  right  wing,  24,000  men,  was  directed 
against  the  Grivitza  redoubt,  which  formed  the  eastern 
end  of  the  northern  defences  :  the  centre,  25,000  men,  was 
to  attack  the  works  covering  Plevna  on  the  south-east ; 
and  the  left,  15,000  men,  was  to  advance  from  the  south. 
Four  days  were  spent  in  cannonading  the  Turkish  positions, 
but  with  small  result,  though  there  was  great  expenditure 
of  ammunition.  During  these  days  the  left  wing  gained 
ground,  and  established  itself  on  the  Green  Hills,  south- 
west of  Plevna.  The  three  attacks  were  meant  to  be 
simultaneous,  at  3  p.m.  on  September  1 1 ;  but  circum- 
stances made  them  successive.  Skobeleff',  who  commanded 
on  the  left,  became  engaged  in  the  morning,  fought  all  day, 
and  by  evening  had  taken  two  works  on  the  outskirts  of 
Plevna.  The  sound  of  the  firing  caused  two  regiments  in 
the  centre  to  attack  prematurely.  They  were  repulsed 
with  heavy  loss,  and  renewed  attempts  by  other  regiments 
had  no  better  success.  On  the  right,  the  Grivitza  redoubt 
was  stormed,  but  did  not  prove  (as  it  was  suppo.sed  to  be) 
the  key  of  Plevna.     This  was  the  only  fruit  of  the  day's 

'  Herbert,  p.  210.  ■  lb.,  p.  281. 


270  THE   HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

work,  which  cost  the  Russians  and  Roumanians  18,000 
men  ;  for  Skobeleff,  after  holding  his  ground  heroically  for 
nearly  twenty-four  hours,  was  obliged  to  fall  back  to  his 
former  position  for  want  of  support. 

The  unprecedented  rain  of  bullets  to  which  the  assail- 
ants were  exposed  was  one  cause  of  their  failure.  It 
began  when  they  were  still  a  mile  from  the  works,  and 
caused  them  serious  loss,  even  when  they  were  hidden 
from  view  by  the  ground.  But  their  own  tactics  contri- 
buted to  their  defeat.  The  attacks  were  disconnected, 
and  where  (as  in  Skobeleff's  case)  they  met  with  some 
success,  reinforcements  were  not  furnished  to  secure  what 
had  been  won.  The  successful  troops  found  that  they  had 
entered  the  enemy's  positions  m  the  form  of  a  wedge, 
and  were  exposed  to  concentric  fire  from  three  sides. 
There  were  few  sappers,  and  the  infantry  had  thrown 
away  their  tools,  so  that  they  had  to  use  bayonets  and 
mess  tins  for  intrenching  the  positions  they  took. 

The  normal  attack  formation  of  the  Russians  was  two 
lines  of  company  columns  preceded  by  skirmishers;  but 
the  columns  of  the  second  hne  soon  closed  up  with  the 
first,  and  presented  large  targets  to  the  enemy.  Their 
close  order,  while  adding  to  their  casualties,  did  not  serve 
to  develop  a  crushing  fire  in  reply.  Kuropatkin  (who 
was  Skobeleff's  chief  staff  officer)  says :  "  Even  when  we 
had  arrived  within  600  paces  of  the  enemy  we  made  but 
little  use  of  our  rifles,  and  attempted  to  advance  without 
firing  a  shot,  without  taking  advantage  of  the  natural 
cover  which  the  ground  afforded. "  ^ 

Skobeleff's  own  opinion,  as  expressed  after  the  battle, 
was:  "The  only  formation  in  which  troops  can  success- 
fully assault  intrenched  positions  is  in  successive  lines 
of  skirmishers.  The  division  general  must  be  perfectly 
'  K.E.  Occasional  Papers,  v.  140. 


THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY  271 

thoughtless  of  his  own  comfort  and  safety,  and  post  him- 
self between  the  skirmishers  and  the  reserve,  where  he 
can  feel  the  pulse  of  the  battle  and  have  his  troops  in  his 
own  hand,  and  judge  himself  of  the  moment  when  the 
successive  battalions  in  reserve  should  be  sent  forward. 
.  .  .  The  reserves  must  be  sent  in  at  the  moment  when 
the  reasonably  brave  men  have  been  long  enough  engaged, 
and  have  met  with  sufficient  resistance  to  begin  to  feel 
nervous,  but  before  they  have  actually  begun  to  retreat ; 
and  it  is  in  deciding  upon  the  opportune  moment  for 
sending  forward  his  reserves  that  the  art  of  a  division 
commander  consists." ' 

It  was  in  this  way  that  he  succeeded  where  others 
failed.  His  men  had  to  advance  over  1100  yards  of 
falling  ground  covered  with  vines,  to  cross  a  brook,  and 
mount  a  steep  slope  of  a  quarter  of  a  mile,  in  order  to 
reach  the  Kazanlik  redoubts.  He  sent  forward  eight 
battalions  which  got  as  far  as  the  brook ;  a  reinforcement 
of  fifteen  fresh  companies  carried  them  half-way  up  the 
slope;  twenty  companies  more  brought  them  nearly  to 
the  upper  redoubt,  but  a  counter-attack  checked  them. 
Then  Skobelefl',  having  used  up  his  reserves,  rode  forward 
himself,  and  by  his  personal  stimulus  captured  the  work.^ 
In  winning  and  holding  this  part  of  the  Turkish  defences 
the  loss  of  his  infantry  was  40  per  cent. 

After  the  third  failure  it  was  decided,  by  Todlebcn's 
advice,  to  treat  Piuvna  as  a  fortress,  invest  it  on  all  sides, 
and  starve  the  defenders  out.  For  several  weeks  the  road 
to  the  west  was  still  open,  and  the  Turks  might  have 
retreated  on  Sofia;  but  Osman  had  orders  to  stay  at 
Plevna  at  any  cost.  Reinforcements  were  sent  to  him, 
but  they  only  shortened  his  resistance.  By  December  10 
his  provisions  were  exhausted,  and  his  attempt  to  cut  his 
'  H.E.  Occasional  Papers,  V.  134.  -  Kuropatkin,  i.  382. 


272  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

way  out  inevitably  failed.  He  was  forced  to  surrender, 
with  40,000  men.  The  Turkish  soldiers,  so  stubborn  in 
defence,  are  said  to  have  lacked  dash  in  attack,  but  their 
cheerful  endurance  of  hardships  was  exemplary. 

In  spite  of  the  final  catastrophe,  for  which  Osman  was 
not  responsible,  Plevna  was  a  striking  example  of  the 
combination  of  the  strategical  offensive  with  the  tactical 
defensive.  The  impression  made  on  Skobeleff  led  him 
to  say  that  "  if  the  French  armies  in  the  second  period 
of  the  war  of  1870-71  had  kept  strictly  to  the  plan 
of  occupying  strategic  positions  (directed  by  preference 
against  the  lines  of  communication),  combining  with  this 
a  strictly  defensive  system  of  tactics,  assisted  by  field 
fortifications,  the  campaign  would  have  had  a  result  more 
favourable  for  the  French."  ^ 

He  and  others  did  their  best  to  induce  the  Russians 
after  the  war  to  develop  fire  tactics  and  rely  less  on  the 
bayonet.  But  they  met  with  strong  opposition  from 
Dragomirov,  a  forcible  and  indefatigable  writer,  who  had 
taught  tactics,  had  witnessed  the  campaigns  of  1859  and 
1866,  and  had  commanded  a  division  with  distinction  in 
1877.  He  insisted  that  national  character  must  be  taken 
into  account :  "  The  conclusions  of  the  Prussians  must 
not  be  applied  to  our  men,  who  are  well  known  to  prefer 
fighting  shoulder  to  shoulder."  He  urged  that  improve- 
ments in  small  arms  are  always  followed  by  a  recrudes- 
cence of  defensive  tactics,  and  by  schemes  for  avoiding 
loss  in  attack ;  but  the  principles  of  tactics  are  substan- 
tially what  they  were,  and  Russian  leaders  should  still 
look  to  Souvorov  as  their  guide.  Good  troops  should 
not  indulge  in  long-distance  lead-pumping ;  they  should 
husband  their  cartridges  and  fire  volleys.  An  attack 
once   launched    should    be   resolutely   carried    through : 

1  Report  of  September  If),  1877. 


THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY  273 

what  the  bullet  cannot  do  tlie  bayonet  will.  This  is 
the  only  means  of  findinj^'  out  whether  a  position  is 
really  held  in  force.  The  greatest  pains  should  be  taken 
to  develop  the  sense  of  duty  as  well  as  the  intelligence  of 
the  soldier,  to  make  him  skilful  in  the  use  of  rifle  and 
bayonet,  and  eager  to  close  with  the  enemy.  Such  was 
the  substance  of  his  teaching,  which  commended  itself 
to  the  national  sentiment.' 

In  France  there  was  a  reaction  in  the  same  direction, 
partly  owing  to  the  influence  of  Dragomirov.  The 
Instructions  of  1875  were  charged  with  looking  too 
exclusively  to  fire  effect,  and  lacking  the  spirit  of  the 
offensive.  New  instructions  were  issued  in  1884,  and 
were  modified  several  times  in  the  next  ten  years.  In 
these  it  was  laid  down  that,  if  an  attack  was  not  a  mere 
demonstration,  the  main  thing  was  to  get  forward,  and 
fire  was  only  a  means  to  it.  The  function  of  supports 
and  reserves  was  to  sustain  the  forward  movement  rather 
than  to  increase  the  intensity  of  the  fire.  The  normal 
interval  between  the  files  of  the  chain  of  skii-mishers 
wa.s  reduced  from  six  paces  to  three;  the  supports  were 
suppressed,  and  the  reserves  brought  nearer  to  the  fighting 
hne.  The  final  charge  would  be  made  by  men  practically 
shoulder  to  shoulder  and  in  two  ranks,  one  section  of  each 
half  company  being  behind  the  other.  VoUey  firing  by 
sections  was  recommended  for  the  fighting  line,  though 
the  French  had  always  preferred  independent  tiring, 
and  Napoleon  had  declared  it  was  the  only  kind  of  fire 
practicable  in  war.- 

In  Germany  the  prevailing  current  was  m  the  opposite 
direction,  though  equal  stress  was  laid  on  a  vigorous 
offensive.  The  Infantry  Exercise  issued  in  1888,  on 
the   accession   of  William   II.,  definitely  recognised   for 

>  R.r.fl./.  Journal,  xxxii.  98r>.  -  Thiry,  pp.  34-101. 


274  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

the  first  time  that  "  the  fight  is  commenced,  and  in 
most  cases  carried  through  to  the  end,  in  extended 
order."  i  To  maintam  the  density  of  the.  fighting  line 
and  its  full  fire  action,  the  front  of  a  company  should 
not  much  exceed  100  metres  (or  about  two  men  per 
yard).  The  advance  by  rushes  should  only  be  resorted 
to  when  the  enemy's  fire  made  it  imperative,  and  then 
one  portion  of  the  fighting  line  should  keep  up  its  fire 
to  cover  the  advance  of  the  other  portion.  When  short 
range  had  been  reached,  and  the  final  assault  had  been 
sufficiently  prepared,  closed  bodies  from  the  rear  would 
join  the  fighting  line  and  carry  it  on  with  them.  The 
laying  down  of  definite  rules  for  the  execution  of  an 
attack  was  prohibited,  and  stress  was  laid  on  developiiag 
the  initiative  and  alertness  of  the  subordinate  officers  and 
of  the  men.  The  latter  must  be  trained  to  fire-discipline, 
for  volleys  were  regarded  in  Germany  as  things  of  the  past. 
As  regards  the  closed  bodies  above  mentioned,  it  was 
soon  recognised  that  even  company  columns  were  in- 
admissible under  fire,  and  in  a  few  years  nothing  was 
to  be  seen  at  German  manojuvres  but  lines  upon  lines 
of  deployed  skirmishers.-  Another  method  of  advance 
which  found  favour  at  long  ranges  was  by  sections  or 
squads  in  fours  or  in  file.-'  These  "  snakes  "  or  "  worms," 
with  wide  intervals  between  them,  would  suffer  less  than 
line  or  column  from  artillery  fire,  and  could  make  their 
way  better  through  woods  and  obstacles.  How  to  get 
men  forward  in  sufficient  strength  to  prevail  without 
incurring  prohibitory  losses,  and  how  to  direct  and 
control  them  when  extended,  were  knotty  questions, 
and  their  difficulty  was  aggravated  by  the  adoption  of 
smokeless  powder,  magazine  rifles,  and  quick-firing  guns. 

'  Part  li..  para.  19.  -  R.E.  Occasional  Papers,  xix.  .W. 

»  Balck,  p.  322. 


THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY  275 

It  was  the  needs  of  naval  warfare,  the  defence  of  ships 
against  torpedo  boats,  that  led  to  the  development  of 
these  novelties;  but  they  were  soon  turned  to  account, 
not  only  for  coast  batteries  and  fortresses,  but  also  for 
service  in  the  field.  Magazine  rifles  of  small  bore  (threo- 
tenths  of  an  inch)  were  issued  to  the  German  infantry 
in  1890-91,  and  other  countries  followed  suit.  They  not 
only  gave  the  means  of  very  rapid  fire  at  need,  but  they 
had  greater  range,  accuracy,  and  penetration,  a  flatter 
trajectory,  and  lighter  ammunition.  They  could  send 
their  bullets  3000  yards,  which  was  not  nmch  short  of 
the  efi'ective  range  of  shrapnel,  so  that  the  rifle  threatened 
to  overtake  the  field  gun.  It  was  the  wish  to  keep 
outside  the  rifle  fire  of  the  Turks,  armed  with  a  weapon 
of  less  range,  that  had  made  the  Russian  artillery  so 
inefi'ective  at  Plevna. 

But  the  smokeless  powder  which  gave  the  magazine 
rifle  its  value  lent  itself  to  correspondmg  progress  in  gun- 
making.  The  strain  on  the  gun  was  less,  so  that  for  a 
given  weight  higher  velocity  and  longer  range  could  be 
obtained.  Absence  of  smoke  allowed  the  rate  of  fire  to  be 
increased  from  three  rounds  to  thirty  rounds  a  minute.  The 
new  type  guns  were  of  various  calibres,  and  it  was  found  that 
pieces  much  heavier  and  much  lighter  than  the  ordinary 
1  ."i-pounder  field  gun  could  be  taken  into  the  field.  Field 
howitzers  firing  oO-lb.  shells  charged  with  high  explosives 
were  introduced,  and  shrapnel  was  made  more  effective. 

The  French  had  adopted  universal  service  in  1872,  and 
in  1889  the  term  of  service  with  the  colours  was  reduced 
from  five  years  to  three.  By  1900  the  number  of  their 
battalions  hud  been  doubled,  the  number  of  their  field 
batteries  trebled.  The  war  strength  of  the  French  army 
rose  to  nearly  two  millions,  or  including  the  territorial 
army  to  four  millions,  of  trained  men.     The  other  great 


276  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

continental  powers  increased  their  forces  correspondingly ; 
and  it  became  evident  that  in  future  battles  would  be  on 
a  much  larger  scale,  and  prolonged  perhaps  for  several 
days.  Ammunition  trains  had  to  be  considerably  in- 
creased to  moot  the  needs  of  the  new  guns  and  rifles. 
Smokeless  powder  helped  the  defenders  to  conceal  their 
numbers  and  position,  while  long-range  weapons  hindered 
staff"  oflicers  from  reconnoitring  or  from  carrying  orders 
to  troops  engaged.  It  was  not  easy,  therefore,  for  a 
general  to  plan  the  battle  beforehand,  or  to  regulate  it 
when  once  begun.  The  risks  of  frontal  attack  by  day 
turned  attention  to  night  operations,  and  to  wide  envelop- 
ing movements  which  would  take  time.  Mobility  became 
more  important  than  ever,  though  there  was  likely  to  be 
little  scope  for  the  use  of  lance  or  sabre.  The  dismounted 
action  of  cavalry,  the  employment  of  mounted  infantry 
and  of  cyclists  became  pressing  questions. 

The  war  in  South  Africa,  which  began  in  1899,  threw 
light  on  many  of  the  points  on  which  speculation  had 
been  active.  It  also  threw  light  on  the  question  how  far 
the  professional  soldier  retains  his  old  pre-eminence  over 
"men  with  muskets."  In  1848  Sir  Harry  Smith,  with 
six  companies  of  infantry  and  two  squadrons  of  Cape 
rifles,  had  routed  1000  Boers  at  Boomplaats.  In  1881  the 
British  had  met  with  mortifying  reverses,  and  in  expla- 
nation of  them  Sir  George  Colley  wrote :  "  The  want  of 
good  mounted  troops  told  very  heavily  against  us,  and 
our  soldiers  are  not  as  trained  skirmishers  and  shots  as 
the  majority  of  theae  Boers,  who  from  their  childhood 
have  lived  in  the  country,  and  to  a  great  extent  by  their 
guns,  and  are  used  to  stalking  and  shooting  deer." ' 

It  was  known  that  the  Boers  had  increased  in  number, 
1  Butler,  p.  318. 


THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY  277 

and  had  provided  themselves  amply  with  guns,  rifles, 
and  ammunition  of  the  latest  type;  but  it  was  reckoned 
that  the  Transvaal  and  Orange  Free  State  could  not 
muster  more  than  about  50,000  burghers,  ranging  from 
sixteen  to  sixty  years  of  age,  and  unused  to  war.  When 
the  British  Government  decided  to  send  out  an  army 
corps,  bringing  up  the  forces  in  South  Africa  to  70,000 
men,  it  was  thought  to  be  doing  more  than  was  needed  : 
"  Against  such  an  array  of  bayonets,  sabres,  and  carmon, 
what  can  General  Joubert's  half-trained  mob  of  irregulars 
expect  to  accomplish  ? " '  The  force  was  in  fact  the  largest 
that  Great  Britain  had  ever  sent  ofi'. 

The  war  lasted  two  years  and  a  half,  and  it  is  now 
reckoned  that  the  total  of  those  who  fought  on  the  Boer 
side  (including  foreigners  and  Cape  Colony  rebels)  was 
not  much  short  of  90,000 ;  but  it  is  doubtful  whether  more 
than  half  of  them  were  in  arms  at  any  one  time.  On  the 
British  side,  the  regular  troops  employed  amounted  to  a 
quarter  of  a  million,  and  the  auxiliaries  to  nearly  200,000, 
including  colonial  corps.  The  offers  of  the  colonies  were 
at  tirst  accepted  as  a  mere  form :  their  contingents  were 
to  be  mainly  infantry,  and  the  total  was  put  at  less  than 
2.">00  men.  But  soon  there  was  a  cry  for  mounted  men, 
and  the  colonial  corps  rose  to  29,000  men,  besides  50,000 
men  raised  in  South  Africa. 

The  war  passed  through  three  phases,  which  to  some 
extent  overlapped :  the  Boer  invasion  of  British  territory, 
the  British  invasion  of  the  Free  State  and  the  Transvaal, 
the  guerilla  war  directed  against  the  British  network  of 
occupation.  It  had  been  thought  that  15,000  men  would 
be  enough  to  protect  Natal,  but  the  action  at  Lombard's 
Kop  (October  30)  dispelled  this  belief.  Sir  George  White 
found  that  to  defend  himself  at  Ladysmith  was  as  nuich 

'  SlandaM,  October  II,  189il. 


278  THE   HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

as  he  could  do  ;  and  he  was  shut  in  there  for  four  months, 
in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  a  relieving  array  which  gradually 
rose  to  some  35,000  men.  Yet  the  Boer  forces  in  Natal  at 
no  time  exceeded  27,000,  and  were  latterly  much  less.  The 
British  failures  (Colenso,  Spion  Kop,  Vaal  Krantz)  were 
attempts  to  drive  a  wedge  into  the  enemy's  positions,  so 
that  the  assailants  were  enveloped  instead  of  enveloping. 
It  was  only  when  the  situation  was  reversed  that  success 
was  attained.  To  account  for  the  British  tactics,  after 
making  all  allowances  for  the  character  of  the  ground  and 
the  mobility  of  the  Boers,  we  must  fall  back  on  the  fact 
noted  by  Colley  that  the  British  infantry  soldier  was  no 
match  for  the  Boer  as  a  skirmisher. 

The  men  themselves  knew  it.  "  The  astuteness  and 
adaptability  of  their  invisible  foe,  how  cleverly  he  fought 
in  all  shapes,  how  rarely  he  committed  himself,  how  rarely 
he  was  at  a  loss,  were  subjects  of  frequent  discussion 
amongst  them,  and  one  heard  more  than  one  surmise  as 
to  what  would  happen  '  if  we  were  allowed  to  scatter  over 
the  country  like  the  Boers  do ! '  Poor  fellows,  the  pro- 
position was  usually  succeeded  by  a  thoughtful  silence, 
and  a  helpless  look  which  augured  ill  for  comfort  in  the 
verdict.  Once  a  man  actually  and  boldly  averred  what 
all  had  in  their  minds:  'They've  got  more  brains  nor 
we  ! '  and  the  announcement  was  not  negatived  by  his 
comrades."  * 

Their  officers  came  to  recognise  that  precision  of  drill 
may  be  even  detrimental,  and  that  in  the  form  of  intelli- 
gence required  on  the  battle-field  the  town-bred  European 
soldier  is  as  far  behind  the  natural  man  of  the  hills  and 
plains  as  he  is  in  hardiness  and  keenness  of  sight.-  Usually 
the  balance  is  more  than  redressed  by  the  difterence  of 
equipment,  but  that  was  not  the  case  in  South  Africa. 

1  ■'  Liuesmau,"  p.  oil.  -  May,  p.  68. 


THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY  379 

Consequently  "in  situation  after  situation  where  our 
soldiers  were  helpless  the  Boers  were  perfectly  at  home. 
It  was  this  which  made  one  Boer  equal  to  three  freshly 
landed  British  soldiers  in  everything  except  those  hammer 
and  tongs  fights  which,  in  such  a  war,  are  quite  excep- 
tional." ' 

The  last  remark  touches  the  weak  point  of  the  Boers. 
They  were  as  a  rule  careful  of  their  skins ;  they  had  no 
bayonets,  and  disliked  coming  to  close  quarters.  There 
was  so  little  discipline  and  subordination  among  them 
that  each  man  practically  did  as  he  pleased,  and  it  was 
useless  for  the  leader  to  give  orders  which  his  men  disap- 
proved. This  accounted  for  their  want  of  enterprise  in 
the  first  months  of  the  war,  for  the  failure  of  the  assault 
on  Ladysmith  (January  G,  1900),  and  for  the  purely 
passive  character  of  their  defence.  On  the  other  hand 
the  British  infantiy  never  showed  more  courage  and 
discipline  than  in  returning  again  and  again  to  the  assault 
of  positions  from  which  they  were  shot  down  by  an  unseen 
enemy.  Smokeless  powder  was  a  godsend  to  the  Boers. 
They  could  keep  themselves  and  their  guns  hidden ;  and 
their  schanzes  were  so  cunningly  made  that  "  a  keen-eyed 
man  could  approach  within  a  few  yards  of  them  without 
detecting  that  a  stone  had  been  moved."  - 

In  the  second  phase  of  the  war  the  open  country  of  the 
Free  State  allowed  cavalry  and  artillery  to  be  of  more 
service  to  the  infantry.  Of  the  45,000  men  with  whom 
Lord  Roberts  advanced  from  Bloemfontein  on  Pretoria, 
three-tenths  were  cavalry  or  mounted  infantry.  This 
enabled  him  to  march  on  a  broad  front,  and  to  turn  the 
enemy's  flank.  As  he  reported  in  the  case  of  the  Zand 
river  (May  10),  "  they  occupied  a  position  twenty  miles  in 
length  ;  ours  was  necessarily  longer."     By  these  tactics  he 

■  Hamilton,  i.  5.  *  Pilcher,  p.  18. 


28o  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

forced  the  Boers  back,  and  reached  Pretoria  with  small 
loss,  having  marched  250  miles  and  crossed  three  rivers 
in  a  month. 

The  mounted  troops  to  whom  his  success  was  largely- 
due  did  most  of  their  fighting  on  foot,  seizing  points  of 
vantage  and  holding  them,  and  so  gaining  time  for  the 
infantry.  Great  hopes  had  been  built  on  the  shock  action 
of  the  cavalry,  but  little  came  of  it.  At  Elandslaagte 
(October  21,  1899)  two  squadrons  charged  twice  through 
a  stream  of  retreating  Boers  with  good  effect ;  but  under 
similar  circumstances  elsewhere  {e.g.  at  Karree  siding, 
March  29, 1900)  the  Boers  showed  so  bold  a  front  that  the 
cavalry,  though  in  a  position  to  charge,  forbore  to  do  so. 
Perhaps  the  most  successful  stroke  of  horse  was  made  by 
Bushmen  and  New  Zealandors  forming  the  advanced 
guard  of  Babington's  column  (March  23,  1901);  .50  Boers 
were  killed  and  wounded,  and  140  were  made  prisoners 
with  two  guns,  &c.  These  colonial  horsemen  had  not 
the  discipline  of  regular  troops,  but  they  had  the  "  disci- 
pline of  enthusiasm  "  under  a  leader  whom  they  trusted, 
and  they  had  many  of  the  Boer  characteristics.^ 

In  the  last  phase  of  the  war  the  Boers  had  no  longer 
any  fixed  points  to  guard,  and  could  turn  their  mobility 
and  knowledge  of  the  country  to  full  account.  They 
could  act  in  large  bands  or  small.  Their  numbers  had 
shrunk  to  some  20,000,  but  those  who  still  kept  the  field 
were  more  apt  for  the  offensive  strokes  which  were  now 
their  only  resource.  In  dealing  with  mobile  columns  of 
mounted  men  they  developed  a  bold  method  of  attack. 
Takmg  advantage  of  mist  or  rain,  they  came  down  on 
the  columns  at  a  gallop  in  very  open  order,  with  loud 
cries,  and  shootmg  from  the  saddle.  Sometimes  they 
succeeded  in  spreading  a  scare,  and   bursting   into   the 

'  Abbott,  pp.  9,  84. 


THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY  281 

midst  of  the  escort  overpowered  its  units  in  detail.  If 
they  were  met  by  a  steady  fire  they  dismounted,  took 
cover,  and  tried  to  push  their  attack  on  foot.  In  so 
doing,  they  would  make  extensive  detours  to  avoid 
ground  where  they  would  be  exposed.  If  it  could  not 
be  avoided  they  crossed  it  by  creeping,  or  by  making 
rushes  of  ten  or  twenty  paces,  singly  or  by  twos  and 
threes.  They  formed  groups  of  which  one  fired  while 
the  other  advanced,  and  so  they  gained  ground  alternately. 
"  The  carrying  out  of  the  advance  entirely  rested  with  the 
individual  Boers ;  commandants  and  field  cornets  merely 
started  the  commandoes."  ^ 

It  was  a  disconcerting  novelty  to  the  British  to  find 
heavy  long-range  guns  (even  6-inch)  brought  into  the 
field  against  them,  and  the  Boers  handled  them  with 
surprising  ease.  The  etfect  was  mainly  moral,  but  the 
British  made  haste  to  provide  themselves  with  pieces 
of  corresponding  range  (up  to  10,000  yards).  The  suc- 
cess of  the  innovation,  however,  depended  on  the  skill 
of  the  Boers  as  skirmishers,  which  enabled  them  to 
check  pursuit,  and  give  time  for  the  removal  of  the 
guns  when  it  became  necessary.  The  Greeks  had  tried 
a  similar  experiment  in  Thessaly  in  1897,  but  lost  all 
their  gims.-  The  Boers  also  set  the  example,  which 
the  British  followed,  of  using  one-pounder  quick-firers 
(pompoms)  in  the  field.  Though  their  shell-power  was 
insignificant,  their  mobility  and  rapid  fire  made  them 
formidable.  The  50-lb.  lyddite  shells  of  the  British 
howitzers  fell  short  of  expectations,  as  there  was  seldom 
a  good  target  for  them,  and  the  Boers  had  "  no  nerves." 
The  expenditure  of  ammunition  in  this  war  was  very 
large,  especially  of  small-arm  ammunition.  On  the 
British   side   it   amounted    to   sixty-six    million    rounds, 

I   It.U.S.I.  JourmJ,  xlvi.  iifio.  -  Calhvell,  ij.  121. 


282  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

more  than  twice  the  expenditure  of  the  Germans  in 
1870-71. 

The  war  in  South  Africa  was  of  so  exceptional  a  kind 
that  large  allowance  had  to  be  made  for  the  local 
conditions.  But  British  officers  brought  home  with 
them  some  general  conclusions,  based  on  the  weapons 
used :  that  the  extension  of  infantry  in  attack  must  be 
carried  much  further  than  had  been  thought  necessary 
hitherto ;  that  discipline  must  become  less  mechanical 
and  more  intelligent,  "  the  discipline  of  a  well-trained 
pack  of  hounds  ;  "  '  that  to  master  the  tire  of  the  defence, 
even  if  a  position  was  thinly  held,  was  exceedingly  diffi- 
cult, and  that  envelopment  was  almost  indispensable 
for  success ;  that  guns  should  not  be  massed,  and  should 
be  hidden  ;  that  mounted  troops  were  more  needed  than 
ever,  but  their  mobility  and  their  fire-action  were  the 
things  to  be  studied.  The  adoption  of  khaki  for  the 
normal  dress  of  the  soldier,  the  substitution  of  "  Infantry 
Training "  for  "  Infantry  Drill,"  were  significant  of  the 
change  that  had  come  over  the  British  army.  A  short- 
ened rifle  was  adopted  for  cavalry  and  infantry  alike, 
superseding  the  cavalry  carbine,  and  the  artillery  was 
rearmed  with  a  quick-firing  field  gun  of  greater  range. 

Abroad  opinion  was  divided.  There  was  much  opposi- 
tion in  Germany  to  views  that  would  aggravate  the  diffi- 
culty of  handling  large  masses  of  men  on  the  battle-field, 
and  would  not  square  with  the  great  cavalry  charges 
which  were  a  favourite  feature  at  German  manoeuvres. 
It  was  argued  that  the  war  had  really  taught  nothing 
new,  nothing  to  affect  the  principles  of  the  existing 
Regulations.  It  had  been  "  a  fight  between  rigid  system 
and  free,  sound,  common  sense."  As  a  fact,  there  was 
nothing  peculiarly  rigid  in  the  British  methods  of  using 
1  Henderson,  Science  of  War,  p.  410. 


THE  NINETEENTH   CENTURY  283 

infantry  and  artillery  :  they  had  been  much  the  same 
as  those  of  continental  armies,  and  had  been  quickly 
adapted  to  the  new  conditions.  Nevertheless  the  German 
staff  preferred  to  take  the  view  that  "it  was  not  the 
suiall-bore  rifle  and  smokeless  powder  nor  the  loss  of 
men  (which  was  comparatively  small)  that  caused  such 
shrinking  from  frontal  attacks :  it  was  the  misgivings  of 
the  leaders  about  their  own  capacity,  and  consequently 
the  shaken  confidence  of  the  troops  in  their  leaders."  ^ 

In  France  there  was  less  self-complacency.  General  de 
Negrier  wrote  forcibly  on  the  lessons  of  the  war.  New 
regulations  for  infantry  were  issued  in  1902  and  1904, 
which  aimed  at  simplification  and  the  development  of 
initiative.  Captains  of  companies  were  given  a  freer 
hand,  and  leaders  of  sections  were  entrusted  with  fire 
control.  A  system  of  advance  by  groups  was  substituted 
for  the  chain  of  skirmishers. 

The  Russo-Japanese  war  threw  fresh  light  on  these 
vexed  questions.  Here  the  combatants  were  not  so  un- 
equal as  Briton  and  Boer,  yet  the  disparity  was  great. 
Russia  had  three  times  the  population  of  Japan,  five 
times  as  many  soldiers,  and  seven  times  the  revenue. 
But  the  seat  of  war,  withiia  easy  reach  of  Japan,  was 
4000  miles  from  Russia ;  and  though  the  single  line  of 
rails  which  formed  the  only  connection  did  far  more 
than  was  expected  of  it,  the  strength  of  Russia  could  be 
exerted  only  slowly  and  partially.  When  the  war  began, 
in  February  1904,  there  were  only  150,000  Russian  soldiers 
in  Manchuria,  and  they  had  to  guard  and  garrison  two 
naval  bases  900  miles  apart.  Command  of  the  sea  was 
vital  to  the  Japanese.  They  were  much  below  the 
Russians  in  naval  strength,  all  told  ;  and  their  first  busi- 
ness was  to  take  or  destroy  the  squadron  in  Port  Arthur 

'  KrieyiijcicluchUiclun  £{n-^dschriftcn,  Nos.  34-35,  p.  171. 


284  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

before  it  should  be  joined  by  other  ships  from  Europe. 
Consequently  the  war  hinged,  hke  that  in  the  Crimea 
fifty  years  before,  on  the  siege  of  a  coast  fortress. 

The  first  Japanese  army,  after  occupying  Korea,  forced 
the  passage  of  the  Yalu  (May  1)  and  threatened  Liao- 
yang,  the  Russian  headquarters.  Shortly  afterwards  a 
second  army  landed  in  the  Liao-tung  peninsula,  and  drove 
the  garrison  of  Port  Arthur  back  upon  the  fortress.  Two 
divisions  were  left  to  besiege  it,  and  grew  into  a  third 
army ;  four  marched  northward  and  defeated  a  Russian 
force  which  was  advancing  to  its  relief  (Telissu,  June 
15).  The  siege  of  Port  Arthur  lasted  seven  months,  and 
of  150,000  Japane.se  soldiers  who  took  part  in  it,  nearly 
half  were  killed  or  wounded.  Meanwhile,  the  first  and 
second  armies,  with  a  fourth  army  as  a  link  between 
them,  held  the  main  Russian  army  in  check.  They  even 
forced  it  to  abandon  Liao-yang  (September  4),  and  fall 
back  on  Mukden.  In  October,  reinforcements  having 
raised  the  Russian  army  to  more  than  200,000  men,  it 
took  the  offensive,  and  tried  to  roll  up  the  Japanese 
right.  While  the  troops  held  their  ground  there  as  best 
they  could,  the  Japanese  centre  and  left  made  a  vigorous 
counter-attack,  and  the  Russians  retired  to  their  old 
positions  on  the  Sha-ho,  having  lost  more  than  40,000 
men  (October  9  to  IS). 

The  surrender  of  Port  Arthur  (January  1,  1905)  set  the 
third  Japanese  army  free  to  join  the  others,  and  a  fifth 
army  was  sent  from  Japan,  raising  the  force  at  Marshal 
Oyama's  disposal  to  more  than  300,000.  The  Russian 
forces  were  by  this  time  quite  as  large,  and  before  the 
additional  troops  could  come  up  the  Russians  took  the 
offensive  again,  striking  at  the  Japanese  left.  The  attack 
met  with  some  success,  but  was  not  supported  by  de- 
monstrations elsewhere,  and  ultimately  failed  (Sandepu, 


THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY  285 

January  2(i  to  29).  In  another  month  the  Japanese  were 
ready  for  a  general  advance,  which  at  first  threatened 
the  Russian  left,  but  really  aimed  at  enveloping  the 
right.  A  battle  which  lasted  a  fortnight,  and  extended 
over  a  front  of  more  than  100  miles,  ended  in  the 
abandonment  of  Mukden  by  the  Russians  (March  10) 
and  their  retreat  northward  with  a  loss  of  nearly  one- 
third  of  their  number.  The  annihilation  of  the  Baltic; 
fleet  off  Tsushima  (May  27,  28)  finally  settled  the 
question  of  sea-command,  and  was  soon  followed  by 
negotiations  for  peace. 

The  prolonged  resistance  of  Port  Arthur  and  the 
admirable  working  of  the  Siberian  railway  had  made  it 
a  fairly  even  duel  between  Russians  and  Japanese  in  the 
valley  of  the  Liao,  and  in  each  phase  of  it  the  Russians 
had  been  worsted.  Their  commander-in-chief.  General 
Kuropatkm,  the  sharp  critic  of  their  shortcomings  in 
1877,  had  been  minister  of  war.  He  was,  therefore, 
primarily  responsible  for  anything  wrong  in  the  organisa- 
tion or  handling  of  his  army ;  but  he  had  been  often  over- 
ruled. He  had  also  much  fault  to  find  with  his  tools. 
In  his  farewell  address  to  the  army,  and  in  his  report  to 
the  emperor,  he  complained  that  he  had  been  short  of 
men  and  of  war  material,  his  lieutenants  had  disobeyed 
orders  or  shown  incapacity,  and  there  was  a  lack  of 
instruction,  ability,  and  initiative  among  the  subordinate 
officers.  "Unfortunately  there  do  not  exist  in  Russia 
a  great  number  of  men  of  energetic  and  independent 
character."  *  Among  officers  and  men  alike  there  had 
been  little  enthusiasm,  little  desire  to  distinguish  them- 
selves, and  a  want  of  the  resolution  to  win.  This  was 
partly  due  to  "the  obscurity  which  surrounded  the  objects 
and  causes  of  the  war." 

1   It.L'.S.I.  Journal,  1.  lir.C. 


286  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

On  the  other  hand,  in  the  Japanese  army  all  ranks 
were  convinced  that  the  war  was  a  matter  of  life  or 
death  for  their  country,  and  were  animated  by  a  spirit  of 
patriotism  and  self-devotion  to  which  it  would  be  hard 
to  find  a'  parallel.  Napoleon's  saying  was  borne  out,  that 
moral  factors  count  for  three-fourths  in  war.  Drawn 
from  a  people  of  quick  intelligence  and  rare  dexterity, 
untouched  by  "  the  enervating  influences  of  civilisation," 
but  trained  to  the  strictest  discipline,  the  Japanese  troops 
combined  the  alacrity  of  Frenchmen  with  the  fortitude 
of  Russians.  They  were  not  only  first-class  fighting 
men ;  they  had  assimilated  all  that  their  German  in- 
structors had  to  teach  them  as  to  military  organisation. 
The  staff  and  departments  were  models  of  efficiency;  the 
telephone  was  largely  used  for  transmission  of  orders  and 
direction  of  fire ;  and  a  prearranged  system  of  spies  gave 
them  a  great  advantage  over  their  enemy  in  the  matter  of 
intelligence. 

The  course  of  the  war  confirmed  in  the  main  the 
teaching  of  South  Africa.  The  Russians  fought  mostly 
on  the  defensive  in  prepared  positions,  and  it  was  found 
that  frontal  attacks,  even  by  troops  ready  to  give  their 
lives  without  counting  the  cost,  seldom  succeeded.  The 
second  Japanese  army  lost  a  fifth  of  its  strength  to  no 
purpose  before  Liao-yang,  and  found  it  necessary  to  modify 
its  German  tactics.  Ground  must  be  gained  as  far  as 
possible  by  night,  trenches  must  be  made  for  cover,  and 
two  or  three  days  would  be  needed  to  carry  through  an 
attack.'  Advance  in  daylight  under  fire  could  only  be 
made  by  creeping  in  open  order,  or  by  rushes  of  groups, 
who  dug  themselves  in  as  soon  as  they  halted,  and  were 
taught  to  dig  lying  down.  The  first  army,  operatmg  in 
more  broken   ground,  made  less  use  of  the  spade,  and 

»  R.U.S.I.  Journal,  !i.  1005. 


THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY  287 

advanced  by  rushes  of  companies,  100  yards  or  so  at  a 
time. 

The  consumption  of  ammunition  was  so  large,  and  the 
difficulty  of  replenishing  it  so  great,  that  the  men  some- 
times carried  nearly  400  rounds  into  action.  They  had 
holdalls,  G  feet  long  by  S  inches  wide,  open  at  each  end 
and  sewn  across  the  middle,  so  that  they  formed  two 
pockets.  These  could  be  used  for  cartridges  and  emer- 
gency rations,  and  the  holdalls  were  worn  over  the 
shoulder  like  a  bandoleer.  The  Japanese  rifle  was  of 
small  bore  (.25-inch),  and  its  ammunition  was  light ;  but 
the  wounds  inflicted  were  often  trifling. 

The  Russians  found  themselves  obliged  to  adopt  the 
same  methods  as  the  Japanese  when  they  had  to  cross 
open  country  under  artillery  fire.  Captain  Soloviev  says 
that,  formed  in  Indian  file  at  ten  paces  interval,  "  the 
men  run  stooping,  as  fast  as  they  can,  and  utilising 
as  much  as  possible  the  least  inequality  of  the  ground. 
It  is  well  that  the  leading  men  should  be  trained  to 
choose  the  sinuous  line  most  advantageous  to  follow." 
Volleys  had  to  be  given  up,  and  the  whistle  was  found 
to  be  the  only  means  of  exercising  fire  control.  In  the 
battle  of  Liao-yang  the  34th  Siberian  Rifles  used  1,200,000 
cartridges,  or  6:10  per  man.  Fire  at  ranges  over  2000 
yards  was  found  effective  against  hidden  batteries.  The 
Russians  always  had  their  bayonets  fixed,  and  their  faith 
in  the  bayonet  was  not  shaken  by  the  war.  Their  strength 
and  reach  gave  them  the  advantage  with  it ;  the  Japanese 
were  shy  of  closing  with  them,  and  often  preferred  to  use 
hand  grenades  or  even  stones.  But  a  bayonet  charge 
must  not  be  launched  acnjss  a  wide  space,  or  few  men 
will  survive  to  make  it.  There  is  no  "decisive  range," 
as  the  regulations  had  assumed:  "Sometimes  the  two 
adversaries  remain  lying  face  to  face  at  only  fifteen  or 


288  THE   HISTORY   OF   INFANTRY 

twenty  paces  from  each  other,  until  some  gallant  men 
bound  from  the  ranks  with  a  shout,  and  hurl  themselves 
upon  the  enemy's  trenches.  Some  twenty  others  will  at 
once  respond  to  this  example,  then  the  whole  company 
follows  the  movement."  ^ 

A  Japanese  officer  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  there  was 
but  one  method  of  attack,  "  namely,  the  selection  and 
envelopment  of  one  wing  of  the  decisive  point."  -  This 
caused  the  attacking  troops  to  make  wide  turning  move- 
ments, which  the  defenders  met  by  extension  of  their 
front.  The  telegraph  and  the  breech-loader  had  made 
such  dispersal  of  forces  much  less  hazardous  than  it 
would  have  been  formerly,  and  3000  men  per  mile  was 
a  sufficient  allowance  generally.  Battles  were  prolonged 
by  the  distances  to  be  covered,  and  by  the  power  which 
modern  weapons  have  given  to  a  weaker  force  to  hold  its 
ground  for  some  time  against  a  stronger  one.  This  caused 
the  admirably  planned  envelopment  of  the  Russian  right 
at  Mukden  to  prove  less  crushing  than  it  promised  to  be. 
One  Japanese  brigade  engaged  in  it  lost  90  per  cent,  of 
its  men  in  capturing  and  trying  to  hold  a  village.  The 
strain  of  continuous  fighting,  day  after  day,  exhausted 
both  armies,  and  left  the  victors  unable  to  follow  up 
their  success. 

The  Russian  field  guns  were  better  than  the  Japanese, 
and  were  better  horsed,  but  the  gunners  were  unpractised 
in  indirect  laying,  to  which  both  sides  found  it  necessary 
to  have  recourse.  Rapid  fire  was  little  used  because  of 
the  difficulty  of  supplying  ammunition.  Shrapnel  was 
the  most  effective  projectile  against  troops  at  ranges  not 
exceeding  4000  yards.  High  explosive  shells  were  useful 
against  villages,  but  otherwise  they  did  less  than  was 
expected.     At  first  the  batteries  on  both  sides  hung  back, 

'  Ji.U.SJ.  Journal,  1.  1175.  "-  lb.,  li.  331. 


THE   NINETEENTH   CENTURY  289 

and  seldom  shifted  their  positions  except  at  night ;  but 
latterly  the  Japanese  artillery  became  less  cautious, 
followed  the  infantry  in  its  advance,  and  gave  it  good 
support.  Their  mountain  guns  were  very  serviceable  in 
the  hilly  country  to  the  eastward.  Towards  the  end  of 
the  war,  machine  guns  were  nmch  used,  especially  by  the 
Japanese.  Their  chief  value  was  in  defence.  Attached 
to  advanced  guards,  they  helped  them  to  hold  ground 
that  they  had  seized  till  other  troops  could  come  up.  It 
was  found  best  to  carry  them  on  pack  animals,  with 
tripod  stands,  and  to  work  them  in  pairs.i 

In  cavalry  the  Japanese  were  no  match  for  the  Russians : 
they  were  outnumbered,  their  horses  were  weak,  and  the 
men  were  not  good  riders.  But  though  the  country  west 
of  the  railway  was  well  suited  to  cavalry  action,  the 
Russians  derived  little  advantage  from  their  superiority. 
Mistchenko's  big  raid  upon  the  Japanese  communications 
in  January  1905  was  ineffectual,  owing  to  the  want  of 
howitzers  to  make  villages  untenable.  A  raid  made  by 
two  Japanese  squadrons  seems  in  fact  to  have  had  more 
result.  They  reached  the  railway  north  of  Mukden,  and 
blew  up  a  bridge;  this  caused  Kuropatkin  to  detach 
SOOO  men  from  his  army  on  the  eve  of  the  battle,  to 
guard  his  line.  The  Japanese  generally  avoided  cavalry 
encounters,  and  sent  out  mixed  detachments  for  screen- 
ing and  reconnaissance.  There  was  little  scope  for  lance 
or  sabre;  the  Kghting  was  mainly  on  foot;  and  the 
Russian  troopers,  though  trained  as  dragoons,  shot  badly. 
The  .'10,000  horsemen  at  Kuropatkin's  disposal  might  have 
been  treated  as  a  mobile  reserve  of  riflemen  in  the  battle 
of  Mukden ;  but  there  and  elsewhere  the  Japanese  cavalry 
seem  to  have  been  used  in  this  manner  to  better  purpose. 

Infantry  was  emphatically  the  predominant  partner  in 

'   K.U.S.I.  Jovrnal,  li.  4S0-457. 


290  THE  HISTORY  OF  INFANTRY 

this  war.  The  moral  drawn  from  it,  both  by  Russians 
and  Japanese,  was  that  regulations  must  be  simplified, 
and  initiative  developed.  "  Our  soldiers,"  says  a  Russian 
■writer,  "positively  did  not  know  how  to  fight  without 
receiving  the  minutest  detail  of  orders  from  their  officers. 
.  .  .  We  must  do  our  recent  enemy  the  justice  of  acknow- 
ledging that  they  know  how  to  fight  individually  whilst 
co-operating  for  a  common  object."  *  Russian  officers 
regarded  it  as  the  chief  advantage  of  night  attacks  that 
they  could  keep  their  men  in  hand,  and  bring  them  up 
in  close  formation  without  excessive  loss. 

Whilst  modern  war  calls  for  men,  not  machines,  in  the 
lower  ranks,  there  is  something  of  an  opposite  tendency 
in  the  upper  ranks.  The  higher  leaders  have  less  con- 
trol of  the  fight  than  they  used  to  have,  and,  owing  to 
the  telegraph  wire,  they  have  less  independence.  Their 
function  is  reduced  at  both  ends.  The  commander-in- 
chief,  while  he  has  more  control  over  his  lieutenants, 
can  see  little  for  himself,  and  is  in  his  turn  dependent 
on  his  staff.  His  plans  are  more  and  more  governed  by 
supply  and  transport.  There  is  less  scope  for  brilliant 
strategy  and  tactics,  for  genius  and  rowp  d'ceil ;  and  the 
quality  of  "  the  brain  of  the  army,"  or  rather  its  nervous 
system,  has  become  more  important.  Lastly,  Japan  has 
shown,  as  Prussia  did  before  her,  that  a  nation  which 
mean.s  to  win  must  put  forth  all  its  .strength.  Railways 
and  telegraphs  have  increased  the  size  of  armies  by  facili- 
tating their  movements,  and  the  numbers  now  called  for 
can  only  bo  had  by  universal  training  for  war. 

>  R.l'.S.I.  Journal,  li.  1419. 


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INDEX 


Adriaiiople,  battle  of,  45 
Advance  by  rushes,  267,  274,  281, 

287 
>1^milius  I'aullus,  L.,  28 

the  younger,  35 

Agincourt,  battle  of,  70 

Albuera,  battle  of,  218 

Alesia,  siege  of,  38 

Alexander  the  Great,  17 

Alma,  battle  of  the,  237 

Alva,  Duke  of,  92,  96 

Ambiorix,  41 

American  troops,  184-6,  245-50 

Arbedo,  battle  of,  77 

Arbela,  battle  of,  17 

Archers,  6,  45,  58,  65,  71,  75,  104 

Armour,  23,  47,  50,  63,  125 

Army  corps,  205 

Arrian,  45 

Artevelde,  P.  van,  54 

Artillery,  field,  87,  112,  164,  175, 

192,  241,  257,  275,  281,  288 
Asculum,  battle  of,  24 
Athenians,  the,  5-14 
Auerstedt,  battle  of,  212 
Augereau,  Marshal,  214 
Augustus  Cesar,  42 
Auray,  battle  of,  69 
Austerlitz,  battle  of,  208 
Austrian    troops,    158,    170,    200, 

208,  215,  241,  252-5 
Avaricum,  siege  of,  38 


eers,  91,  134 
I   Bannockburn,  battle  of,  59 
j   Battalions,  96,  98 

Bayonets,     135,    207,    248,    273, 
287 
I   Belisarius,  45,  48 
i   Beneventum,  battle  of,  25 
I   Beresford,  Marshal,  218 
i   Bernhard  of  Saxe-Weimar,  115 
I   Bicocca,  La,  battle  of,  88 
I    Blenheim,  battle  of,  139 

Blucher,  Marshal,  212,  223 

Bffiotians,  the,  1 1 

Boers,  the,  276-81 

Bouquet,  Colonel,  177 

Bouvines,  battle  of,  53,  64 

Bows,  long,  59,  67,  104 

Breechloaders,  237,  250,  257 

Bremule,  battle  of,  61 

Brigades,  99,  iii,  138 

British  infantry,  103,  122-4,  144, 
146,  171,  184,  197,  216,  224, 
238,  241,  276-83 

Broglie,  Marshal,  176,  182 

Brunswick,  Duke  of,  212 

Prince  Ferdinand  of,  173 

Bueil,  Jean  de,  72,  76 

Bugeaud,  Marshal,  216,  232 

Bull  Run,  battle  of,  247 

Bunker  Hill,  battle  of,  184 

Burgoyne,  General,  178,  184 

Busaco,  battle  of,  218 


298 


INDEX 


Cassar,  C.  Julius,  3S-41 
Calivers,  92 
Cannse,  battle  of,  28 
Caracoles,  107,  109 
Carbines,  rifled,  235 
Carmagnola,  F.  di,  77 
Carnot,  L.  N.  M.,  194,  197 
Carrhas,  battles  of,  41,  52 
Carthaginians,  the,  26,  33 
Cartridges,  112 

expenditure  of,  255,  281,  287 

carried  by  the  soldier,  155, 

257,  287 
Casilinum,  battle  of,  48 
Catinat,  Marshal,  132 
Cavalry,   10,  16,  23,  30,  32,  106, 

120,    130,   159,   205,   249,   256, 

265,  280,  289 
Centurions,  24,  37 
Cerignola,  battle  of,  86 
Charonea,  16 

Chancellorsville,  battle  of,  248 
Chandos,  Sir  John,  69 
Charlemagne,  50 
Charles  VII.,  74 
Charles  the  Rash,  79-82 
Charles,  Archduke,  199,  215,  232 
Chasseurs,  176,  236 
Close  order  and  extended  order, 

154,     177,     '87,     195r     200,     233, 

252,  262,  267,  274,  278,  282 
Coburg-Saalfeld,  Prince  F.  J.  of, 

194-8 
Cocherel,  battle  of,  69 
Cohorts,  36 

Colborne,  Colonel  J.,  219,  228 
Coldharbour,  battle  of,  248 
Colley,  Sir  George,  276 
Colonels,  96 
Columns,    142,    148,    174,    181-4, 

201,  214,  225,  263 

company,  234,  255,  270 

Comitatenses,  44 


Conde,  Prince  of,  118,  127 
Conscription,  205 
Cornwallis,  Lord,  185,  221 
Coronea,  battle  of,  1 1 
Courtrai,  battle  of,  53 
Crassus,  P.  Licinius,  41 
Crecy,  battle  of,  63-7 
Cromwell,  Oliver,  120 
Crossbows,  52,  66 
Culloden,  battle  of,  1  50 
Cumberland,  Duke  of,  145,  150, 

171 
Custine,  General,  193 
Cynoscephals,  battle  of,  34 


Danes,  the,  5 1 

D'Avila,  Sancho,  94 

Davout,  Marshal,  212,  216,  222 

Decius,  Emperor,  44 

Delium,  battle  of,  1 1 

Depth  in  line,  99,  in,  121,  137, 

154,  187,  217,  231 
D'Erlon,  Count,  225 
Dettingen,  battle  of,  144 
Diocletian,  Emperor,  44 
Divisions,  201 
Dragomirov,  General,  272 
Dragoons,  107 
Dreux,  battle  of,  97 
Duhesme,  General,  200 
Dumouriez,  General,  190-3 
Dunbar,  battle  of,  122 
Dundas,  Sir  David,  179 
Dunes,  battle  of  the,  123 
Dunkirk,  siege  of,  194 
Dutch  troops,  95,  131,  141 

order,  99 

Dyrrhachium,  blockade  of,  38 


E 


I 


Edward  I.,  57,  59 
Edward  III.,  56,  60,64 


INDEX 


299 


Edward,  the  Black  Prince,  54,  64, 

68,  70 
Elephants,  iS,  24,  27,  32 
Epaminondas,  11-14 
Essling,  battle  of,  215 
Eylau,  battle  of,  214 


Fairfax,  Sir  Thomas,  121 
Falkirk,  battles  of,  59,  149 
Feudalism,  49 

Firelock  or  fusil,  124,  133,  136 
Fire  tactics  and  shock  tactics,  135, 

143,  155,  161,  174,  207,  240 
Flemish  burghers,  53 
Fleurus,  battles  of,  131,  198 
Folard,  Chevalier,  142 
Fontenoy,  battle  of,  145 
Formigny,  battle  of,  76 
Francis  I.,  85 
Franks,  the,  48 
Frederick     the     Great,     153-69, 

173-5.  178 
Frederick  William  I.,  151 
Frederick  William  III.,  209,  233 
French  infantry,  85,  u8,  131,  145, 

147,  165,  170,  184,  189,    195,  2CX3, 

223,  241,  261 
Fyrd,  the,  54 


(Jambetta,  Leon,  266 
George  II.,  144 
Gonzalo  of  Cordova,  86 
Goths,  the,  45 
Granson,  battle  of,  80 
Grant,  (leneral,  248 
Gravelotte,  battle  of,  263 
Grenadiers,  136 
(luard.  Imperial,  206,  228,  244 
Guesclin,  Hertrand  du,  69 
Guibert,  Count,  180-4 
Gustavus  Adolphus,  108-16 


H 


Halidon  Hill,  battle  of,  60 
Hand-guns,  90 
Hannibal,  27-33 
Harquebus,  90,  104 
Hastati,  22 

Hastings,  battle  of,  58 
Hawkwood,  Sir  John,  74 
Hawley,  General,  148 
Henry  I.,  61 
Henry  V.,  70 
Hepburn,  Sir  John,  117 
Heraclea,  battle  of,  24 
Highlanders,  the,  149 
Hobelars,  63 
Hochkirch,  battle  of,  168 
Hohenfriedberg,  battle  of,  159 
Hohenlohe,  Prince,  212 
Hondschoote,  battle  of,  194 
Hoplites,  2 
Horses,  war,  62 
Houchard,  General,  194 
Howe,  Lord,  177 
Hypaspists,  15 


Infantry,  50 

Inkerman,  battle  of,  239 

Interlining  of  horse  with  foot,  10, 

40,  1 10,  121,  139 
Iphicrates,  8 
Issus,  battle  of,  17 


Jackson,  General  (Stonewall),  247 
Jagers,  175,  210,221,235 
James  II.,  123 
Janissaries,  130 
Japanese  troops,  286-90 
Jemappes,  battle  of,  192 
Jena,  battle  of,  212 
John,  King  of  Fram  e,  67 


INDEX 


Jomini,  General,  216,  232 
Jourdan,  Marshal,  195,  igj 


Kesselsdorf,  battle  of,  i6o 
Knights  and  knight  service,  54-5 
Kolin,  battle  of,  165 
Koniggnitz,  battle  of,  254 
Kunersdorf,  battle  of,  169 
Kuropatkin,  General,  270,  285 


L 

Lacedaemonians,  the,  5-14 
Ladysmith,  siege   and    relief  of 

277-9 
Laeffelt,  battle  of,  14S 
Lance,  the  furnished,  74,  80,  92 
Landsknechts,  84 
Lannes,  Marshal,  215 
La  Noue,  F.  de,  92,  97,  98 
Lechffium,  action  at,  g 
Lee,  General,  248-9 
Legions,  20 

Leipzig,  battle  of,  no,  113 
Length  of  service,  205,  223,  230, 

241,251,257,275 
Leopold  of  Anhalt-Dessau,Prince, 

154,  160 
Leuctra,  battle  of,  12 
Leuthen,  battle  of,  167 
Liao-yang,  battle  of,  286 
Light  infantry,  175,  196,  210,  221 
Ligny,  battle  of,  223 
Lincoln,  battle  of,  62 
Line  and  column,  181,  207,  21 

220,  225,  228,  232,  238 
Lloyd,  General,  170 
Louis  XI.,  74,  79,  85 
Louis  XIV.,  118,  126,  131,  139 
Louvois,  Marquis,  124-6,  133 
Liitzen,  battle  of,  1 14 
Luxemburg,  Marshal,  131 


M 


Machiavelli,  N.,  s3,  84,  88,  99 
Machine  guns,  257,  289 
Magenta,  battle  of,  242 
Malplaquet,  battle  of,  139 

Maniples,  21 

Mantinea,  battles  of,  4,  13 

Marathon,  battle  of,  6 

Marching  in  step,  15G 

Marengo,  battle  of,  207 

Marius,  C.,  36 

Marlborough,  Duke  of,  139 

Marsaglia,  battle  of,  132 

Martinet,  Colonel,  125 

Matchlocks,  90,  134 

Maurice  of  Nassau,  Prince,  96,  99 

Melegnano,  battle  of,  87 

Men-at-arms,  49,  63 

Menil-Durand,  Baron,  181-3 

Mercenaries,  26,  33,  56,  So,  84 

Metz,  blockade  of,  264 

Minden,  battle  of,  172 

Mobility,  99,   ,26,   157,  ,63,  ,79, 

181,  204,  220,  236 
Mollvvitz,  battle  of,  158 
Moltke,  Marshal,   238,  254,  259, 

264 
Monk,  George,  65,  133 
Montebello,  battle  of,  242 
Montecuccoli,  Count,  108,  127 
Montluc,  Marshal,  S3 
Mook,  battle  of,  94 
Moore,  Sir  John,  221 
Morat,  battle  of,  81 
Morgarten,  battle  of,  76 
Mounted  rifles,  249,  280 
Mukden,  battle  of,  285 
Muskets,  91,  104,  206 
Musketeers,  99,  114 
Musketry  instruction,  237 


Nachod,  battle  of,  253 
Najera,  battle  of,  70 


I 


INDEX 


301 


Nancy,  battle  of,  82 
Napoleon  1.,  177,  204-29 
Napoleon  III.,  243,  257 
Narses,  46,  48 
Necdie-guns,  237,  250 
Neerwinden,  battles  of,  n 
New  model  army,  the,  121 
Niel,  Marshal,  243,  258 
Nieuport,  battle  of,  100 
Noailles,  Marshal,  144 
Novara,  battles  of,  84,  87 


Oblique  order,  the,  162,  177 
Ordonnances,  74,  80 
Osman  Pasha,  268,  271 


Palatini,  44 
Pandours,  175 
Parthians,  the,  42 
Pausanias,  6 
Pavia,  battle  of,  85,  88 
Pelopidas,  12,  13 
Peltasts,  7,  9 
Percussion  caps,  234 
Perseus  of  Macedon,  35 
Persians,  the,  i 
Peter  of  Navarre,  87 
Phalanx,  Macedonian,  15- 
Pharsalia,  battle  of,  40 
Philip  of  Macedon,  14 
Philip  V.  of  Macedon,  33 
Philip  Augustus,  53 
Philip  of  Valois,  63 
Phcenicians,  2 
Pichegru,  General,  197 
Pikes,  89,98,  135 
Pilum,  the,  23 
Plata-a,  battle  of,  6 
Platoons,  138 
Plevna,  battles  of,  268-72 


Poitiers,  battles  of,  49,  68 

Polybius,  19 

Pompeius,  Cn.,  40 

Port  Arthur,  siege  of,  284 

Portuguese  caijadores,  221 

Prague,  battle  of,  164 

Pretoria,  advance  to,  279 

Principes,  22 

Prussian  infantry,   151,  160,  170, 

178,209,223,251-5,259,274 
Pydna,  battle  of,  35 
Pyrrhus  of  Epirus,  24 


Quick  loading,  154,  254 
Quick-firing  guns,  275,  2 


R 


Ramillies,  battle  of,  139 

Ramrods,  iron,  154 

Ravenna,  battle  of,  87 

Regiments,  96 

Regulus,  M.  Atilius,  26 

Reiters,  92,  109 

Richard  I.,  52,  58 

Richelieu,  Cardinal,  117 

Riflemen,  221,  235 

Rifles,  210,  234,  237,  250, 257,  273, 

282,  287 
Rivoli,  battle  of,  204 
Roberts,  Lord,  279 
Rochambeau,  Marshal,  1S2,  190 
Rocour,  battle  of,  148 
Rocroy,  1 18 

Romans,  the,  20-4,  35-8 
Roosebeke,  battle  of,  53 
Rossbach,  battle  of,  165 
Rupert,  I'rince,  121 
Ruspina,  battle  of,  41 
Russian  troops,  iCiS,  222,  238-40, 

268-73,  283-90 


302 


INDEX 


Sabugal,  action  of,  220 
Sackville,  Lord  George,  173 
Saint  Jacob,  battle  of,  74,  79 
Saint  Privat,  battle  of,  262 
Saratoga,  surrender  at,  186 
Saxe,  Marshal,  143-8,  155,  176 
Scharnhorst,   General,    199,   209, 

223 
Schwerin,  Marshal,  158 
Scipio,  P.  Cornelius,  32 
Scots,  the,  59,  117,  122 
Sedan,  battle  of,  265 
Sempach,  battle  of,  76 
Seydlitz,  General,  159,  166,  169 
Sha-ho,  battle  on  the,  284 
Sheridan,  General,  249 
Skirmishers,    176,    195,  200,   221, 

242,  248,  253,  261,  270,  278 
Skobeleff,  General,  269-72 
Smythe,  Sir  John,  65,  89,  104 
Snaphances,  133 
Solferino,  battle  of,  243 
Solidarii,  52 
Soor,  battle  of,  160 
Soult,  Marshal,  218 
Spaniards,  the,  86,  89-94 
Spartans,  the,  2 
Sphacteria,  action  in,  7 
Squares,  97 

Standard,  battle  of  the,  61 
Steenkerque,  battle  of,  131 
Stewart,  General  W.,  221 
Stoffel,  Colonel,  254,  257 
Swedes,  the,  no,  117 
Swiss,  the,  74,  76-80,  87 
Sword  and  buckler,  88,  1 50 
Supply  and  transport,  203 


Tactics,  offensive  and  defensive, 
69,73,   100,  126,  142,  154,  160, 


192,   221,  224,   247,   252,   260, 

272 
Taginae,  battle  of,  46 
Tchernaya,  battle  of  the,  240 
Tercios,  96 
Thebans,  the,  1 1 
Theodebert,  King  of  the  Franks, 

48 
Theodosius,  Emperor,  45 
Thermopylae,  5 
Tilly,  Count,  113 
Tinchebrai,  action  of,  61 
Titus,  Emperor,  37 
Torgau,  battle  of,  168 
Tourcoin,  battle  of,  197 
Trasimene,  battle  of,  28 
Trautenau,  battle  of,  253 
Trebia,  battle  of  the,  27 
Triarii,  22 

Tribunes,  military,  24 
Trochu,  General,  244,  257 
Turcos,  260 

Turenne,  Marshal,  119,  123,  127 
Turks,  the,  129,  268-72 


[25,  179,  206, 


Valmy,  battle  of,  190 
Varro,  C.  Terentius,  28 
Vauban,  Marshal,  135 
Vegetius,  13,  46 
Velites,  22 

Vere,  Sir  Francis,  loi 
Villars,  Marshal,  140 
Vimiero,  battle  of,  217 
Voltigeurs,  205 
Volunteers,  French,  189,  191 


I 


INDEX 


303 


w 


Wagram,  battle  of,  215 
Wallenstein,  A.,  Duke  of  Fried- 
land,  114 
Washington,  General,  9,  186 
Waterloo,  battle  of,  224-9 
Wattignies,  battle  of,  195 


Wellington,     Duke     o 

223-30 
Welsh  bowmen,  59 
Wheel-lock  pistols,  92 
William  I.,  52,  53,  58 
William  III.,  131 
William   I.  of  Prussia, 

267 
Williams,  Sir  Roger,  92,  104 
Wilson,  Sir  Robert,  197,  223 


217-20, 


233,  262, 


Wolfe,  General  James,  155, 
Worth,  battle  of,  260 


Xenophon,  8 


Yeomen,  55 

York,  Duke  of,  194- 


Zama,  battle  of,  31 
Ziethen,  General,  168 
Zorndorf,  battle  of,  168 
Zouaves,  236,  243 


THE   END 


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